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PREFACE
atoMiar e#judicial review of written constitu­
tions is seen by most modern researchers as a value-ridden, 
policy-making exercise. A rapid (I do not say superficial) 
analysis of the judicial process tenas to see it, in the end, 
m  terms of judicial activism or restraint. In explanations 
of such ’activism* or ’restraint’ it is not uncommon to see 
references to factors personal to the judges such as their 
preferences on social and economic matters.
Studies of the ’irrational factors’ in judicial 
policy-making, convincing as many of them are, could easily 
become exaggerated and tend to become one-sided. It is 
fair to ask that judges should be ’conscious’ of their pre­
ferences in whatever choices they make, but it may not be 
right to ask them to transcend themselves in a totally un­
realistic fashion.
Admitting that judicial policy-making exists and 
that presuppositions pervade decisions interpreting a written 
Constitution, it still remains to be said that judges do, in 
the course of their work, try to express their concept of 
’justice’ , albeit legal justice.
Every general, unspecific expression in a written 
legislative document gives rise to judicial review and there 
constantly arise opportunities for the Judges to express 
their notion of ’justice' in the ciruumstances of the cases 
before them. Such a flexible expression as ’reasonable
restrictions' (on Fundamental Rights) used in Article 19 
of the Indian Constitution provides a good field in which 
to see how Judges develop the notion^of 'reasonableness' 
or 'fairness' which are inseparable from the very idea of 
judicial review. Among the many valuable and comprehen­
sive treatments of the constantly shifting subject of 
Indian constitutional law, there appears no treatise de­
voted to 'reasonableness' • It is not hard to see why 
(as will be explained below).
One often hears that the notion of 9reasonableness' 
varies from case to case, from one set of circumstances to 
another. This platitude is true so far as it goes, but 
not being the product of detailed research into judicial 
attitudes, it has no secure foundation and thus cannot 
dispense with the need for an inquiry into the acute problem 
it poses with regard to judicial method.
The notion of reasonable restrictions is a vital and 
growing area of the law relating to fundamental rights guaran­
teed by the Indian Constitution. The potentiality of this 
notion has already been realized in such areas as freedom of 
the press in India, freedom of assembly and freedom of associ­
ation. Further growth, we find, is possible in the area of 
free movement and free pursuit of profession.
Needless to say there are considerable pressures in 
an underdeveloped country of India's complexity and size.
A hypothetical judicial notion of reasonableness may be but 
one of hundreds of factors that constitute the basis of the 
Indian nation. The immediate impact of judicial attitudes
expressed in decisions is felt by the administration and the 
State. Only indirectly does the citizen perceive the effects. 
Nevertheless, a link must exist between the judicial view of 
'reasonable restrictions* on the basic freedoms ana the 
evolving notions of society ana government in India. It 
would take more than a thesis to explore such a coup lex 
subject.
As long as Courts are taken seriously in India, in 
the sense in which they have been since 1772, the constitu­
tional requirement of reasonableness esqpressly referred to 
in Article 19 will play a vital role. It is not too much 
to speculate that in the long run the Courts could by being 
sensitive to the problems faced both by the public and the 
executive when the latter seeks to curtail the established 
rights of the former (the'litigation situation'), repel the 
charge presently levelled against them that they represent, 
as in other underdeveloped countries, the values of an elite. 
India's judiciary undoubtedly works a Constitution that has 
borrowed ideas from the West. But the 'liberal' democratic 
view of fundamental rights and permissible limitations on 
themj may not be incompatible with perfecting the admini­
stration and erecting new institutions to help raise the 
standard of living. Already the impact of Article 19 on 
the administration cam be seen. The result has amounted 
to a pruning of statutory rules and administrative regula­
tions. No unwieldy or casually-framed rule could survive 
on the touchstone of procedural or substantive reasonableness. 
Further Indian Courts have insisted on subordinate legisla­
tion keeping strictly to the purpose of the statute under 
which they were framed.
Judicial attempts to e2q>and their jurisdiction under 
Article 19 to other areas of the fundamental rights part have 
not been successful so far. The Supreme Court's claiip,for 
example, to review the reasonableness of expropriatory legis­
lation has been consistently thwarted by Constitutional Amend­
ments • Thus, the accident of one party domination in Parlia­
ment and its command of the required majority to pass the 
amendments to the Constitution have stultified a natural 
growth of the Courts' jurisdiction. This state of affairs 
may well change. With more and better possibilities, the 
Indian judiciary may also become more innovative. Such 
innovativeness may even be appreciated so that criticisms, 
which are inevitable, will be kept in perspective.
The language of Indian law is English. Yet what 
is conveyed in that language are not necessarily English 
thoughts, nor do they relate to English problems. There 
are not less than twenty-two languages cLpfceh for the 
purpose. Any number of rules of English origin can be 
traced in Indian legal practice. It will not come as a 
surprise that many have been adopted, or continued select­
ively, and that when adopted to Indian conditions, the 
adoption has been sometimes unconscious and often partial.
We are in a transitional stage in which a nation is being 
welded into a unit and many theses will be necessary over 
the coming century to document movements partially charted 
in the pages that follow.
A good introduction to the geo-political factors 
making up modern India would be B.L. Sukhwal, India. A
Political Geography. Bombay, 1972* From J.D.M. Derrett, 
Religion. Law and the State of India. Faber, London, 1968, 
one may have a view of Indian society and practice before 
the arrival of the British and the subsequent changes under 
the impact of British administration of Justice* For the
evolution of modern Indian law, one may profitably look at
the following:
Alan Gledhill, The Republic of India, the Development
of its Laws and Constitution. Volume 6,
The British Commonwealth Series (Gen,
ed* George E* Keeton), Stevens, London, 1964*
M.P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History, 2nd edn.,
Bombay, 1966 *
T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar, The Evolution of the Indian
Constitution, University of 
Bombay, 1970*
Bo No Rau (ed. B. SKiva Rao), India's Constitution in 
the Making, Longmans, 1960.
P.K. Ghosh, The Constitution of India, How it has been 
Framed, Calcutta, 1966.
For a much shorter work on the subject one may consult:
M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, Asia 
Publishing House, London, 1967.
Other works are referred to in the thesis itself. A short 
and valuable introduction to Indian Fundamental Rights is 
Alan Gledhill, Fundamental Rights in India, Stevens, London, 
1956. Also useful in that connection is C.H. Alexandrowicz, 
Constitutional Developments in India, O.U.P., Bombay, 1957.
The volume of constitutional litigation in India is 
such that no book can remain up-to-date for long. Several 
have become obsolete incredibly soon after their publica­
tion. This thesis brings the law up to about the end of 
1973. Allowing for the five or six months it takes Indian 
law reports ana journals to arrive here by Sea Mail, this 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER GENERALLY
In an atmosphere of renewed concern for freedom in 
civil society many post-war constitutions accepted the prin­
ciple of incorporation of a Bill of Rights.1 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations 
Assembly lent added significance to the idea of such an in­
corporation. There is not a single notable exception 
amongst the post-war constitutions: all have a set of * Funda­
mental Rights*. Mere incorporation, however, did not always 
imply the enforceability of the rights enumerated. A distinc­
tion must be drawn between those constitutions that regarded
the 'rights* as mere declarations of state policy and those
2
that envisaged full judicial review and enforceability.
In the constitutions of the latter type the provisions 
embodying the rights soon came to occupy the centre of much 
debate in court as well as in academic circles. Experience
1. The earliest charter of rights seems to be the English Bill 
of Rights, 1 Will, and Mar. Sess. 2, Cap. 2, 1689. The Bill 
consisted of 'the general heads of such things as are abso­
lutely necessary to be considered for the better securing our 
religion, laws and liberties.' See C. Grant Robertson,
Select Statutes, Cases and Documents. 3rd edn. London, 1919, 
129. Ian Brownlie (ed.). Basic Documents on Human Rights. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971•
2. in the former category are the Constitutions of the Formosan 
Republic (Dec. 25, 1946), Indonesia (Aug. 18, 1945), Afghani­
stan (1964) and Cambodia (1947, as amended, Jan. 1964). See 
Amos J. Peas lee. Constitutions of Nations. 4 vols. Ed. Dorothy 
Peas lee Xydis, 3rd edn., The Hague, 1965-70. There should be 
a third category of extravagantly-worded provisions such as 
Art .15 of the Constitution of Japan (Nov. 3, 1946): "The 
people have the inalienable right to choose their public offi­
cials and to dismiss them." Perhaps it was put in with the 
pre-war history of Japan in mind.
with the Bill of Rights in the United states Constitution, 
which provided the inspiration for some of the newer ones, 
had already shown that litigation relating to the rights be­
comes prominent and controversial. This is so not only be­
cause ox the importance of the rights in themselves but also 
due to two other equally important reasons. First of all, 
the determination of the question, what limitations might 
lawfully be imposed on the guaranteed rights, has, perhaps 
surprisingly, but inevitably given rise to wide-ranging 
questions of social, political and economic consequences. 
This, in turn, has provided unprecedented scope for judicial
3
creativity, which in fact, has come to be associated with 
almost every decision on fundamental rights under these 
newer constitutions. Any effective Bill of Rights must, 
in one way or the other, produce this inter-related pheno­
menon. So intense and varied were the questions decided 
by the United States Supreme Court in the last three or four 
decades that the whole of the judicial process was subject to
3. It is too sterile to enter into the question whether judges 
make law and if so, how and when. The following comment may, 
however, be of interest. Recognizing that judicial law­
making exists, Lord Radcliffe, a member of the House of Lords, 
observes:
It is to me a matter of suprise that so much pen and 
ink has been employed by commentators in demonstrating 
this fairly obvious conclusion. If judges prefer to 
adopt the formula - for that is what it is - that they 
merely declare the law and do not make it, they do no 
more than show themselves wise men in practice. Their 
analysis may be weak, but their perception of the na­
ture of the law is sound. Men's respect for it will 
be the greater, the more imperceptible its development.
Law and its Compass. Faber, London, 1960, 39. Also M.D.A. 
Freeman, 'Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and 
Prospective Overruling' • (1973) 26 Current Legal Problems, 
166-207.
4
miscroscopic analysis by American writers. as a result of 
this study and scrutiny at least two schools of jurisprudence 
arose to enrich legal thought* Of the two schools, vis* 
Roscoe Found9s Sociological Jurisprudenceand the Realists,6 
the former is of great relevance to the question of social 
control through law which is what restriction on freedoms is 
about*
4. The following views of an American political scientist is a 
good illustration of the extent to which the analysis has gone:
Even American jurists and commentators, accustomed 
as they are to viewing judicial review in its poli­
tical context, too often fail to see the logic of 
their own views* A large part of the debate over 
judicial self-restraint is coloured by the Inability 
of its proponents to recognize that self-restraint 
is just as political as activism: i*e*, that it
reflects political attitudes in general, and that 
in specifxc cases it constitutes (in fact if not In 
theory) judicial sanctification of the political 
solution*
• • •
It requires an act to refuse to act, and the con­
sequences of refusal are as socially and politi­
cally far-reaching as those of activist decisions*
Loren P* Beth, The Development of Judicial Review in Ireland* 
1937-1966* Dublin, 1967, li-27 [ The author was an American
visitingscholar in Ireland]*
While 1 find this enlightening, 1 cannot help feeling that 
this needs qualifying*
Non-interference may be politically inert* May not a court 
restrain itself from interfering in the hope that the politi­
cal forces in the rest of the community will find the solution? 
This becomes genuine self-restraint where the court may feel 
it can produce a good solution itself but that it is not the 
forum in which to do so* Self-restraint in this sense is de­
sirable at times and is exemplified in the United States by 
the 9New Deal9 controversies*
5* See W* Friedmann, Legal Theory* 4th edn*, Stevens, London, 
i960, ch*25*
6* How the view of legal systems was changed by these theories 
and how the present Indian legal system figures in the light 
of these theories is dealt with in good detail by Raina,
9Judicial Law Making9, 8 Jaipur Law Journal (1968), 67-184.
However detailed the provisions that lay down the cir­
cumstances under which the rights are to be curtailed, judi­
cial creativity in course of review cannot be circumscribed
7
by the draftsman of the constitutional document* Framing 
a lengthy and elaborate constitution, the Indian Constituent 
Assembly did not mean to eliminate judicial review, but 
imagined they would narrow down its scope and make matters 
more certain by specifying the grounds upon which ’reasonable 
restrictions' could be imposed by the legislatures on the 
rights guaranteed* Were they right in their assumption?
At any rate, did it really make any difference to the quality 
of judicial review exercisable by Indian courts?
The Assembly succeeded in propounding, as it were, a 
summary of the United States constitutional experience and 
the well-known Common Law grounds (for example, public order, 
defamation, contempt of court and obscenity) that generally
U
justify restricting the rights* Still there must be, and
7* see Michael Coper, 'Freedom of trade in India and Australia: 
Nature of Judicial choice* , 10 Jaipur Law Journal (1970) for 
an analysis of constitutional concepts and judicial choice*
8* To take one of the seven freedoms guaranteed by Article 19,
Right to Freedom
19* Protection of certain rights regarding freedom 
of speech, etc* - (1) All citizens shall have 
the right -
a) to freedom of speech and expression;
••• ••• ••• •••
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) 
of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law, or prevent the State from making 
any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of the right confer­
red by the said sub-clause in the interest of the 
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security 
of the State, friendly relations with foreign 
States, public order, decency or morality, or in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or in­
citement to an offence*
/Cont' d* on next page:
has been in India, the definite scope of judicial review, for 
it is the courts that judge the reasonableness of the restrict­
ions imposed by legislative and executive measures*
'Reasonable Restrictions'
The expression 'reasonable' is both a compendious and
a vague term* Compendious, in the sense that it necessarily
pervades the whole of the transaction under examination,
though it may be possible to put the emphasis on certain
aspects of it, and vague because pre-determined standards
cannot always be applied in a predictable way since the rul-
8 a.ing factor must be the nature of the transaction* The
Note 8 - continued from p*4s
(the expression in italics was introduced by Section 2, Con­
stitution (16th Amendment) Act, 1963, with effect from 5
October, 1963)*Fqr the full text of Article 19 and other art­icles, see Appendix II.
Though the exceptions look more impressive than the right, 
all of them are, as observed, well-known exceptions* m  any 
statute the recital of any of the exceptions is not conclus­
ive as to its merits but justiciable* See Romesh lhapper v* 
Madras, AIR 1950 S.C.124, (1950) S»C.J.418; Ram Manohar l^ ohia 
v* Supdt*. Central Prison, AIR 1960 S.C.633, (1960) s*C.J*567, 
where it was held that the connection between the restriction 
imposed and the exception referred to in the statute was too 
remote and therefore, inoperative* But the general presump­
tion is "legislative judgment holds", F.N. Balsara v* Bombay 
AIR, 1951, S.C. 318 (1951), S.C.R.682*
8a* For the word ' reasonable' has a number of different meanings 
and it has become more ana more apparent that in different 
legal contexts its significance is not always the same; and 
the danger is that its use in one context may be improperly 
borrowed to fit another context* Professor Gluckman speaks 
of the 'reasonable liar* (Max Gluckman, The Judicial Process 
among the jfearotse of Northern Rhodesia, 1955, 359) and the 
' reasonable wrong-doer» (ibid*, 137)♦ Sir Alan Herbert made 
an English court hold that the 'reasonable woman' does not i 
exist in English law (A.P. Herbert, The Uncommon Law, 1935, | 
1 et seq*)* Raphael Powell, 'The Unreasonableness of the j
Reasonable Man*, (1957) 10 Current Legal Problems, 104, 107. i
relative and indeterminate character of this term poses a 
challenge* It seems to call for a study somewhat in the 
style of the 'due process* clause of the United states Con­
stitution but on a reduced scale* The Indian Constitution 
is only about a quarter of a century old and though there are 
a number of decisions bearing on this subject, the time has 
as yet been too short for any work on the scale appropriate 
to 'due process' in the United states* But there is enough 
material for us to be able to assess the judicial review that 
rests on the corresponding Indian clause* The expansion and 
reduction in the scope of the clause, its bearing on the other 
provisions of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and judicial 
attitudes in general will found the question to be dealt with 
in the following pages*
The intellectual ancestry and origin of the reason-
g
ableness notion can be traced to England and English Law*
This will be dealt with in Chapter I, Section 3, to follow*
But here some further observations are necessary to put this 
study in its proper setting*
One of the several factors that lend importance to a
9* Indeed, the very concept of the reasonable man, which 
is so characteristic of the many legal systems founded 
upon the Common Law, is am expression of that aspect 
of the legal protection of the rights and freedoms of 
the individual*
Sir Humphrey waldock, * The Legal Protection of Human Rights - 
National and International* in Sir Francis Vallat (ed*) An 
Introduction to Human Rights, London, 1970* But see RapEael 
Powell, note 8a above, concludes that there is no such being 
as a ' reasonable man' •
*.* Mast er Diamond and I were about to cross a busy 
road when I remarked: »we must now use the care of 
a reasonable man'* He said: 'He doesn't exist, does 
he?' I replied: ' I doubt it* • But we still crossed 
the road s a f e l y N o t e  8a above at 126, f*n*7*
10study of this kind is the v ideology’ behind the notion of 
* reasonableness. While there cannot be universal national 
consensus on the courts' pronouncements as to which are and 
which are not reasonable restrictions, there must be some 
degree of appreciation and understanding of what the courts 
have done. With no supreme Legislature immediately to 
rectify a harsh or unpopular judicial decision, in normal 
times the commmunity’s appreciation of the courts’ stand is 
essential for the viability of its decisions. Constitution­
al issues are bound to be controversial; often the disagree­
ment pertains to matters of policy and at times to basic poli­
tical considerations, however mildly these may be expressed in 
words. The Indian supreme Court’s stand on the question of 
compensation payable for private property, compulsorily ac­
quired by the State (for 'public purpose' as authorised by 
Article 31(2)), has been consistently rejected by the Indian 
Parliament and State Legislature. Matters only became worse
when the narrow majority in the Supreme Court decided in
11Golaknath v. Punjab» that Parliament acting as the amending 
body with a special maj’ority (under Article 368) could not 
amend the Fundamental Rights. This result, achieved by a 
technical and dry reasoning, was interpreted by Parliament­
arians as an 'obstructionist' attempt to stop Parliament re­
versing the Court's decisions on property matters by simply
10. This need not always mean political ideology. Here the 
term's primary sense is to indicate the differing standpoints 
putting different emphasis on what an impugned law does and 
how it does it. These are serious enough without having to 
bring in political creeds•
11. AIR, 1967, S.C. 1643, (1967) II S.C.W.R. (Supp.), 1006.
amending the Constitution.
In all such controversies the term 'reasonable re­
striction' itself is not invoked as the central issue: but
one can see the connection between 'ideological presupposi­
tions* and the judicial view of what is right and reasonable 
12in each case. In other areas, the Supreme Court has adju­
dicated upon delicate social and religious issues without
13giving rise to any notable controversy. The Supreme Court
is likely to face many more similar questions of social policy,
some at least of which will come directly under Article 19's
provisions. Indian Judges have, indeed, recognised that
their views on social questions, and on matters of public
14interest generally, may influence their decisions.
12. The recent decision in Kesa^Vananda Bharathi v. Kerala. AIR, 
1973, 5.C. 1461, can be seen as providing for judicial review 
of the 'reasonableness' of the Constitutional amendments them­
selves. For a detailed analysis of the problem of amendment 
with comparative references, see D. Conrad, 'Limitation of 
Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power' , The Indian 
Year Book of International Affairs (1966-67), 375-430.
13. En Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. Bihar. AIR, 1958,s.C. 731 (1959),
S .C. R. 629. and in Abdul Hakim v . Bihar. AIK, 1961, S.C .448, 
(1961) 2 s.C.R.6109 the Court detefmined the reasonableness 
of anti-cow-slaughter laws (passed to respect Hindu senti­
ments) vis-a-vis the right of the Muslim butchers to carry 
on their trade in slaughtering animals for meat; in shaikh
*/ Piro guimev. Kalandi pati, AIR, 1970, S.C. 1885, the right 
' of religious communities to take out processions; in Hamdard 
Dawakhana v. Union. AIR, 1960, s.C.554 (1960) 2 S.C.R. 671, 
the question of advertising magical remedies for serious af­
flictions •
14. The State of Madras v. VG Row, AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, riiich has 
been repeatedly quoted ana followed in subsequent decisions.
A more explicit recognition has come from the Judges' extra­
judicial pronouncements - M. Hidayatullah (Chief Justice of 
India), Judicial Methods, I.e.P.S., New Delhi, 1970, 21-2;
P.B. Mukharji (chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court).The 
Critical Problems of the Indian Constitution, University of. 
Bombay, 1968, 123-4.
While this element of 1 ideology* should not be exagger­
ated and read into each and every issue coming before the 
courts, to deny its presence and scope may not help* That 
to pronounce on the f reasonableness* of a law enables the 
judges to be creative is well recognized:
In the second place, the function of 'reason­
ableness* is to enable the judge to be crea­
tive where a gap in the law, conflicting autho­
rities, or a widely framed provision of a 
statute allows him to be creative* Xhe test 
of reasonableness thus is nothing substanti­
ally different from 'social engineering',
* balancing of interests', or any of the other 
formulas which modern sociological theories 
suggest as an answer to the problem of judi­
cial function,15
To dispute the judicial discretion in this matter seems hardly 
possible 'without indulging in terminological contortions or 
over-refined distinctions.»^
But there is at least one question that seems to pre­
sent some obvious theoretical if not practical, difficulties*
Many authorities have stated that the test of 'reasonableness*
17is an objective test* The meaning of the word 'objective'
15* W* Friedmann* Legal Theory, 4th £dn* * Stevens* London* i960* 
86*
16* S*A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action* 3rd 
edn*, London, Stevens, 303-4* —
17* English authorities include Associated Provincial Pictures v. 
Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K*b7 223, (1^47) £ All E*R. 
686, per Lord ureene at 230:
• •• it must be proved to be unreasonable in the 
sense that the court considers it to be a deci­
sion that no reasonable body could have come to*
It is not what the court considers unreasonable, 
a different thing altogether*
Skipping several cases in between, Fawcett Properties v*
Bucks County Council* (1961) A.C. 636, (1959) 2 All E.R.321, 
Lord Evershed at 327 of the All K.R. Approved in Re W* (An 
Infant) (1971) A.C.682 (H.L.) Lord Hailsham L.C.:
/Cont'd* on next page:
is put in issue*
'Subjectivity* and 'Objectivity* in Reasonableness
There seems to be a contradiction between, on the one 
hand the ideological content of 'reasonableness* and on the 
other, its objective examination and treatment by the courts* 
if by objectivity it is meant that the judges’ personal views 
will not govern the final outcome then the statement is 
correct* Equally, if it means that a methodical examination 
by a trained and impartial judiciary will be brought to bear 
upon the question, then also it is correct* But if it means 
that there cannot be honest differences between the judges on 
issues that can be traced to the realms of public policy ana 
political matters then it is not correct* The considerable 
number of decisions on reasonableness which have produced
Npte 17 - continued from p*9:
Indeed 1 cannot myself readily visualise circumstances 
in which the words 'reason', 'reasonable' or 'unreason­
able* can be applied otherwise than objectively* And 
be it observed, 'reasonableness' or 'unreasonableness', 
where either word is employed in English law, is norm­
ally a question of fact and degree and not a question 
of law so long as there is evidence to support the 
finding of the court*
Ibid* at 699* This has not stopped w* Friedmann from com­
paring the decisions in Roberts v. Hopwood* (1925) A.C. 578, 
and Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation (1954), 3 W.L.R. 990 
(C.A.j with the 'policy* decisions of the United States Su­
preme Court under the 'due process' clause* See W* Friedmann, 
Law in a Changing Society* 2nd edn*, Penguin, London, 1972, 
394, f*n*39* (287, f.n.62 of the first Indian reprint, Uni­
versity Book House, Delhi*)
Indian authorities include VG Row v* Madras * AIR, 1951, Mad- 
raSlpon appeal, The State of Madras v* VG Row* AIR, 1952,
S.c\ 196, per Patanjali pastri C.J. at 200, col*l*
The test of reasonableness laid down there has been followed 
in innumerable decisions* See also Seervai, Constitutional 
Law of India* Bombay, Tripathi, 1967, 288-90*
18strong dissents can only be explained on the basis of such
honest differences amongst the Judges* Of these different 
opinions of equal authority, it is only those that evolve 
criteria which make sense in the light of the general policy 
pursued by the community that are eventually accepted* The 
others are either cast away or lie dormant to be resurrected 
when the general policy of the community comes to be changed 
through time* These apparently conflicting elements in this 
'indeterminate* expression Justify study whether or not the 
results appear in the form of concrete propositions of law* 
The task becomes even more necessary when the expression is 
used in the vital provisions of a constitutional document*
The generation of Indian lawyers who participated in 
the framing of the Indian Constitution were familiar with the 
English legal idea of reasonableness and for other reasons, 
too, the English notion qualifies to be the closest to the 
clause found in the Indian Constitution* Soon this clause 
and other similar clauses were included by several common­
wealth countries in their constitutions* Notable amongst
them are Pakistan, British Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, Zambia
1 9
and more recently, Western Samoa* Malaysia and recently,
18* Lord Atkin's dissent in Liversidge v. Anderson, L.R. (1942), 
A.C. 206, is a good example* There are many in the United 
states*, the classic being Holmes' in Lochner v* New York, 
(1905), 198 U.S.45, (1905 ) 49 L.Ed* 93*71 "Dissenting judg- 
ments not only indicate the lack of legal compulsion but al­
so that more than one answer may be reasonable*" Michael 
Coper, op*cit*, note 7 above, 4*
19* Articles 8, 8, 10 and 11 of the Pakistan (1956) Constitution, 
and Article 6, Right Nos. 5, 6, and 7 of the Pakistan (1973) 
Constitution; Article 13(1) & (2) of the Constitution of 
Guyana, 1966; Articles 14, 17 and 18 of the Constitution of 
Sierra Leone, 1966, and Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Consti­
tution of Swaziland, 1968, adopt the 'reasonably required' 
formula; Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962, uses
/Cont'd* on next page:
Sri Lanka are notable in that they have not used the term
'reasonable* anywhere in the fundamental rights provisions
of their Constitutions, thus clearly indicating their origi-
20nal intention of not providing for Judicial review* Sing­
ling out here the expression 'reasonably Justifiable in a 
democratic society* used in the Zambian, Maltese and Kenyan 
Constitutions, it seems vaguer than 'reasonable restrictions', 
apart from begging the inevitable question as to what is meant
Note 19 - continued from p»ll;
the 'reasonable' (Article 5(1)) as well as the 'due process' 
(Article 1(a)) formulas; Zambia and Kenya have used 'reason­
ably Justifiable in a democratic society' as a characterist­
ic of constitutionally valid restrictions on rights; Con­
stitutions of Barbados, 1966, Botswana, 1966, and that of 
Western Samoa, i960, have used the same ' reasonable restrict­
ions' clause as in the Indian Constitution* For the text 
of these Constitutions, see Blaustein and Flanz (ed*), Con­
stitutions of the Countries of the World, Oceana, New York, 
1971-1974* See further, s.A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth 
and its Constitutions* Stevens, London, 1964, Ch*5, also 
James S. Read, 'kills of Rights in "The Third World"* Some 
Commonwealth Experiences' , Ver fas sung und Recht in Ubersee, 
Hamburg, Vl , 1973, 21-47. D.O. Aihe, * Neo-Nigerian Human”” 
Rights in Zambia', vol*3 -4, Zambia Law Journal* (1971-72), 
43, 48 ff* Article 24i , united Nations Declaration of 
Rights, 10 December, 1948, this the only provision there 
that talks about "reasonable limitations"* "Everyone has 
the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limita­
tion of working hours and periodic holidays with pay*"
20* constitution of Malaysia, Article 10* The Malaysian Parlia­
ment can impose such restrictions as "it deems necessary and 
expedient" (Article 10) * While the Constitutional dr ait was 
being discussed in the Parliament, the then Attorney General 
it seems, maintained that the question of 'reasonableness' 
was a political one to be ultimately decided by Parliament 
and not the Courts* Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, Sec­
tion 18* In sri Lanka, the new arrangements consisting of 
a continental-style 'Constitutional Court' to which Bills 
are referred, largely at the initiative of the speaker of 
the National Parliament, do not appear to be working very 
well* The first Constitutional Court resigned (in protest?) 
after difficulties over the government's controversial 
Press Bill* Thus Sri Lanka provides one example of an 
alternative to the Anglo-American notion of Judicial review* 
But other commonwealth countries may hesitate to follow the 
example of Sri Lanka*
21by 'democratic1* Therefore, it seems hardly a better alter­
native to the Indian clause*
The proliferation of the 'reasonableness' notion in the 
Constitution of many nations gives it an importance far beyond 
its occurrence in the Indian Constitution* However, this 
work is confined primarily to the Indian provisions*
Relevant from a comparative angle is the frequent
reference made by Indian courts and commentators to the 'due
process' clause while discussing the ambit of judicial review
in India* The point made by these references seems to be
that by using 'reasonable' instead of 'due process* the
framers of the Indian Constitution have narrowed down the
scope of judicial review - narrowed relatively to the power
supposedly enjoyed by the United States Sumpreme Court under
the 'due process' clause* Yet even if preventive detention
without trial is permitted by the Indian Constitution and the
22right to property has been curtailed, it seems doubtful if 
any or all of these would make a difference to the quality of 
judicial review where it is clearly meant, as under Article 
19 of the Indian Constitution* Such comparisons as have
been made with the 'due process' clause have been inconclusive
and somewhat misleading* This point needs to be explored 
further.23
21* Many provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
limit the rights by stating they are subject to such re­
strictions "as are necessary in a democratic society", e*g*
Articles 9(2), 10(2), 11(2).
22* The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, see 
Appendix I*
23* See below, Section 2 of Chapter 1*
An Introduction to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution
Article 19 whose sub-clauses contain the 'reasonable 
restrictions' formula occupies a central position in the 
scheme of Fundamental Rights* The dictates of Article 19 
other than the requirement of reasonableness of restrictions 
are as follows:
1) The restrictions on a fundamental right must be imposed
by a law and not by a mere administrative or executive
order which is not supported by a law* Article 19(2)
to (6) referred to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by
24law made "in the interests of" etc*
2) When it comes to constitutional challenge, however, it
is possible to say that an order or notification made
under a valid law, yet imposes unreasonable restrictions*
This may be simply 'ultra vires' , or unreasonable because
the order took into account extraneous matters or was ex-
25cessively harsh*
3) The grounds enumerated in Article 19 'in the interests'
of which 'reasonable restrictions' can be imposed are
exhaustive and possibilities of judicial decision adding
 ^ 26new grounds are remote*
24* Rashid Ahmad v* Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR, 1950, S.C.
163 (19^0) S.C.R. 566, (195b) £.C*J. 324. Ram* Krishna v. 
Union, AIR, 1969, ual*18* See Appendix II.
25. Oudh Sugar Mills v. Union, AIR, 1970, S*C*1070* Ramakrishna 
Hegde v* The Market Committee, AIR, 1971, S.C.lOlTI
26* Cf* Article 18, European Convention on Human Rights: "The
restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said 
rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose 
other than those for which they have been prescribed*"
4) On the other hand, the existing grounds have received
27restrictive interpretations*
5) Counsel have often pointed out that the adjective 'reason­
able* qualifies 'restrictions' and therefore, the entire
law is not to be judged as to whether it is reasonable or 
28not* But in practice, this distinction has been found 
to be a difficult one to maintain and the test of reason-
2o
ableness laid down in V *G. Row recognizes that the en­
tire law has to be reviewed*
The task of a Court under Article 19 would consist in
a) definining the scope of the Fundamental Right in 
question;
b) determination of the nature of the restriction imposed;
c) the object for which it is imposed;
d) the determination of the ambit of the ground supporting
the restriction such as 'public order' or 'in the inter-
30ests of the general public', etc*
The scheme of Article 19 itself clearly indicates that 
the duty of the Court is to find the right balance between 
freedom and social control* This inevitably brings the
27* Dr* Lohia v* Supdt* Central Prison, AIR, 1960, S.C. 633;
(i960) 2 S.C.R. 821; (1960) S.C.J. 567* Madhu Limaye v* Supt,
Dt* Magistrate, Monghyr, AIR, 1971, S.C. &4869 holding that 
in cases of preventive detention the ground of 'public order' 
would receive a narrow interpretation* See below, Ch*3, 
Section 1*
28* Dr* N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR, 1950, S.C.211; (1950)
S.C.R. 5l9; (1950) S.C.J. 328*
29* AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200*
30* D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th edn*,
Vol.I, Calcutta, 1965, 545-604; H.M. Seervai, Constitutional 
Law of India, Tripathi, Bombay, 1967, Ch.xi; A.S. chaudhrl, 
constitutional Rights and Limitations, Vol.I, Agra, 1955*
judges into contact with legislative policies represented 
through the laws impugned before them* Admittedly, theirs 
is a passive role to the extent that they do not approve or 
disapprove such policies*
30aFinally, the current criticisms in India concerning 
the role of judicial review cannot be meaningful without a con­
sideration of what the courts have done under the sub-clauses 
of Article 19* How do the courts see 'reasonableness* under 
Article 19? How have they drawn the balance between Funda­
mental Rights and social control? To answer these questions 
we must first step back a little into legislative history, of 
which the judges must be taken to have considerable background 
knowledge*
30a* See below, Conclusion*
CHAPTER 1: HISTORY a n d COMPARISONS
Section 1: The Indian Constituent Assembly and Limitation of
Rights
In the 1920s the British Government's answer to Indian 
31demands for constitutional guarantees was that such a course 
would prove to be troublesome in practice, and in any case 
would be less effective than imagined* Not least of the 
objections, in its view, was the difficulty of formulating 
such rights and enabling them to be suitably enforced when 
violated*
The statutory provision would therefore have 
to be drawn so widely as to be little more 
than a statement of abstract principle, afford­
ing no precise guidance to courts which would 
be asked to decide whether a particular group 
constituted a minority, and whether the action 
complained of was discriminatory* Moreover, 
having regard to the ingenuity and persistence 
with which litigation is carried on in India, 
we should anticipate that an enactment of the 
kind would result in the transfer to the law- 
courts of disputes which cannot be conveniently 
disposed of by such means ••• These objections 
are decisive against the proposal to prevent
31* The demand for written guarantees to secure minority rights 
(particularly of religious minorities) was a familiar and old 
theme when the Nehru Report, 1928, was published* See Gran­
ville Austin, The Indian Constitution, Cornerstone of a 
Nation* oxford, 1966* ~
Representatives of the Muslim, Indian Christian and Anglo- 
Indian communities spoke for such guarantees in the Round 
Table Conferences. See Indian R.C. Proceedings, 1930-1,
Cmnd. 3778. For details, see K.c* Markandan, Directive 
Principles in the Indian Constitution, Allied publishers, New 
Delhi. 1966. Ch*2: see also. Report~of the Indian Statutory
Commission, Vol.II, Recommendations, 129-130 (1930); A* Gled- 
hill, 'The Twilight of India's Fundamental Rights' in De 
L» Independance politique a la Liberte Economique et a L' egal- 
ite sociale en Asie uu sud-est, Collogue, Brussels November 
1904, 225*
discriminatory legislation by attempting to ^  
define it in a constitutional instrument*
The reaction of the then Government of India to these recommend­
ations was slightly more positive while it did agree with the 
Commission's views*
The subjects to be covered by these rights are 
by no means matters of agreement* Their na­
ture would require careful scrutiny* If they 
are expressed in the Constitution merely as so 
many general political maxims, they are un­
likely to serve the purpose for which they are 
framed* On the other hand, at first sight 
there seems to us to be objections to making 
at least some of such rights justiciable* If 
administrative decisions of all kinds can be 
taken to the Courts, grave disadvantages and 
embarrassments may be expected to ensue*
There may* howeverf be some via media between 
these two alternatives* 33
When it came to framing a Constitution for independent India, 
the Advisory committee on Fundamental Rights in the Constituent 
Assembly faced all these questions and fully evolved the answers 
only towards the final stages of their proceedings* The ex­
ceptions justifying restrictions on the rights guaranteed were 
not in place until fairly late* It is indeed possible to urge 
that, difficult as the task was, the Advisory Committee left a
32* Report of the Indian statutory Commission *•• op*cit** 130,
On Anglo-Saxon Attitudes" to Bills of Rights, see s.A. de 
Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions* Stevens, 
1964, ch*5« Note the change in British attitudes referred 
to there* There have been demands in Britain itself for 
written guarantees* It is known that the Liberal Party of 
Great Britain is advocating a Charter of Rights* Also see, 
"Who Cares about civil rights", The Times Saturday Review*
29 May, 1971, On Britain's adoption of the European Conven- 
tion on Human Rights, see Charles L* Black Jr., 'Is there al­
ready a British Bill of Rights?* , 89 (1973) L.Q.R.173*
33* Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for constitutional 
Reform* Government of India Central Publication Branch, cal- 
cutta, 1930, 45 (para*50). The Government of India Act,1935, 
did have two sections guaranteeing non-discriminatory legis­
lation - sections 298 and 299* See Tan Bug Taim v* Collector 
Bombay* ILR, 1946, Bom. 116, 232 quoted Ih A.S. Lhaudil* con­
stitutional Rights and Limitations*Vol*I* Agra, 1955.
34few clear gaps in the edifice they built* This necessitated
a major amendment of the Constitution within the first year of
its commencement (Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951]*
Many of the modifications were mostly necessitated by the land
reform and nationalisation policies known in advance to the
Advisory Committee as likely avenues of action by the inde-
35pendent government of India*
Ihe cautions administered by the Statutory Commission, 
however, did not go entirely unheeded by the Advisory Commit­
tee* It was the Committee and not the Assembly that wished 
to incorporate the detailed exceptions to the rights* The 
Committee was accused of being too cautious* The formula 
Reasonable restrictions*, as we shall see, was a compromise
34* Some may have been mere oversight, such as the absence of 
the expression * reasonable' in Article 19(2) limiting the 
right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)* This was oorrected 
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
More serious omissions were failure to provide for the 
Zamindari abolition - also corrected by the amending Act of 
1951, and the failure to modify suitably the equality pro­
visions to permit 'protective discrimination' in favour of 
tribal peoples, 'untouchables' and other backward communities, 
See below, 197*
35* Speakers in the Constituent Assembly demanded a 
»straight-forward' declaration that a policy of 
nationalisation would be pursued ana accurately 
prophesied how the courts would construe the 
right to compensation for expropriation but the 
Establishment would not heed them*
A. Gledhill, 'Twilight of India's Fundamental Rights', op.cit, 
note 31 above, at 254* One reason may well be that the Con­
gress party has always been, so the experts tell us, an 'um­
brella party' holding within it diverse and opposing interest 
groups *
36* A member of the Assembly, Somnath Lahiri, described the
rights sis having been framed from the 1 point of view of the 
police-constable* , C.A.D., III, 2, 384* See Granville 
Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* 
Oxford, 1966, 68-75.
agreed to between the majority of the members of the Assembly 
who were against the exceptions and the Advisory Committee, 
which favoured them*
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee
B.N* Rau, the Constitutional Advisor to the Assembly, 
referred to the problem of limiting the rights as the most 
vital part of the task facing the Assembly* In his very 
first 'Notes on Fundamental Rights', he observed:
The difficulty is in definining the precise 
limits in each case and in devising effect­
ive protection for the rights so limited*
Some of the constitutions have attempted to 
define the limits of some of these rights 
and in doing so have gone far towards des­
troying them* As an example, we may take 
Article 153 of the German constitution of 
1919, which runs:
'Property is guaranteed by the Constitu­
tion* Its extent and the restrictions 
placed upon it are defined by law* Ex­
propriation may be effected only for the 
benefit of the general community and 
upon the basis of law* It shall be 
accompanied by due compensation save 
insofar as may be otherwise provided by 
a law of the Reich*'
In other words, rights of private property 
are said to be inviolable except where the 
law otherwise provides, which means that 
the rights are not inviolable*37
It is clear that B.N* Rau would not have recommended 
mere political declarations of a general nature but would 
have required instead, as in fact he did, a justiciable &et 
of rights with a balanced list of exceptions to their exer­
cise* All the members of the Advisory Committee were in
37. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Cons titut ion, Vol.ll, 
The Indian institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 
1968, 22.
favour of justiciable rights and would not have countenanced 
mere 'educational' declarations of Rights* Directive prin­
ciples were another question altogether* For the goals in­
cluded there, such as the community's health, education and
welfare, were regarded as of relatively less direct interest
38to the individual compared with Fundamental Rights*
Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar in a note submitted to the 
Sub-Committee on March 14, 1947, alluded to the very general 
and comprehensive rights of the United states Constitution 
and the manner in which the United states Supreme Court had 
carefully delimited them* Many later constitutions (which 
he did not specify) he said, had expressly incorporated the 
effect and substance of many United States cases* Accord­
ingly, he stated that in formulating the rights "the question
before the Constituent Assembly of India is whether to follow
39the model of the U.S.A. or of the later constitutions"*
K.M. Munshi, another lawyer who took a prominent part 
in the business of the Assembly, submitted a note to the Sub­
committee in which he referred to four requisites essential, 
in his opinion, in the formulation of the rights:
a* Enforceability must be the essence of 
any instrument defining fundamental 
rights and duties;
b* A person or a State under an obligation 
cannot claim the right to determine 
whether he would comply with the obli­
gation and if so, to vrtiat extent;
38* The United iNations Declaration of Human Rights is a mixture 
of what in Indian terms would be Fundamental Rights and Dir­
ective Principles of State policy*
39. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit*, Vol.II, 67-8.
c. The observance of the fundamental rights 
and duties must be determined by a pro­
cedure and a machinery common to the 
Union as a whole;
d. Limitations to such law whenever neces­
sary must only be imposed by the law of 
the Union*40
The second of these principles is as good an approximation to
the final form of * reasonable restrictions* as was antici-
41pated at that time*
Or* Ambedkar's draft of March 24, 1947,guaranteed 
amongst others the right to freedom of speech, press, asso­
ciation, assembly, religion and residence and subjected all 
of these rights to considerations of * public order and moral­
ity' * Put in that form, there would have been no knowing 
whether legislative judgment as to the justification in im­
posing restrictions would have been final and, therefore, not 
reviewable by the courts* Presumably, Dr. Ambedkar had not 
yet given mature thought to the matter* But he was subse- 
/  quently to accept the 'reasonable restrictions* formula put 
forward by Thakurdas Bhargava, a member of the Assembly*
To that history we proceed now*
The origin of the 'reasonable restrictions* formula
The Sub-Committee on Fundamental rights 'slipped' the 
clause in for the first time during its proceedings on the 
24th March, 1947* The relevant note from the minutes runs
40. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit* * 71. Also see K.M. Munshi's collected 
papers and impressions published as Pilgrimage to Freedom* 
Indian Constitutional Documents, Two Volumes, Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhayan, Bombay, 1957*
41* Attention may also be drawn to Article 1(5) and Article V(2) 
of K.M* Munshi's draft articles, B* Shiva Rao, op.cit** 73 
and 75*
as follows:
4. As regards Article II of Mr, Munshi's 
draft, it was decided to adopt Article I, 
sub,sections (1) and (2) of B.N. Rau's 
draft in the following modified form:""
Article 1(1)* Every person born or natural­
ized in the Union of India and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof shall be a citizen 
of the Union,
(2) Every citizen of the Union shall be free 
to move throughout the Union, to reside 
and settle in any part thereof, to ac­
quire property, and to follow any occu­
pation, trade, business, or profession 
subject to such reasonable restraints 
as the law may impose.42
We have no means of knowing what B.N, Rau's draft was. It
has not been appended to the minutes <r reproduced anywhere
else in the four volumes of documents in the series Xhe
Framing of India's Constitution, B.N. Rau's collected papers
43edited and published by B, Shiva Rao do not have amongst
44them the draft referred to here, B.N. Rau, as the Consti­
tutional Advisor, did prepare a draft Constitution in the 
October of 1947 well after the Sub-Committee had finished 
its work (April, 1947), Since that draft could not be the 
one mentioned, we cannot be certain whether the clause owes 
its origin to B.N. Rau, However, since none of the draft 
provisions produced by K.M. Munshi, Professor K.X, Shah,
42, B, Shiva Rao, op.cit,, Vol,II, 116, my emphasis.
43, B, Shiva Rao (ed.), B.N. Rau, India's Constitution in the 
Making, Longmans, Bombay, 1960.
44, An account of Sir B.N. Rau appears in the work referred to 
in the footnote above, and also a short sketch is given in 
M. Hidayatullah, A Judge's Miscellany, N.M. Tripathi, 1972,
65.
45Or* Ambedkar or Harnam Singh had the clause in them, it 
is a fair guess that B.N* Rau’s draft carried it*
B.N* Rau and Judicial Review
The main question to which this thesis addresses it­
self concerns the notion of judicial review, albeit from a 
specific single* Consequently, every clue which throws any 
light on the notion or notions entertained by those instru­
mental in framing the constitution has to be weighed care­
fully* Individuals such as B*N. Rau, K.M* Munshi and Alladi 
Krishnaswamy Ayyar had considerable influence in the shaping 
of the constitution* B.N. Rau, in particular, dealt with
the question of judicial review in greater detail than the
46others* His ’preliminary note on Fundamental Rights’ 
was a cautious assessment of the nature and effect of judi­
cial review of legislation* It was a cautious assessment 
because it referred to the inconveniences rather more than 
the advantages of judicial review* The following passage 
is a good summary of his views:
The other difficulty, namely, that of de­
vising effective protection for the rights 
defined, really arises out of the difficulty 
of definition already pointed out* Where 
a right can only be indicated in broad terms, 
there is an obvious risk in allowing it to 
be enforced in the ordinary courts, because 
there is no knowing how broadly they might 
interpret it* There are at least three 
alternatives possible in this connection:
45. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit* * Vol.II, 69-96*
46* See note 37*
1* to take this risk and allow the rights, 
however imperfectly defined, to be en­
forced in the ordinary courts;
2* to set out the ric$its as moral precepts 
for the authorities concerned and to bar 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
either expressly or by implication;
3. to allow the more easily definable rights 
to be enforced in the ordinary courts and 
keep the rest out of their purview* 47
Elsewhere B.N* Rau points out many more disadvan­
tages attached to judicial review - (a) Parliament’s room
for doubt while enacting legislation as to the question of 
the constitutionality of the law when enacted; (b) a pos­
sible ’vast mass of litigation’ subjecting the same laws to 
frequent challenges (several distinct provisions of the same 
law could be challenged separately without ' res judicata* 
acting as an impediment); and (c) an irremovable judiciary 
may not be adequately sensitive to the public needs and may 
exercise a veto on essential legislation.4® The acuteness 
of some at least of these fears has been proved by recent 
experience*
The only advantage referred to by B.N. Rau i.% that 
judicial review would give racial and religious minorities 
a sense of security* The aptness of this esqpectation has 
also been proved* He was definitely in favour of circum­
scribing judicial review after his tour of the U.S.A. and 
Ireland* It is of great interest that in his report on 
the tour he recommended without any reservation that the
47. B* Shiva Rao, op.cit., vol.II, 22, my emphasis.
48. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit*, Vol.II, 30-31.
Fundamental Rights be made subordinate to the Directive prin­
ciples :
• •• When a law made by the State in the dis­
charge of one of the fundamental duties im­
posed upon it by the Constitution happens to 
conflict with one of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed to the individual, the former 
should prevail over the latter: in other
words, the general welfare should prevail 
over the individual right* Indeed Justice 
Frankfurther considered that the power of 
judicial review implied in the due process 
clause of which there is a qualified version* 
in clause 16 of our Draft Constitution was 
not only undemocratic (because it gave a 
few judges a power of vetoing legislation 
enacted by the representatives of the nation) 
but also threw an unfair burden on the judi­
ciary; and justice Learned Hand considered 
that it would be better to have all funda­
mental rights as moral precepts than as legal 
fetters in the Constitution* 49
It is significant that both names referred to by B.N. Rau 
were of judges known to be leading exponents of judicial 
•restraint* in their country.
49. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit., vol.ill, 218.
#»*16 No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
without due process of law* nor shall any person be denied 
equality before the Taw within the territories of the Feder­
ation •**
50* K.M. Munshi, another prominent member ox the Assembly and of 
the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights remarks:
Though this clause (Due process) was supported 
by a majority - almost all - of the members of 
the Constituent Assembly, at a later stage,
Justice Frankfurter, judge of the Supreme Court 
of the U.S.A., when he saw the diraft of our con­
stitution, conveyed to B.N. Ram that the Due 
Process clause would not be helpful and that it 
had created many complications in the U.S.A.
\ If Jutstice Black of the supreme Court of the
U.S.A. had been consulted/possibly he would 
have given an opinion contrary to Justice 
Frankfurter•s . - —
K.M. Munshi, Constitutional Documents, vol.I, Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan, Bombay , 1967, 298. CTjT”emphas is .
But the essence of B.N. Rau’s recommendation was that vital 
social legislation should not be hampered by judicial review 
on account of Fundamental Rights. B.N. Rau had, earlier in 
April 1947, recommended that a clause along the following 
lines should be included:
The State may limit by law the rights 
guaranteed by sections 11, 16 and 27 
whenever the exigencies of the common 
good so require.H 51
There is no sign that this recommendation was ever 
discussed at that time either by the Assembly or by the Ad­
visory Committee on Fundamental Rights, but nearly twenty 
years later such a provision has been enacted by the Consti­
tution (25th Amendment) Act^ . 1971, which now subordinates
52fundamental rights to two specified directive principles.
This amendment like most other preceding amendments, is ex­
pected to narrow the scope of property rights. There is 
strong evidence that B.N. Rau had in mind nationalisation
and similar economic measures affecting the right to pro-
53perty when he made his recommendations.
By the time the Sub-Committee completed its draft 
there were three clauses which employed the expression 
’reasonable1 • To take them one by one,first there was 
clause 10:
51. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit., Vol.II, 152.
52. Article 39(b) and (c). For these provisions ana for the 
constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, see 
Appendix I.
53. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit., Vol.Ill, 199.
There shall be liberty for the exercise of 
the following rights subject to public order 
and morality •..
(f) The right of every citizen to reside and 
settle in any part of the Union, to ac­
quire property and to follow any occupa­
tion, trade, business or profession.
Provision may be made by law to impose 
? reasonable restrictions as: may be neces­
sary in public interests* 54
In terms of drafting there was some overlapping and incongruity 
between1 public order and morality1 on the one hand, and * public 
interests' in sub-clause (f) on the other* It appears that 
restrictions in pursuance of 'public order and morality' need 
not necessarily be 'reasonable'* If so, the freedom granted 
in clause 10(f) was greater than those in the other clauses 
of the article because none of them was qualified by 'reason­
able restrictions' but they were subject to 'public order and 
morality*•
The second occurrence was in Article 28 of the draft:
"No person shall be subj‘ected to prolonged detention preced­
ing trial, to excessive bail, or unreasonable refusal thereof, 
or to inhuman or cruel punishment*" (emphasis supplied)*
The third provision:
14. (1) Subject to regulation by the law of 
the Union, trade ••• shall be free provided 
that any unit may impose reasonable restrict­
ions in the interest of public order, moral­
ityor health or in an emergency*
B.N* Rau had indicated the source of inspiration behind
55clause 10(f) in a note he circulated on the 8th April, 1947*
54. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit*, Vol.II, 172, cl.10.
55. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit*» vol.II, 147*
"Clause 14 (it was then numbered (14)} embodies one of the 
chief privileges or immunities of the citizens of the U.S.A., 
which no state is permitted to abridge, see Amendment XIV, 
section 1* See also Weimar Constitution, Article III*"
The United States provision referred to does not use the 
term 'reasonable' but employs 'due process'* B.N. Rau 
might have regarded 'reasonable' as a positive compromise 
between due process and the absence of judicial review*
Here again, we proceed on conjecture*
The draft prepared by the Sub-committee was revised 
by the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights* The second 
of the three clauses quoted above relating to * unreasonable 
refusal' of bail was dropped* The other two clauses, as re­
vised, then read as follows: Clause 10(f) becoming clause
8(e)
Rights of Freedom 8. There shall be liberty 
for the exercise of the following rights sub­
ject to public order and morality or to the 
existence of grave emergency **•
(e) The right of every citizen to reside and 
settle in any part of the Union, to ac­
quire property and to follow any occupa­
tion, trade, business or profession:
Provision may be made by law to impose 
such reasonable restrictions as may be 
necessary in the public interest includ­
ing the protection of minorities and 
tribes* 56
It is rather curious that of the five sub-clauses in 
clause 8, only sub-clause (e) quoted above carried the expres­
sion 'reasonable', since the two freedoms guaranteed by it, 
viz., the right to property and profession, were the two
56. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit*, Vol.II, 297, emphasis supplied.
most restricted by amendments later enacted by the Indian 
57ParliamentI No one in any of the Committees tried to
point out the anomaly of sub-clause (e) being the sole bene­
ficiary of the 'reasonableness* clause* That they allowed 
this imbalance to continue certainly becomes a puzzle when 
we come to the next clause, viz* clause 14(1) in the Sub­
committee draft, re-numbered by the Advisory Committee as
58Clause 10, and retained in the same form as quoted above*
The puzzle lies in the awareness shown by the drafters of
the difference between a general power to impose restrictions
simpliciter and a power to impose only reasonable restrictions*
Whereas the Union Government was given the power to regulate
inter-state traae by imposing restrictions free from judicial
review, the states were given the same power but subject to
judicial review, such as would examine the state regulations
as to their reasonableness "in the interest of public order,
morality, or health, or in an emergency' * * This distinction
between the powers of the Union and the States in respect of
inter-state trade was carried into the Constitution and duly
59recognized by the Supreme court*
57* The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; The Consti­
tution (Fourth Amendment) Act * 1955, and The constitution 
(Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act. 1971*
58. Above, 29.
59. Article 302 with 304(b). See Atiabari Tea C o . v. Assam.
AIR, 1961, S.C.232, where at 254 the following observation 
is to be found: "Prima facie the requirement of public in­
terest [under Article 302] can be said to be not justiciable 
and may-be deemed to be satisfied by the sanction of the Pre­
sident; but whether or not the restrictions [in 304(b)] im­
posed are reasonable would be justiciable and in that sense, 
laws passed by the State legislatures may on occasions have 
to face judicial scrutiny." (per Gajendragadkar J.) (words
in square brackets supplied). The cautious language is due 
to the fact that the question was not directly raised in the
/Cont'd* on next page:
The majority of the Committee members may have assumed that 
judicial review would exist under Article 8 whatever phrase­
ology was employed* The lack of adequate discussion on vital 
points affecting judicial review strengthens this view*
However, individual members of the Committee, as well 
as members of Constituent Assembly were aware of the special 
significance attached to the word 1 reasonable*. Almost all 
these members saw it as a term imposing restraint on the exer­
cise of the powers of Government* For example, F.R. Anthony, 
the Anglo-Indian leader, suggested in April that 'reasonable' 
be substituted for 'special' in the following draft provision:
25* Equal opportunities of education shall 
be open to all citizens: Provided that
nothing herein contained shall preclude 
the State from providing special facilities 
for educationally backward sections of the 
population* 60
The member may have felt that judicial review should be avail­
able to judge the extent of the facilities provided for the 
backward sections of the population* 'Special facilities', 
in his view, could not, in practice, amount to unreasonable 
privileges.
Note 59 - continued from 30:
case and the passage was obiter. See also Andhra Sugar Mills 
v. A.P., AIR, 1968, S.C.599. For a fuller discussion, see 
Chapter 2, Section 2(c).
60. B. shiva Rao, Vol.II, 203, Sub-Committee on Minorities.
For the text of the provision, see 174 of Vol.II.
32.
Assembly Proceedings - Stage 1
Introducing clause 8 of the interim draft, Vallabhai 
Patel announced that the expression ’reasonable1 in pro­
viso (e) of the clause was to be dropped in accordance with 
an amendment proposed and to be moved by the Reverend Nichols
Roy, a member from Assam. The member's Justification for
the amendment, in his own words, was as follows:
The word 'reasonable* will create a great 
deal of contention and confusion. If a 
State or a unit will impose (sic) restrict­
ions, someone may go to the Supreme Court
as provided in clause 2 and say they are 
not reasonable. So I consider that pro­
tection to be made by law for groups and 61 
tribes is not a proper and safe protection.
Vallabhai Patel had already indicated his acceptance of the
amendment, but formally once more signified his concurrence
62with the amendment. The Constituent Assembly voted to
63drop the expression from clause 8(e). The expression 
' reasonable' in clause 10 of the draft was also purged 
without much discussion and apparently without any dissent­
ing voices. K.M. Munshi supported Patel's wish to drop 
the term also from clause 10. He is reported as saying:
"The word 'reasonable' gives a certain amount of vagueness
64and therefore, it is not necessary."
61. Vol.3, c.A.u. 461. One of the grounds for imposing reason­
able restrictions in clause 8(e) was the protection of minor­
ities and tribes. Reverend NicholS^ Roy's interest was to 
secure maximum benefits for the tribal groups without Judi­
cial interference on account of fundamental rights.
62. Vol.3, C.A.U., 409 and 466.
63. Vol.3, C.A.D., 468.
64. Vol.3, C.A.D., 475.
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In the Fundamental Rights Sub-Commit tee, K.M. Munshi was 
a strong supporter of judicial review and was also in 
favour of the incorporation of the 'due process' clause 
in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. He confirms this 
in his recent memoirs.6^ In view of that, his observa­
tion as quoted above, seems surprising.
Ihus both Clauses 10 and 8(e) were stripped of the 
'reasonable* clause. Vallabhai Patel's definite move in 
omitting the term seems to suggest that he, amongst the 
select influential members of the leadership, had wished 
to keep judicial review to the minimum, if such a thing 
was possible. None of the other leaders such as Nehru,
Maulana Azad or Prasad had expressed views in favour of,
66or against, the clause.
Vallabhai Patel did not move provisos (a), (b) and
65. K.M. Munshi, Pilgrimage to Freedom (Indian Constitutional 
Documents), Vol.I, Part XIII, 291-314.
66. But Nehru's remarks about the function of a Supreme Court 
in India was in terms that did not encourage judicial re­
view:
No Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in 
judgment over the sovereign will of parliament 
representing the will of the entire Community.
If we go wrong here and there, it can point out, 
but in the ultimate analysis, where the future 
of the Community is concerned, no judiciary can 
come in the way ... ultimately, the fact remains 
that the legislature must be supreme and must 
not be interfered with by the Courts of Law in 
such measures of social reform.
C.A.D., vol.9, 1195-6.
(c) of Clause 8. This meait that 'public order* and 'moral­
ity' remained as the only grounds restricting the freedoms
67. Draft clause 8 as it was before the Assembly:
"Rights of freedom"
8. There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following 
rights subject to public order and morality or to the exist­
ence of grave emergency declared to be such by the Government 
of the Union or the unit concerned whereby the security of 
the Union or the unit, as the case may be, is threatened:
(a) The right of every citizen to freedom of speech and ex­
pression: Provision may be made by law to make the pub­
lication or utterance of seditious, obscene, blasphemous, 
slanderous, libellous or defamatory matter actionable or 
punishable.
(b) The right of the citizens to assemble peachablyand with­
out arms: Provision may be made by law to prevent or
control meetings which are likely to cause a breach of 
the peace or are a danger or nuisance to the general pub­
lic or to prevent or control meetings in the vicinity of
any chamber of a legislature.
(c) The right of citizens to form associations or unions:
Provision may be made by law to regulate and control in
the public interest the exercise of the foregoing right 
provided that no such provision shall contain any poli­
tical, religious or class discrimination.
(d) The right of every citizen to move freely throughout the 
Union.
After consideration by the Assembly, the clause read as 
follows:
"Rights of freedom"
8. There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following 
rights subject to public order and morality and except in a 
grave emergency declared to be such by the Government of the 
Union or the unit concerned whereby the security of the Union 
or the unit, as the case may be, is threatened:
(a) The right of every citizen to freedom of speech and ex­
pression.
(b) The right of the citizens to assemble peaceably and 
without arms.
(c) The right of citizens to form associations or unions.
(d) The right of every citizen to move freely throughout the
Union.
(e) The right of every citizen to reside and settle in any
part of the Union, to acquire, hold, and dispose of pro­
perty and to exercise or carry on any ocuupation, trade, 
business, or profession: Provision may be made by law
to impose such restrictions as may be necessary in the 
public interest including the protection of minority 
groups and tribes.
guaranteed. The exception to this was clause (e) which was 
also subject to restrictions in the 'public interest includ­
ing the protection of minority groups and tribes' •
The Constituent Assembly probably acquiesced in the 
omission of the term 'reasonable' because clause 9 of the 
draft contained the due process clause guaranteeing life 
and liberty. The 'due process' history was widely known 
amongst the non-lawyers of the Assembly. Many regarded it 
as the bulwark against the legislature and executive.
(Endian and Irish Provisions
The most crucial question to arise out of clause 8
as passed by the Assembly would have been, who would judge
whether a restriction was imposed in furtherance of public
order or morality? Would a declaration in the Preamble
of the statute have been conclusive of the matter? In the
scheme of clause 8 vagueness prevailed here. It might have
been argued that since the legislature enacts laws to meet
particular problems faced by the community its view or ver-
68diet would conclude the matter. In that case the consti­
tutional guarantee was hardly a guarantee at all. But if 
the judges were to review regularly each statute as to its 
policy and methods, to check if it was in furthernace of 
public order or morality, it might have proved cumbersome 
to all concerned not excluding the judges. Almost certainly
68. The present law on the subject presumes legislative judgment 
on such matters to be correct or at any rate, not easily 
challenged, Bombay v. Balsara, AIR, 1951, S.C.318; S.I.S.Ltd. 
v. Union, AIR, 1972, Delhi, 159.
such a course would have been deplored or even rejected by 
the judges, but the result would have been feeble or no judi­
cial review and a feeble or no guarantee of Fundamental Rights.
Article 40.6.1, of the Irish Constitution and draft 
clause 8 were very similar in their scheme and phraseology:
Article 40.6.1.
The State guarantees liberty for the exer­
cise of the following rights, subject to 
public order and morality:- (i) The right 
of the citizens to express freely their con­
victions and opinions•......
The publication or utterance of blasphemous, 
seditions, or indecent matter is an offence 
which shall be punishable in accordance with 
law.
(The other rights conferred are similarly 
restricted in the public interest).
A brief look at the Irish provision and its experience in 
Ireland indicates that clause 8 would not have played the 
role that Article 19 (its final offspring) has played, and 
continues to play, under the Indian Constitution of 1950.
The makers of the Irish Constitution, intended, it
seems, to regard the declaration of Fundamental Rights as
a resolution of good intention on the part of the State
69and nothing more. Article 40.6.1. of the Irish Consti­
tution is a good example of the restricted judicial review
69. "It is obvious, in reading the reports of the debate, that 
the government was inviting the people to enact the Funda­
mental Rights Articles merely as deadlines' for the Oireach­
tas; a situation in which j’udicial review of statutes in the 
light of these Articles would become common was far from its 
mind." J.M. Kelly, Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and 
Constitution, 2nd edn., Dublin, 1967, 18.
intended. While there have been instances where the Irish
Courts have held statutes unconstitutional as violating Art- 
70icle 40.6.1, judicial activity has never been especially
noticeable in this area. New ground, broken recently,
71centres upon Article 40.3.1. Both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Ireland seems to have held that the wording 
of Article 40.3.1. read with Article 40.3.2 ("The State shall, 
in particular, by its law protect as best it may from unjust 
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, 
person, good name and property rights of the citizen".) meant 
that there was jurisdiction "to consider whether an Act of 
the Oireachtas respects, and as far as practicable, defends 
and vindicates the personal rights of the citizen and to de­
clare the legislation unconstitutional if it does not."
72(Kenny J. in Ryan v. A.G.) It was further held that the
rights enumerated in Article 40 were by no means exhaustive 
of personal rights that "result from the Christian and demo­
cratic nature of the state." Thus Article 40.1. rights 
indirectly benefit from a residuary area yielding to judi­
cial review.
Had the Indian rights been finalised in the form of 
the draft clause 8, Indian courts might, perhaps, have looked
70. For example, National Union of Railwaymen v. Sullivan and 
Others, 1947, I.R. 7im
71. 40.3.1. reads: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, 
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindi­
cate the personal rights of the citizen."
72. 1965, I.R. 294.
elsewhere for a meaningful and effective source of review
It was no coincidence that clause 8 of the Indian 
Constitutional draft and Article 40(6) of the Irish consti­
tution were similar. There is an impressive parallel be­
tween the constitutional histories of India and Ireland.
The following passage concerning Ireland can easily be true 
of India;
Irish Government is a distinctive blend, 
consisting of three main ingredients: those 
inherited from Great Britain, those borrow­
ed from the United States, and those indig­
enous to Ireland or invented by its found­
ing fathers. The blend exhibits strong 
tinges of ambivalence and contradiction; 
for instance, the 1937 Constitution-makers 
were quite obviously undecided whether they 
wished to plump for limited Government based 
on court - enforced constitutional guaran­
tees, or for parliamentary supremacy limited 
only by the attachment of political leaders 
to the Constitution. In the event they 
did neither, and have spent thirty years 
suspended uneasily between the two, like 
a slack-wire performer in a circus. These 
characteristics are no doubt primarily the 
result of Ireland's unique history, although 
the personalities of her leaders - particu­
larly that of Kamon de Valera - were also 
of great importance. 73
In India most constitutional controversies of the 
recent past and of the present time can conceivably be 
traced to similar historical conflicts.
73. Loren P. Beth, The development of Judicial Review in
Ireland, 1937-1906, Institute of Public Administration, 
i>ublin-4, 1967, 1-2 •
39.
Assembly Proceedings - Stage II
When the Drafting Committee got back the clauses as 
passed by the Constituent Assembly, it dropped the term *due 
process1 from clause 9 and substituted procedure established 
by law1 in its place. This unauthorised elimination of fdue 
process1 disturbed the members considerably when the draft con­
stitution as a whole was taken up for consideration by the 
Assembly.^4
Clause 8, now numbered 13, became a focus of atten­
tion. This time it was Dr. Ambedkar, and not Vallabhai 
Patel, who was piloting the draft rights through the Assembly. 
He had difficulty in convincing the members that 1 due process1 
was dropped for good and sensible reasons. There was one 
other matter which made the Assembly rise up in anger: all
the exceptions that were dropped by Vallabhai Patel and ap­
proved by the Assembly had been put back by the Drafting Com­
mittee.
How did Dr. Ambedkar, an eminent lawyer himself, con­
vince the Assembly and sooth their righteous anger? He told 
them:
What the draft Constitution has done is that 
instead of formulating fundamental rights in 
absolute terms and depending upon our Supreme 
Court to come to the rescue of Parliament by 
inventing the doctrine of police power, it 
permits the State directly to impose limit­
ations upon the fundamental rights. There 
is really no difference in the result. What 
one does directly the other does indirectly.
In both cases fundamental rights are not 
absolute. 75
74. See below, Section 2.
75. C.A.D., vol.7, 41.
This explanation related to the exceptions, but those 
given to Justify the omission of the * due process1 did not 
convince the members fully and Dr. Ambedkar barely managed 
to get the draft accepted.
Members proceeded to scrutinise the draft Article 13 
in earnest and were to produce the most full and realistic 
arguments bearing upon Judicial review in the Constitution.
Sri Damodar Swarup set the ball rolling when he said 
that the exceptions to the rights were so sweeping that it 
would be impossible to get a law invalidated on the ground 
of violation of a fundamental right. He thought that except 
on the ground of mala fides the supreme Court would have no 
option but to uphold almost all restrictive legislation.
The member had, in fact, raised the basic question of review
of the rights guaranteed whether or not his predictions were
correct.
Another member, Mahboob Ali Baig, came to the point 
more directly:
But the question is when a certain citizen 
oversteps the limits so as to endanger the
safety of the state who is to Judge? 76
He gave the answer himself:
According to me, sir, and according to 
well-recognized canons, it is not the 
Executive or the Legislature, but it 
is the independent Judiciary of the 
State that has to Judge ... 77
76. C.A.D., Vol.7, 714. Though one can understand what the 
honourable member intended to say,the expression as quoted 
here is incorrect. The Juc^iP9 is of laws passed to punish 
citizens endangering the safety of the State.
77. C.A.D., Vol.7, 734.
41.
Sardar Hukum Singh joined in support. He asked:
If the other countries like the U.S.A. 
have placed full confidence in their 
judiciary and by their long experience 
it has been found that the confidence 
was not misplaced, why should we not 
depend upon similar guardians to pro­
tect the individual liberties and the 
state interests, instead of hedging 
round freedom by so many exceptions 
under these sub-clauses? 78
Thinking on the floor of the Assembly was sharpening on the 
question of judicial review and the appropriate form of ex­
pressing it in the Constitution.
Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava, the eventual author of the 
Reasonable restrictions* formula, noticed the missing link 
when he said:
The question has been asked, if the 
legislature enacts a particular Act 
(restricting the rights) is that the 
final word? If you consider clauses
(3) to (6) you will find that in the 
objects and reasons an enactment says 
(sic) that its object is to serve the 
interests of the public or to protect 
public order, then the courts would be 
helpless to come to the rescue of 
nationals of this country in respect 
of the restrictions. 79
He suggested, therefore, that * reasonable* be added before 
* restrictions* . in the result, in his view, the court would 
be able to examine the law to see if it was in the interests 
of the public, and secondly to see if the restrictions imposed 
could be considered reasonable.
Therefore my submission is that we must 
put in the words * reasonable* or * proper* 
or * necessary* or whatever good word the
78. C.A.D., Vol.7, 734.
79. C.A.D., Vol.7, 739.
House likes, 1 understand that Dr,
Ambedkar is agreeable to the word 
1 reasonable1 . 80
ur, Ambedkar had, indeed asserted earlier, in a different 
context, that there was such a standard as that of a 'reason­
able and prudent man' . That assertion supports the view ex­
pressed here that there is a link between the Indian clause 
and the English notion of reasonableness.
Briefly, there the question agitating the Assembly was 
what would a 'backward community1 amount to for the purposes 
of draft Article 10 which provided reservations in the public 
services in their favour. That determination had been left 
to the discretion of the local government. Dr, Ambedkar 
thought the matter was justiciable in a court of law, which 
would strike down any unreasonable classification as offend­
ing the equality guarantee.
The Courts would see if the local government had acted
in a reasonable and prudent manner. At this stage, a member
of the Assembly (Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari) asked: "Who is a
reasonable man and who is a prudent man? These are matters
of litigation." To which Dr. Ambedkar replied: "Of course,
$hey are matters of litigation, but my honourable friend ...
will understand that the words 'reasonable person and prudent
person' have been used in very many laws and if he will refer
81only to The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, he will find
80. C.A.D., vol.7, 739.
81. For example, section 41 ("reasonable care"). See also sec­
tions 7 ("reasonable manner", "reasonable time") and 38 
("reasonable opportunity") of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
that in very many cases the words *a reasonable person and
a prudent person* have been defined and the Court will not
82find any difficulty in defining it.**
In the face of his previous admission, Dr* Ambedkar
83accepted Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava*s amendment 9 even though
the position of the term in the Constitutional provision would
look very different from what it may stand for in the Transfer
84of Property Act, 1872.
By an oversight, Article 19(2) qualifying the freedom 
of speech and expression did not carry the term ’reasonable * 
before restrictions but this was soon rectified by Section 2, 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
Indian experience shows that by far the most important 
task in framing a Bill of kights is the matter of qualifying 
the rights which have to be framed in language that is abso­
lute. The alternative of leaving the task to the judiciary, 
as we see from the history of the Constitution of the United 
btates, results in prolonged and painful manoeuvres in judi­
cial law-making. The various doctrines and principles de­
veloped by the United states Supreme Court and which have been 
frequently modified in the history of the court show that some 
constitutional text is necessary, if only to enable the Courts
82. C.A.D., vol.7, 702.
83. C.A.D., vol.7, 741.
84. More on this below, Section 2.
to rest their decisions . on the constitu­
tional provisions themselves.
But that is not all. There cannot be a bald proposi­
tion that all limitations said to be in the interests of public 
order or national security would be valid, and according to the 
Constitution. There simply could be no way in cdiich judicial 
review of the limitations or restrictions can be kept out.
It seems that once the basic decision was taken by the framers 
that judicial review (constitutional rights can be mere decla­
rations and non-justiciable) shall be permitted then, however 
elaborately the limitations may be spelt out, judicial review 
cannot be circumscribed. Nor is there any way of limiting 
the evolution and growth subsequently of that j'udicial review 
thus permitted.
A comparison between ’reasonableness* under Article 
19 and the ’due process* under the united States Constitution 
is often made by Indian writers ana judges with the obj'ect of 
showing that judicial review of fundamental rights in India 
was not the same as, but limited in comparison with the ’due 
process* jurisdiction exercised by the United States Supreme 
Court. This proposition can be very misleading and needs 
to be examined closer.
Section 2 ; ’Due Process* in American Law and » Reasonableness* 
in India
The phrase ’due process* has come to mean judicial 
law-making of an '’activist* nature even though its chequered 
history in the Constitutional law of the United States does
85not fully justify this attribute* After the storm over 
the New Deal cases passed it was fprocedural due process* 
much more than the abused 'substantive due process' that was 
given prominence in the Supreme Court of the U.S.A.
Indian Constituent Assembly ana 'Due Process* ; in Outline
Operating as it did in the years 1946-1950, one would 
have expected the Indian Constituent Assembly to be most 
familiar with the version of 'due process' as it figured in 
the 'new deal* crisis. in the initial stages of its deli­
berations, the Assembly as well as the various expert com­
mittees favoured the clause notwithstanding its then recent 
implications. It was perhaps assumed that the future 
Indian supreme Court would not interpret it so extensively 
to produce the results obtained by the United states'Supreme 
Court. Alternatively, the Assembly and the e^ qpert Commit­
tees were willing to take a gamble in order to satisfy fully 
their 'liberal democratic* instincts in creating a powerful 
Supreme Court to guard the liberties of the future citizens
85. William F. Swinder, Court and constitution in the 20th Cen­
tury, The New Legality, 1932-1968. New York. 1970. Alpheus 
T. Mason, 'Judicial Activism: uld and New* , (1969), 55 Virg.
L.R.385.
86. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.227, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940); In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S.l, 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946). See the dissent 
by Justice Murphy; Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46, 91 
L.Ed. 1903 (1947) Note Justice Black's dissent; Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S.145, 20 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1968). The develop 
ment of procedural due process is not, however, a matter en­
tirely of the post-New Deal period, see, for example,
Fowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.45, 77 L.Ed.158 (1932). There 
were similar cases in which the members of the black minor­
ity were officially and unofficially discriminated against
in the trial procedures and such discriminations were held 
unc ons titutional.
of India. The clause could well have become part of India's 
Constitution but for the strong opposition to it by three 
influential members of the Assembly, Sri Govind Vallabh Fant, 
Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar and B.N. Rau. The last two were 
regarded by the Assembly as their experts in constitutional 
matters and, very reluctantly, they bowed to the opinion of 
these two members. B.N. Rau* s tour of the U.S.A., his meet­
ing with Justice Frankfurter (a well-known advocate of judi-
87cial self-restraint) has already been mentioned. K.M.
Munshi's comments on this meeting and his regret at the omis-
88sion of 'due process' has also been referred to* Even now
there are lawyers who wish the clause had been retained.
They particularly regret that the Supreme Court did not take
89the opportunity in A.K. Gopalan's case to read the clause
albeit in its procedural aspect,into Article 21. Counsel
who appeared on Gopalan's behalf, M.K. Nambyar, has said that
the definition of law laid down by Daniel Webster in the
90Dartmouth College case was described by the supreme Court 
during the hearing to be the ancient Indian concept of
87. Section 1 above, 25-26.
88. Section 1 above, 26.
89. AIR, 1950, S.C.27, (1950) S.C.R.88.
90. 4, Wheaton, 518. The definition of law given in Dartmouth 
College ran:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the 
general law; a law which hears before it condemns; 
which proceeds upon enquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial. The meaning is that every citi­
zen shall hold his life, liberty, property and im­
munities, under the protection of the general rules 
which govern society. Everything which may pass 
under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, 
to be considered the law of the land.
91Pharma,
Both Munshi and Ambedkar had also included the clause
92in their draft Fundamental Rights, Alladi Krishnaswamy
Ayyar and B.w. Rau appear to have taken a neutral stand in
93the initial stages. For Alladi, as late as 31st October,
1947, during the Drafting Committee proceedings, added his
94assent to the retention of the clause. Admittedly, he 
had already warned the Advisory Committee on Fundamental 
Rights during April, 1947, in the following prescient terms:
There is all the danger that it may stand 
in the way of what may be called expropri- 
atory legislation. If you have got a set 
of judges who are more inclined to property, 
then they might put a wide construction upon 
the words so as to hamper what may be called 
social legislation and if you have another 
set of j'udges who are imbued with modern 
ideas, they might put a more liberal inter­
pretation, There is that danger inherent 
in ’due process’ whatever provision of law 
may be made in the different provinces in 
lndia,95
The proceedings of the Drafting Committee on 31st October, 
1947, show one interesting change made in the ’due process* 
clause. In MNo person shall be deprived of his life or
91. Proceedings of the Seminart Provincial Bar Federation, Madras, 
23-25th October, 1963, 78. pharma = Righteousness. For its 
function in ancient Indian law, politics and society, see 
J.D.M, Derrett, History of Indian Law (Pharmasastra), Leiden, 
Brill, 1973; the same, pharmasastra and Juridical Literature, 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1973, and references there cited.
92. see Article V, cl. (4) of K.M. Munshi’s draft and Article II, 
Section 1, cl. (2) of Pr. Ambedkar’s draft, both in B. Shiva 
Rao, Vol.II, 75 and 86 respectively.
93. See his note reproduced in B, Shiva Rao, Vol.II, 68,
94. B. Shiva Rao, vol.Ill, 327-329.
95. B. Shiva Rao, op.cit♦, vol.II, 241.
liberty without due process of law” , "personal” was added be­
fore liberty* That altered reading would seem to reduce due 
process to procedural due process only and could have existed 
comfortably in the constitution if it could have been recon-
Qf%
ciled with preventive detention which was also provided for 
in the Constitution* Whether it would have been possible to 
accomplish it through techniques of 'harmonious construction' 
or by reading the one or the other provision narrowly is now 
a matter of mere conjecture*
The amazing fact to be noted here, however, is that it
is not clear from the records at what stage 'due process' was
substituted by "procedure established by law" - a formula used
97by the Japanese and Irish Constitutions* In view of the 
significance of the change, one would have expected a full 
debate amongst the experts in the Drafting Committee* There 
was, however, a debate in the Constituent Assembly itself on 
6th December, 1948, where the members clearly conveyed their 
displeasure at the omission of 'due process'*
It is possible to hazard a guess* Perhaps B*N. Rau 
and Dr* Ambedkar (the Chairman), with no other members pre­
sent, made the substitution on 20th January, 1948* The 
guess is supported by the fact that Ambedkar bore the main 
brunt of the members' attack when they realised 'due process' 
had been omitted*
96* Article 22*
97. Also the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(1) 
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save ••• in accord­
ance with a procedure established by law."
What now seems clear is, that it was omitted because 
the ex-perts* fear of judicial interference with 'social 
legislation' meant to curb the property rights of large 
estate-owners such as Zamindars and other hated ' intermedi­
aries' standing between the cultivator (the ultimate pro­
ducer of revenue) and the State to which revenue is paid*
The right to property, it can be said without exaggeration, 
shaped the form of this important provision of the Indian 
Bill of Rights* Yet the problems were not solved, it was 
the right to property that inspired constitutional develop­
ment in India during the first decade* For the present,
there is a lull in this controversy, perhaps to be renewed
98later in a different form. Whether the question of pro­
perty-right more truly 'bedevilled* or 'motivated' constifci- 
fbnal development must remain a matter of opinion according 
to one's view of property rights, and, in any case, according 
as one views judicial review*
The 'Ghost* of 'Due Process'
The power of constitutional amendment that the Indian 
Parliament possessed during most of the first decade, and 
which it exercised in amending several provisions of the Con­
stitution, including those that dealt with the right to pro­
perty, has made this discussion less relevant* In the light 
of amendments like the Twenty-fifth, perhaps it would have 
made little difference whether the phrase 'due process' had
98* See below, Ch.^, section 2,
been included in the Indian Constitution or not*
But there is another point that is relevant and needs
to be considered here* The omission of the clause from the
go
Indian constitution has led commentators and the Supreme 
Court itself *00 to conclude that judicial review under the 
Indian Constitution was a somewhat reduced and * scaled-down* 
version of the jurisdiction which the United States Supreme 
court possesses under the 1 due process* clause of the United 
States constitution* H.M. Seervai, for instance, has this 
to say:
The framers of our constitution did not 
create courts which could act as * super- 
legislatures* or as permanent * third 
chambers* revising the legislation en­
acted by the elected representatives of 
the people* The elimination of the 
*due process' clause from our Constitu­
tion, and the detailed specification of 
restrictions to which fundamental rights 
were subject were important safeguards 
against the abuse of judicial review*
It would certainly be correct to say that the framers 
might well have been anxious to summarise, or in other ways 
clarify, the rights vis-a-vis the necessary social or public 
control, in order that the courts might not produce conflict­
ing interpretations regarding basic matters clearly established
99* Seervai, The Position of the Judiciary Under the Constitu­
tion of India, University of Bombay, 1970, 56-62,
100* Collector of Customs v* Sampathu Chetty, AIR, 1962, S*C.316# 
per Rajagopala Ayyangar at 3^8, col.2, warning against read­
ing American cases based on * due process*• Amritsar Munici- 
pality v. Jt*unjab, AIR, 1969, S.C. 1100 per J.C. shah J., 
li03-4 *
101. seervai, op.cit*, 58-59.
under many Constitutions, notably that of the U.S.A. It is 
also true that they did not wish to see any ’abuse' of judi­
cial review* But they undoubtedly wished to see a use of 
judicial review, otherwise all their efforts in drawing up 
'Fundamental nights' would have been pointless* The mere 
omission of 'due process* certainly could not mean that 
judicial review was wiped clean outI That clause is not 
the only form in which to bestow judicial review* Even 
in the U.S.A., it is by no means true that the Supreme court 
has consistently regarded the clause as enabling it to act 
as a "super-legislature"* The New Deal cases (altogether
about 12 statutes were held invalid between 7th January,
1021935, and 25th May, 1936), made several American^expert 
ana lay, feel that the Supreme Court was acting contrary to 
the wishes of the majority and, what is of greater import­
ance in this writer's view, it was employing a defective
method of interpretation in reading its favourite economic 
103notions_____ into the conflicts that came before it*
The point has to be made that the primary concern of 
a constitutional lawyer is not seeking out whether a court 
acts as a "super-legislature" (it is asserted here that judi­
cial review itself by definition allows a court that role 
under certain conditions) but whether the reasoning by vdtiich
102. See Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constituional 
Law, University of Chicago Press, 1967, 180-181.
103. Such as 'Liberty of Contract' and economic 'Laissez-Faire* * 
Courts nowadays are unlikely to adopt any economic dogma, 
simple because economic matters are admitted to have become 
too complex*
it arrives at its decisions is explicit, and the implieit 
factors if any, are acceptable to the community's moral 
sense* Because in Constitutional Law, as in many other 
branches of the law, the initiative of the judiciary con­
sists in its moral leaderships made manifest by its impartial, 
independent stand* In its main function the judiciary, 
whether by its 'activism' or in its 'restraint' or even in 
its 'neutrality*, tends to implement this moral leadership**033. 
In this it has, as would occur in every leadership position, 
to take into consideration a number of complex factors*
The purpose of this seeming digression is to put in 
perspective the conclusions drawn from the omission of the 
'due process' clause and the effect these have had on the 
existing arrangements for judicial review under the Indian 
constitution - the most prominent of these arrangements be­
ing 'reasonable restrictions* under Article 19 of the Indian 
constitution* The views adopted in India of 'due process' 
have tended to cloud the assessment of the power of review 
granted in the clauses of Article 19 •*
It is reasonable to ask vrtiether the 'due process' and 
'reasonableness* clauses are qualitatively different* Can 
the former be wider in its scope than the latter? or is it 
really something for the courts to build on and, therefore, 
much depends on what they make of it? The united states
103a. "If the judiciary is prepared to provide leadership, its 
voice will be listened to with respect and gratitude* 
Because the individual citizen is dwarfed by the State and 
because the legislature may be relatively subservient to 
the executive, the judiciary is the most immediately avail­
able resource against the abuse of executive power"* Louis 
L. Jaffe, English and American Judges as Law-Makers, oxford 
1969, 19.
Supreme Court imported 'Natural law' into the 'due process'
clause to secure property rights. That was in the last 
century and it is not likely that the United States Supreme 
Court or any other court in any other country, would, seek 
to rely on notions such as that to secure any right. It 
should also be clear that whatever the expression, it is 
open to us to urge judicial restraint on particular issues . 
But H.M. Seervai appears to take the view that the question 
of * reasonable' restrictions is a much easier matter for 
decision by Courts than - presumably - 'due process* .
With these departures from the American 
model of the Bill of Rights, the framers 
of our Constitution believed that they 
had removed any possibility of abuse of 
judicial review and had made it a bulwark 
of freedom. No doubt most of the funda­
mental rights were subject to 'reasonable* 
restrictions, and it was for the courts to 
decide what was * reasonable' but to law­
yers brought up in the Anglo-Indian law 
this would cause no uneasiness, for the 
concept of reasonableness ran right 
through the whole law. The reasonable 
main, reasonable doubt, reasonable time, 
reasonable care, reasonable price and 
reasonable notice, had presented no seri­
ous difficulties ... and it was assumed 
that 'reasonable restrictions' would pre­
sent no difficulties ... 104
One of the departures was from 'due process* which Seervai 
mentions in the previous two sentences. The examples given 
by Seervai of reasonable doubt, reasonable care and reason­
able notice are phrases occurring in statutes or case-law,; 
No question of the validity of such phrases arises for con­
sideration. 'Reasonable restrictions', unlike all the
104. seervai, The Position of the Judiciary Under the constitu­
tion of India, University of Bombay, 1970, 57.
examples <£iven by Seervai, will go to the root of a particular 
statue's validity and this is a very great distinction. Seer­
vai's point is that the court will determine whether a doubt 
was reasonable, the care taken was reasonable, etc., and that 
it can equally easily decide whether a statutory restriction 
xs reasonable - but the cases are hardly in pari materia for 
the legislature is not a 'reasonable man'. The court may 
readily decide whether reasonable notice was given, e.g., to 
a particular tenant by his landlord, or whether, under the 
Hindu Marriage Act, ly55, section 9(1), a spouse has with­
drawn from the society of the other 'without reasonable ex­
cuse* (facts would vary widely) but it is quite a different 
operation to decide whether the legislature's curtailment 
of a fundamental right which is of general concern apper­
taining to all persons or citizens has been per se 'reason­
able* • It seems Dr. Ambedkar himself was none too clear 
on this distinction.*05
At all events, it makes hardly any difference whether 
a statute is held invalid because it violated 'due process* 
or because it imposed unreasonable restrictions. The qual­
ity of the exercise is the same and in constitutional terms, 
it will be judicial review. However to repeat, it should 
be always possible to urge judicial restraint where there 
are good reasons for doing so.
The decision in A.K. Gopalan *°^ is often construed
105. See above, 42.
106. AIR, 1950, S.C.27* below, 6o and 223.
to mean that 'due process* could not be invoked in India 
(correct so far) and therefore, the Indian courts' power 
of judicial review is limited (incorrect). Limited with 
reference to what? presumably due process. This seems 
an erroneous process of reasoning but it has been doctrin­
al ly perpetuated.
Indeed, the judicial-review powers as understood in 
the U.S.A. with its own history, traditions and notions are 
different from the Indian courts* powers, given the Indian 
experience or perhaps expectations. There can never be an 
identity in this respect. The Indian Constitutional posi­
tion needs to be examined in its own light without any con­
fusion of thought created by the notion of 'due process' or 
any other test. What matters is judicial review as a fact, 
and that undoubtedly exists under the Indian Constitution.
A notable surmise as to the 'similarity' between the
American and Indian clauses comes from justice Douglas of
the United states Supreme Court. While delivering his
107Tagore Law Lectures in July, 1955, he remarked crypti­
cally in his introduction:
Suffice it to say here that the concepts 
embodied in due process are also embodied 
in Indian constitutional law, where other 
clauses ao service for due process.108
Towards the end of Lecture VIII of the series, Justice Douglas
107. Published as From Marshall to Mukherjea, Studies in A»meri- 
:can and Indian constitutional Law, Tagore Law Lectures, 
Calcutta, 1956.
108. Ibid., 12.
sees a qualitative similarity between the American and Indian 
claus es.
The power is a potent one, because it is 
undefined except by the judiciary itself.
The judiciary today, however, is the ifirst 
to recognize that the Due Process clauses 
should not be used to substitute its judg­
ment on policy for that of the other two 
branches of Government.
The Indian courts have powers narrower 
than ours in some respects and as broad 
as ours in others. There is no Due Pro­
cess clause in the Indian Constitution.
But Article 19(1)(f) and (g) guarantee 
important rights - the right to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property, and the 
right to practice a profession and carry 
on an occupation, trade or business.
(Article 19(5) and (6)); and it appears 
that the supreme court of India is the 
ultimate interpreter of what is reason­
able in a given case. 109
It is intriguing to see this contrast resting exclu­
sively on the rights to property ana occupation, traae, etc., 
while none of the other rights in Article 19 are mentioned.
It is also ironical since it is these two rights that have 
been curbed most by various constitutional amendments in 
the last decade. On that basis, there would be very little 
judicial review in India. But the truth of the matter is 
that five other rights guaranteed by Article 19 have received 
full judicial attention. curbs on the rights to property 
and business do not mean the end of judicial review. Even 
with respect to the two rights there is yet further scope 
for judicial review as the law-reports clearly demonstrate.
109. Ibid., 225, emphasis added.
This writer's view is that comparison between the 
Indian 'reasonableness* clause and the American 'due pro­
cess' clause is likely to be inconclusive and therefore, 
the scope of review under the Indian clause has to be esti­
mated independently. Broad similarities between the two 
clauses can, however, be usefully drawn where one is look­
ing for confirmation on doubtful points. However, 'due 
process' continues to figure in discussions on judicial re­
view in India because it was first considered and then 
dropped by the Indian constituent Assembly. Whatever 
the reason, there have been repeated references to 'due 
process' by Indian writers and, as pointed out above, by 
Indian courts. Though our reasoning is adequte, the con­
cept cannot simply be dismissed on historical grounds.
An important Indian commentator, Dr. D. Basu, has
consistently maintained that in their essential nature the
'due process* idea and the 'reasonableness* notion are simi- 
110lar. Provided we follow him at his chosen level of dis­
cussion, it must be admitted that American material is in­
structive. Recently, he has put this view forward again 
in these words:
If the concept of 'due process* be founded 
on the universal principles of justice, it 
cannot but be that its essentials must 
enter into our constitutional jurispru­
dence, even though we may not agree with 
its detailed application to particular 
situations, or the scheme of our Consti­
tution may not permit our judges to use"
110. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 1950, 
1st edn., 71-72, the same, 5th edn., Calcutta, 561-574. 
►Basu was a Judge of the Calcutta High Court.
it to the jfaH length to which it has been 
stretched by the American supreme Court.
(Italics original), ill
Dr. Basu has sought to substantiate his point by actually
tabulating the rationes in the United states and Indian
cases, thus highlighting the similarities between the two 
112claus es .
Despite our conclusion above, it is necessary there* 
fore, to examine some at least of the United states deci­
sions by way of illustration of the manner in ttfiich 'due 
process' figures in them. It is also essential to appre­
ciate and render meaningful the comparison - however loose 
it may be - between the 'due process* and 'reasonable re­
strictions' clauses.
'Due process' became famous, or perhaps infamous,
with the 'New Deal* cases but its history predates the iNew
Deal. The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United states Constitution appears to have attracted the
attention of the legal profession and the bench to this
clause though it has always been present in the Fifth
113Amendment to the Constitution. The early decisions
111. Basu, Limited Government and Judicial Review, Tagore Law 
Lectures, Calcutta, s.c. Sarkar, 1972, 216-17.
112. Ibid., 226-30.
113. Fifth Amendment (1791): "No person shall ... be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Fourteenth Amendment (1868): "No State shall ... deprive 
any person of life,' liberty or property, without due pro­
cess of law."
of the United States^ Supreme court in cases involving indus-
114trial and trade regulations such as the slaughter-house cases
115and Munn v. Illinois, show the court1 s deference to legis­
lative wisdom and policy and its reluctance to act as a censor 
in those matters*
The change in the Supreme Court1 s stand, from such 
caution to a fairly aggressive display of its powers, is 
attributed to a number of factors such as the rising American 
capitalism, and the views expressed by the American Bar Asso­
ciation favouring restricted use of legislative power so as
H Ato let the business enterprises grow as they wished* it
is beyond the scope of this work to go into the many and 
complex details of this change* However, the following 
decisions illustrate how the changed version of the court’s 
jurisdiction worked.
To start with an early case, Chicago Milwaukee and
117St* Faul Railway Co*, v. Minnesota, the respondent State 
had enacted a law establishing a commission to fix "equal 
and reasonable rates of charges for the transportation of
property". In other words, the Commission was to fix freight
114. 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed* 394 (1873).
115. 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77, (1877).
116. See Alpheus X. Mason and william M.Beaney, American Consti­
tutional Law, 5th Edn., New Jersey, 1972, 323-3^8.
117. 134 U.S. 418, 33, c.Ed. 970 (1890). The case is regarded
as the one which opened the chapter on ’due process’ of law. 
See i^ aul A. Freund, On Law and Justice, Cambridge, Mass., 
1966.
charges that it considered reasonable which was done in the 
appellant’s case. The statute provided the manner in which 
such freight-rates were to be computed by the commission.
But there were no provisions for a formal notice or hearing 
afforded those affected by the rates-determination.
There was, therefore, scope for saying that procedural 
due process was absent. The supreme court went further and 
held that even the 1 reasonableness* of the charges fixed was 
reviewable judicially.
The question of reasonableness of a rate 
of charge for transportation by a railroad 
company, involving as it does the elements 
of reasonableness both as regards the com­
pany and as regards the public, is emi­
nently a question for j'udicial investiga­
tion, requiring due process of law for 
its determination. 118
Thus what was intended to be a determination by an admini­
strative body was turned into a decision by the Judiciary 
as any other substantive constitutional matter.
The dissenting opinion was that, “the legislature 
either fixes the charges at rates which it deems reasonable; 
and it is only in the latter case, where what is reasonable 
is left open, that the courts have jurisdiction of the sub- 
ject."119
120Lochner v. New York is perhaps the most frequently
118. 134 U.S. 418, 458.
119• lbid« » 462 •
120. 198 U.S. 45, 49 C.Ed. 937 (1905).
61.
quoted decision contrasing the misuse by the majority, on 
the one hand, and the correct use by the minority - parti­
cularly Justice Holmes - on the other, of the *due process* 
Jurisdiction. A New York law limited to ten hours a day 
and 60 hours a week the working time in bakeries and con­
fectionary establishments. The appellant, a bakery owner, 
challenged the law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority upheld the challenge. They thought it 
was an unconstitutional interference with the ’liberty of 
contract* and therefore, in violation of due process.
The general right to make a contract in 
relation to his business is part of the 
liberty of the individual protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578. 121
We do not believe in the soundness of 
the views which upheld the law. On the 
contrary, we think that such a law as 
this, although passed in the assumed 
exercise of the police power, and as 
relating to the public health or the 
health of the employees named, :is not 
within that power, and is invalid. 122
In other words, whatever the State legislature might have 
thought about the law the Judges thought the law did not 
relate to public health.
Clean and wholesome bread does not 
depend upon whether the baker works 
but ten hours per day or only sixty 
hours a week.
121. 198 U.S.45, 53.
122. 198 U.S. 45, 61.
62.
According to this view, bread prepared by bleary-eyed and 
tired men and women would still be wholesome bread.
Justice Holmes and three other justices dissented. 
Holmes* dissent began with the finger pointing at the 'in­
articulate maj'or premise* of the roaj'ority decision, ’’This
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
123of the country does not enter tain.11
That a dogmatic view or liberty of contract underlay 
the majority decision could not be denied.
While determining the constitutionality of statutes, 
judges should never identify themselves with any theory 
whatsoever, thought Justice Holmes.
But a constitution is not intended to 
embody a particular economic theory, 
whether of paternalism and the organic 
relation of the citizen to the State or 
of laissez faire. It is made for people 
of fundamentally differing views, and the 
accident of our finding certain opinions 
natural and familiar, or novel, and even 
shocking, ought not to conclude our judg­
ment upon the question whether the statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitu­
tion of the United States. 124
To complete Justice Holmes’ view of the court’s ’due process’ 
jurisdiction:
I think that the word ’ liberty* , in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when 
it is held to prevent the natural out­
come of a dominant opinion, unless it 




man necessarily would admit that the 
statute proposed would infringe funda­
mental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our 
people and our law.
A reasonable man might think it a pro-
per measure on the score of his health.
The majority too, thought in terms of what was reasonable
and what was not. These two cases so far considered would
show that the primary question under the 1 due process* test 
is: *»ls the restriction imposed reasonable?'* Yet this simi­
larity need not make the Indian and United states clauses 
identical, i.e. the scope of Judicial review need not be 
the same, more or less. One is not the yardstick for the 
other.
126Adkins v. Children's Hospital is yet another
example of the majority in the United states Supreme Court 
invalidating a law on the basis of * liberty of contract*•
In this case, it was a minimum wages law passed by Congress 
and the majority felt it imposed unreasonable burdens on the 
employer and in any case, interfered unnecessarily between 
employer and employee.
The law takes account of the necessi­
ties of only one party to the contract.
It ignores the necessities of the em­
ployer by compelling him to pay not 
less than a certain sum ... 127
125. Ibid.. 76.
126. 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
127. Ibid, 1 ^ 7 .
64.
Justice Holmes* dissent once again emphasised the need 
to respect legislative policy and wisdom. The belief enter­
tained by Congress in the efficacy of the law in what it 
sought to achieve, thought Justice Holmes, “may be held by 
reasonable men*1. These decisions give the impression that 
the Supreme Court considered the preservation of vested in­
terests important. It was prepared to express opinions 
clearly showing its preferences. There was no evidence 
that well-established principles of interpretation were 
applied in a systematic manner.
The view of the majority in the three cases so far
discussed contrast well with what the maj’ority in West Coast
128Hotel Co. v. Parrish conceived to be the scope of due 
process.
Liberty in each of its phases has its 
history and connotation. But the 
liberty safeguarded is liberty in a 
social organization which requires the 
protection of law against the evils 
which menace the health, safety, morals, 
and welfare of the people. Liberty 
under the Constitution is thus neces­
sarily subj'ect to the restraints of due 
process, and regulation which is reason­
able in relation to its subj*ect and is 
adopted in the interests of the commu­
nity is due process ... 129
In the case, a minimum-wage law of Washington similar to the 
one held invalid in Adkins was upheld as a reasonable exer­
cise of police power. Thus one witnessed a change in the
128. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.b.379, 81 L.Ed.703 
(1937), Emphas is added.
129. 300 U.b.379, 391.
65.
Supreme court’s view of ’due process’.
130Perhaps Ferguson v. Skrupa, represents the modern 
view of ’due process*. There . a ’’debt-adjusting” law of 
Kansas was upheld as not an unreasonable exercise of legis­
lative power - something different from a ’ reasonable exer­
cise of power’ .
Ihe doctrine that prevailed in Lochner,
Coppage, Adkins, Burns and like cases - 
that due process authorises courts to 
hold laws unconstitutional when they 
believe the legislature has acted un­
wisely - has long since been discarded.
We have returned to the original consti­
tutional position that courts do not 
substitute their social and economic 
beliefs for the judgment of legislative^^ 
bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
However, the duty to judge the reasonableness of the restrict­
ion imposed on guaranteed rights is still a part of the United 
States Constitution, as is well illustrated by the decisions
on civil liberties of speech, association and fair-trial pro- 
132cedures•
Returning to Indian decisions, we find there are at 
least three given by the Indian Supreme Court which distin­
guish the reasonableness clause in the Indian constitution
130. 372 U.S. 726, L.Ed. 2d 93 (1963).
131. 372 U.S. 726, 730£
132. Git low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927);
United states v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Kd. 2d 484 
(1965), and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 29 L.lid. 2d 
284 (1971). On Association, see N.A.A.C .P. v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1488 (195871 On fair-trial pro- 
cedures, see note 86 to this section.
from ’due process* in the United States Constitution, to draw 
the conclusion that the Indian clause was narrower in its 
scope•
Ihe earliest of these decisions is A.K. Gopalan v.
133Madras which is often relied upon to show the supposedly
narrower scope of Judicial review enjoyed by the Indian 
courts *
A.K. Gopalan denied that the Court had any power under
134Article 21 of the Constitution to read *procedural due
135process* requirements into laws relating to preventive
detention or penal statutes generally* While it was con­
sidering the constitutionality of The Preventive Detention 
Act, 1950, the question was posed before the Supreme Court 
whether * law* in Article 21 meant enacted law (lex) or law 
in the sense of natural law or * due process of law* (jus).
They rejected the view that what was meant was * due process’, 
and accepted that * law* in Article 21 referred to enacted 
law* The Supreme Court pointed out that the framers of the 
fconstitution were anxious to keep ’due process* out and, there­
fore, that clause could not be imported back into the Article 
by implication* So far they were right* But the learned
133* AIR, 1950, S.C. 27.
134. **21. Protection of life and personal liberty - JNo person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.**
135. See K.K. Nigam, ’Due process of Law: A Comparative Study 
of Procedural Guarantee Against Deprivation of Personal 
Liberty in the U.S. and India*, (1962) 4 J.I.L.I. 99.
Judges forming the majority in the case went on to hola that 
the Court’s power of review was limited in any case, not 
merely because ’due process* has been dropped but also be­
cause under the scheme of Article 19, the Constituent Assembly 
had spelt out the grounds on vtfiich ’reasonable restrictions' 
could be imposed by a Legislature* In their view, both 
these points were clearly indicative of a narrower scope 
for judicial review under the Indian Constitution* It is 
difficult (with hindsight) to see how the spelling out of 
the grounds referrea to could make the judicial task of re­
view any narrower or easier*
It has already been mentioned that the framers wanted 
little judicial interference with certain social ana property 
legislation* The constitutional experts in the Assembly 
did not like the expression ’due process’. When one exam­
ines the kind of legislation they had in mind, one would 
clearly see that they affect only the funaamental rights 
to property and to some extent, the right to trade and 
business* But, as we have seen, Article 19 guarantees 
other rights besides* Therefore, could one justifiably 
derive the conclusion, as the Supreme Court seems to have 
done, that the Indian Courts were to exercise a narrower
or limited judicial review with respect to every consti-
iM*
tutional matter that might comejjfor consideration? It 
is necessary to confine the anxieties of the framers to 
what they regarded as essential socio-economic measures 
which could have proved, in their operation, incompatible 
with a wholehearted guarantee of rights to property or
1
trade and business.
It is true that the framers also, however reluctantly, 
acknowledged that in India preventive detention laws were 
necessary even in normal times* Thus it was provided for 
in Article 22 of the fundamental-rights part* Under these 
circumstances, the Gopalan court could not but say that there 
was no question of examining the reasonableness of the pre­
ventive detention law impugned before the Court.
But meanwhile the dictum on the scope of judicial re­
view was too sweeping* It is not surprising that the Supreme
court subsequently disapproved of Gopalan1s stance on judicial
137review of restrictions upon fundamental rights.
’Vagueness 1 and Unreasonableness
The second decision to be considered is on a narrow
specific point. The question that arose in Amritsar Muni-
138cipality v. Punjab was whether vagueness in a statute 
could be an in firmity justifying a constitutional challenge*
The statute impugned before the Court, The Punjab Cattle- 
fairs (Regulation) Act, 1968, contained no definition of a
136. K. Subba Rao, both as a judge and then chief Justice of 
India, made it part of his view of fundamental rights that 
the only major exception to judicial review of the rights 
was matters relating to ’agrarian reform’. This view ac­
corded with the wishes of the Constituent Assembly* It 
certainly would have made Indian fundamental rights more 
meaningful. But recent amendments, particularly the 25th 
Amendment may have over-ruled the case where K. Subba Rao J • 
expressed his view, K.K. Kochuni v. Madras & Kerala, AIR, 
1960, S.C. 1080. See below, Ch.3, section 2.
137. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR, 1970, S.C. 564 (1970),
3 s.C.R. 530, bee below Section 1(a), chapter 2.
138. AIR, 1969, S.C.1100.
cattle-fair but purported to give the State a monopoly in con­
ducting cattle-fairs. The Punjab High Court had struck down 
the Act as unreasonable on account of vagueness. The Supreme 
Court disapproved of the High Court decision because in its 
view ’vagueness* as a ground of challenge was associated with 
’due process’. Since there was no question of ’due process’, 
i.e., no question of the Indian Courts exercising such wide 
powers of review (relying on A.K. Gopalan), they would not 
entertain the plea. The Supreme Court was prepared to read 
a definition of * cattle-fair’ into the Act but the State Legis­
lature had, in the meanwhile, supplied a definition in a new 
revised Act.
In England, when this same plea had been raised in
iqq
Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council. no refer­
ence was made to * due process’ or any less foreign-sounding 
equivalent.
In granting planning permission to a farmer to build 
cottages for farm-labourers the respondent Council attached 
a condition that they should be used only for the purpose of 
occupation by ’members of the agricultural population*. The 
reason behind the condition being the cottages might not be 
used for any purpose likely to spoil the landscape. The 
appellants, a property company which bought the cottages, 
attacked the condition as unreasonable because the meaning 
of the expression ’agricultural population’ was vague and 
uncertain.
139. L.R. (1961) A.C.636.
The majority in the House of Lords rejected the plea
that uncertainty would be a ground for holding the condition
void. Lord Denning amongst the majority hela that a court
should give a construction to ambiguous words that would
render them valid unless the words were totally meaningless 
140or absurd. At a more general level, Lord Denning made
a distinction between uncertain and meaningless expressions
in statutes. He held that there were no cases to support
the plea that uncertainty would be a ground of challenge but
held that meaninglessness could be a basis for striking down 
141the provision.
Referring to uncertainty, Lord Cohen who concurred 
with Lord Denning held:
It is based in the main on the principle 
relating to penal provisions of a statute 
which was concisely stated by ... Visccunt 
Simonds, in London & N.E. Rly. co. v.
Berriman (1946 A.c. 278, 313-14) in these 
words: * A man is not to be put in peril 
upon an ambiguity*. ... but the court 
should not, I think, strike a provision 
out of an Act on the ground of uncertainty 
unless it is impossible to resolve 
ambiguity which it is said to contain.
But Lord Morton, dissenting held the condition void 
for uncertainty. He approved of the decision given by the 
Court of Appeal below holding the condition void for un-
140. Relying on Manchester Ship canal Co. v. Manchester Race 
Course (1900) 2 ch.35^, 366-1, and R. v. Saddlers^ Co. 
(1963) 10 H.L.C. 404, 463.
x 'fco141. He referred/the following authorities: R. v. King (1826)
2 C & P. 412; Green v. Wood (1845) 7 Q.B. 178, and Salmon 
w. Duncombe (1886) 11 A.C. 627 (P.C.).
142. L.R. (1961) A.C. 636, 662.
n .
143certainty. it is clear that both uncertainty and meaning­
lessness of statutory expressions present a problem of con­
struction. Admittealy, a court should try to construe the
uncertainty in a manner consistent with the continued opera­
tion of the statutory provision concerned. If it is unable 
to do so it has no alternative but to strike out the provi­
sion.
Reverting to Indian Law, the bupreme court in Harak-
144 iar
chand v. Union, notwithstanding Amritsar Municipality 
(above, 68) proceeded to hold beetion 27 of the Gold (Control) 
Act, 1968, unreasonable because of vagueness. The Act was 
passed to combat the effects of widespread smuggling of gold 
into India where the demand and consequently, the price paid 
for gold were high. The Preamble provided that it was:
An Act to provide in the economic and 
financial interests of the community, 
for the control of the production, 
manufacture, supply, distribution, use 
and possession of, and business in, 
gold, ornaments and articles of gold 
and for matters connected therewith 
or incidental thereto.
Section 27 provided:
On receipt of an application for the 
issue of a licence under this section, 
the Administrator ... (may) either issue 
or renew the licence, or reject the ap­
plication ... (if) having regard to the 
following matters, is satisfied that the
143. [1959] Oh.543.
144. AIR, 1970, S.C.1453.
145. AIR, 1969, b.O. 1100.
licence should be issued or renewed, 
namely:-
(a) the number of dealers existing in 
the region in which the applicant 
intends to carry on business;
(b) the anticipated demand as estimated 
by him, for ornaments in that region 
• • • (c) «« « (d__ . « .
(e) the suitability of the applicant;
•••••••
(g) the public interests.
All the underlined words were held by the Supreme Court to be 
incapable of any objective assessment and therefore, bound to 
lead to uncertainty. They imposed unreasonable restrictions 
on the right guaranteed by Article I9(l)(g).
146Very soon in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India the Su­
preme Court was asked to examine the rules framed under Cinema­
tograph Act, for vagueness. It proceeded to do so on the 
basis that vagueness could be a ground of challenge. When 
its attention was drawn to Amritsar Municipality and the view
expressed there, the Court speaking through Hidayatullah C .J.
147
distinguished it as obiter and therefore, inapplicable.
The law as enunciated by the Supreme Court was very
close to the reasoning of the House of Lords in Fawcett Pro- 
148perties. It was held that a court should give a construct­
ion, 1 as far as may be, language permitting1, that would 
accord with the intention of the Legislature. But where
146. AIR, 1971, S.C. 481.
147. nThes:e » observations which are clearly obiter are apt to be 
too generally applied and need to be explained. While it 
is true that the principles evolved by the Supreme Court of 
the U.S.A. in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were eschewed in our Constitution ..., it cannot be said as 
an absolute principle that no law will be considered bad for 
their vagueness.11 Ibid., 496, Col. 1-2.
148. L.R. (1961) A.u. 636, above 69
such a construction was not possible, and there was uncer­
tainty, then invalidity would arise because of the ’proba­
bility of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the 
individual* . On the point about the association of vague­
ness with * due process* , he held:
While it is true that the principles 
evolved by the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America in the appli­
cation of the 14th Amendment were es­
chewed in our Constitution and instead 
the limits of restrictions on each 
fundamental right were indicated in 
the clauses that follow the first 
clause of the nineteenth Article, it 
cannot be said as an absolute prin­
ciple that no law will be considered 
bad for sheer vagueness. 149
The matter, however, does not end there. In a recent
decision, the Indian supreme Court had thrown doubts on the
150question by indicating that it prefers to keep it open.
In view of the strong decision in K.A. Abbas, the Court is 
surely having its doubts, if it is going to keep the matter 
open.
It seems clear that at least one of the reasons for 
these doubts is the intrusion of *due process* into the dis­
cussion of issues before the Court which could have been de­
cided without any such distractions.
This writer is inclined to support the treatment of 
the question of vagueness in K.A. Abbas. Vagueness in a
149. Ibid., 496. As a matter of law, the present writer does 
not challenge either the decision or the dictum.
150. Maharashtra v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha, AIR, 1973, o.C. 588, 
(1973) II, S.C .J. 224.
statutory instrument should, as a last resort, be a potential 
ground for constitutional invalidity. There are, in fact, 
some High Court decisions on thevery point, but none of them 
was referred to in the Supreme Court decisions* It is pro­
posed now to deal with two of these High Court decisions*
In Ajablal v* Bihar Section 8(1) of the Bihar 
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, enabled the State 
Government to impose * a collective fine1 if it appeared to 
the Government that the inhabitants of any area were concern­
ed in the commission of offences prejudicial to the mainten­
ance of public order. The Patna High Court, following
152 153Screws v* U.S. and Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, held
that a statute imposing a penalty for a course of conduct
must be sufficiently definite so that the parties affected
might have notice as to the conduct it was necessary to
follow to avoid so large a penalty*.
154In the second case, the following condition in 
the Mysore Foodgrains (Wholesale) Dealers Licensing Order, 
1964, . was impugned:
The licensee shall not -
(i) enter into any transaction involving 
purchase, sale or storage for sale of 
foodgrains in a speculative manner, 
prejudicial to the maintenance and 
easy availability of supplies of food­
grains in the market*
151. AIR, 1956, Patna, 137.
152. (1944) 325 U.S. 91, 95.
153. (1952) 343 U.S. 495.
154. A.K.A. Chetty & Sons v. Mysore, AIR, 1970, Mys. 289*
The expression * speculative manner* or ’speculation* was not 
defined in the Order. The Mysore High Court held that **in 
the absence of specific criteria for determining what trans­
actions are speculative tbe condition ... in the license 
must be held to be void on account of vagueness ...” It 
was held that the impugned condition as it stood might be a 
laudable moral injunction, but it was legally invalid. The 
Court accepted the petitioner’s argument that such vague 
conditions might mean harrassment of traders by state auth- 
rities. Therefore, it was held that buying and selling in 
the normal course of trade and doing so in a ’speculative 
manner* must be distinguishable by some definite criteria.
This, it is submitted, is a correct decision and the 
condition was rightly held invalid on account of vagueness. 
One hopes the Indian Supreme Court would see its way to 
accepting this position without bringing in considerations 
of * due process* .
Finally, in the area of property-rights, references 
to doctrines allied to the *due process* concept, such as 
police powers and eminent domain have been positively mis­
leading, as shown by the confusing judgments delivered in
155the early cases where these doctrines were invoked to
explain Indian provisions.
In view of the intention of the framers, these refer­
ences looked particularly uncalled for. This was perhaps
155. Subodh Gopal v. West Bengal; Dwarka Prasad v. Shoalapur. 
See below, Chapter tfc, section 2. see P.K. Tripathi, 
Some insights into Fundamental Rights, 216-230.
realised by the Indian Supreme Court and in cases later than 
1954, such references ceased to appear in its Judgments.
In conclusion, it has to be emphasised that it was not
the intention in this section to repudiate the relevance of
United States decisions based on 'due process1 to problems
155a.faced by Indian courts. Indeed, as will be seen below, 
in the area of free speech, United States decisions have been 
freely referred to by Indian courts. For comparative pur­
poses, United States or indeed, any other relevant material, 
may be- consulted by Indian courts.
The main burden of the section has been to show how 
comparison with 1 due process1 has become an unnecessary part 
of Indian constitutional discussions. Such a comparison has, 
at the moment, resulted in a distorted view of the scope of 
judicial review in the Indian Constitution. The scope of 
review in India - the power to pronounce restrictions un­
reasonable - should be determined without reference to fdue 
process1.
Section 3 ; The Role of Reasonableness in English Law
it has already been mentioned in the introduction that 
the intellectual ancestry of the notion or reasonableness lies 
in English law. For that reason, and because Indians were 
familiar with that notion when their Constitution was framed, 
it is proposed to discuss the English legal position.
155a. Chapter 3, Section 1.
The term * reasonable* is unique in that it is used in
both popular and legal speech in the same or closely similar
senses. While most vague terms are given a consistent shape
by the legal process, this term has eluded such treatment.
1 AException has been taken to this * vague and ugly phrase*
157both in England and from time to time in India. Notwith­
standing such adverse comments, the term continues to appear 
in English as well as in Indian statutes. Quite clearly, 
the draftsmen find it convenient to use it. ’Reasonable* 
and other cognate terms, such as ’fair*, ’prudent* and iin­
telligible* are used in judgments given in both countries. 
Every time one such expression is used, it represents not
just one idea but several, all of which are subsumed under
* 158 the term.
156. This was how the term was described at the meeting of the 
War Policy Committee (13th November, 1939) where the possi­
bility of using the formula, ’’reasonably satisfied1* in the 
regulation that subsequently became famous# in Liversidge v. 
Anderson (1942) A.C. 206, viz., Reg.l8-B, of the Defence 
(General) Regulations, 1939 - was discussed. This informa- 
tion and many others relating to the background to Liver­
sidge is provided by Professor R.F.V. Heuston, »Liversidge 
v. Anderson: Two Footnotes’, (1971), 87 L.Q.R., 161, 163.
157. In India, the objections raised by K.M. Munshi, Reverend 
^icols Roy ^ d  T.T. Krishnamachari are noteworthy. See 
above, section 1. Professor Alan Gledhill called the notion
of ’reasonableness* a ’priggish abstraction developed in the 
law of negligence’, De L*Independance Politique, op.cit., 
note 31 above, 249.
158. When such an expression is used in a Constitution, the im­
plications are enormous. ’’The conflicting ideas are repre­
sented by satellite categories which interpret the written 
word. No one satellite concept can control. The major 
words written in the document are too ambiguous; the ideals 
are too conflicting, and no interpretation can be decisive.” 
Edward H. Levi, An introduction to Legal Reasoning, Chicago, 
1948, 13th reprint, 1970, 60.
15«
The concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term as 
follows s
a.i. Endowed with reason, reasoning (rare).
2. Sound of judgment, sensible, moderate, 
not expecting too much, ready to listen 
to reason.
3. Agreeable to reason, not absurd, within 
the limits of reason, not greatly less 
or more than might be expected, inexpen­
sive, not extortionate, tolerable, fair 
... (after L rationabilis). 160
Sir Frederick Pollock, who was one of the few writers to keep 
alive the link between the concept of Natural Law and the 
English legal system, defines the term ’reasonable1 as
an ideal standard, which cannot be pre­
cisely defined, but is none other than the 
general consent of right-minded and 
rightly informed men which our ancestors 
in the profession called reason, and con­
tinental doctors the law of nature ...
In modern terms, we say that the duty of 
the court is to keep the rules of law in 
harmony with the enlightened common-sense 
of the nation. 161
Reasonableness is, perhaps, the principle that stands 
for harmony. What Sir c.K. Allen says may add to our under­
standing of the term:
159. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964.
160. Raphael Powell, ’The Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Man’, 
(1957) 10 Current Legal Problems, 104, demonstrates through 
cases that none ox xhese nfdAnings are adequate. He quest­
ions the adequacy of the notion of ’reasonable man’ itself.
161. ’Judicial caution and valour’ (1929), 45 L.Q.R. 293, at 294-5 
Also quoted in F.e. Dowrick, Justice According to the English 
Common Lawyers, London, Butterworths, 1961, ?5. The author 
discusses the idea of reasonableness mostly in his chapter 
on ’Moral Justice’,thus perhaps indicating the moral basis 
of the idea.
The conception of harmony is a dominant 
theme in every aspect of justice and in 
every treatment of it, ancient and modem.
It vibrates through the Greek exalt at dbon 
of sophrosyne or moderation, as a capital 
virtue, and m  Aristotle’s identification 
of justice with a form of the golden mean. 
Subjectively, it is that balance or poise 
of self-government which is the true, in­
deed the only, disposition or hexis, of 
justice. 162
’Balance’ may convey to some the impression that there is 
a desire to maintain the status quo. That impression may 
not be correct. An element of innovation cam be compatible 
with ’harmony*.
Other older writers have also discussed the notion of 
* reasonableness*.
It would be unreasonable to expect an 
exact definition of the word ’reason­
able’ . Reason varies in its conclusions 
according to the idiosyncracy of the indi­
vidual, and the times and circumstances in 
which he thinks. The reasoning which 
built up the old scholastic logic, sounds 
now like the jingling of a child’s toy.
But mankind must be satisfied with the 
reasonableness within reach; and in 
cases not covered by authority, the ver­
dict of a jury (or the decision of a judge 
sitting as a juryj^ usually determines what 
is ’reasonable* in each particular case; 
but frequently reasonableness ’belongeth 
to the knowledge of the lawj and. there- y ?
fore, to be decided by the justices. 163
It is essential to make a note of one more observation 
of Sir Frederick Pollock.
There is much to be said of the function 
of natural or universal justice, including 
the idea of reasonableness in its various
162. Aspects of Justice, London, Stevens, 1958, 15.
163. Coke upon Littleton, 18th Edn., by Hargrave & Butler.
branches, in the later developments of 
our system. In particular an important 
part has been played by natural law, 
under the name of ’justice, equity and 
good conscience’, or otherwise in the 
extension of English legal principles 
under British political supremacy, but 
beyond English or Common Law jurisdict­
ion. 164
While the main interest of this work lies with the 
’idea of reasonableness in its various branches’ in English 
Law, a brief mention should be made of the other idea re­
ferred to by the eminent author; ’Justice, equity and good 
conscience’ played a crucial role in Hindu Law,165 and 
a less conspicuous part in the law of contract, transfer 
of property and trusts.in India. The concept is clearly 
wider than the idea of reasonableness and has been shown to 
be of Romano-Canonical origin. It does not play any part 
in the interpretation of the Indian Constitution.
Reasonableness unlike equity is not entirely a matter 
of the judge’s conscience, or at least that is not the ex­
plained basis of the notion. This is not to deny their 
possible common origin in the theory of Natural Law.
Dowrick tells us that earlier Common lawyers, such as 
Littleton, Coke, St. Germain and Shepherd of late medieaval
164. Pollock, Essays in the Law, Lonaon, Macmillan, 1922, 61.
165. See J.D.M. (Derrett, ’Justice, Equity ana Good Conscience’ 
in J.N.D. Anderson, ed., Changing Law in Developing Coun- 
tties, London, Allen & Unwin, 1963, 114. A slightly modi- 
fied version appears in ( ,1962 ) 1 Bombay L.R. Journal,129.
166. See for example, section 46, Indian Contract Act, 1872, and 
the invocation of ’Justice, Equity and good conscience* in 
relation to it in Bank of India v. Chinoy, AIR, 1950, P.C. 
90 and Pandrangi Gopalan v. Chinnayya, AIR, 1958, A.P.630.
or early modern times "took into account at least occasion­
ally as one factor in law-making and the judicial process, 
their own estimate of what was agreeable to citizens gener-
1 67
ally or to the majority of the class of persons affected.”
This idea was expressed vigorously by Parke, J. in the 
early part of the nineteenth century:
Our common law system consists in applying 
to new combinations of circumstances those 
rules of law we derive from legal principles 
and judicial precedents; and for the sake 
of attaining uniformity, consistency, cer­
tainty, we must apply those rules when they 
are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient 
to all cases which arise; and we are not at 
liberty to reject them, and to abandon all 
analogy to them, in those to which they have 
not yet been judicially applied, because we 
think that the rules are not as convenient 
and reasonable as we ourselves could have 
devised. it appears to me of great import­
ance to keep this principle of decision 
steadily in view, not merely for the deter­
mination of the particular case, but for the 
interests of law as a science. 168
This affirmation of 1he judicial discretion and the almost 
immediate qualification of it by a caveat has characterised 
English Law on this point. Mere affirmation of the dis­
cretion without qualifying statements, perhaps, could make 
it appear a very wide judicial power. The principle of 
Parliamentary supremacy apart, the analytical and positivist 
elements dominating English Law will find any such judicial 
discretion unacceptable.
167. Dowrick, op.cit.t 114-5.
168. Mirehouse v. Kennel1 (1833), 8 Bing. 490, 515-6, quoted 
in Dowrick, op.cit., 181-2.
169Sir C.K. Allen, for example, disapproves as being 
too wide, Brett J fs dictum in Robinson v. Mollett (1875) 
that the Court had a duty to pronounce “unreasonable, con­
trary to law and void a business custom that infringed a 
’fundamental principle of right ana wrong’, or a custom so 
entirely in favour of one side in a transaction as to be 
fundamentally unjust to the other.” English Courts must 
clearly have felt the need to so pronounce upon commercial 
manners and customs in the rapidly expanding economy of 
England at that time. This is similar to the need felt 
by Indian Courts to pronounce upon social and religious
customs in nineteenth and early twentieth century India.
170J.W. Gough discussing this point affirms the juris­
diction of the English Courts to so declare customs un­
reasonable, and goes so far as to say that it is ”one of 
the oldest ’fundamental’ ingredients in common law.”
Indian law notoriously cuts down alleged customs if they
171are shown to be ’unreasonable'•
169. C.K. Allen, Law in the Making, Oxford Paperbacks, 1961, 
136-7.
170. J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional 
History, Oxford, 1955, £13. The modern principle of 
’reasonableness’ dates back to cases decided about the 
middle of the nineteenth century. See, Raphael Powell, 
’The Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Man*, (1957) 10
Current Legal Problems, 104, 105.
171. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, Bombay, 
Oxford University Press, 1963, para.15*
English Law on ’Reasonableness1
Even at the present time English Courts show an
unwillingness to treat ’unreasonableness’ as an independ-
172
ent head of invalidity - invalidity that is, of subordi-
173nate or delegated legislation. There is no question
of the English courts’ pronouncing upon the reasonableness 
of statutory provisions. Needless to say,this is a vital 
distinction between Indian and English Laws.
English Courts can, however, hold ultra vires an un­
reasonable exercise of statutory power or statutory discret-
174ion. There is an implied requirement that such power
or discretion shall be exercised reasonably. Bye-laws
made in furtherance of statutory enablement and in many
cases, administrative discretion are reviewable on the
175ground of unreasonableness.
172. The plea of ’manifest unreasonableness’ is not easily sub­
stantiated before English Courts.
I73* Associated Provincial Picture v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948)
1 K.B. 223, (1947) 2 All TE.R. 680. The authority of this 
decision has never been doubted. Applied by the House of 
Lords in Smith v. East Elloe, (1956) A.C. 736, 762 and 
Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County council, (1961) A.C. 
636, 660.
174. S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
3rd Edn., London, 1973, 303-4.
175. Alty v. Farrell (1896) 1 Q.B. 636; Westminster Corpn. v. 
London & N.W. Rly. (1905) A.C. 426; Arlidge v. Islington 
Corpn. (1909) 2 K.B. 127; O. Hood Phillips, Consti tut l onal 
and Administrative Law, 4th Edn., 625; C.K. Allen, Law iiT 
the Making, Oxford paperbacks, 1961, 555; S.A. de Smith, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2nd Edn., Penguin, 
1973, 592-4.
Today It is in the field of administrative law that1 Unreason­
ableness * is more frequently invoked. While there is a cate- 
gory described as ’manifest unreasonableness’ English
Courts are not keen on entertaining a plea of unreasonableness 
on its own without anything more specific. The following 
are some of the ways in which ’unreasonableness* could be 
successfully pleaded ana substantiated:
(1) The bye-law or statutory regulation is shown to be
partial and unequal in its operation as between different 
177classes •
(2) While administering the bye-laws or statutory regu­
lation, the authority addressed itself to the wrong questions 
or took into account irrelevant considerations or conversely,
176. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Lord Hailsham),
London, 1973, Vo 1.1, Administrative Law, 72-4. An example 
of manifest unreasonabless would be the dismissal of a red- 
haired teacher because she had r^d hairi This example was 
given by Warrington, L.J. in Shoet v. Poole Corporation, 
[1926] ch.6 6 , 90-1, and referred to by Lord Greene, M.R. in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpora­
tion, (1948) 1 K.B.^ 3 ,  229.
177. Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 Q.B. 91, “But unreasonable in what 
sense? if, for instance, they were found to be partial and 
unequal in their application as between different classes; 
if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith 
if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference 
with the rights of those subject to them as could find no 
justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court 
might well say, ’’Parliament never intended to give authority 
to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires” . 
Lord Russell, at 99-100; Repton school Governors v. Repton 
Rural Dt. Council (1918) 2 K.B. 133; Cumings v. Birkenhead 
Corpn. , (1972) Ch. 12.
relevant considerations were left out of its deliberations
178in arriving at the decision.
(3 ) A statutory discretion ought to be exercised to
further the purposes and policies of the statute concerned.
Deviations may be regarded as evidence of unreasonableness.
Where a minister or a statutory authority does not provide
any reasons at all for his refusal to exercise his statitory
discretion to entertain complaints from those affected by
the operation of the statute, then the Court would assume
179that the refusal was without good reason.
(4) Evidence of bad faith or personal bias would render
130the decisions unreasonable, though the reverse position 
that manifest unreasonableness proves bad faith or bias may 
not follow.
178. Associated Provincial Picture v. Wednesbury Corpn. (1948)
1 K.B. 223 (1947) 2 All TE.K. 680; Pyx Granite v. Minister 
of Housing, (1958) 1 Q.B. 554, (1958) 1 All E.R. 625 (C.A.) 
approved on this point in Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham 
County Council (1961) A.C. 636, (1960) 3 Al 1 E.R. 503; 
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969),
2 A.C. 147, ("1969) , 1 All E.R. 208. On the last case, see 
H.W.R. Wade, ’Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of 
the Anisminic Case*, (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 198-212.
179. Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, E.R. (1968) A.C. 997 
(H.L.).
180. Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971) 2 Q.B. 175, 
(1971) 1 All E.R. 1148 (C.A.).
181. Horrocks v. Lowe (1972) 1 W.L.R. 1625; R. v. Roberts, Ex 
parte Scurr (1924) 2 K.B. 695, 719, see S.A. De wraith, Judi­
cial Review of Administrative Action, 1st Edn., 214.
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Notwithstanding this apparently neat classification, 
the extent of the Court*s review in these cases is not settled, 
even in England, nor, it seems, it is possible to predict it. 
The following words of de Smith, though at first sight obvious, 
are of great weight against the Indian background:
Judicial standards of reasonableness are 
also variable. If a court holds that it 
has jurisdiction to determine the reason­
ableness of an administrative decision, it 
may try to imagine itself in the position 
of the competent authority when the impugned 
decision was taken and then determine what 
would have been a reasonable decision. This 
process may, in practice, verge on de novo 
review of the merits of the decision. At
the other end of the spectrum, it may simply
ask itself whether a reasonable body of per­
sons could possibly have arrived at the im­
pugned decisions; if the answer to that 
question is in the negative the administra­
tive decision will be invalid. 182
A possible obj*ection may be raised here that all these 
points arise in English administrative law and are not rele­
vant to a discussion of the provisions of the Constitution
of India. Firstly, whatever the area a general comparison
will show similarities in the approaches of English and
182aIndian Courts towards the question of unreasonableness.
Clearly, any such comparison must be subj‘ect to the consider­
ation that in India the question is one of * reasonableness* 
of restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Secondly, the distinction between constitu­
tional reasonableness and administrative reasonableness is 
not a valid one since the guarantees in Articles 19 and 14
182. s.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
3rd Edn., 304.
182a.See below, Chapter 3*
of the Indian Constitution can be invoked whether the griev­
ance is based on an administrative order or a legislative
enactment* Thus, the Indian Reasonable restrictions*
183clause has a wider applicability*
Any doubts that may be entertained on this account 
would be dispelled when one considers that English cases on 
* reasonableness* have given rise to the same dilemmas of 
constitutional policy-making which Indian and American 
Courts have faced*
Liversidge v* Anderson
A good illustration is the classic case of Liversidge 
184v* Anderson where the majority in the House of Lords main­
tained that the use of the expression 'reasonable* did not 
always indicate justiciability of the matters the adjective 
qualifies* ihe result of their decision was that the Home 
Secretary had an unhampered discretion to detain persons 
without trial* This power and its approval of it
by the majority though it was at a time when Britain was 
fighting the Nazis was considered drastic by a number of
183* For the purpose of challenge a 'law' abridging a funda­
mental rights has been defined by Article I3(3)a as fol­
lows: *"law* includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, 
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the 
territory of India the force of law.” The following de­
cisions substantiate the point made* In all of them,
Artrle 19 was invoked to impeach what were really admini­
strative orders. Kishanchand Arora v* Commissioner of 
Police, AIR, 1961, S.C.705; Krishna Kumar v. State of J & K a 
A i r, 1967, S.C. 1368; Union v* Anglo-Afqhan Agencies, AIR, 
1968, S.C. 718; Abraham v* Kerala, (1972) K.L.T. 165, and 
Kesava Mills v. Union, AlR, 1973, S.C.389.
184. (1941) 110 L.J.K.B. 724, (1942) A.C.206.
185critics. The regulation in question was 18-B, Defence
(General) Regulations, 1939, issued under the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act, 1939:
(1) If the secretary of State has reason­
able cause to believe any person to be 
of hostile origin or associations or 
to have been recently concerned in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the 
defence of the realm ... he may make an 
order against the person directing that 
he be detained ...
The majority in the House of Lords held that the words,
"the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe11 
meant that in the Secretary's judgment there was reason­
able cause to detain. The decision was his in his sub­
jective judgment and a court could not go into the grounds 
or causes of decision. The petitioner's contention was 
that the words 'reasonable cause' clearly meant there exist­
ed external standards as to the cause. The court could go 
into the grounds supporting the 'cause*. The majority's 
answer, in the words of Viscount Maugham L.C. was:
I am not disposed to deny that in the ab­
sence of a context the prima facie meaning 
of such a phrase as 'if AB has reasonable 
cause to believe' a certain circumstance or 
thing, it should be construed as meaning 'if 
there is in fact reasonable cause for be­
lieving* that thing and if AB believes it^
But I am quite unable to take the view that 
the words'can only have that meaning. 186
185. c.K. Allen, 'Regulation 18-B and Reasonable Clause',
(1942 ) 58 L.Q.R. 232. W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing 
Society, 2nd edn., Penguin, London, 385.
186. [1942] A.C. 206, 219-20.
Still with the majority, Lord Wright answered the same point 
by saying:
I cannot accept that contention, which 
seems to me to subordinate the whole 
substance of the enactment to a single 
word, which itself is ambiguous and in­
conclusive. The word 'reasonable* does 
cbndeed imply instructed and intelligent 
care and deliberation, the choice of the 
course which reason dictates. But the 
choice is not necessarily that of an out­
sider; ...
'Reasonable* connotes a quality or character­
istic. Who is to decide on reasonableness 
is a different matter which depends on the 
circumstances. 187
The lone dissenter, Lord Atkin, was quite emphatic that the
188expression 'reasonable* always meant a court's review.
But in all cases the words indicate an 
existing something the having of which 
can be ascertained. And the words do 
not mean and cannot mean "if A thinks 
that he has". "If A has a broken ankle" 
does not mean and cannot mean "if A 
thinks that he has a broken ankle"; "if 
A has a right of way" does not mean and 
cannot mean " if A thinks that he has a 
right of way". "Reasonable cause" for 
an action or a belief is just as much a 
positive fact capable of determination 
by a third party as is a broken ankle 
or a legal right. 189
The intimate relationship between the expression 'reasonable* 
and the judicial process itself is shown by another remark 
of Lord Atkin:
187. Ibid., 268*
188. His Lordship referred to a number of decisions to support 
this point. Some of them are: Broughton v. Jackson,
(1852) 21 L.J.Q.B. 265, 267-8; Wallace v. W.H. Smith (1914) 
1 K.B. 595; R. v. Secretary of State, Ex parte Lees [1941]
1 K.B. 72. Most of the decisions referred to by him-re- 
lated to police powers of arrest.
189. [1942] A.C. 206, 227-8.
I view with apprehension the attitude of 
judges who, on a mere question of con­
struction, when face to face with claims 
involving the liberty of the subject show 
themselves more executive-minded than the 
Executive. Their function is to give 
words their natural meaning, not perhaps 
in war-time leaning towards liberty, but 
following the dictum of Pollock C.B. in 
Bowditch v. Balchin (1850' 19 L.J. Ex 
337;, 5 ex. 378) cited with approval by 
Lord Wright in Barnard v. Gorman (1941,
110 L.J.K.B. 557; 57 T.L.R. 681) 'in a 
case where the liberty of the subject is 
concerned, we cannot go beyond the natu­
ral construction of the statute.1 In 
this country, amidst the clash of arms, 
the laws are not silent. 190
Thus, Lord Atkin expressed his view of the judicial function. 
ds the task one of protection of civil liberty or is it self- 
restraint in the 'context* of a serious crisis that the Exe­
cutive government and the country have to face? Reference 
to the term 'reasonable* indeed created a dilemma in Liver- 
sidge and continues to create the same difficulty of choice 
in India. This compendious term waits with, as it were, 
its lid open for the judge to fill it I A complete denial 
of review, as did the majority in Liversidge, appears to be 
incompatible with what the term stands for. On the other 
hand, total lack of restraint on the part of the judges and 
thus, an undue interference with the Executive's work would 
itself be unreasonable by the same standards that demand 
some review as the necessary connotation of the term.
Though here Lord Atkin held that the grounds were reviewable, 
in an appeal heard at the same time as Liversidge, he appears 
to have been satisfied with less than strict proof of the
190. Ibid., 244 (Contradicting in the last-quoted words, an 
ironical Roman maxim).
191reasonableness of the grounds.
192Liversldge v. Anderson has not been generally con­
sidered in terms of the differing views held by the majority 
and minority on the judicial function that traditionally 
British Courts have played or are expected to play. The 
majority thought they must look at Parliament's intention 
behind the words. It could not, in their view, have in­
tended that the grounds of detention should be gone into at 
a time when Britain was faced with a serious military threat. 
The 'context* was an over-riding consideration. Lora Atkin 
could not read a contextual meaning into the words of a sta­
tute so as to give the Home Secretary full powers to detain 
persons without trial. To him the law must speak the same 
language in war as in peace. His task as a judge was, "to 
stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on
his liberty by Executive; alert to see that any coercive
193action is justified in law."
Professor Heuston is of the view that the majority 
were correct in their assumption that every statute must be 
construed in its own particular context. He says, "Lord 
Atkin's opinion is based upon the heresy of supposing that
191. Greene v. Home Secretary [1942] A.C. 284. "Lord Atkin, 
therefore, clearly showed.that he was not imposing an ab­
surdly difficult onus of proof on the security authorities, 
and decisively forestalled any criticism that he was theo­
retical, impractical, or lacking in common-sense - always 
serious charges in English public life." R.F.V. Heuston, 
'Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect* (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 33, 
40.
192. (1942) A.C .206.
193. Ibid., 244.
the construction of words in a statute is a matter of law and 
194not of fact.11 But there are ’principles1 of statutory
interpretation which are matters of law and do not vary with 
facts; there may, also, be ’principles* which imply questions 
of both law and fact. The principle on which Lord Atkin re­
lied, namely, in the matter of civil rights,courts cannot give 
to words in statutes more than their natural meaning even in 
emergencies, can be regarded as well-understood.
In any case, the strength of Lord Atkin’s dissent and 
the concern with which it was written makes it difficult for 
us to believe that his disagreement with the majority was 
merely on statutory construction. Zn the subsequent
development of the law in England as well as in many other 
Commonwealth countries, it was the dissent of Lord Atkin
194a
that came to be accepted.
W. Friedmann, a critic of Liversidge, was not impressed
with the fact that the decision was given at a time of emer-
195gency. He proceeds to contrast Liversidge with another
196decision of the House of Lords in Roberts v. Hop wood.
There a local authority fixed the minimum weekly wage of its 
lowest paid employees, whether men or women, at £4/- in
194. (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 33, 64. borne might question whether it 
is a heresy (too much emphasis should not be based on the 
dictum in Re W below, 97\
l94a.Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne (1951) A.C. 6 6 . Ghulam J.ilani v. 
Government of West Pakistan P.L.U. 1967, S.C. 373.




pursuance of the statutory/it possessed to fix the wages T,as 
they may think fit". The House of Lords agreed with the 
district auditor in his objections that the sum fixed was 
so excessive in relation to the cost of living as to amount 
to a gift disguised as wages. It was held that the statu­
tory power should have been exercised reasonably taking into 
account the cost of living as computed through a recognized 
method.
The Borough Council’s contention that it wished to 
be a model employer and therefore, it could not be content 
with cost of living indices was rejected. With evidence 
before them that the cost of living in the post-First 
War period actually dropped the House of Lords had no diffi­
culty in holding that, as they saw it, the power to fix 
wages was exercised unreasonably.
Friedmann points out that Lord Atkinson went so far 
as to condemn ’ eccentric principles of socialist philan­
thropy * which in His Lordship’s view,were responsible for 
the impugned exercise of power. To provide the context, 
Lord Atkinson may be quoted in full:
The Council would, in my view, fail in 
their duty if, ... ... they put aside
all these aids to the ascertainment of 
what was just and reasonable remuneration 
... ... and allowed themselves to be
guided in preference by some eccentric 
principles of socialist philanthropy, or 
by a feminist ambition to secure the 
equality of the sexes in the matter of 
wages in the world of labour. 197
197. Roberts v. Hopwood, L.R. (1925) A.C. 578, 594.
198From this Friedmann draws the conclusion that 
though wedded to a 1 strict’ construction of statutes, the 
House of Lords has not hesitated in establishing other 
canons of construction if the problem before the House 
appeared to justify it. Presumably the reference is to 
Liversidge.
Friecimann has said more. In 1951 he regarded Roberts 
v. Hop wood as a solitary example of the use of judicial power
luo
to frustrate a social purpose.
Writing about it in 1972, he seems far more critical 
of the decision and compares it with those given by the 
United states Supreme Court invalidating Congressional and 
State laws as being in violation of the ’due process’ clause.200
201He refers to Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation 
as another example of a policy decision. There the plaintiff, 
a rate-payer in Birmingham, questioned a scheme of free travel 
provided by the respondent Corporation for certain categories 
of old people. The cost of the scheme was met from out of 
the general rates paid by people like the plaintiff.
His complaint was the Corporation could not thus employ 
its power to benefit a section of the public at the cost of
198. up.cit., note 195 above.
199. W. Friedmann, Laty and Social Change in Contemporary Britain. 
Stevens, 1951, 164-5. He contrasts the decision with Re 
Decision of Walker, (1944) 1 K.B. 644.
200* W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, 2nd edition, Pen­
guin, London, 1972, 393-4, f.n.39. (287, f.n. 62 of the
first Indian reprint, University Book House, Delhi, 1970.)
201. (1954) 3 W.L.R. 990 (C.A.).
the general body of the public. The Corporation argued 
that under the relevant statutory provision, they could 
charge fares for bus travel ’as they think fit’ provided 
they did not exceed a statutory maxima. They interpreted 
their power as enabling them to waive fares in their dis­
cretion. They wished to point out that they had not taken 
irrelevant factors into consideration in devising the scheme 
which they argued was reasonable. There was no equality 
clause subject to which they were required to exercise their 
power - the general principle being authorities empowered to 
levy charges could differentiate.
Jenkins L.J. held for the Court that the objection to 
the Corporation’s scheme arose from the duty it owed to all 
the rate-payers to apply the funds contributed by them for 
general benefit. Though it was not a trustee to its rate­
payers, the Corporation owed ”an analogous fiduciary duty” .
It was not entitled, ’’merely on the strength of a general 
power” to charge different charges to different passengers.
A clear statutory authority was required to do so.
Such power as the Corporation had, meant that the 
transport undertaking should be run along ’’ordinary business 
principles” . The scheme went beyond anything that could be 
reasonably regarded as authorised.
202In comparison with Roberts v. Hopwood the decision 
in Prescott v. Birmingham was less beset with value consider­
ations. The latter could be seen as an application of
202. L.R. (1925) A.C. 578.
’narrow1 ultra vires principle. Was the decision indicative 
of judicial conservatism? It may well be but courts need 
not be criticised for fearing possible misuse of power by 
statutory bodies. Even a laudable act such as the one in­
tended to benefit old folk may set a precedent.for something 
far less laudable and difficult to distinguish from the earlier 
precedent* One may disagree with judicial caution in parti­
cular cases but it is always possible to understand it*
No doubt the three cases discussed so far are remark­
able examples. But an appreciation of policy matters is, 
in any case, necessary before a decision on the reasonable­
ness of action taken under the statute can be given. It 
seems altogether better (because more objective and less 
doctrinarie) to accept this, rather than deny it even on 
grounds of ’strict* or ’technical* ideas of statutory inter­
pretation.
A recent English decision on adoption, though it re­
lates to private law, illustrates the degree of divergent 
opinions amongst Judges on what are really matters of policy. 
Some background is necessary to understand this case. In 
Britain, unmarried mothers or young mothers deserted by their 
partners are known to offer their babies for adoption. Some­
thing that also happens frequently is that they require, 
presumably after a change of heart, their babies to be return­
ed to them whether or not the legal formalities had been com­
pleted. This raises many difficult questions likely to 
arouse feelings, not just of the parties concerned, but of 
the entire community. Is the natural mother to be denied 
her baby? But on the other hand, would it be right to
disappoint the foster-parents who, in most cases, are exem­
plary in the affections they lavish on their adopted children?
203It was against this background that In re W, (An Infant) 
was decided.
Section 5 of the Adoption Act, 1958, was the provision 
relevant to the case:
(1) The Court may dispense with any con­
sent required by para.(a) of section 
4(1) of this Act if it is satisfied 
that the person whose consent is to 
be dispensed with - (a) has abandoned, 
neglected or persistently ill-treated 
the infant; or (b) cannot be found, 
or is incapable of giving his consent 
or is withhholding his consent un­
reasonably. (Italics supplied).
The question was whether the natural mother in the case, who 
appeared to have no matrimonial home, had 1 withheld her con­
sent unreasonably* thus blocking the completion of the adopt­
ion proceedings. Two different benches of the court of 
Appeal had disagreed, in similar cases on what constituted
’withholding consent unreasonably*. Sachs L.J. in the 
204instant case, thouglt it was the culpable behaviour of 
the natural mother that constituted unreasonable be­
haviour enabling the court to waive her consent. Cross L.J. 
of the same bench, interpreted unreasonable behaviour as 
merely indifference towards the infant and its proper care.
In a later case, a different bench of the Court of Appeal
205disagreed with these formulations.
203. [1971] A.C. 682 (H.L.).
204. In Ke W. (An Infant), [1970] 2 Q.B. 589.
205. In Re B. (C.H.O.) An infant (1971) 1 Q.B. 437. A more
’ contextual* standard was prgfexred,thus leaving it to the 
yourt to assess each case in its special circumstances.
The House of Lords disapproved all such singling out 
of factors amounting to ’withholding of consent unreason­
ably’ , It was held that courts should not add explanations 
to embellish language vised by parliament. The test, there­
fore, was ”reasonableness and reasonableness in the totality
o
of circumstances.” The Lord Chancellor observed:
And be it observed, reasonableness, or 
’unreasonableness* where either word is 
employed in English law, is normally a 
question of fact and degree and not a 
question of law so long as there is evi- 207 
dence to support the finding of the court.
It is submitted that too much emphasis should not be 
placed on this dictum since unfortunately, the Lord Chancellor 
has not referred to any authorities in support, and this 
writer was unable to trace a clear precedent that would 
justify the view that reasonableness is not a question of 
law.
The scope and power of the English Courts to hold an 
exercise of statutory power unreasonable can have constitu­
tional implications of considerable interest to Indian stu­
dents. A recent illustration of this is the decision in
206. L.R. (1971) A.C. 682, 699, per Lord Hailsham.
207. CEbid. , 699. In India, the Assam High Court held that 
whether the test of reasonableness under Section 41, 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has been applied properly 
in a case, was not a question of fact precluding review on 
appeal. Sarju Kairi v. Panchananda, AIR, 1959, Assam, 15.
208Cumings v. Birkenhead Corporation. The respondent-
corporation sent out a circular to parents of children 
about to begin secondary education,that if the children 
had attended Roman Catholic primary schools, then they 
would be considered for admission only to Roman Catholic 
secondary schools. The plaintiff parent, and others af­
fected, complained that the corporation discriminated un­
fairly and without lawful justification against one class 
of rate-payers, i.e. Roman Catholic parents and their child­
ren by denying them fair opportunity in the matter of educa­
tion. They argued that the power given the Corporation 
under Section 8 of the Education Act, 1944, was exercised 
unreasonably because it took into account irrelevant con­
siderations (such as the religious affiliation of the 
parents) ana failed to take into account the relevant ones 
(such as the aptitude anu abilities of the children).
There was no evidence that Roman Catholic secondary schools 
were inferior.
Lord Denning M.R. held that it was open to an admini­
strative boay like the Education authority to frame a general 
policy affecting individual cases provided the policy was not
208. L.R. [1972] Ch.12, cf. Bombay v. Bombay Education Society. 
AIR, 1954, S.C. 561, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 568 - a decision aris- 
ing under Article 29(2) of the Indian Constitution: ,!No 
citizen shall be denied admission into any educational in­
stitution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of 
State Funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, lan­
guage or any of them.” And also Madras v. Champakam,
AIR, 1951, S.C. 226. Where admission to colleges was 
allotted according to community and caste, it was held un­
constitutional under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2). The 
cases must be read subject to Article 15(4) introduced by 
the First Amendment, ;1951, below, 199.
unreasonable and was supported by good educational reasons.
j£o here, if this education authority were 
to allocate boys to particular schools ac­
cording to the c olour of their hair, or, 
for that matter, the colour of their skin, 
it would be so unreasonable, so capricious, 
so irrelevant to any proper system of edu­
cation that it would be ultra vires alto- 
gether, and this court would strike it down 
at once. But, if there were valid educa­
tional reasons for a policy, as, for in­
stance, in an area where immigrant children 
were backward in the English tongue and 
needed special teaching, then it would be 
perfectly rcbght to allocate those in need 
to special schools where they would be 2og
given extra facilities for learning English.
The following reason had been given by the respondent-corpor- 
ation in justification of the circular impugned in the case.
The Corporation did not have enough room for all comers. So 
as a temporary measure, they decided to send those from Roman 
Catholic primary schools to secondaries of the same denomina­
tion, since these had ample places. Presumably, the idea was 
that those of the Roman Catholic faith would have less object­
ion to going to such schools than non-Roman Catholics. The 
Court found this a satisfactory reason and upheld the circular 
as reasonable and in reasonable exercise of the power under the 
Education Act, 1944. This was certainly a review of the Cor­
porations decision against the background of public policy as 
the Court understood it.
In India the plaintiffs in such a case would have pro­
bably pleaded Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
Finally, the decision in A.G« v. Independent Broadcasting
209. [1972] Ch.12, 37
210Authority, is another example of recognition of a consti­
tutional liberty of the subject through the operation of the 
court1s power to declare administrative decisions unreason­
able# In this case, an individual citizen sought a writ 
against the respondents to prohibit them from showing in 
their television channels a film that newspaper previews 
had characterised as offensive to decency and morality.
Since it was argued that the feelings of many people would 
be outraged by the film, the Attorney-General was j'oined as 
a party to the action. The main contention in the case was 
that the television authority had not fulfilled their statu­
tory duty to satisfy themselves * as far as possible* and 
1 reasonably* that the film met the statutory requirements 
of proper and fit exhibition to the public.
It was found by the Court that in discharge of its 
duties, the authority must view such films itself before 
exhibition to the public, instead of relying on someone 
else*s opinion of the films. After the court had seen 
the film, it came to the conclusion that the original deci­
sion of the authority to show it was not unreasonable since 
a reasonable body could have done so. The Court had no 
hesitation in putting itself into the respondent’s shoes.
The English notion of reasonableness (or unreason­
ableness) has the greatest claim to be uppermost in the 
minds of the Indian lawyers of the generation of the 1940s
210. [1973] 1 All E.R. 689
who framed the Constitution. These lawyers, more than 
the present-day ones in India were close to most of the 
concepts of the Common Law system. Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to say that the inspirations for the Indian 
* reasonable restrictions* clause lies with the English 
notion.
Bye-Laws and Indian Courts
The current law in India does indeed admit the exist­
ence of the power in Indian Courts to declare bye-laws of 
municipal bodies unreasonable. This would be independent
of the Constitution. A recent example is the decision in
211V.G. Panneerdas & Co. v. Corporation of Madras. where the
212High Court followed the English decision in Kruse v, Johns on 
to uphold a bye-law prohibiting display of advertisements in 
specified places in the City of Madras as not unreasonable.
Many older authorities are referred to by Satya Ranjan
213
Das in his Tagore Law Lectures, 1903.
It is clear from such cases as Ganga iMarain v. The
214Municipal Board of Cawnpoore that two propositions were 
well-established early on in Indian law:
211. (1967) I M.L.J., 253.
212. L.R. (1898) 2 Q.B.91.
213. The Law of Ultra Vires in British India, University of 
Calcutta, 1924.
214. I.L.R. (1897) 19 All. 313.
a) Bye-laws should be strictly construed where they
infringe on the liberties of a subject, ana
b) the powers conferred by bye-laws should be exer­
cised reasonably.
That case arose out of the respondent board*s annoyance at 
the popularity of the plaintiff*s market as compared to 
their own*. They appeared to have made every attempt to 
have his market closed even though his rights and title to 
run the market appeared clearly established in law.
It is worth reproducing the passage in the judgment 
from which the above two propositions have been deduced:
There is another reason against our con­
struing this clause as the Board contends 
we should, and it is this. We do not be­
lieve it is possible that the Legislature 
could have intended to give a power to 
the Board by the exercise of which they 
might confiscate private rights for the 
purpose of increasing their own revenues; 
and that in truth is what the Board has 
been trying to do with regard to the 
plaintiff and his market. The Legis­
lature could not have intended that a 
Municipal Board should, of its own free 
^ will, and at its own ^indiscretion, have
a right to treat that as a nuisance which 
by no possible view could be regarded by 
the public or by the lawyer as a nuisance.
Finally, an old privy council decision in an appeal 
from India provides a link between the principle there esta­
blished and Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.
2
In Gaekwar sarkar v. Gandhi Kachrabhai» the Privy 
Council confirmed a decision of the Bombay High Court that 
where a railway company governed by the Indian Railways Act,
215# lbid« > 323*
216. I.L.R. (1903) 27 Bom. 344.
1 8 9 0, was negligent in constructing an embankment while 
making the railway was liable for damages notwithstanding 
the provision of the Act which immunised the company in 
relation to all authorised work. Lord Macnaghten observed:
Powers of this sort are to be exercised 
with ordinary care ana skill ana with 
some regard to the property and rights 
of others. They are granted on the con­
dition sometimes expressed and sometimes 
understood - expressed in the Act of 
1 8 9 0, but if not expressed always under­
stood - that the undertakers * shall do 
as little damage as possible in the exer­
cise of their statutory powers*. 217
The principle behind Article 19 is similar. The 
legislature while enacting laws of social control shall do 
as little damage as possible to the liberties of the sub­
jects. The Indian judiciary is, if we are to judge from 
its performance, in its own eyes there to see to it.
In conclusion, it may be said that the question of 
reasonableness can be as difficult in English law as it can 
be, ana has been?unaer the Indian Constitution. Though the 
origin of the notion of ’reasonableness* in English law shows 
its lofty connections with such concepts as ’natural law* or 
’reason* in its application by English courts, it is kept 
much closer to the ground and the circumstances under which 
it may be pleaded are laid down in workable terms, if not 
with legal precision.
It is very much to be desired that Indian Courts 
develop similar workable terms under which the law regarding
217• Ibid«» 352•
’reasonable restrictions* could be considered with greater 
predictability and confidence. Indian Courts have gone 
some way towards doing this even though their tasks are far 
more difficult than anything that English courts have to 
face. It is undoubtedly going to be a long process.
Yet another point to emerge In this section is the 
way the wishes of the executive - in the English cases the 
local authorities, such as borough councils - to do some­
thing, be it granting free travel for old folk or giving 
minimum wages, have to be confronted by the Courts. How 
much sympathy or consideration should a Court have towards 
these executive plans while determining the question of 
reasonableness? This is bound to be a crucial factor in 
the Indian constitution. But as we shall see in the next 
section, it is a crucial factor in any system of fundamental 
rights•
Section 4 : European Convention and Restrictions on the Rights
The reason for including this small section is that 
the European Convention - one of the more serious international 
attempts at protection of human rights - offers some instruct­
ive parallels to Indian law on ’reasonable restrictions*. 
Particular attention is paid here to the principle developed 
by the European Commission and the European Court described 
as the doctrine of ’margin of appreciation*. Given this 
limited interest, no comprehensive discussion of the Convention
or its jurisprudence will be gone into. Principally, two
standard works on the Convention are relied upon in giving
218the following information and facts.
Introduction
The reason behind the formation of the Council of 
Europe (5th May, 1949) and the signing of the Convention 
on Human Rights in Rome (4th November, 1950) was the horror 
of the War of 1939-45. The nations of Europe emerging 
from the destruction and suffering resulting from that war 
seemed resolved to prevent recurrence of that history.
The rights guaranteed by the Convention are largely 
based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,
10th December, 1948. Any individual citizen or group or 
institution in any of the member states of the Convention 
may resort to the European Commission only after exhausting 
local or national remedies. The European Commission which 
processes the applications, acts also as a conciliating body 
which attempts a friendly settlement between the individual 
who has come to assert his convention rights and his govern­
ment. If no such settlement could be arrived at, and if 
the Commission feels there is a prima facie case, the appli­
cation is referred to the Committee of Ministers which on 
further consideration may refer it to the European
218. J.E.S, Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969. — — —
Clovis c. Morrisson, Jr., The Developing European Law of 
Human Rights ,Leiden > 1967.
4. 2 1 9Court •
As examples of the rights referred to by the Convention, 
the following selected provisions that bear similarity to 
Indian Fundamental Rights may be reproduced:
Article 9 (1) Everyone has the right to free­
dom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s reli­
gion or beliefs shall be subject to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the in­
terests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.
Article 10 (1) Everyone has the right to free­
dom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without inter­
ference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This Article shall not pre­
vent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema inter­
prises .
219. The following figures indicate the way the stages of the 
Convention work. By 1st August, 1966, there were over 
2,700 applications, ten applications reached the Committee 
of Ministers and only three the European Court itself. 
Therefore, the Commission has done the bulk of the work in 
disposing of 2,690 applications. Information taken from 
Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr., op.cit.
Professor Fawcett, in a lecture delivered at University 
College, Loncton, 14th January, 1971 (as part of the Current 
Legal Problems series), stated that in the early days it 
was feared that too many frivolous applications might pour 
in. This might have been the reason why several stages 
were established before applications reach the European 
Court.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, 
since it carries with it duties ana respon­
sibilities, may be subject to such formali­
ties, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of dis­
order or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputa­
tion or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confi­
dence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 11 (1) Everyone has the right to free­
dom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right 
to form and to join traae unions for the pro­
tection of his interests.
(2) No restrictions shall be placed 
on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are neces­
sary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security of public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or cdLme, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This Article shall not prevent the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the 
armed forces, of the police or of the admini­
stration of the State.
220 221 Professor Fawcett has classified the grounds
on which the restrictions may be imposed as follows:
(a) Order ’national security and territorial integrity’, 
’prevention of disorder or crime’, ’the protection 
of public order* and ’maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary*•
220. Op.cit., 26.
221. He describes them as ’purposes*. But in India one is 
most used to calling them ’grounds of restrictions’ or 
sometimes simply the ’justifying grounds’.
(b) Welfare ’ the economic well-being of the country1 
(Article 8) ana 1 the protection of health and 
moral* s •
(c) Conflict of rights ’protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others* and ’preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence*•
Ihe grounds in the sub-clauses of Article 19 of the 
Indian Constitution may be classified likewise.
Margin of Appreciation
The doctrine amounts to this: in examining the justi­
fications for the restrictions put on the rights of an indi­
vidual by his State, the latter must be allowed a margin of 
discretion in the manner it has ’appreciated* the necessity 
of imposing the restrictions.
The doctrine has its role to play when the Commission
asks the question: ’Are the restrictions covered by one or
more or the 11 except ions” indicated in the provisions of the
convention?* Only after this question is answered does the
commission proceed to examine if those restrictions were such
222as would be ’necessary in a democratic society*.
Thus, when a State says it imposed a certain restrict­
ion, say, on the ground of ’public order’, a margin is allowed
222. See the de Becker case, application number 214/56.
Judgment, 2/th March ly62, Publications of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Judgments and Decisions, Series A, 
published by the Registry of the Court, 1962. See Fawcett, 
op.cit., 215-19.
in the State’s favour before the Commission begins to evalu­
ate the reasonableness of the restrictions.
A possible immediate reaction to this doctrine from 
an Indian or American lawyer may well be that this is simi­
lar to the doctrine of presumption of constitutionality of 
enactments. However, it will be difficult to equate the 
two doctrines. There are similarities but they are not 
on all fours. The ’margin of appreciation* idea is con­
cerned only with the justification for the imposition of 
restrictions while presumption of constitutionality cam 
be wider, embracing the question or legal competence in 
the Legislature which enacted the impugned law.
une other difficulty in any such equation is that 
it is doubtful whether one may apply the general presump­
tion in favour of constitutionality to a provision such as 
Article 19 of the Indian constitution. It cannot be pre­
sumed that legislative restrictions that prima facie violate 
rights are, notwithstanding that, reasonable. The reason­
ableness of restrictions is what the Court has to determine. 
In that context, therefore, the presumption of constitution­
ality can be nothing more than that there is a legislative
entry from which legal competence was derived in passing
223the impugned law. But the question of judicial defer­
ence to the opinions and views of the other two branches of
#
Government is crucial in the determination of the reasonable-
223. See below, Chapter 2, Section 1(b) on Burden of Proof.
ness of the restrictions on Fundamental Rights. This is what 
is behind the 1 margin of appreciation’. Hence, this has a 
greater rete^knce than the doctrine of ’presumption of con­
stitutionality’ to the Indian Article 19. We will return 
to this shortly.
There is another idea present in both the United States 
and in India which may be closer to the ’margin of apprecia­
tion* doctrine.
When it is alleged that a law unconstitutionally dis­
criminates by selecting a subject and leaving out others 
similar to it in imposing a liability or limitation, an 
Indian court may well say that the legislature should be 
presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs 
of its people and the subject it selects is the result of 
what in its experience it conceives to be appropriate.22^
But this has to be confined to the * equality’ guarantee
and could not be fully recognized under a provision like
22 ^
Article 19. 3
commenting on the ’margin of appreciation* idea,
Clovis C. Morrisson Jr. contends that narrowly construed 
the doctrine would be defensible.
Applied very cautiously, the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation Is defensible.
Some latitude must be given the govern-
224. Bombay v. Balsara, AIR, 1951, S.C. 318; Ramakrishna Dalmia 
v. Xendolkar, AIR, 1958, S.C. 538, (1959) S.C.R. 279.
225. See below, Chapter 2, Section 1(b).
ments in difficult situations. But the 
Commission must be very judicious in grant­
ing this latitude. 226
He proceeds to limit the doctrine when he says,
The Commission must always be free to 
question the judgment and the actions of 
the Government if it sees fit. Any ques­
tion of the reasonableness of the grounds 
for the actions should only be raised if 
these actions are within a narrow margin 
granted the Government. 227
There must be particular executive or legislative actions 
which it would be difficult for any court to question, on 
such occasions, a Court may well deny that the law applied 
to the facts of the case before it. This may, for example,
be achieved by defining such wide expressions as ’public
. t 228 order1 •
A salutary principle that may be deduced from the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation is this: in constitu­
tional adjudication, one should bear in mind that respon­
sibility and initiative lie with the executive Government 
while the judges1 role is to protect the rights of the citi­




228. See Dr. Lohia v. Supdt., Central Prison, AIR, 1960, S.C.
633, (i960) £ S.C.K. 821, (i9 6 0) S.C.J. 567. Madhu Limaye 
v. S.bt. Magistrate, Monghyr, AIR, 1971, S.C. 2486. Both 
cases are examples of restrictive reading of ’public order’. 
See below, Chapter 3, Section 1.
Judicial Deference to Legislative Policies
Reverting to the question of judicial deference, the 
views of Professor Archibald Cox may be referred to in con­
clusion. He supports the need for judicial deference to-
229wards legislative opinions on two grounds. Firstly, the
Legislature is, or can be, a better fact-finding body than
an appellate Court. Particularly on socio-economic matters,
the Court can hardly manage an inquiry into the ’rightness*
of the action taken. As an example, he refers to the deci-
229a
sion in Brown v. Board of Education where, according to him,
the Supreme Court instead of entering into controversy by
quoting sociologists to the effect that separate schools
hampered the education of black children, should have simply
asserted the norm (a ’political proposition* ) ’’that a State
cannot be the government of all the people if it supports a
230caste system by racial segregation.” One questions how
the Courts arrive at such a ’political proposition*.
Secondly, judicial deference ’partly met’ the charge 
that the Court was acting as an unrepresentative Council of 
Revision in reviewing legislative enactments.
Having said this much, Professor Cox raises the most 
crucial question affecting judicial review. Where would
229. ’The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations’, 
40/2, University of Cincinnatti Law Review, 1971 , 199.
229a. 347 U.S. 483, 98< L.Ed. 873 (1954).
230. Ibid., 209.
the Court ’round off’ its judicial deference? That there is 
no simple answer to this is clear:
Theoretically, the Court can set outer 
limits to what the legislature can ’reason­
ably’ conclude, but where the variety of 
acceptable justifications is great and the 
ultimate balance depends as much upon the 
facts and their characterization as upon 
ultimate values, the theoretical check has 
little practical meaning and, if the Court 
is faithful to the formula any constitutional 
limit virtually disappears. 231
It is clear that the Court cannot always be faithful to the 
formula of deference to legislative opinions forming the 
basis of legislative measures. Besides, not every decision 
that a statute is unconstitutional is necessarily a rebuttal 
cr adverse commentary on what the legislature has done. It 
is undoubtedly part of the judicial function to enunciate con­
stitutional standards to which every law ought to conform.
Even where the stanoarcfe are occasionally applied to thwart 
the fulfilment of vital aims and objects, it has to be re­
garded as the price paid for the protection judicial review 
gives. It needs to be emphasised, however, that judicial 
review should not operate to impede normal executive and 
legislative functions.
Professor Cox, after tracing the ups and downs in 
judicial deference in the United states, raises the point 
whether there can be judicial deference when constitutional 
rights are sought to be limited by Congress? It was easy 
to practice the formula when Congressional determinations
231. Ibid., 211
supported measures that broadened the application of consti­
tutional rights - which seems to have been the case in the 
United States. But will it be so easy when the operation 
of the rights are curtailed?
It can safely be predicted that it will not be easy.
In India it was not easy when it came to the controversial 
amendments to the Constitution which gave many the impression 
that the amendments were made without care of mature deliber­
ation.
It is hoped the following pages will show that in the 
two areas of law and order and economic and trade regulations, 
Indian Courts have shown as much deference to legislative 
plans as could be wished for. In the determination of the 
reasonableness of restrictions under Article 19 there has 
been (to anticipate a conclusion) sufficient and imaginative 
deference shown to what the other two branches of Government 
have tried to do. Too often the Courts1 insistence on full 
compensation for expropriated property has been relied upon 
to criticise the judiciary. In the process much else has 
gone unsaid.
Whenever the State marshalled its facts and properly 
presented the purpose behind the impugned law, Indian Courts 
have appreciated such material.
As with the American experience, there has to be in 
India too, it seems, ups and downs m  this respect. Two 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court at New Delhi suggest,
or even indicate, the end of judicial deference and the be-
232ginning of an assertion of minimum constitutional standards.
In concluding this section, the need for such a prin­
ciple as ’margin of appreciation1 may be emphasised. But 
the essential function of a Court of law may be frustrated 
if this principle is not carefully limited. That is not 
easy to achieve. Any casual observer of Indian constitu­
tional law today can see that the Indian judiciary is being 
urged not merely to increase its margin of appreciation but 
to give up judicial review altogether when it comes to socio­
economic measures. This makes nonsense of judicial review
233and the notion of fundamental rights. More on this later.
But perhaps, one need not be too disconcerted by these pres­
sures tending to upset an imagined ideal balance. bays an 
American writer, ”[The] basic dilemmas of art and law are, 
un the end, not dissimilar, and in their resolution - the 
resolution of passion and pattern, of frenzy and form, of
convention and revolt, of order ana spontaneity - lies the
234clue to creativity that will endure.” But first it is
232. Bennett Colemand & Co. v. Union of India, AIR, 1973, S.C.
106 (1973) 1 S.C.J.' 177. Sambjunath Sarkar v. West Bengal,
i AIR, 1973, S.C. 1425. See below Chapter 3, Section 1.
233. See below, Conclusion.
234. Paul A. Freund, On Law and Justice, Cambridge, Mass., 
1968, 23.
essential to know the convention and hence, the following 
section looks at how the Indian Courts view the scope of 
their inquiry regarding reasonableness.
CHAPTER 2
NATURE AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE REASONABLENESS OF 
RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Section 1
a ) Scope of Review under Article 19
However relative and changing the notion of reasonable 
restrictions may be, some judicial dicta can be expected 
giving some insights as to how the courts view their task in 
pronouncing statutory restrictions reasonable or otherwise* 
That it is the responsibility of the court to pronounce fin­
ally upon the question is well-understood and beyond any 
235challenge* The legislative judgment and wisdom in im­
posing restrictions will be respected by the courts but have 
no finality and would hence be overruled, where necessary* 
Indian courts have often declared that they are not concerned 
with legislative policy or details of its motives (provided 
the question of mala fides does not arise) and that they will 
not challenge or comment upon the policy chosen by the leg is- 
lature or the Executive* However, in determining the
reasonableness of a restriction, it is difficult scrupulously 
to exclude a judgment, even if it be en passant, upon the 
policy behind that restriction* The important point is that 
the Court* s concern should be, and should be seen to be, with 
determining the constitutionally permissible area of State
235. A.K. G opal an, AIR, 1950, S.C. 27, per B.K. Mukherjea J. 
at 90, col*2; Das* J* at 109, col*1-2*
236. R.C. Cooper v. Union, AIR, 1970, S.C. 564.
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action. It is, therefore, desirable that criteria of a 
general application are evolved so that all criticism may 
be avoided that the Court has disapproved of legislative 
policy. Ihis the Indian Courts have done to a notable 
extent.
Under Article 19, the Indian judiciary sees its duty
237as holding the balance between freedom and social control. 
While this is the general description, the notion of reason­
ableness itself has been variously characterised as * proper 
care and deliberation' or as meaning the opinion of a ’pru­
dent and reasonable individual’•
Indian Courts have also often stated that there are 
no general standards nor any pattern of reasonableness. The
way was led by the classic account of the test of reasonable-
238ness given by Patanjali Sastri C.J. in Madras v. V.G. Row.
It is important in this context to bear 
in mind the test of reasonableness, wherever 
prescribed, should be applied to each indi­
vidual statute impugned, and no abstract 
standard, or general pattern, of reasonable­
ness can be laid down as applicable to all 
cases. The nature of the rightalleged to 
have been infringed, the underlying purpose 
of the restrictions imposed, the extent and 
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied 
thereby, the disproportion of the imposi­
tion, the prevailing conditions at the time, 
should all enter into the judicial verdict.
In evaluating such elusive factors and form­
ing their own conception of what is reason­
able in all the circumstances of a given 
case, it is inevitable that the social 
philosophy and the scale of values of the
237. Golaknath v. Punjab, AIR, 1967, S.C. 1643 (1967), II, 
S.C.W.R. (Supp.) 1006, 1022-3, per Subba Rao C.J.
238. AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200.
Judges participating in the decision should 
play an important part, and the limit to 
their interference with legislative judg­
ment in such cases can only be dictated 
by their sense of responsibility and self- 
restraint and the sobering reflection that 
the Constitution is meant not only for 
people of their way of thinking but for 
all, and that the majority of the elected 
representatives of the people have in autho­
rising the imposition of the restrictions 
considered them to be reasonable.
Notwithstanding this, some general principles did emerge in 
that very case. But first some details of the case. Acting 
under Section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, the 
State Government declared an association, The People's Edu­
cation Society (of vrtiich the respondent was the Secretary) 
unlawful. The relevant provision was section 15(2)(b) of 
the Act:
15. In this Part:
(1)vassociation' means any combination or 
body of persons whether the same be known 
by any distinctive name or not; and
(2)'unlawful association’ means an associ­
ation;
(a)which encourages or aids persons to com­
mit acts of violence or intimidation or 
of which the members habitually commit 
such acts, or
(b)which has been declared by the State 
Government by notification in the offi­
cial gazette 1d be unlawful on the ground 
(to be specified in the notification) 
that such association:
(i)constitutes a danger to the public 
p eac e ...
(ii)has interfered or interferes, with the 
maintenance of public order or has in­
terference >for its object, or 
(iii)has interfered or interferes with the 
administration of the law, or has such 
interference for its object.
The order made gave no reasons or facts in support of the 
Government's conclusion that the association was unlawful.
The copy of the order was published in the Official Gazette
but no attempt was made to serve it on the office-bearers 
of the association. There was an opportunity given to those 
affected to make representations to the government against the 
order within a period of ten days. There was an Advisory 
Board constituted under the Act to consider such representa­
tions and to submit a report to the government as to whether 
the original notification was necessary. The government was 
obliged to cancel the notification if the Advisory Board re­
commended such a course. Though no reasons were given in 
the order itself, the State informed the Court that the Society 
in question was helping the Communist Party in Madras which 
was declared an unlawful association in 1949.
The respondent had successfully argued in the Madras 
High Court that his fundamental right to form associations 
under Article 19(1) (c) was violated by the law. It imposed 
unreasonable restrictions and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 
He also questioned the lack of proper notice to those affected 
by orders made under the section impugned.
The Supreme Court in an unanimous judgment upheld these 
contentions, and held that Section 15(2)(b) was unconstitution­
al. At least the following points made by the court do lay 
down specific criteria of reasonableness.
(1) The first point in the words of the Court is:
The formula of subjective satisfaction 
of the Government or of its officers, 
with an Advisory Board thrown in to re­
view the materials on which the Govern­
ment seeks to override a basic freedom 
guaranteed to the citizen, may be viewed 
as reasonable only in very exceptional 
circumstances and within the narrowest 
limits, and cannot receive judicial ap­
proval as a general pattern of reasonable
239restrictions on fundamental rights.
(2) Secondly, the general rule of reasonable restrictions 
established by the case is that grounds upon which the 
State seeks to deprive a citizen of his fundamental 
right are justiciable in a court of law - a conclusion 
that is doubly fortified by the existence of a guaran­
teed right under Article 32 to resort to the Supreme 
Court for a judicial remedy. In the Court's own words:
We are unable to discover any reasonable­
ness in the claim of the Government in 
seeking, by a mere declaration, to shut 
out judicial enquiry into the underlying 
facts (arising) under clause (b). 240
Therefore, there should be an objective estimation by
the judiciary of the grounds upon which a citizen's
Fundamental Rights are curbed, and the only exception
to this is where some anticipatory action is required
in order to meet an emergency. It was on this basis
that the Court distinguished its decision in Dr. N.B.
241Khare* s case.
(3) The final point relates to notice and the right to make 
representations. Publication in the Official Gazette 
was held to be inadequate. In order that the right 
to make representations may be exercised, notice must 
be adequate and full. In the Court's view an attempt 
should have been made to serve the order at the premises 
of the society or at any one of the office-bearers' resi­
dences .
239. Ibid., 200, col.l.
240. Ibid., 200, col.2.
241. AIR, 1950, S.C. 211, (1950) S.C »J.328^ below 129.
123.
Yet another important criterion was laid down by the
242Supreme Court in Chintamanrao v. Madhya Pradesh. The
Central provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of 
Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, 1948, authorised the State 
Government to prohibit the manufacture of bidis (small cigars 
during the agricultural season so that enough labour would be 
available for essential agricultural work. The prohibition 
was to apply to those villages where manufacture of bidis 
went on as a 'cottage industry'. The petitioner, a manu­
facturer of bidis, argued that the restriction was excessive 
insofar as there were old and hanidcapped men and women who 
were unsuitable for agricultural work but who could roll 
bidis in their homes. He contended that his right under 
Article 19(1)(g) was infringed.
The Supreme Court accepted the petitioner's conten­
tion that the restriction was excessive and therefore, un­
reasonable. it was held that to be reasonable, a restrict­
ion must not be arbitrary to excessive but must reflect 
'intelligent care and deliberation' . It must mean choosing 
the course reason dictates. The Court would examine the 
law to see if it has struck the proper balance between social 
control and freedom.
A total prohibition of the manufacture of bidis was 
not necessary to achieve the purpose of the Act. The Act 
might have been confined to agricultural labour alone. The 
restriction? imposed was excessive and therefore; the Act 
was unreasonable and void. This instance certainly shows
242. AIR, 1951, S.C.118.
an ample concern for 1 reason* and affords less opportunity 
than do many cases for detecting a political appreciation 
in the Court*s process of thought.
There are some early High Court decisions on the scope 
of the court's inquiry in determining reasonableness of re­
strictions. They discussed the point more thoroughly than 
the Supreme Court ever did.
We could begin with the Patna High Court decision in
243Brajnandan Sharma v. Bihar. The petitioner was served
with an externment order under Section 2(1) of the Bihar 
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949:
2(1) The Provincial Government, if satis­
fied with respect to any particular 
person that with a view to preventing 
him from acting in any manner preju­
dicial to the public safety and the 
maintenance of public order it is 
necessary so to do, may make the order -
a) ....
b) directing that, ... he shall not be 
in any such area or place in the Pro­
vince of Bihar as may be specified in 
the order;
There were no provisions for the supply of grounds to the 
person affected by an order made under the section. There­
fore, there was no scope for making representations against 
the order. Meredith C.J. and Das J. of the High Court held 
the law unconstitutional as imposing unreasonable restrictions 
on the right of free movement guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d). 
Shearer J. dissented mainly on the view he had taken of the 
scope of the court's inquiry in determining the reasonable­
ness of restrictions.
243. AIR, 1950, Pat. 320; ILR [1950] Pat. 461.
The dissenting views of Shearer J # may be considered
first. According to him, the court could not review the 
entire law to see if it was a reasonable law but could only
examine the substantive provisions. If they were shown to
impose restrictions that were not excessive then there was no 
scope for scrutinising the procedural provisions of the law, 
nor any other ancillary provisions in it. Thus examined, 
the impugned law, a temporary measure with a full life of 
only two years, was valid in his view.
Shearer J.'s view of the court's power under Article 
19 was important at that early period of the Constitution's 
life and hence deserves to be quoted in extenso.
What is the question to which the courts 
are bound to address themselves? The
answer given by the Constitution is that
the question is this: 'Are the restrict­
ions which have been or can be imposed 
reasonable restrictions in the interests 
of the general public?' That, it seems 
to me, is equivalent to saying:- Are the 
restrictions restsonably necessary in the 
interests of the general public? or, to 
depart still further from the language 
used in the Constitution:- Is the extent 
to which the rights of individuals are or 
are liable to be interfered with no more 
than is reasonably necessary for the pro­
tection of the public? If that is the 
criterion to be adopted, then it is, I 
think, immaterial that there may be an­
cillary provisions in the statute which 
may lead to hardship in individual cases.
Whether such provisions were reasonable 
or not was a matter for thelegislature 
to determine, and the judiciary cannot 
now sit in review over what the legis­
lature has done. My learned brothers, 
as I understand their judgments, are of 
opinion that the question to which the 
courts should address themselves is this:
'Are the restrictions reasonable restrict­
ions?' and that restrictions which, imposed 
by one authority and in one manner are 
reasonable restrictions may not be reason­
able restrictions if imposed by another 
authority and in another manner. For 
more than one reason, however, I am of 
opinion that the criterion to be adopted 
is the former and not the latter cri­
terion. 244
Shearer J. felt that the introduction of the word 'reason­
able' in the last stages of the Constituent Assembly proceed­
ings was ' unfortunate'. For it meant that the judiciary 
could review decisions taken by the Legislature after . a 
very full deliberation and with a knowledge of local con­
ditions which the judiciary itself never could possess.
Perhaps the most interesting point made by the learned 
Judge was that some statutes in England did use the term 
* reasonable' but always as qualifying some such word as
245'cause' or 'belief' or 'suspicion' and never 'restriction*. 
Used in that manner it was not open to import the meaning 
the expression bears under English law. It must, according 
to the learned judge, bear a narrower meaning under Article 
19 of the Indian Constitution. He feltthat the majority 
had assigned an 'esoteric' sense to the term.
244. ILR, 1959, Pat. 461, 483-4 (FB). Shearer J. relied on 
Liversidge v. Anderson, L.R. (1942) A,C. 206, 268, Union 
Colliery v. Bryden, L.R. (1899) A.C. 580, 585, Legal Tender 
Cases (1870) 12 Wall 531 (U.S.J^ and Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 
6 Cranch 86.
245. Law Lexicons and Dictionaries invariably deal with such 
categories. Nowhere is there "reasonable restrictions" 
defined. E.g. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. (4th reprint 
1953), 1938, 842^
, . According to the majority view taken by Meredith
C.J. and Das J. the law purported to restrict the right to
free movement of the citizens of India on the subjective
satisfaction of the executive without the latter*s being
compelled to furnish the grounds on which the restrictions
246were imposed. Relying on Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, 
Meredith C.J. held that the burden was on the State to dhow 
reasonable grounds for its action* In Vimlabai it was held 
by the Privy Council that R.129, Sub-rule (1) of the Defence 
of India Rules. 1939, under vriiich **any police officer .*. 
may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably 
suspects of having acted *** (a) ... in a manner prejudi­
cial to the public safety or to the efficient prosecution 
of the war**, meant (distinguishing Liversidge and confining 
it to **cases ... which may involve disclosure of secret and 
confidential information'*) that the police officer must satis­
fy the court that he had reasonable grounds of suspicion*
Thus, according to Meredith C.J. the onus was on the State 
to show that the restriction was reasonable*
On the test of reasonableness, the Chief Justice held:
It is well-settled that there can be an 
objective test of reasonableness, and that 
is what the courts apply* They do not 
ask themselves, do we, as individuals 
feel satisfied that the r estrictions are 
reasonable? But, would that fictitious 
individual, 'the reasonable man', that 
is to say, the normal average man, regard 
them as reasonable? 247
246. L.R. (1946) 73 I.A. 144, AIR, 1946, P.C.123*
247. I.L.R., 1950, Pat. 461, 468.
Das J. held:
The words 'objective* and 'subjective' 
have a philosophical flavour; but put 
in ordinary language, e.g. the language 
used by Lord Wright in Liversidge's 
case - the objective test merely means 
'external standard to be applied by some 
one other than the authority imposing 
the restriction, namely a judge; where­
as the subjective test excludes an exter­
nal yardstick and means the decision of the 
person who acts ... 248
249In another case of externment, the Bombay High 
Court discussed what it could do and not do in determining 
the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by the Bombay 
Public Security Measures Act. 1947. The main ground of 
attack on the statute was that, (a) it did not provide for 
supply of the grounds of externment, and (b) it did not pro­
vide for a time limit for the operation of the order. Thus, 
the first infirmity was common to the Bombay and the Bihar 
statutes. The majority in the Court held the Act of 1947 
unconstitutional as imposing unreasonable restrictions.
Chagla C.J. for the majority held that the Court 
should look upon the restrictions from »every point of view'. 
That would mean examining not merely the substantive provi­
sions and the procedural provisions imposing restrictions, 
but also the 'manner' in which the restrictions were imposed 
in individual cases.
As in the Bihar case above, in this case the High Court 
was not impressed with the fact that the impugned law was a
248. I.L.R., 1950, Pat., 461, 475.
249. Jeshingbhai v. Emperor, AIR, 1950, Bombay, 363.
temporary measure*
The minority judge, Shah J., held that the test of 
reasonableness should be confined to: (a) whether the re­
strictions infringed a fundamental right, and (b) if so, 
whether they were 1 reasonable in the interests of the general 
public*• That a law in its operation might produce hard­
ships in individual cases was no ground for holding it un­
reasonable* In other words, the circumstances of individual 
cases should be excluded from the test of reasonableness under 
Article 19.
The Supreme Court of India discussed all these points
250in Dr. N.B. Khare v. Delhi. Here too, the statute im­
pugned provided for externment of individuals in the subject­
ive satisfaction of the executive authorities. The East 
Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, was ambiguous as to whether 
the authorities were obliged to supply the grounds of extern­
ment to the citizen externed. There was no time limit fixed 
by the Act as to the duration of orders made under it. But 
the Act had a total life of only two years.
The majority of three to two emphasised the temporary 
nature of the Act, construed the provision that grounds 'may* 
be supplied as 'must' be supplied, and upheld the Act. The 
minority of two were not so confident about the constitution­
ality of the Act. Their views will be considered presently.
The question before the court was whether it should 
confine itself to looking at the reasonableness of the re­
striction on the exercise of the fundamental right or whether
250. AIR, 1950, S.C.211.
it could consider in addition the resonableness of the cir-
\
cumstances and manner of imposition of the restriction in 
individual cases. For the majority, Kania C.J. said:
While the reasonableness of the restrict­
ions has to be considered with regard to 
the exercise of the right, it does not 
necessarily exclude from the considera­
tion of the court the question of reason­
ableness of the procedural part of the 
law. 251
It is not clear from this whether the Chief Justice answered 
the question posed. The result of the majority view appears 
to be that the substantive provisions that are directly 
responsible for the restrictions) and the procedural provi­
sions of the impugned law would be examined by the court.
B.K. Mukherjea J. and Mahajan J. gave a dissenting judgment 
in which they assigned a wider scope for the inquiry into 
the reasonableness of restrictions. They refused to con­
sider the restriction in the abstract without reference to
the attending circumstances in individual cases. Mukherjea 
J. said:
With respect to clause (5), the learned 
Attorney-Ceneral points out at the outset 
that the word ’reasonable' occurring in 
the clause qualifies ’restrictions’ and 
not ’ law' • It is argued that in apply­
ing the clause all we have to see is 
whether the restrictions that are imposed 
upon the exercise of the right by law are 
reasonable or not, and we have not to en­
quire into the reasonableness or otherwise
of the law itself. The reasonableness of
the restrictions can be judged, according
251. Kania C.J. at 214, col.l.
251a.A.K. Gopalan v. Madras, AIR, 1950, S.C. 27, (1950) S.C.R. 
88. See below, ^ - ^ 3  •
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to the learned Attorney-General, from the 
nature of the restrictions themselves and 
not from the manner in which or the autho­
rities by which they are imposed* The 
question whether the operation of the law 
produces hardship in individual cases is 
also a matter which is quite irrelevant 
to our enquiry*
I do agree that in clause (5) the adject­
ive 1 reasonable1^  is predicated of the 
restrictions that are imposed by law and not 
of the law itself; but that does not mean 
that in deciding the reasonableness or other­
wise of the restrictions we have to confine 
ourselves to an examination of the restrict­
ions in the abstract with reference merely 
to their duration or territorial extent, 
and that it is beyond our province to look 
up the circumstances under which or the 
manner in which the restrictions have been 
imposed* 252
His lordship held that it would not be possible to dissoci­
ate the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner 
of their imposition* He found that the whole scheme of 
the legislation and the circumstances under which the indi­
vidual restrictive orders were made would have to be taken 
into account*
The dissenting judgments of Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ*
clearly wished to give a wider scope for the inquiry* The
distinction between the majority and minority judgments in
this respect has not been sufficiently recognised in India*
253When in V.G. Row, Patanjali Sastri C.J. laid down the 
classic test of reasonableness, it was a wider, comprehen­
sive test that would have included the views of the dissenting
252. AIR, 1950, S.C. 211, 216-17.
253. AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200, col.l
254minority in Dr* N.B. Khare*
It seems inevitable that a court should be influenced 
by the circumstances under which the restrictions have been 
imposed in a given case* However, it seems too wide a state­
ment if each individual case coming before the court has to 
be examined for a reasonable application of the rules, i*e* 
examined to see if under the circumstances of the case, there 
has been a reasonable application of an otherwise valid sta­
tute* This may seem to lead to undue judicial interference 
in the administration* But as we see from the two cases
below, it has not had that consequence*
255
In Oudh Sugar Mills v* Union, an order made under an 
otherwise reasonable rule but which was harsh under the cir­
cumstances and could not possibly be complied with was held 
unreasonable* Under the Sugar Control Order» 1966, the 
government could order sugar mills to release quantities 
of sugar for sale in the free, uncontrolled market* The 
petitioners were ordered to move their stocks within 28 days 
when in fact, there were no railway available to move
the bags within that time*
The Supreme Court held that the period of 28 days was 
unrealistic under the circumstances, and instructed the autho­
rities to vacate the order. It was held that not merely the 
law restricting Fundamental Rights but every order made under 
it should be reasonable* This may mean hard work for the
254. AIR, 1950, S.C. 211.
255. AIR, 1970, S.C.1070*
administration but that (it would seem) is how it should be.
Another recent decision confirming this is Ramakrishna
236Hegde v. The Market Committee. There an order made under
the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Acta 1939, asking the
petitioner to shift his market to a different site within ten
days was held unreasonable while the Act itself had been held
257reasonable previously. The Court suggested a period of
one year as a reasonable time to comply with the order.
Both these cases can be fairly described as to do with 
the * manner' in which the restrictions have been applied. 
Therefore, the wider view canvassed by Mukherjea and Mahajan 
JJ. in Dr. N.B. Khare, derive support from these two decisions. 
Even then there is a need to clarify what is meant by 'manner' 
of imposition of restrictions and 'circumstances' of indivi­
dual cases. If they merely indicate an undefined area of 
judicial review, it has to be accepted as inevitable, This, 
in this writer's opinion, is how it has to be viewed. In 
any case, what circumstances are relevant and what are not 
will have to be arrived at by a process of elimination 
through decided cases. To start with, we can distinguish 
the two following situations as those in which the Court will 
not pronounce an order unreasonable:
a) Possible hardship in individual cases due to fortuitous 
circumstances that bear no relation to the executive 
order.
256. AIR, 1971, S.C. 1017.
257. Md. Hussain v. Bombay» AIR, 1962, S.C. 97.
b) The possibility that if the order is held reasonable in 
the case before the Court that may possibly give rise to 
abuse of statutory power in future cases .
These two instances are no grounds for holding an 
order or even a law unreasonable. Point a) needs no further 
elaboration. Point b) has been formulated in different ways, 
such as, for example, where power is given validly its pos­
sible unreasonable exercise would be no ground for holding 
it invalid.
The possibility of abuse of a statute 
otherwise valid does not impart to it 
any element of invalidity. The con­
verse must also follow that a statute 
which is otherwise invalid as being un­
reasonable cannot be saved by its being 
administered in a reasonable manner. 258
Decided cases show that Indian courts have looked into the
'circumstances' prevalent at the time a law was passed in
250order to determine the objects for which it was enacted.
Some of the things taken into consideration are: legis­
lative history which would include any report produced by 
a specially appointed commission of inquiry, the condition
258. Per Ayyangar J. in Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetfcy, 
AIR, 1962, S.C. 316, 332, col.l. The observations are ob- 
viously not meant to allow colourable exercise of power.
In the case, the Attorney^eneral sought to prove in evi­
dence that certain departmental instructions governing the 
administration of section 178-A, Sea Customs Act. 1878, 
impugned before the Court, were reasonable and hence the 
section itself, he argued, should be held reasonable.
259. Express Newspapers v. Union, AIR, 1958, S.C. 578, (1959) 
S.C.R. 12; (1958) S.C.J. 113. See below, ,
Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty, AIR, 1962, S.C. 
316, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 786*^  See below, Q - 0 &  • Arunachala
v. Madras, AIR, 1959, S.C. 300, (1959) S.C.J. 297.
of those benefitted or adversely affected by the law, the
duration of the law if the restriction it imposes is a
serious one and so forth. The nature of the restriction
imposed will be an independent factor: Is the restriction
260more in the nature of a punishment or an undue inter-
Of\\
ference with no saving features? Is it a part of a
262well-organised trade mechanism? Finally, is the re-
striction excessive in view of the statutory purpose?
Almost all these are elusive factors and it is difficult to 
describe these collectively more precisely than the Circum­
stances' surrounding a given case*
A specific question as to the interpretation of 'cir­
cumstances' arose in the Supreme Court: Can the Court look
at something done under a different statute while deciding 
the issue of reasonableness? This was the issue on which
the Indian Supreme Court divided in Lord Krishna Sugar Mills
tt i 264 v. Union*
The Sugar Export Promotion Act, 1958, envisaged an 
export promotion scheme by which a quantity of sugar pro­
duced by various mills (operating the 'vacuum-pan process') 
was reserved for export. The quantity reserved in the case
260. RagRujbir Singh v. Court of Wards t AIR, 1953, S.C. 373.
261. Kavalapara K. Kochuni v. Kerala and Madras, AIR, 1960, S.C. 
1680 ;(I960) 3 S.C.R. 887; (1^ 61) 2“S.C.J. 443. See below,
262. Daya v. Chief Controller, AIR, 1962, S.C. 1796. See below,
263. Chintaman Rao v. M.P., AIR, 1951, S.C. 118.
264. AIR, 1959, S.C. 1124; (I960) 1 S.C.R. 39; (1960) S.C.J.
1119.
of each mill was not to exceed 2 0% of the total quantity pro­
duced by the mill and the export was to be handled by an 
agency composed of all the mills*
The cost of the export was to be deducted from the
price obtained for the exported sugar* The export price 
happened to be lower than the home-market price and the pay­
ments were not received immediately* However, in order to 
offset the loss suffered by the sugar mi11s, the Government
came to an understanding with them which was the mills were
to be allowed an increase in the price of sugar to be sold 
in the home-market* This was accomplished under powers de­
rived from Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, 
which enabled the Government to fix the price of essential 
commodities, including sugar*
Under these circumstances, the petitioner filed a 
writ complaining of infringement of its Fundamental Right 
under Article 19(1)(f) and (g)* The contention was that 
the mill was forced to sell a part of what it produced at 
a loss* The constitutionality of the Sugar Export Promo­
tion Act, 1958, it was argued, should be considered within 
its four corners and therefore, the reasonableness of re­
strictions imposed could not be determined with reference 
to other circumstances, such as price agreements or other 
adjustments made under other independent enactments* No 
other laws oould be referred to unless any of them had been 
incorporated into the impugned measure by reference*
The majority in the Court (Hidayatullah J* writing
265that judgment) held that the whole legislative plan should 
be looked at by the Court. There was an export promotion 
scheme and whatever was done in connection with it should be 
taken into account. On that view, it was held that the Govern­
ment had made adequate arrangements for compensating the loss 
suffered by the mills, and therefore, there was no infringement 
of the Fundamental Rights. In the majority view, the peti­
tioner before them was also guilty of unreasonable conduct in 
that it employed delaying tactics to confuse and frustrate the 
administrat ive authorit ies•
The concurring judgment of Subba Rao J. laid emphasis 
on the point that the Essential Commodities Act. 1955, was a 
separate enactment and not part of any scheme or purpose for 
which the impugned Act was passed. To rely on a temporary 
notification (fixing the price of home sugar) amounted to 
placing the statute in a ’fluid state1. To decide the 
reasonableness of the statute on that view was * to destroy 
the stability of legislation’ • But the judge upheld the 
Act of 1958 on the basis of a compelling need to earn foreign 
exchange for the country’s benefit. On that view, he found 
the restriction imposed reasonable.
Sarkar J. dissented on the following grounds
a) The object of earning foreign exchange, however laudable, 
could not by itself and without more, make a restriction 
on the dfandamental right to trade reasonable.
265. Relying on Pillai v. Mudanayake, L.R. [1953] A.C. 514; 
ri955l 2 All E.R. 833 (P.C.).
138.
A restriction on/^erson* s right to 
carry on his trade does not become 
reasonable, simply because it had 
been imposed on him to achieve an 
object of great necessity and un­
doubted merit. The reasonableness 
has to be judged in all the circum­
stances of the case and the object 
to be attained is only one of such 
circumstances. This, in my view, 2 5 5  
is too clear to require elaboration.
One may be tempted to comment that if the national need 
is not a decisive factor, and the Court has no juris­
diction to discover an alternative solution to the 
emergency, challenge of the Act could create an impasse.
b) It was quite obvious that the impugned law resulted in a 
loss to the manufacturers of sugar. It did not matter 
how much loss was caused. Even a small loss would be 
an infringement of their fundamental right.
c) It was not certain that the machinery of Essential Commo­
dities Act, 1955, could be utilised to allow the manu­
facturers to recoup the loss caused by the export scheme. 
The power under that Act was "for maintaining or increas­
ing the supplies of any essential commodity or for secur­
ing their equitable distribution and availability at fair 
prices11.
d) Even assuming that there was power under the Act of 1955 
to make adjustments in favour of the manufacturers, the 
impugned statute's validity would depend upon an execu­
tive act to which the impugned law gives no right. There 
was no compulsion or duty on the part of the Government to
266. Ibid., 1143, para.56.
do or not to do anything under the Act of 1955. The 
test of the statute's constitutionality could not be 
based on such shifting ground. On that view, the 
impugned Act failed as it imposed an unreasonable re­
striction.
No doubt, in the majority judgment, the Act of 1958 
was valid but the minority judgments are important for the 
draftsmen to study and take note of. It seems courts would 
be happy if the factors decisive of a statute's reasonable­
ness appear in the statute itself rather than lie scattered 
elsehwere in the form of notifications or understandings be­
tween the Government and individuals. Temporary arrangements 
introduced an element of uncertainty and change, though in the 
case discussed it is possible to view the understanding between 
the Government and sugar manufacturers as legitimate. There­
fore, the complaint in the minority judgments that the notifi­
cation under the Act of 1955 might be changed by the Govern­
ment at any time, seems unjustified. Ordinarily Governments 
are trusted to keep to their side of the bargain. If any­
thing, it appears from the facts in the case that it was the 
petitioners who were intransigent and unreliable, and not the 
Government of India.
Reasonableness, Object of Legislation and the Directive Prin­
ciples of State Policy
In the case discussed above, the majority attached 
sufficient importance to the object of the impugned statute 
to hold it constitutional. The concurring judge, Subba Rao 
J., saw serious objections to resting the decision in favour 
of its constitutionality on factors extraneous to the statute.
Yet he considered the object of earning foreign exchange so 
important that his concurring judgment can be said to rest 
entirely on it. The dissenting judge, Sarkar J., considered 
the object important but maintained that however laudable that 
may be, it could not be conclusive but was only one amongst 
many factors to be weighed by a court determining the question 
of reasonableness.
In terms of the classic test of reasonableness laid
p  Aff
down by Patanjali Sastri C.J. in V.G. Row, both the major­
ity and minority judgments had something in their favour.
The factors mentioned by Patanjali Sastri C.J. (which could 
only have been illustrative and not exhaustive) were: (a)
The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,
(b) the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed,
(c) the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied 
thereby, (d) the disproportion of the imposition and (e) the 
prevailing conditions at the time.
The majority judgment could be supported on the strength 
of (b) and (c) above, if not also of (d) since the extent of 
the restriction imposed on the petitioner was held not to be 
disproportionate by the majority. It is clear that the dif­
ference between the majority and the dissenting judgments lay 
in the emphasis they put on the object of the statute.
p  A O
Commenting on the decision in Lord Krishna Sugar Mills, 
M.C. Setalvad, the former Attorney-General of India, finds that
267. AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200, col.l* above,119.
268. AIR, 1959, S.C. 1124, above, 135.
141.
the majority judgment cast the f net far too wide* in deter­
mining the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by the im­
pugned statute.
Not only does it consider the surrounding 
circumstances, but it has also taken into 
consideration contemporaneous legislation 
on the ground that they form part of a 
single scheme. The reasonableness accord­
ing to this test is not to be judged from 
the object which the impugned legislation 
(itself) seeks to achieve but the Court is 
required to embark on a scrutiny of the re­
lated legislation and notifications based 
on them to discover its unity or wisdom 26g 
(so far as the object is concerned).
There has alwa?ys been controversy surrounding the 
exercise of judicial veto against laws designed to achieve 
objectives strongly desired by the Legislature and the exe­
cutive. Whenever such 'favourite1 legislation founders on 
the rock of judicial review, the cry goes out that the 'wrong' 
type of judicial policy-making goes on in the higher courts 
of the land. That is the time when the price to be paid
for judicial review seems excessive. At present, the Indian
270judiciary is faced with demands that it should be more
269. M.C. Setalvad, The Indian Constitution, 1950-1965, Univer­
sity of Bombay, 1967, 160. f Words in brackets supplied).
270. Jai Jai Ram Vpadfviyaya, 'Sociological Theory of Reasonable­
ness' (1969) IX /January-June, The Indian Advocate, 61-68. 
The author urges that the notion of reasonableness should re­
flect the social and economic values pursued by the commun­
ity. These values are embodied in the directives. Nara- 
yana Nettar, 'Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles',
(1969) IJ/bctober-December, The Indian Advocate, 24-32, main­
tains that the Indian Constitution is not politically 'neu­
tral' but has the tone set by the Directives. That tone 
should govern the interpretation of the fundamental rights. 
V.S. Deshpande, 'Rights and Duties under the Constitution*, 
(1973) 15/1, J.I.L.I. 101, maintains that the Directives and 
Rights equally govern judicial interpretation. V.R.Krishna 
Iyer, Law and the People, New Delhi, 1972, especially 158- 
173.
* sympathetic * to the ideals of the Indian Constitution as ex­
pressed in its Preamble and in the Directive Principles of 
271State Policy, while determining the reasonableness of re­
strictions imposed by laws passed to further those ideals*
It will be no exaggeration to describe these demands as a 
movement, both in terms of the number of people who voice it, 
and that includes non-lawyers as well as lawyers, and in terms 
of the demand itself* The issues of compensation (the courts 
have insisted on full ’market value1 for expropriated private 
property) and that of amendability of fundamental rights (the
Supreme Court denied that power to Parliament in Golaknath v*
the opportunity 
Punjab) have provide^for the critics of the judiciary to
point out that the mode of literal or grammatical interpre­
tation of laws impugned before them is inadequate and unsuit­
able* It is argued that in an underdeveloped country such 
as India, what is required is a sociological interpretation
which will emphasise the social purpose sought to be achieved
272by the impugned law*
The Directive Principles of State Policy above every­
thing else provide a point of pressure on the judiciary urging
271* Articles 36 to 51 found in Part IV of the Constitution*
Article 37 states that the principles ’’shall not be enforce­
able by any Court** but **are nevertheless fundamental in the 
governance of the country**.
272. Jagat Narain, 'Equal Protection Guarantee and the Right of
Property under the Indian Constitution* (1966) 15/1, I.C .L.Q. 
199, 203 ff. The author argues that the idea of 'reason­
able classification* under Article 14 of the Constitution 
cannot be based on any doctrinaire idea of euqality but 
should take into account the disparities of wealth and oppor­
tunities between different groups of people in India*
them to conceive of a different, perhaps, broader notion of 
reasonableness in regard to 'socio-economic' laws* Thus, 
V*S* Deshpande, a judge of the Delhi High Court, finds the 
test of reasonableness laid down by Patanjali Sastri C.J. 
in V.G. Row inadequate.
With great respect ••• one may doubt whether 
these observations (of Patanjali Sastri C.J.) 
sufficiently emphasise the duty of the judi­
ciary in interpreting the Constitution and 
social legislation intended to implement 27q 
the directive principles of state policy.
H.M. Seervai put the matter differently when he commented on 
Sastri*s test of reasonableness:
You will have noticed that Sastri C.j.'s 
test of reasonableness omits one concept 
to which Holmes rightly attached great 
importance - the right of the majority 
to embody its opinion in law. I think 
that this Is implicit in Sastri C.J.'s 
classic test, but his failure to state 
it expressly was unfortunate.
In other words, judicial deference to the objectives em­
bodied by legislative majorities in their laws should be 
an important factor in the determination of reasonableness * 
But as we have seen from Lord Krishna Sugar Mills (above, 
135-7) how much emphasis that should carry is not easy of 
decision*
There is enough evidence from decided cases to show
273. V.S. Deshpande, 'Rights and Duties under the Constitution*, 
(1973) 15/1, J.I.L.I*t 94, 101. Words in brackets sup­
plied*
274. H.M. Seervai, The Position of the Judiciary under the Con­
stitution of India, University of Bombay, 1970, 6 6 *
that Indian courts have appreciated the object of the statutes
impugned before them* Much detailed information will be
given in Chapters 3 below* In doing so, they have not
demanded hard proof of the element of public interest, but
have been willing to deduce it from the statute itself or
even the attendant circumstances* They have done so mainly
through the acceptance of the * mischief Rule', otherwise
274aknown as the Rule in Heydon* s case*
But to turn for a moment to another aspect of the 
matter, in one of the rarer studies of its kind B*N. Mukerjee 
and David Willcox (below, 145) focussed attention on a new 
element affecting the question of reasonableness,which ele­
ment, in this writer's opinion, takes priority ov^ v” the type 
of demands made on the judiciary as outlined above* The 
main point of their essay has to do with the need to present 
the judiciary with realistic and sensible laws - sensible 
because they grasp Indian problems competently and grapple 
with them adequately - before the judiciary's performance 
can be tested and criticised* The assumption beneath their 
essay is that this has not been done in India* With this 
the present writer agrees* It is rightly argued by them 
that the draftsmen of statutes working with the policy­
makers can achieve a great deal by an able grasp of what 
they mean to achieve and how they could do so within the 
constitutional »room*available to them. They rightly see
274a. (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7b.
the draftsmen’s responsibility and judicial responsibility 
as complementary.
This expansion of judicial responsibility 
brings with it, in turn, an extension of 
the obligation of those who initiate govern­
mental action and, in particular, of those 
who frame statutes touching upon fundamen­
tal rights. In addition to their tradi­
tional responsibility to get programmes 
going, they now owe to the courts, in greater 
measure than ever before, a responsibility to 
elucidate the constitutional implications in­
volved,
• • •  • • • • • t • • •  • • •
In such circumstances, it is the duty of the 
draftsman to examine analogous cases, to note 
the trend of judicial opinion, and to make his 
own interpretation of applicable constitu­
tional provisions. On the basis of th's in­
terpretation, his statute will be shaped; and 
it is incumbent upon him to indicate, through 
the use of clear statutory language and expli­
cit provisions, the theory of the act support­
ing its validity, 275
The authors view government planning as an evolving 
process in which a continuous decision-making goes on. It 
is essential, therefore, for the draftsmen to deduce as 
clearly as possible, the substantive and procedural require­
ments or limitations with which the planning statute should 
conform. They urge that draftsmen should be able to project 
present judicial trends into fair predictions as to future 
reactions of the judiciary to their statutes. Then they 
go on to point out the main defect in present-day statutory 
drafting in India,
275. B.N. Mukherjee and David L. Willcox, ’A Constitutional 
Balance, The Needs of Government Planning v. The ’When* 
of Procedural Reasonableness - A Draftsman's Task' , (1967), 
9 J.I.L.I. 275, 321.
One result of this approach would be some 
relaxation in the overly rigid conformity 
to pre-existing pattern that unhappily 
characterizes much of Indian statute law*
Reliance upon the language of past statutes 
can be dangerous unless it reflects an inde­
pendent analysis of their present applicabi­
lity*
• • * ••• ••• ••• •••
The ’safety’ to be gained from copying pre- 
Constitution statutory language, therefore, 
is more apparent than real* Furthermore, 
such uncritical reliance is all the more 
dangerous because too often it tends to 
draw the attention of the draftsman from 
his main purpose; instead of shaping the 
statute to suit the programme of action, 
he begins to shape his programme to suit 
the statute* 276
After discussing two cases, one decided by the Bombay
277 278High Court, and the other by the Calcutta High Court,
the authors come to the conclusion that:
these cases establish beyond doubt the 
willingness of the judiciary to accept 
both a planning statute, and such plans 
or other recommendations as may be formu­
lated and adopted under it, as reflecting 
a valid public interest* 279
The Bombay case involved acquisition of lands to develop 
industrial areas* The High Court was prepared to hold the 
acquisition as being for a ’public purpose’ though the actual 
provision in the statute was very generally worded and could 
have been held unconst it utioml for that reason.
276. Ibid., 321-2.
277. Sadiruddin Suleman v. J.H. Patwardhan, AIR, 1965, Bom*224.
278. Jibaneswar Bose v. A.B. Mukherjee, AIR, 1964, Cal. 45.
279. (1967) 9 J.I.L.I* 275, 291.
the acquisition of land for the purposes 
of the development of areas from public 
revenues or from some funds controlled 
by or managed by a local authority and 
subsequent disposal thereof in whole 
or in part, by lease, assignment or 
sale with the object of securing fur­
ther development•
Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act,
1953.
In the Calcutta case, the High Court was prepared to view 
the filling of canals in a low-lying area of the city of 
Calcutta as part of a major plan for the whole of Calcutta 
and the Court overruled the obj*ections raised by the peti­
tioners in the case.
ka.5
Much of what the authors say been echoed by Mr.
Atul Setalvad's discussion of planning aspects of acquisi-
280tion under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. One of the
points of coincidence between the two articles is the pro­
cedural reasonableness enabling the owner of the land or 
house sought to be acquired, an opportunity to present his 
obj’ections. The wrong timing of the occasions on vdiich he 
could so raise his obj'ections has resulted in prolonged liti­
gation and the result has been frustration of State plans.
Extremely unfortunate to this discussion are two 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court which are misleading 
unless seen in the context of the two cases concerned.
280. * A Study into Certain Aspects of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894*, (1971) 13 J.I.L.I. 1.
In the first of these, R.C. Cooper v. Union, the Supreme 
Court after discussing A.K. G op a lan (below, 2 .^ 3 ) observed 
in disapproval of its own earlier decision:
But it is not the object of the authority making 
the law impairing the right of the citizen, nor 
the form of action taken that determines the 
protection he can claim: it is the effect of
the law and of the action upon the right which 
attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant 
relief* 280a
Again in Bennet Coleman & Co* v. Union, following R.C. Cooper, 
the Supreme Court held:
The object of the law or executive action is 
irrelevant when it establishes (sic) the pe- 280b 
titioner’s contention about fundamental right.
These observations appear to suggest that the Court would dis­
regard or pay no deference to the object of the law, but that 
is not what the Supreme Court meant to convey. The Court 
was answering the Union’s contention which stretched the 
idea of * incidental effect’ of legislation unreasonably.
A line had to be drawn between an ’incidental effect* and 
’direct effect’ of legislation curbing fundamental rights.
That was the context in which the observations were made. 
TheSupreme Court did not deny that its task included esta­
blishing the relationship between the object of the law, 
the restrictions it imposes and the right that belongs to 
the citizen.
280a. AIR, 1970, S.C. 564 , 596, col.l. See below, 38*1. 
280b. 1 S.C.J. 177, 193, col.l. See below,
Whether it is described as ’sociological interpreta­
tion’ or by any other name, the inclusion of the Directives 
in the judicial notion of reasonableness has become a com­
pelling demand. As has been observed above, the search is on 
for some consistent formula through which the Directives can 
’come in* without spoiling the essence of fundamental rights.
At first glance, it seems an impossibility. To think of it 
in strictly juridical terms, the immediately available answer 
is that it should be left to the judiciary to strike the 
balance between the Directives and the Rights. But it seems 
too vague to leave it there. That has been the position 
adumbrated by the Supreme Court, namely, the Directives were 
subordinate to the fundamental rights but were to be con­
sidered as one of several factors relevant in the determina-
281tion of reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the rights.
Therefore, it was up to the judiciary to weigh all th^e
factors. But the present demands in support of the Directives
imply that they wish to see more concrete evidence that the
judiciary does indeed take the directives into account. The
282Constitution (TWenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, has not 
waited for such proof but has gone ahead and by-passed judi­
cial review altogether. By adding Article 31C two directive
281. Madras v. Champakam, AIR, 1951, S.C. 226, (1951) S.C.J.313. 
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. Bihar, AIR, 1958, S.C. 731, (1959), 
S.C.R. 629. See below^
282. See Appendix 1.
283
principles (in Article 39(b) and (c)) have been given 
special constitutional status* Laws passed to further 
these directive principles are now immune from constitu­
tional review based on Articles 14, 19 and 31. This amend­
ment represents a serious blow to judicial review and to 
cons t itut ionalism•
The primary responsibility for furthering the inter­
ests represented by the Directives lies on the Legislatures 
and Governments in India* It is also their responsibility 
to adequately articulate those interests in the laws passed 
by them* The present demands make it appear that somehow 
the intiative lies with the j’udiciary to articulate and 
overtly support the Directives in their judgments* Indeed 
j*udges have expressed their support and have also based their 
findings of reasonableness on the Directives* But the fact 
remains that initiative will always lie with the Legisla­
tures and not the Courts. Therefore, putting the whole 
responsibility on the j’udiciary amounts to viewing the prior­
ities in the wrong order.
One maj’or difficulty regarding the Directives is that 
most of the important ones are couched in very general terms 
capable of any interpretation that may be put on them* In
283. 39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the
State - The State shall, in particular, direct its
policy towards securing -
(b) that the ownership and control of the material re­
sources of the community are so distributed as best 
to subserve the common good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not 
result in the concentration of wealth and means of 
production to the common detriment;
the Directives quoted above expressions like ’concentration of 
wealth* or ’common good* or ’common detriment’ can mean a vari­
ety of things to a variety of men and women* To give them the 
special status that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has, it seems, 
amounts to inviting controversy in the coming years. Each 
successive Government is different from the preceding one and 
therefore, to give a carte blanche to all of them is surely 
inviting controversy. The generality of the language used
in formulating the Directives and the range of subjects cover-
284ed, from the encouragement of Panchayats (Article 40) and
preservation of cattle wealth (Article 48,under which comes 
the need to protect cows) to respect for International Law 
(Article 51(c)), make it by far the most difficult part of 
the Constitution for any one to interpret decisively. In­
deed, this was the main reason why the Directives were made 
non-j'usticiable by the framers - a position which has not 
changed now*
Nor do we find as much conscientious drafting 
attention being given to the principles as to 
fundamental rights or any other vital provi­
sions of the Constitution. In fact, some of 
. the directives are so broadly formulated that
e/ one can <%ive whatever policy guidance one
wants from them* 285
Everything points to the need, first in the order of 
priorities, for imaginative but realistic laws. That is the 
only way in which to evoke j’udicial response. This fact is
284* Self-governing village council considered to be one of 
India’s indigenous institutions*
285. Upendra Baxi,”'The Little Done, The Vast Undone’ - Some
Reflections on Reading Granville Austin’s The Indian Con­
stitution” . (1967) 9 J.I.L.I., 321, 345.
supported by the history of Constitutional development in the
United States. Apart from B.N. Mukerjee and David Willcox 
(above, 145) another contributor to the Journal of Indian Law 
Institute, Sheldon D. Elliot who like Willcox is an American
? ft f\
lawyer, has emphasised the basic need for focussing one’s 
efforts at the drafting stage. Only then he goes on to point 
out that,
Statutory interpretation as a component 
of the judicial task and function is not - 
and indeed, in its nature it cannot be - 
an exact science. It calls for the exer­
cise of judicial discretion and judicial 
statemanship of a high order. To aid the 
courts in the proper and wise performance 
of this function, a basic rule of construct­
ion like the ’mischief rule’ should be ac­
corded preference over a too rigid adher­
ence to the strict letter of the law with 
its concomitant policy of ’letting the 
chips fall where they may’. 287
Another American contributor to the Indian journal, Arthur
288Taylor von Mehren, appears to take the view that it is 
judicial thinking that ultimately governs everything else, 
not only the argument in the bar but legal thinking in gener­
al, and therefore, we may conclude the thinking of draftsmen 
too.
The extent to which the judicial process 
in a given society realizes its potential 
depends in some considerable measure on 
the kind and quality of thinking encour­
aged by the court. For example, if courts 
in their judgments react mechanically and
286. ’Statutory Interpretation and the Welfare State’, (1959-60), 
2 J.I.L.I.t 255,2 70-1.
287. Ibid., 271.
288. ’The Judicial Process with particular Reference to the 
United States and to India’ , (1963) 5 J.I.L.I., 271.
unimaginatively to problems they encourage 
corresponding habits of mind in the legal 
profession as a whole; lawyers naturally 
enough tend to present to judges the kind 
of arguments that have, in the past, been 
persuasive. The ultimate vice of the 
rigid rule of stare decisis that has emerg­
ed in England lies here: the profession,
even the academic lawyer, is encouraged to 
consider that the essence of the judicial 
process lies in a kind of verbalistic logic 
chopping. 289
It is certainly true that by training and by inclination the 
Indian judges have belonged to the English legal tradition. 
The implications in many recent writings have been that that 
tradition has been responsible for the narrow and legalistic 
approach to the Constitution adopted by the Indian judges. 
’Legalism* has come to mean an apparently outmoded and per­
haps, even harmful idea. But at the same time, the critics 
of legalism do not seem to want a modern version of ’palm- 
tree justice’ (not meant to be pefgorative) devoid of all 
» legalism’ . What lies in between must indeed be a very 
subtle process.
It is this writer’s view that grammatical or (better 
still) a natural interpretation of statutes will continue 
to be the basic rule even for constitutional purposes.
Hence, it is that the draftsmen can achieve so much and 
yet very little attention has been paid to what can be done 
to improve that task. None of this is meant to belittle 
the central role of the judiciary. But theirs is a mainly 
passive role with possibilities of ’controlled activism*.
It is agreed by everyone that the way that opportunity for 
’controlled activism’ is handled qualifies the judiciary
289. Ibid., 275.
for greatness•
Contemporary essays critical of the judiciary in India 
make it appear that there is a special version of judicial 
review in the case of laws enacted to further the Directives 
and another more ordinary version in the case of laws that 
have no direct bearing on the directives but which neverthe­
less, are in the public interest. Postulating such a dual 
standard would be absurd. It seems an altogether more feas­
ible proposition to frame realistic laws with clear object- 
ives. Judicial reaction nay then^justifiably scrutinised.
Retrospectiveness and Reasonableness
The view that has been consistently maintained in
India is that the retrospective operation of a law (except
where it is a penal ex post facto law in which case it would
be hit by Article 2 0 ) will not render it ipso facto unreason- 
290able. It is conceded that retrospectiveness is an element
in the determination of the reasonableness of restrictions on
a fundamental right but it could be overlooked if the statute
291
in many of its other aspects appears to be reasonable.
Thus the Indian Supreme Court in West Bengal v. Subodh 
292Gopal reversed the decision of the Calcutta High Court,
which held that West Bengal Revenue Sales (W. Bengal Amend­
ment ) Act, 1950, retrospectively affected the vested rights 
of purchasers of properties at revenue sales to evict under-
290. West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, AIR, 1954, S.C.92. Mysore v. 
Achiah Chetty, AIR, 1969, S.C. 477.
291. Rai Ramakrishna v. Bihar, AIR, 1963, S.C. 1667. R.L. Arora 
v. U.P., AIR, 1964, S.C. 1230.
292. AIR, 1954, S.C. 92.
tenure holders and therefore, amounted to an unreasonable re-
293striction on their right to property.
The Supreme Court’s view was that tenancy legislation 
like the Act of 1950 wmpQ usual in India and from that long- 
established tradition the Act was reasonable, its retrospect­
ive operation notwithstanding.
This decision needs to be distinguished from a later
294case, Jayavatsingh v. Gujarat, where too the impugned 
legislation related to tenancy matters and was retrospective 
in character. The difference was that the legislation was 
not a fair scheme to benefit tenants but was a device to re­
duce the present value of a landlord’s interest, with the 
consequence that any possible compensation payable to him 
on his interest being transferred to his tenants would be 
less. The Supreme Court held that such retrospective ad­
justments adversely affecting vested rights, in this case a 
straightforward cut in the value of the rights, would be un­
reasonable and void.
With the exception of this case, so far as this writer 
is aware, there has not been any other holding a law unreason­
able because of its retrospective operation. One good reason 
for this nay be that most retrospective laws have been taxa­
tion measures which have amended inadequate provisions or 
loopholes in previous measures in order to sustain taxation 
throughout a given period. The Indian Supreme Court has
293. See Subodh Gopal v. Bihari Lai, AIR, 1951, Cal.85.
294. AIR, 1962, S.C. 821.
consistently held that taxation as an attribute of a sovereign
Parliament and State legislatures implies the widest discret-
29 5ion and that would include validating taxes retrospectively.
The two fqllowing decisions illustrate another aspect 
of the same question where the Indian Supreme Court refused 
to strike down retrospective measures.
296In Narottamdas v. Madhya Padesh by passing the 
M.P. Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962, the State Government 
prescribed retrospectively rates of minimum wages for workers 
in the bidi manufacturing units. In so doing, the Government 
reversed earlier High Court decisions holding similar rates 
fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, ultra vires the Act.
In other words, the Government armed themselves with more 
power but did so retrospectively.
The Supreme Court held that the Act of 1962, impugned 
before them, was enacted on the basis of Legislative Entry 
No.24, List III (concurrent List), dealing with minimum 
wages. The power given there enabled the passing of such 
a legislation as the Act of 1962. There was no question of 
viewing the matter as one affecting the petitioner’s right 
under Article 19(1)(g).
A similar decision emphasising the plenary powers of
297Indian legislatures is to be found in Mysore v. Achiah Chetty,
295. Rai Ramakrishna v. Bihar, AIR, 1963, S.C.1667.
296. AIR, 1964, S.C. 1590.
297. AIR, 1969, S.C. 477.
where one of two procedures governing the same matter was dis­
carded by legislation which was retrospective. The existence 
of two procedures giving the authorities an unexplained dis­
cretion to resort to either one has been held unreasonable 
under Article 14. It was in order to obviate any challenges 
that one of the procedures was done away with altogether.
But it was done while petitions challenging that very thing 
were pending in the High Court. The petitioner’s case was 
that notifications were issued while the two procedures were 
in existence but subsequently, they were validated by the 
abolition of one of the procedures. This according to him 
was unreasonable. The Supreme Court rejected the conten­
tion. This does seem hard. But on the other hand, the 
clear right enjoyed by a legislature to enact retrospect­
ively could not be denied.
There is a need in this area to limit the extent to 
which Legislatures can pass retrospective laws. The empha­
sis put by the Indian Supreme Court on the plenary nature of 
legislative power to pass prospective or retrospective laws 
cannot be a full answer to the problem of retrospective legis­
lation talking away vested rights. There must be some indi­
cation that the citizen’s fundamental rights do exist and 
matter.
Taxation laws have been regarded by Indian Courts as 
belonging to a special category of privileged legislation.
Even conceding that to be the case, a pronouncement quali­
fying the generality of legislative power to enact retro­
spective laws is called for.
158.
On the main theme of this section, the early decision
298of the Supreme Court in Dr. N.B. Khare did not favour a
too generalised view of the Court’s power to determine the
question of reasonableness. But the ratio of that case that
the Court could examine the substantive as well as procedural
provisions of the statute means full review of the laws.
299Except for Dr. N.B. Khare and perhaps V.G. Row, there has 
been very little general discussion in the Supreme Court of 
the nature of the review in determining reasonableness. At 
times one looks for such a general framework in the context 
of particular cases and one is disappointed to find none.
Perhaps, it is felt, that for the actual decision of the 
cases no such general theoretical outline is required.
Whatever the theory, there is at least one practical 
question involved in the determination of reasonableness of 
restrictions. That is the question of burden of proof.
SECTION 1(b) BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER ARTICLE 19
The inconsistencies in the law relating to burden of 
proof in determining constitutionality of statutes in India 
affects the scope of judicial review under the Indian Con­
stitution. Relevant here is the <jiestion of presumption in 
favour of constitutionality or validity of statutes, a notion 
that the Indian Supreme Court first entertained in A.K. Gopalan’s
298. AIR, 1950, S.C. 211.
299. AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200, col.l.
159
case.^0 0 The position early commentators have argued for
is that as far as the rights guaranteed by Article 19 are
concerned, the presumption in favour of constitutionality
could not apply. The rights under Article 19(1) are regarded
as the rules and the other clauses of Article 19 are considered
the exceptions. On that basis the argument goes that the
burden of proof is on those who seek the protection of the 
301exceptions. None of the early Supreme Court decisions
302 ydeals with this question. Neither Dr. N.B. Khare nor 
303V.G. Row, considered authorities on the test of reason­
ableness under Article 19, deal with the point about burden
of proof. But the remark made by Bose J. in Ram Singh v.
304Delhi that it was the rights which were fundamental and
305not the limitations was perhaps made to show where the
300. Per M&hajan J. "The benefit of reasonable doubt has to be 
resolved in favour of legislative action, though such a pre­
sumption is not conclusive.” (1950) S.C.R. 8 8 , 222. A 
recent example is Rayala Corpn., v. Director of Enforcement, 
AIR, 1970, S.C. 494, 499.
301. "To such a scheme the presumption of prima facie consti-
tionality has no scope. The judges are asked the ques­
tion - is the legislation good? There is something 
hazy in the idea that they may begin by saying that it 
is good because it is legislation. And if nothing else 
appears the restrictions are ’reasonable restrictions’ 
because they are legislative restrictions." Atul Chandra 
Gupta, Reasonable Restrictions, (1951) 5 Indian Law Review,
72 , 74-T.
302.AIR, 1950, S.C.211.
303.AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200, col.l.
304^xR j 1951, .S.C.270; (1951) S.C.R.451; (1951) S.C.J. 374.
305.Ibid., 276, col.l.
burden of proof was under Article 19. This view of Article 
19 as embodying rules and exceptions is unfortunately not the 
consistently accepted view.
306Sarkar J. in his dissent in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. Assam 
held that the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) 
was what was left after the restrictions in 19(6) were taken 
into account. In other words, he denied that Article 19(6) 
enabling the imposition of reasonable restrictions was an ex­
ception to Article 19(1)(g).
This dissenting view of a single judge has now become
307the view of the Delhi High Court. In S.I.S. Ltd. v. Union 
the facts were these: the petitioner challenged the mode in
which the price of sugar was fixed by the Government acting
308under Section 3(3)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, 
They contended that it was up to the Government to show that 
the price they fixed was not unreasonably low and further, 
that the manner in which they arrived at the price was also 
not unreasonable.
The High Court held that the burden was on the peti­
tioner to show that the mode in which the price was calcu­
lated was unreasonable. Further, the following view was
306. AIR, 1964, S.C. 925; (1964) 5 S.C.R. 975.
307. AIR, 1972, Delhi, 159.
308. 3(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it
is necessary or esqpedient so to do for maintaining or 
increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for 
securing their equitable distribution and availability 
at fair prices ... it may, by order, provide for regu- 
lat ing ...
(3 )(c) where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, 
the price calculated at the market rate prevailing in 
the locality at the date of sale.
expressed by the court:
The object of the imposition of restrict­
ions on a fundamental right is to secure 
the interests of the society and the State 
as against the excesses which may be com­
mitted by an individual in exercising a 
fundamental right. It does not take away 
from the individual anything or any right 
or liberty for any wrong done by him. The 
restriction which appears to be imposed on 
a fundamental right is, according to the 
scheme of Part III of the Constitutioh, 
really a built-in part of the limited 
fundamental rights which are conferred by 
Part III: The right possessed by the indi-
vidual was limited from its very inception.
It was held that the analogy of onus of proof being borne by
the State in proceedings under penal statutes could not be
extended to Article 19. This holding means that a citizen
complaining that his fundamental right has been infringed
must prove not only that he has a prima facie case but also
that what the legislature or the executive has done was
310clearly unreasonable. This may not appear to be such
an unconscionable proposition aad citizens may well be able 
to discharge this burden in most cases. But it does seem 
to derogate from the idea that these rights are fundamental 
and that the State can impose only those restrictions that 
would be judged by the courts to be reasonable. Since it 
enables the State to do something, that is to say, to impose 
restrictions, it seems more natural to put the burden on the
309. AIR, 1972 .Delk'u 159, ooi-Z-
310. In regard to two earlier cases where price-fixing laws were 
employed, no such burden was expressly cast on the peti­
tioner. It appears the State justified the prices fixed 
as reasonable. M/s Diwan Sugar & General Mills v. Union, 
AIR, 1959, S.C. 626; (1959) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 123 and Rohtas 
Industries Ltd. v. Union, AIR, 1971, Patna, 414.
162.
State to show that what it has done in abridging the funda­
mental right was reasonable. Moreover, it is the State which 
is in a better position to put all relevant facts and material 
in favour of the restriction imposed. This may, in practice, 
prove to be an opportunity for the public to know the back­
ground to many a statute or statutory instrument which it may 
not otherwise do. However, that is only incidental.
311The decision in S.I.S. Ltd. v. Union has an un­
settling effect on the law. In this connection a similar 
unsatisfactory decision, though it relates to an administra­
tive law point, may be referred to. Article 19 was not 
directly invoked there, but the decision has a bearing on
the question of reasonableness. In V.V. Iyer v. Jasjit 
312Singh the appellant, a businessman, imported agricultural 
machinery on the strength of an import licence which he ob­
tained by representing that the machinery to be imported was 
manually operated. The customs authorities maintained that 
it was, in fact, mechanically operated equipment and they 
charged the appellant with having obtained an import licence 
through misrepresentation and in violation of the import regu­
lations. The appellant was fined Rs.80,000 and the goods 
imported, worth Rs.30,000 were confiscated.
The appellant demonstrated to the authorities that 
the machinery could be operated manually. The Supreme 
Court assumed that the machinery could be operated in either
311. AIR, 1972, Delhi, 159.
312. AIR, 1973, S.C. 194.
way, but held that unless the order of the customs authori­
ties was manifestly unreasonable, of the two possible views 
the one favourable to the administration would prevail.
This result was arrived at exclusively from the stand­
point of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to 
review the decisions of administrative tribunals. The
Supreme Court had in an earlier decision in Collector of
313Customs v. K. Ganga Setty held that a High Court could 
not interfere with the finding of the customs authorities 
as to which entry of the import regulations governed a parti­
cular item of import unless the finding was perverse or mani­
festly unreasonable.
314This decision was reinforced in Girdharilal v. Union 
where the Supreme Court laid down that a High Court, acting 
under Article 226, was not sitting in appeal over the deci­
sions of customs authorities.
But these two cases did not fully explain an earlier
315decision in A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhivaxvi where the 
Bombay High Court did reverse a finding of the customs autho­
rities and the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s deci­
sion as valid’. The Supreme Court and the High Court below 
disagreed with the authorities’ determination, but there was 
no basis for saying that that determination was perverse or 
manifestly unreasonable# Yet the courts interfered and the
313. [1963] 2 S.C.R.277.
314. [1964] 7 S.C.R.62.
315. AIR, 1961, S.C.1506.
164 \
Supreme Court both on procedural and substantive grounds up­
held the citizen* s case*
It is quite clear that it is not feasible to have every
decision of an administrative tribunal reviewed by a High
Court or the Supreme Court* What is contended for here is
that the presumption in favour of the administration has to
be considerably modified where penal consequences must 
316follow if the administration* s view is to prevail and
317where the citizen* s case is not an attempt to defraud 
the laws of custom and excise* If indeed, the petitioner 
V«V* Iyer intended the machinery he imported to be oper­
ated manually it was plainly unfortunate to let the customSs 
authorities insist that there were other possibilities. This 
is particularly so in view of the Supreme Court’s admission 
that the machinery enabled manual as well as mechanical opera­
tion*
318The decision in V.V. Iyer gives the impression
that the administration exists not for the citizen but for 
its own sake. The man in the street is understandably 
tempted to comment that the sooner the presumption stated 
by the Supreme Court in this case is modified the better 
for the citizens.
316. So held in I.T* Commr* v. G* Banneriee & Co*, AIR, 1965,
S.C* 1977. The Supreme Court applied the ’yardstick of 
a prudent businessman* *
317. See Fedco (p'j Ltd. v. Bilgrami^ AIR, 1960, S.C.415, a 
licence obtained, by fraud or misrepresentation could be 
cancelled under Section 9(a) of the Imports (Control)
Order, 1955. That was held to be a reasonable restriction.
318. AIR, 1973, S.C.194.
The correct view on the question of burden of proof
under Article 19 was, it is submitted, taken in the very
first year of the Constitution’s life in Brajnandan Sharma 
319v* Bihar - a significant decision in many respects.
There Meredith C.J. held that once a citizen establishes 
that prima facie there has been an infringement of his funda­
mental right or rights the burden was on the State to bring 
the law within the ’exception* in clauses 2 - 6 of Article 19.
This clear and workable proposition was adopted by the 
Supreme Court on at least three occasions,, -only-to-be-contra­
dio ted by other decisions of which S. I .S. Ltd. v.
Union is the most recent one.
Decisions taking the right view call for considera-
321tion. In Saghir Ahmad v. Uttar Pradesh the Supreme 
Court stated:
There is undoubtedly a presumption in 
favour of the constitutionality of a 
legislation. But whenihe enactment
on the face of it is found to violate
a fundamental right guaranteed under 
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, 
it must be held to be invalid unless 
those who support the legislation can 
bring it within the purview of the ex­
ception laid down in clause (6 ) of the 
article. If the respondents do not 
place any materials before the court 
to establish that the legislation comes 
within the permissible limits of clause 
(6 ), it is surely not for the appellants 
to prove negatively that the legislation
319. I.L.R. [1950] Pat.461. Above, 125 ff
320. Above , 160. .
321. AIR, 1954, S.C.728.
was not reasonable and was not conducive 
to the welfare of the community. 322
323In Khyerbari Tea Company Ltd. v. Assam, Gajendragadkar 
J. (for the majority) after confirming the above dictum in 
Saghir Ahmad (above, 165) went further and held that different 
considerations applied to cases under Article 14 (The Right 
to Equality: see Chapter 2, below, 171 ). There the ’ini­
tial presumption of constitutionality may have a larger sway’ 
and the petitioner may have to show that the impugned law
denied equality before the law, or equal protection of the
- 324laws.
A third decision is to be found in Vrajlal Manilal &
325Co. v. Madhya Pradesh where the court put the onus on the 
State to show the restriction to be reasonable after the pe­
titioner had shown a prima facie infringement of his funda­
mental right.
Distinction between Articles 14 and 19
The distinction between Article 19 and Article 14 in
the matter of presumption of constitutionality was for the
first time recognised by the Supreme Court in Khyerbari.
But before that decision much confusion prevailed in the
Supreme Court
past in the j'udgments of the / which did not maintain
322. Ibid., 738, col.2.
323. AIR, 1964, S.C. 925; (1964) 5 S.C.R.975.
324. Ibid., 1003-1004.
325. AIR, 1970, S.C. 129, 135, col.1; see also Mohd. Faruk v. 
Madhya Pradesh, AIR, 1970, S.C. 93, which takes the right 
view.
326. AIR, 1964, S.C.925; (1964) 5 S.C.R. 975.
167.
the distinction and freely quoted passages applicable to 
Article 14 in support of a similar presumption in cases 
arising under Article 19. This has been a subs taunt ial 
cause of contradictory statements on the point from the 
Supreme Court Bench.
327Thus, m  Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India both 
Articles 19 and 14 were invoked. But the Court laid down a 
common rule of presumption in favour of constitutionality in 
all caises.
There have been discussions in High Court decisions
where a similar confusion appears to have prevailed. In
328Shersingh v. Rajasthan, a case where the Rajasthan Produce 
Rents Regulating (Amendment) Act, 1952, was challenged on the 
ground that Article 19(1)(f) was violated, the majority held 
that there was always a presumption that a statute was consti­
tutional, and the burden was upon him who assailed its consti­
tutionality to prove that there was fa clear transgression1 
of constitutional principles. The majority mistakenly relied
on a dictum of the Supreme Court from the judgment in Chi ran jit 
329Lai v. Union case on Article 14. There, Fazl Ali J. had 
obs erved:
It is the accepted doctrine of the Ameri­
can Courts, which I consider to be well 
founded on principle, that the presump­
tion is always in favour of the consti - 
tutionality of an enactment, and the
327. AIR, 1960, S.C. 554; (1960) 2 S.C.R.671; (1960) S.C.J.611.
328. AIR, 1954, Raj. 65 (F.B.).
329. AIR, 1951, S.C. 41.
burden is also upon him who attacks it to 
show that there has been a clear trans­
gression of the constitutional principles.
(Emphasis supplied), 330
The Rajasthan High Court disagreed with Meredith C.J.’s
331view expressed in Brajnandan Sharma that the petitioner
attacking the constitutionality of a law had merely to show
332that prima facie the law violated his fundamental rights.
But the concurring judge, Bapna J., held that different con­
siderations applied to Article 14 and Article 19 respectively. 
He preferred the view expressed by Meredith C.J. in Brajnandan 
Sharma (above) and held that the burden was on the State to 
show that a restriction on a right guaranteed under Article 
19 was reasonable,
Harris C.J, of the Calcutta High Court had already 
applied the same observations of Fazl Ali J, in Ch&ranjit 
Lai v. Union and held:
Where such relief depended upon whether 
a legislative provision was ultra vires 
and void the onus of establishing such 
invalidity rested on the party challeng­
ing the provision in question, 333
The challenge there was to section 7 of the Bengal 
Land Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, on the 
ground that it violated the right to hold property guaranteed 
by Article 19(l)(f), Unlike the Rajasthan High Court, the 
Calcutta High Court did not demand proof of ’clear trans-
330. Ibid., 45.
331. I.L.R. [1950] Pat.461.
332. AIR, 1954, Raj. 65, 70.
333. Subodh Gopal v. Behari Lai, AIR, 1951, Cal. 85, 89.
gression of constitutional principles* before the petitioner*s 
case could be accepted. After all, there is a difference be­
tween a prima facie case to be made out by the petitioner in­
voking Article 19 and a burden on him to prove that the im­
pugned law clearly transgressed the rights.
334The presumption has, indeed, been rightly applied 
in the case of Article 14, to mean that the legislature does 
not ordinarily pass unequal laws, i.e. laws that discriminate 
between classes and people. That seems different from a 
similar presumption applied to Article 19 to mean that an 
enactment prima facie violating a fundamental right in Article 
19 must be taken to impose only reasonable restrictions. A 
* short* presumption that laws are passed in good faith is not 
the same as a »long* presumption which goes further and holds 
that the laws are presumed to impose reasonable restrictions 
on fundamental rights.
It is clear from the discussion so far that the pre­
sumption of constitutionality is a crucial question and its 
application Article 19 has a special significance. A 
general presumption in favour of the statute can be compat­
ible with the main burden being on the State to prove that a 
law which is prima facie violative of a fundamental right im­
poses only reasonable restrictions. The general presumption 
in favour of the statute’s validity is rebutted once a prima 
facie violation of a fundamental right is shown. As will be 
seen in the next jchapt er«. Article 14 is governed by a different 
set of considerations. The unique position of Article 19,
334. Chiranjit Lai v. Union, AIR, 1951, S.C.41, 45.
therefore, must be recognised for the purposes of burden of 
proof.
CHAPTER 2
SECTION 2(a) REASONABLENESS OF DISCRIMINATORY CLASSIFICATION
UNDER ARTICLE 14
14* Equality before law;- the State shall 
not deny to any person equality before 
the law or the equal protection of the 
laws within the territory of India.
An examination of the idea of reasonableness in the 
Indian Constitution cannot be complete without a look at 
Article 14. As a check against arbitrary exercise of State 
power this provision is as important as Article 19 and is 
more often invoked, in many cases along with Articles 15 and 
16. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and Article 16 
secures equality of opportunity in public employment. These 
provisions have an ancestor in Section 298(1) of the Govern­
ment of India Act, 1935,
No subject of His Majesty domiciled in '
India shall on grounds Only of religion, 
place of birth, descent, colour or any 
of them be ineligible under the Crown 
in India, or be prohibited on any such 
grounds from acquiring, holding or dis­
posing of property or carrying on any 
occupation, trade, business or profes­
sion in British India.
Matters arising under Articles 15 and 16 are not 
strictly within the scope of this iwork. However, the notion 
of ’protective discrimination* incorporated in Articles 15 and 
16 and which poses a challenge to the idea of equality will be
dealt with below.^35
335. See below, 197 and ff.
Any state action whether it be legislative, executive, admini­
strative or even judicial could be challenged as being in vio­
lation of Article 14
The first important point to be noticed with regard to tkls 
provision is that, behind the seemingly absolute guarantee of 
equality, lies what has come to be known as the ’doctrine of 
classification* which permits the State to classify peopUe, 
facts, circumstances or cases in enacting legislation so long 
as such classification is reasonable. This doctrine of classi­
fication has given a practical expression to this difficult 
idea of equality. The doctrine was developed by the United 
States Supreme Court and adopted by the Indian Courts on the 
assumption that Article 14 is partly based on section 1 of the 
United States 14th Amendment.
336. Chief Settlement Commr. v. Qm Prakash, AIR, 1969, S.C.33, 
where the Supreme Court rejected the concept of ’dual state’ 
which places state action in a privileged position giving
it immunity from the courts. It was held that all admini­
strative action would prima facie be liable to be tested for 
their legality in law courts.
A  recent decision'that summarises case law on the point is 
Abraham v. Kerala, 1972, K.L.T# 165, where an administrative 
circular exempting an individual from conditions laid down 
for promotion within the Education Department was held dis­
criminatory under Article 14. *
Union v. Anglo-Afghan Agenciest AIR, 1968, S.C. 718: admini­
strative promis es held binding•
Budhan Choudhry v. Bihar, AIR, 1955, S.C. 191; I.L.R.(1955)
34 Patna 194; (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1045. Jagmohan Singh v.
Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1973, S.C. 947.
337. For example, Barbier v. Connolly (1885) 113 U.S. 27:
Class legislation, discriminating against some and 
favouring others, is prohibited but legislation 
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited 
in its application, if within the sphere of its 
operation it affects all persons similarly situated, 
is not within the Amendment, 
per Field J.
Some American writers have made a distinction between the 
’old’ and ’new* equal protection: The ’new* protection cases
dating from the 1960s do not seem to regard legislative policy 
with the same deference as the * old* equal protection cases
/Cont’d. on next page:
Meaning of * Reasonable Classification*
Equality in Article 14 has been construed by Indian 
338courts to mean that separating people who are prima 
facie similarly situated into groups with different rights 
and liabilities should be accounted for on the basis of dif­
ferences that could be said to be reasonable: (a) from the 
point of view of the purpose for which the law is enacted,
and (b) from the standpoint of the classification actually
339made by the law. Taking the first condition in point
(a) here the Courts are obviously looking for a definite
public interest or State interest as the aim or purpose of
the law. In India that interest could be anything from
levying income tax at varying rates on people with different
340incomes to favouring ’’backward classes” of citizens (a
large part of whom were described as ’untouchables* in the 
past) in public services and educational institutions.
Note 337 - continued from 172:
assumed. For an example of the rnew* protection see Shapiro 
v# Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22L.Ed* 2d 600 (1969). See S.M; 
Huang-Thio, ’Equal Protection and Rational Classification*, 
(1963) Public Law. 412*
338.H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Bombay, 1967, 
Chapter IX. 'P.P. Basu; Commentary on the Constitution of 
India, Vol.l, 5th edn., Calcutta, 1965, 444-465.
339.Chiranjit Lai v. Union, AIR, 1951, S.C.41,'45; (1950)'S.C.R. 
869, 879. West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR, 1952, S.C. 
75, (1952) S.C.R. 284. ' J .K. Mittal, * Right to Equality in 
the Indian Constitution* (1970) Public Law, 36-72 (Part I), 
(1972) Public Law, 232-255 (Part II).
340.janki Prasad v. Jammu & Kashmir, AIR, 1973, S.C. 930. These 
are communities that could be considered both educationally 
and socially backward. See also Balaji v . Mysore, AIR,
1963, S.C. 649. See below, 2 0 2 .
The second condition in point (b) means that the Court 
would examine if the classification has been reasonably and 
fairly drawn in the light of the aim of the impugned legis­
lation* The primary judicial task under Article 14 is some­
what generally described as examining the reasonableness of 
the classification made by the impugned law* But as in most 
constitutional adjudication relating to fundamental rights 
the courts in practice examine the entire stattte for ’clarity* 
of purpose and, perhaps,the ’viability* of the means adopted - 
’clarity’ and ’viability’, of course only to the extent the 
court is able to see that the infringement of a fundamental 
right is not without good reason*
Whether or not a particular classification should be
made at all in order to achieve the statute’s purpose is very
341often a policy matter but can occur to a court of law* and 
the Court may be tempted to trace unconstitutional discrimi­
nation through any number of ways. Even otherwise the scope 
of judicial review in pronouncing upon unconstitutional dis­
crimination appears to be large* It has been stated by the
Indian Supreme Court that the Indian provision comprehends
342both English and American notions of equality before the
341. A pronouncement on this very point is Willie E. Williams v. 
Illinois, (1970) 26 L.Ed* 586, also AIR, l$7i, U.S.S.C.63*
342. ” ... not only that with us no man is above the law, but 
(what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be 
his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the 
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tri­
bunals#1’ Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 10th edn*, London, 1961, 193* r
Section 1, 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
”No State shall *** deny to any person within its jurisdict­
ion the equal protection of the laws.” See Chiranjit Lai v. 
Union, AIR, 1951, S.C. 41, 45; (1950) S.C.R. 869, 879.
law and the equal protection of the laws. Perhaps realising
that there was an uncomfortably large scope for review under
Article 14, the Indian Supreme Court, following the example
of the United States Supreme Court, has limited that scope
through the presumption that a legislature ordinarily does
343not pass discriminatory laws.
It is presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the needs of the people who elected it
and would only pass such laws as would provide remedies for
344the problems Damfest m  its experience. Further in choos­
ing its subject-matter "the legislature is free to recognise
degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those
345cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest•" The
inequality relied on must be shown to be unreasonable and 
arbitrary. Vague allegations of inequality would have no 
effect.
It is plain that every classification is 
in some degree likely to produce some in­
equality, but mere production of inequal­
ity is not by itself enough. The inequal­
ity produced ... must be 'actually and pal­
pably unreasonable and arbitrary. 346
343. Chiranjit Lai v. Union. (1950) S.C;R. 869, 879} AIR, 1951 
S.C. 41, 45 per Fazl Ali J.
344. Ibid., 913, per Mukherjea J. quoting the United States case 
of Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company, 248 U.S. 152, 
157.
345. Per Mukherjea J. in Chiranjit Lai (1950) S.C.R.869, 914, 
quoting Radice v. N.Y., 264 U .S. 294.
346. Per Das J. in Chiranjit Lai (1950) S.C.R. 869 , 932. Also 
see Twyford Tea Co., v. Kerala, AIR, 1970, S.C.1133.
347In Chiranjit Lai v. Union, the Sholapur Spinning 
and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act. 1950, provided 
for the dismissal of the managing agents of the company named, 
and for the removal of its directors, and held certain provi­
sions of the Indian Companies Act inapplicable to this company. 
The Government was authorised to appoint new directors. The 
petitioner, a share-holder, whose rights were affected by the 
provisions of the Act, contended that Article 14 was violated 
inasmuch as the company was singled out for special legisla­
tion. The State produced the following reasons for enacting 
the impugned measure:
(a) The company’s textile-mill, then one of the largest in 
Asia, employing 13,000 workers, was closed down due to 
’appalling mismanagement*•
(b) This finding was reached after proper enquiry and dis­
cussion by Government officials after consultations with 
non-governmental sources.
(c) The closing down of the company has meant unemployment 
to a considerable workforce. So both for that reason 
and in the interest of continued production of a commo­
dity vital to the community, the Government decided to 
take over the management. (It is not clear whether 
this was for a temporary period and if so, for how long).
The petitioner argued that there must be other companies 
and mills who were suffering from mismanagement but the law
347. AIR, 1951, S.C. 41, (1950) S.C.R.869.
348
does not cover them. The Supreme Court sustained, the Act. 
The majority of 3 to 2 (Patanjali and Das JJ. dissenting, 
and Mukherjea J . writing the main majority judgment) upheld 
the Act on the ground that a single company or individual or 
group could be in a clans by themselves. The presumption, 
as outlined above, was in favour of constitutionality and it 
was up to the petitioner to show that the company in question 
was singledout from amongst many similarly situated.
The dissenting judges, accepting that the presumption 
was in favour of constitutionality, held that discrimination 
was too obvious in the Act, which contained no classification 
and which did not attempt to treat the question of mismanage­
ment as a general problem,
Patanjali Sastri J. could not gather the element of 
public interest which could support the Act, Both the dis­
senting judges were certain that the petitioner was being 
asked to discharge an impossible burden of proving that other 
mills in a similar situation were left out of the government’s 
consideration. In the words of Patanjali Sastri J.:
How could the petitioner discharge such a 
burden? Was he to ask for an investiga­
tion by the Court of the affairs of other 
industrial concerns in India where also 
there were strikes and lock-outs resulting 
in unemployment and cessation of product­
ion of essential commodities? Would those 
companies be willing to submit to such an 
investigation? 349
348. There certainly are now several such sick mills. A recent 
Act entitled The Sick Textile Undertakings {Taking over 
Management) Act, 1972, includes forty-six mills. See 
Schedule 1 to the Act, which provides for government take­
over of the mills specified in Schedule 1.
349. (1950) S.C.R. 869, 892.
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A decision similar to Chiranjit Lai, where the same 
emphasis was laid on the presumption in favour of constitu­
tionality, is to be found in Board of Trustees, Tibia College
350v. New Delhi, where a private medical institute with reason­
ably large assets was put under a new board of trustees by the 
impugned Act after squabbling members had jeopardised its pro­
per management.
The Supreme Court showed an even greater readiness than 
it did in Chiranjit Lai (where at least some proof of public 
interest was available) to assume an element of public interest 
and held that Article 14 was not violated by the impugned Act#
Not only in this, but in every such case of an indivi­
dual company or institute forming the subject matter of spe­
cial legislation, it seems necessary that the court devotee 
some space in its judgment to explaining how and to what ex­
tent public interest is involved# This has been noticeably 
lacking in more than a few judgments of the Indian Supreme 
Court# It is important to note that such ’single entity*
legislation has not (unfortunately) been rare, but arises
351periodically. The emphasis on presumption of constitu­
tionality can only be given a reduced status where prima 
facie the law is discriminatory# Then the State must supply 
enough facts to highlight the element of public interest#
350# AIR, 1962, S.C. 458.
351. A recent example of what in effect amounts to a*single- 
person* legislation is to be found in V ic e«Chanc ell or, 
Osmania University vi Chancellor, Os mania University#
AIR, 1967, S.C. 1305, where however, the statute impugned 
was held unconstitutional#
Two more decisions where the Indian Supreme Court
rightly upheld executive action affecting individuals are
352to be found in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar,
353and State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad*
In the first case the question was whether the power of the 
executive government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate **any matter of public importance** could be 
validly exercised in relation to an individual and his finan­
cial operations, which in fact, had resulted in considerable 
financial loss to members of the public* The Supreme Court 
answered in the affirmative*
In the second decision, appointment of a Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate alleged acts of corruption committed 
by a Chief Minister of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was held 
not to violate Article 14* The Supreme Court held that the 
matters which the Commission was asked to inquire into were 
matters of public importance* Public men who fail to con­
duct themselves properly could be subject to such investiga­
tions in the larger public interest*
A cor|bllary to presumption of constitutionality is 
that the legislature has freedom to choose its subject-matter 
and the distinctions or classifications made by a law could 
be based on geographical, historical or other like consider­
ations* Secondly, each legislature should be treated as a 
separate source of legislative authority and laws enacted by 
one cannot be compared or contrasted with any other on similar
352. AIR, 1958, S.C .538.
353. AIR, 1967, S.C .122.
354or same subject-matters.
As illustrations of difference based on area, two
decisions can be looked at* In the first case S*M* Trans-
355ports (P) Ltd* v* Sankaraswamigal Mutt, a Madras law re­
lating to protection of residential tenants in cities but 
which also extended the protection to commercial tenants 
in some selected towns was attacked as discriminatory for 
having left commercial tenants in other towns without such 
protection.
The Court sustained the law on the basis that those 
towns selected were commercially more important than those 
left out. This decision can make sense only if it is under­
stood that the protection extended to commercial tenants was 
regarded as a concession both by the State and the Court.
Why it should be thus seen as a concession is (on the face 
of the report) beyond all cogent explanation. One would 
have thought all commercial tenants wherever they were would 
have qualified for protection of their tenancy.
Many cases have come before the Supreme Court where 
discrepancies in the operation of tax laws from area to area 
have been challenged. Some of these discrepancies arose as 
a result of the reorganisation of the old Presidencies of 
Madras, Bombay and Calcutta into a number of old and new 
States. The old Madras Presidency, for example, was divi­
ded to form Madras, Kerala and Andhra States in 1956. In
354. Madhya Pradesh v. Mandawar, AIR, 1954, S.C.493; Purushottarn 
v. Desaj, AIR» 1956, S.C.20.
355. AIR, 1963, S.C.864.
Khadinge Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, 356 
differences in the computation of Agricultural Income-Tax 
between areas of Kerala that were originally part of the old 
Madras Presidency and the rest of Kerala (Travaneore-Cochin) 
was continued for a long time after 1956. When challenged, 
the Supreme Court upheld the differences as being not dis­
criminatory. One would have thought that the people of 
Kerala should be liable for payment of agricultural tax at 
uniform rates throughout the territory of the State. From 
the administrative point of view too, this would make sense.
But the Supreme Court did not see any constitutional compul­
sion derived from Article 14 to enforce uniform rates of 
agricultural tax throughout the State. Taxes vary accord­
ing to situations and the policies behind the levy. But to 
continue a discrepancy created by the reorganisation of states 
but which could be put right appears to be discriminatory be­
cause it has no good reason to support it. It would seem
that inertia as such is not violative of Article 14.
Another recent decision of the Supreme Court that per­
mitted such an anomaly is to be found in Nazeeria Motor Ser-
357vice v. Andhra Pradesh.
Quite rightly in matters of taxation the legislature
is given maximum freedom to choose the subject-matter and the
manner of tax levy. The presumption in favoux/constitution-
35 8
ality applies with particular force in such cases.
356. AIR, 1963, S.C.591.
357. AIR, 1970, S.C.1864.
358. Krishnan Nayar v. Kerala, AIR, 1961, Kerala 72, as long as
a tax was meant for legitimate revenue purposes it could not 
be held to be discriminatory. Also see T.K. Abraham v. T.C. 
AIR, 1958, Kerala, 129.
359In Twyford Tea C o , v. Kerala, the argument was raised 
that the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act» 1960, imposed 
a uniform tax on plantations and took no account of the varying 
profits and incomes out of different types of plantations viz*, 
those growing tea or coffee or cardamom or coconuts* The law 
did, however, prescribe that for purposes of taxation in rela­
tion to each type of plantation the number of plants would be 
divided by a standard figure appropriate to it* But these 
figures were attacked as arbitrary and as bearing no relation 
to the extent of profits made*
The Supreme Court held that a tax law could not be held 
discriminatory because it * touches purses of different lengths*• 
As long as there was some classification providing for the dif­
ferent types of plantations the law could not be discriminatory*
Relying on the American writer Willis, the Supreme 
Court held a legislature could pick and choose districts, ob­
jects, persons, methods, and even rates for taxation as long
361as it does so reasonably*
362In Madhya Pradesh v« G.C. Mandavar * the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that:
359* AIR, 1970, S.C .1133.
360. H.E. Willis9 Constitutional Law of the United Statesa 
Bloomington, Indiana, 1936, 587*
361. Another recent decision confirming this position is 
Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturing Association v* Union 
of India, AIR, 1970, S.C.1589.
362. AIR, 1954, S.C .493.
Article 14 does not authorise the striking 
down of a law of one State on the ground 
that in contrast with a law of another State 
on the same subject its provisions are dis­
criminatory ... The sources of authority of 
the two statutes being different Article 14 
can have no application. 363
There the petitioners grievance was that the scale of pay 
for the Central Government employees in the State was more 
than that of the comparable State government servants. This
was sought to be assailed as discriminatory. Purushottam v.
364B.M. Desaj reinforces the present point by holding that
each State legislature frames its own land revenue recovery 
laws and there was no question of comparing them to see if 
one was more severe than the others.
India’s ’welfare state* ideals combined with her social­
ist aims were given implicit recognition by the Supreme Court 
when it held that it would be reasonable for the State to dis­
criminate in its own favour not merely in respect of its essen­
tial governmental functions but^1 so in its trading activities.
OiC C
In Manna Lai v. Collector of Jhalawar the petitioners 
objected to a provision in the impugned law treating loans owed 
to a government-owned bank as a ’public demand’ , thus giving 
those loans priority over others.
It was argued that Article 14 was violated by making a 
distinction between private commercial banks and government 
commercial banks. It was held by the Supreme Court:
363. Ibid.
364. AIR, 1956, S.C .20.
365. AIR, 1961, S.C.828.
It seems to us that theGovernment, even 
as a banker, can be legitimately put in 
a separate class. The dues of the 
Government of a State are the dues of 
the entire people of the State. This 
being the position, a law giving special 
facility for the recovery of such dues 
cannot ... be said to offend Article 14 
... 366
S.R. Das J. and Reasonable Classification
An embellishment was added to the reasonable classi­
fication notion by S.R. Das J. of the Supreme Court in West
367Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar. He mentioned two conditions:
1 ) that the classification must be 
founded on an intelligible differ­
entia which distinguishes those 
that are grouped together from 
others, and
2 ) that that differentia must have a 
rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further S.R. Das J. laid down:
The differentia which is the basis of 
the classification and the obj’ect of the 
Act are distinct things and what is 
necessary is that there must be a nexus 
between them. 368
In that case, the Attorney«<3eneral had argued that the 
test of reasonable classification should not be considered 
universal. If the discrimination was in the general inter­
est of the administration and was not aimed at any particular 
individual or group then it should be held valid. Das J. 
rej’ecting that contention held that, if accepted, the words
366. Ibid., 831, col.2.
367. [1952] S.C.R.284.
3 6 8. [1952] S.C.R.284, 334-5.
* except in good faith and in the general interest of the admini< 
stration1 would have to be added to the wording in Article 14*
In that same decision, however, both Patanjali Sastri
C.J* and Bose J# disapproved of any "wordy •tests*” of equal­
ity or of reasonable classification to solve individual prob­
lems that come before the Court* Patanjali Sastri J* held 
that the test of classification was not a universal test 
since, in his view, orders under the Land Acquisition Act*
1894, or orders under a variety of laws made against indivi­
duals could not always be scrutinised with the help of the 
classification test* He held that courts could not insist 
on "delusive exactness" (quoting Holmes J* in Truak v*
Corrigan* 257 U*S* 312) by applying doctrinaire "objective 
tests" .
Bose J* was happy to stop at the view that the judges 
could say when a law was arbitrary and unreasonable under 
Article 14. There was no need for the judges to look at the 
object of the law in judging the arbitrary or discriminatory 
nature of that law* Ihey must look at the constitutional 
limits laid down by Article 14. It was possible for the
court to make up its mind without laying down any such
general proposition.
I realise that this is a function which 
is incapable of exact definition but I 
do not view that with dismay. The 
Common Law of England grew up in that
way* It was gradually added to as each
concrete case arose and a decision was . 
given ad hoc on the facts of that partiCuU^/ 
case. 369
369. [1952] S.C.R. 284, 362.
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (above, 184) is an 
authority for the proposition that where there was no classi 
fication at all but yet the administration was given a power 
to discriminate between similar cases, Article 14 would be 
violated.
Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. 1950 
had provided:
A special court shall try such offences 
or classes of offences or cases or classes 
of cases as the State Government may, by 
general or special order in writing direct#
Trial by the special courts meant* that certain features of 
a regular trial under the Criminal Penal Code such as the 
presence of judges or assessors, committal proceedings and 
a right to ask for adjournments were dispensed with. All 
the other requirements of a fair trial were retained* The 
Preamble of the impugned Act stated that it was expedient 
to provide for the speedier trial of certain offencefe* But 
which type of offences were to be sent to the special courts 
was not clarified by the Act* In fact, the object of the 
Act, viz*, the need for speedier trial, was not itself clear 
to the court.
The opinion of the maj'ority of the Supreme Court is 
summed in the following passage taken from the j*udgment of 
Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
The policy or idea behind the classifi­
cation should at least be adumbrated, if 
not stated, so that the court which has 
to decide on the constitutionality might 
be seized of something on which it could 
base its view about the propriety of the
187; .
enactment from the standpoint of dis­
crimination or equal protection* 370
According to the majority, the impugned Act gave no indication 
as to what offences needed speedier trial and why it was that 
such speedier trial was necessary.
Patanjali Sastri CJ* dissented* He appeared to indi­
cate that the Act was passed to deal with a number of offences
arising out of near riot conditions. None of the other judg­
ments referred to this aspect of the case. He held:
The discretion vested in the State 
Government in selecting cases for 
reference to a special court may not ' 
be subject to judicial review and may, 
in that sense, be absolute, but that 
is very different from saying that it 
was intended to be arbitrary. Its 
exercise must involve bona fide con­
sideration of special features or cir­
cumstances which call for a compara­
tively prompt disposal of the case or 
cases proposed to be referred. 370a
The Chief Justice made the further point that if the discret­
ion was shown to be arbitrarily exercised in any given case 
that administrative action or order was open to challenge 
under Article 14.
Soon after the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar , another
legislation similar in most respecis except one, was challenged
371in Kathi Raning v. Saurashtra. The different was this: 
whereas the statute in Anwar Ali sarkar simply stated in the 
Preamble that speedier trials were necessary, the statute 
here provided in the Preamble that the Act was:
370a. Ibid., 293. Emphasis original
371. AIR, 1952, S.C. 123.
to provide for public safety, maintenance 
of public order and preservation of peace 
and tranquility in the State of Saurashtra.
The Supreme Court held this Act as not discriminatory under 
Article 14. The Act had laid down a clear policy to be 
achieved, and therefore, a laok of classification of the 
offences to be tried by the special courts would not be 
fatal to the Act's constitutionality. Mukherjea J. held:
A statute will not necessarily be condemn­
ed as discrimination, because it does not 
make the classification itself but, as an 
effective v&y of carrying out its policy, 
vests the authority to do it in certain 
officers or administrative bodies. 371a
Discriminatory Procedures
Discriminatory procedures have been a particular 
matter that the Indian Courts have disapproved of whatever 
the merits of the law otherwise?such as being in the public 
interest.
0 7 0
In Suraj I#all Mohta & Co. v. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri
/ ;
the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act» 1947» 
was challenged under Article 14. A Commission set up under 
the Act investigated tax evasion, it seems, mostly in regard 
to excessive profits made during the war of 1939-45. The 
petitioner was one such alleged war profiteer.
The Commission had under the Act special powers which 
the authorities investigating evasion under the regular pro­
cedure provided for in Section 34 of the Income Tax Act,1922,
371a. Ibid., 132.
372. AIR, 1954, S.C.545.
did not have. The Commission could require written state­
ments of accounts from a bank or other savings company, could 
compel production of account books and could exercise powers 
of a civil court, in the matter of production of evidence and 
witnesses. The impugned Act did not, however, specify ade­
quately the conditions and circumstances under which the pro­
visions of the Act would be invoked by the Government. In 
other words, the Supreme Court found that all tax evaders 
would be within the ambit of both Section 34 of the regular 
Income Tax Act and the impugned Act. The court wished to 
know under what circumstances would some of the evaders be 
subject to the rigorous procedure under the impugned Act and 
under what circumstances would they be spared from its opera­
tion and the less rigorous procedure under the Income Tax Act 
applied?
in the absence of a sufficiently clear answer, the 
impugned Act was struck down as discriminatory and bad under 
Article 14.
The presumption of constitutionality could have been 
usefully invoked to save the Act. The attending circumstances 
in the case showed that the Act was presumably passed to deal 
with war profiteers who could easily be imagined as in a class 
by themselves, separate from all other tax evaders. War 
profiteers took advantage of a grave situation to make un­
conscionable profits. The huge sums of tax evaded would 
certainly have justified the rigorous procedure adopted.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the event has proved 
less than satisfactory. The petitioner, if indeed, he was 
a war profiteer, won the case with costs awarded to him by
theSupreme Court1# A cynic might enquire how much more the 
State could have lost#
In the second illustration of the Supreme Court’s sen­
sitivity to ’discriminatory* procedures, Northern India Caterers 
373v* PunJa^ » Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land 
(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, was challenged# The 
pattern here was the same as in the previous case# The Govern­
ment had a discretion, or so it seemed, to resort to either a 
rigorous or less rigorous of two possible procedures# The 
impugned Act contained a drastic procedure for evicting un­
authorised occupants of public premises (or in regard to whom 
original authorisation had come to an end) while the Civil 
Procedure Code, 1908, provided for a comparatively milder 
procedure to achieve the same object#
The Supreme Court struck down the impugned provision 
by a three to two majority# The provision was held to en­
able discrimination insofar as it departed from the regular 
procedure without clarifying the circumstances under wtfiich it 
could be invoked* The two dissenting judges maintained that 
Article 14 did not always prohibit discretionary powers in the 
Government to choose an appropriate procedure to achieve the 
object* This was particularly so in the recovery of
revenue due to the State# In '.saying so, the minority re-
374lied on Mannalal, a case we have already dealt with#
From the facts it appears that the petitioners had 
been plainly unreasonable in their conduct as occupiers of
373. AIR, 1967, S.C.1581.
374. (1961) 2 S.C.R.962; AIR, 0961, S.C.828 above, 183.
premises let out to them by the State# They were unreason­
able because it was plain that they wished to frustrate 
government attempts to realise rents due from them by pro­
longing litigation which advanced the case no further# Con­
sidering their conduct and such conduct in possible future 
cases, and bearing in mind that the government as landlords 
would not har#ass their tenants whatever the law the Supreme 
Court should, I submit, have upheld the statute.
Here again, the presumption of constitutionality was 
nowhere evident# Above all, the fact was forgotten that 
sadly, many in India, while dealing with the administration, 
try to postpone their obligations by initiating endless liti­
gation# While resolving constitutional issues, the Supreme 
Court has wide scope for moulding public policy by discourag­
ing such trends and encouraging or at least approving, other 
healthier trends.
Where Presumption of Constitutionality Neutralised
Although the presumption of constitutionality is strong,
there are circumstances where it has been expressly neutralised
375by the Couut# Thus, in R.P.N. Sahi v. Bihar, the Supreme 
Court held that where there was no evidence of any different­
iation marking those singled out from the rest, then there 
was no presumption in favour of the statute’s constitution­
ality# There the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, pur­
ported to nullify a transaction thouglt to be inadvisedly 
entered into by the Court of Wards administering a large 
well-known estate# The transaction consisted of a settle­
375. I.L.R. (1953) 32 Patna, 375.
ment of lands on the petitioners* In the objects and reasons 
the impugned Act stated that the lands were settled contrary 
to law and public policy and that it was necessary to nullify 
the transaction*
The Supreme Court held that the law had singled out the 
petitioners amongst similar other lease-holders. If the
Court of Wards had entered into a transaction inadvisedly then 
a Civil Court could see if it could be set aside under the 
Courts of Wards Act*
The petitioners, it was held, were discriminated against 
in that they were denied the opportunity of having the matter 
settled by a regular court of the land. Mukherj’ea J* refer­
ring to the question of presumption stated:
It is true that the presumption is in favour 
of the constitutionality of a legislative en­
actment and it has to be presumed that a 
legislature understands and correctly appre­
ciates the needs of its own people. But 
when on the face of a statute there is no 
classification at all, and no attempt has 
been made to select any individual or group 
with reference to any differentiating attri­
bute peculiar to that individual or group and 
not possessed by others, this presumption is 
of little or no assistance to the State. 375a
This point is further illustrated by the decision in
376K.T* Moopil Nair v. Kerala where the State imposed a land 
tax at a ’flat rate* on all lands whether dry forest land or 
fully cultivated. The Supreme Court found that there was 
no classification along such lines as the income yielded by 
the land or the potential of the land or any such generally
375a. Ibid., 390-1.
376. A.I.R., 1961, S.C. 552.
acceptable criterion. under the circumstances it was held 
that Article 14 was violated. The essence of Article 14 is 
thus not merely discrimination through unreasonable classifi­
cation but also discrimination through lack of any classifi­
cation where one is required in order to avoid equating situa­
tions that are dissimilar in nature.
Similarly, a law that levied tax on buildings according
to their floor-area (’floorage*) wherever the buildings might
be, whether in a central urban area or in a small rural area
would be in violation of Article 14 for failing to make a
377classification. The Indian Supreme Court has indeed
held that in matters of taxation the State must have ample
freedom to determine when to levy a tax, the extent of the
378tax and the means of realising the tax. However, even
a tax law will be hit by Article 14 if it makes an unreason­
able classification or makes no classification at all.^^
Criticisms of the ’Nexus’ Test
Before concluding this section, notice must be taken
of a recent criticism of what has come to be known in India
as the ’nexus’ test of reaamableness under Article 14.
380S.R. Das J.’s two conditions laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar
377. Kerala v. Haji K. Kutty, AIR, 1969, S.C. 378. Also see
New Manek Chowk Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Municipal Cor­
poration, AIR, 19o7, S.C .1080.
378. Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturing Association v. Union 
of India, AIR, 1970, S.C. 1589.
379 • A *p » v « Raja Reddy, AIR, 1967, S.C. 1458.
380. AIR, 1952, S.C. 75; (1952) S.C.R. 284.
as explanations of how reasonable classification would be 
tested has already been mentioned: the passage following
the two conditions is the relevant one, which may be conven­
iently repeated here:
The differentia which is the basis of the 
classification and the object of the Act 
are distinct things and what is necessary 
is that there must be a nexus between them*
Recently Professor P.K* Tripathi, a well-known writer on Indian 
Constitutional matters, has queried whether it is right to 
treat the * nexus* test, as he describes it, as universal and 
well established in Indian law as many Court decisions seem 
to suggest* He has argued that there are cases where
this ‘nexus* test has not proved satisfactory and has perhaps 
impeded a proper inquiry* He has also shown that it was by 
a coincidence of circumstances that the ‘nexus* test has come 
to be regarded as the uniformly accepted ruling of the Supreme 
Court*
The learned author appears to suggest that the test 
focuses solely on an examination of how the object of the 
statute is related to the basis of classification envisaged 
by it* In his view, there is one more area that needs to 
be examined by the courts viz* the actual persons or circum­
stances that are grouped or classified* In other words, the 
courts are not to forget how this rather abstract ‘basis* or
381. (1952) S .C . R • 294, 334-5*
382. P.K* Tripathi, Some Insights into Fundamental Rights* Uni­
versity of Bombay, 1972.
‘criterion* of classification works in practice* Ihis is 
important even where the type of cases according to the 
classification are foreshadowed in the statute itself.
Treated sis a caution, these suggestions are, in this 
writer’s opinion, valid and correct. After all, any kind 
of ‘test* broken up into explanations can, in course of time, 
become an ossified formula, if the explanations take over 
while the essence of the ‘test* is forgotten. We have not­
iced that in the early decision of Anwar Ali Sarkar*3 83  
Patanjali Sastri, Bose and Chandraasekhara Aiyar JJ* did 
express their disapproval of the ‘nexus* test. They would 
have disapproved of any embellishments to the basic require- 
ment aht, under Article 14, the Court would see if the differ­
ential treatment complained of was reasonable.
Tripathi contends that the ‘nexus* test is comprehen­
sive only where the law itself is straightforward, indicating 
its object, the criterion of differentiation and the persons 
or things actually differentiated. Such a law leaves very 
little to the executive in selecting persons or cases. There­
fore, there is no room for executive discrimination.
But where the law indicates only its object and the 
basis of differentiation in general terms, the author sug­
gests, the court*s task is not over until it examines how 
these two relate to the third element, viz., the cases se­
lected by the executive in inplementing the law.
383. See above, 184-186.
This is no doubt true, but it must be qualified by the 
need to permit the executive some discretion in selecting the 
cases or persons, sis otherwise administration would be im­
possible. The Supreme Court has held that an individual 
order made under such a law could be challenged though the 
law itself need not be.
In conclusion, it has to be emphasised that Article 14 
has to be interpreted, like all other commandments of that 
nature, according to the circumstances of the cases arising 
under it. One very important aspect is, of course, the 
public interest. A reasonable discrimination in the public 
interest will not amount to unconstitutional discrimination* 
It is necessary, therefore, that the law is clear and simple 
in stating what it wishes to achieve and how it proposes to 
do it. That will help a great deal but that is not all.
The court will still have to balance the public interest 
(including its political aspects, if necessary) against the 
extent and nature of the discrimination involved to see if 
the ultimate result is reasonable under the given circum­
stances. Indian courts have, rightly, been cautious in 
treating this difficult and subtle area covered byArticle
14. They have chosen to err, if at all, in favour of the 
ostensible public interest, setting their faces against any 
hasty condemnation of the statute. This, with respect, is 
the right attitude in this difficult area of constitutional 
adjudication, for otherwise the judges must figure as a non­
elective super-legislature.
197.
Reasonableness of Protective Discrimination1 and an Aspect 
of Welfare State in India
Incorporated firmly as a constitutional norm ’Protect­
ive Discrimination’ in India means that certain backward sec­
tions of the country’s population get preferential treatment 
in matters of education, employment and in a number of others
where the State has, or can have, a say. Underlying the idea
384of ’Protective Discrimination* is a: regret that certain
sections of Indian society have been treated with indiffer­
ence and at times, with hostility by the rest and the hope 
that with easy and adequate opportunities given to those sec­
tions thus badly treated in the past (and to a muted extent 
in the present) they would be able to emerge as more influen­
tial citizens than they have been. Thus ’Protective Discrimi­
nation* forms an exception to the notion of equality guaran­
teed by the Constitution.
The two most important provisions incorporating ’Pro­
tective Discrimination’ are Articles 15(4) and 16(4).
15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of religion, race, caste, sex or place 
of birth - (1) The State shall not dis­
criminate against any citizen on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place 
of birth of any of them.
• • •  • • • •
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause
(2) of article 29 shall prevent the State 
from making any special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and education­
ally backward classes of citizens or for 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes .
384. Marc Galaoter, ’’’Protective Discrimination” for backward 
classes in India’, (1961) 3 J.I.L.I.. 39-70.
16. Equality of opportunity in matters of 
public employment. - (1) There shall 
be equality of opportunity for all 
citizens in matters relating to employ­
ment or appointment to any office under 
the State.• • • ... .. • .... ....
(4) Nothing in this article shall pre­
vent the State from making any provision 
for the reservation of appointments or 
posts in favour of any backward class 
of citizens which, in the opinion of the 
State, is not adequately represented in 
the services under the State.
Also relevant are Articles 340, 341(1) and (2) and the Direct­
ive in Article 46. Article 340 empowers the President of
the Country to appoint a Commission 1 to investigate the condi-
*
tions of socially and educationally backward classes' in India. 
Article 341(1) and (2) empower the President to specify the 
tribes, castes and groups who will be the Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes entitled to favoured treatment. Article 46 reads:
46. Promotion of educational and economic 
interests of Scheduled Castes, Sched­
uled Tribes and other weaker sections - 
The State shall promote with special 
care the educational and economic in­
terests of the weaker sections of the
people, and, in particular, of the
Scheduled castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes, and shall protect them from 
social injustice and all forms of 
exploitation.
Thus classifying groups as 'backward' for preferential 
treatment is largely a question for fact-finding commissions.
However, the wishes of the State and its discretion in the
385matter will play an important part. It has been held 
that the State may in the exercise of its executive power,
385. M.R. Balaj’i v. Mysore. AIR, 1963, S.C.649.
without having to show legislation in support, specify the 
classes and groups to be considered eligible for reserva­
tions in colleges and government offices.
The first question of some importance to the reason-
15’
ableness of classification of this kind is^caste, that ubi­
quitous Indian phenomenon, to be the basis of preferential
386treatment? Mention of Scheduled Castes in Articles 46
and 341 above seems to suggest that it is or can be. Caste, 
after all, is the basis of bias and prejudice and hence, it 
can be argued, caste should be the factor.
But one must remind oneself first that non-discrimi­
nation on the ground of caste is also a constitutional norm. 
Therefore, rightly Indian Courts have closely examined the 
question and have drawn limits within which ’caste1 may be 
a consideration. They have rightly realised that creating 
vested interests on the basis of caste would only deepen 
caste divisions in Indian society and not help towards eradi­
cating it. In any case, the matter deserves attention in 
the Indian context. Secondly, any classification under 
Article 15(4) and 16(4) must be reasonable and also in­
telligible. This point was settled nearly on by the
387Supreme Court in the case of Madras v. Champakam. The
appellant Government issued an Order regulating admissions
386. Marc Galanter, ’Caste Disabilities and Indian Federalism’ , 
(1961) 3 J.I.L.I., 205-234.
387. AIR, 1951, S.C. 226, (1951) S.C.J. 313.
to Government run medical and engineering colleges not only 
on the basis of caste but also religious faith. Thus, for 
every fourteen seats the allocation went as follows:
Non-Brahmins (Hindus) •••• 6
Backward Hindues •••• 2
Brahmins •• • • 2
Hari j*ans .... 2
Anglo-Indians & Indian 
Christians .... 1
Muslims .... 1
The respondents applicants to some of the colleges, 
impugned the order as being in violation of Article 15 as 
it stood before the insertion of sub-clause (4). They 
had successfully argued before the High Court that the 
classification was solely on the basis of caste and commun­
ity and was unconstitutional.
The State contended before the Supreme Court that 
it was only discharging its obligations under the Directive 
in Article 46 (above, 198). In so implementing the Direct­
ives, it was argued, fundamental rights could not stand in 
the way*.
An unanimous Supreme Court rejected the State1 s argu­
ments and held the Order unconstitutional. On the Direct­
ives it was held:
The Directive Principles of State policy 
have to conform to and run as subsidiary 
to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights•
... However, so long as there is no in­
fringement of any Fundamental Right, to 
the extent conferred by the provisions 
of Part III, there can be no objection
to the State acting in accordance with 
the directive principles ... 388
(n>
After referring^Article 16(4); which was part of the Consti­
tution as originally enacted, and noting that a similar pro-
"UV
vision was absent^Article 15 (or Article 29) the Court 
obs erved:
It may well be that the intention of 
the Constitution was not to introduce 
at all communal considerations in mat­
ters of admission into any educational 
institution maintained by the State or 
receiving aid out of State funds. 389
As an immediate consequence of the decision, the 
Indian Parliament which was considering an amendment to 
several provisions of the Constitution included a new sub­
clause in Article 15 making it possible to discriminate in 
favour of ’backward* sections in matters of education also. 
It is generally believed that the Supreme Court decision 
has thus been over-ruled* But as J.K. Mittal rightly
pointed out that classification according to religious faith 
was unconstitutional still stands. As for the other part, 
that classification on the basis solely of caste was bad , 
may, as we shall see, have much force behind it even now.
The Supreme Court considered in some detail the con­
stitutionality of reservations on the basis of caste in
388. AIR, 1951, S.C. 226, 228, col.l.
389. Ibid., 228, col.2.
390. ’Educational Equality and the Supreme Court of India* , 
(1965) V/Jan.-June, The Indian Advocate, 31-39.
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391M.R« Balaji v* Mysore* The case dealt with two quest­
ions. What is the basis of classifying ’backward classes’? 
What could be the extent of reservations in their favour? 
After a few unsuccessful attempts when their orders had been 
held unconstitutional, the State of Mysore appointed a Com­
mission to report on the matter of ’backwardness’• In view 
of the earlier experience, the Commission reluctantly con­
cluded that caste was, after all, the best guide in approach­
ing the matter.
This Report proceeds on the basis that 
higher social status has generally been 
accorded on the basis of caste for cen­
turies; and so, it takes the view that 
the low social position of any community 
is, therefore, mainly due to the caste 
system. According to the Report, there 
are ample reasons to conclude that social 
backwardness is based mainly on racial, 
tribal, caste and denominational differ­
ences even though economic backwardness 
might have contributed to social back­
wardness . 392
On the strength of the Report, the State issued a 
fresh Order reserving nearly 68% of the seats in medical 
and engineering colleges of the State. This meant only 
32% of the seats were available to the ’merit pool’. Most 
of the numerically greater castes were classed as ’backward*. 
Perhaps*- to avoid political controversy,Muslims were all in­
cluded in the castes chosen for favoured treatment. Ulti­
mately, nearly 90% of the State’s population were found to 
have been classified as backward*.
391. AIR, 1963, S.C. 649
392. Ibid., 656-7.
While thus the index of social backwardness was
393solely caste, educational backwardness was calculated 
by the State on the basis of the average of student popu­
lation in the last three High School classes of all the High 
Schools in the State in relation to a thousand citizens of 
that community. That figure was compared with the State 
average of student population calculated on the same basis.
Any community that came below the State average was to be 
classed ’backward* and any that was less than 50% of the 
State average was to be regarded as ’ more backward* #
The petitioners, applicants to some of the colleges 
raised the following arguments against the State’s Order:
(a) The percentage of reservations is so high it is a fraud 
on the Constitution. Article 15(4) did not envisage 
such high percentages.
(b) The classification adopted by the State is unreasonable 
and irrational. What they have done is to separate the 
most advanced sections of the population from the rest 
who were termed ’backward*.
(c) Caste, in any case, could not be the sole index of social 
backwardness• There were other factors such as one* s 
occupation or income.
The State argued that there was no constitutional 
limitation on its power to make adequate provision for the 
backward classes. What percentage of places it reserves has
393. Article 15(4) states that the ' advancement is of ’socially 
and educationally backward classes’ •
to be seen in the light of the problem the State is called 
upon to face*
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the 
percentage of 68 was beyond what was envisaged by Article 15(4).
It is because the .interest of the society 
at large would be served by promoting the 
advancement of the weaker elements in the 
scoiety that Art. 15(4) authorises special 
provision to be made. But if a provision 
which is in tie nature of an exception com­
pletely excludes the rest of society, that3g4 
clearly is outside the scope of Art.14(4).
Special favoured treatment given to the less advanced should 
not be, the Court stated, at the cost of quality in the scien­
tists, doctors and engineers these institutions of Higher
395Education are to produce. Merit and talent was the
rule and favoured treatment was the exception.
That eventually the State had approached the problem 
from the wrong angle was accepted by the Court. In identi­
fying the groups to benefit from 'Protective Discrimination', 
the State could not set up ideal standards that do not have 
a bearing on the immediate needs of those that require prompt 
assistance. These that are badly in need of help could not 
be submerged by a great number of others joining their rank, 
thus reducing the availability of full assistance to them.
Finally, the Supreme Court accepted the petitioners
394. Ibid., 662, col.l.
395. Ibid., 662. "If admission to professional and technical 
colleges is unduly liberalised it would be idle to contend' 
that the quality of our graduates will not suffer." Ibid., 
662, para.34.
contention that caste could not be the sole criterion of 
social backwardness. Other criteria like occupation, 
place of habitation, and others related to these may well 
be important. The petitioners succeeded in getting the 
Order of the State quashed*
The Supreme Court repeated its view laid down here
in several subsequent cases, notably, in Chitralekha v. State 
396of Mysore. There, Subba Rao J. for the majority in the
Supreme Court stated:
It may be that for ascertaining whether a 
particular citizen or a group of citizens 
belong to a backward class or not, his or 
their caste may have some relevance, but 
it cannot be either the sole or the domi­
nant criterion for ascertaining the class 
to which he or they belong. 397
An example of how far the Courts1 notion of reason­
ableness is itself put under strain is to be found in Jankiy
393Prasad v. Jammu & Kashmir. The extraordinary story of
how the respondent State misused or mismanaged its powers to 
classify classes for favoured treatment is too long to be
396. AIR, 1964, S.C. 1823, (1964) 6 S.C.R.368. For a criticism 
of the case, see N. Radhakrishnan, 'Units of Social, Econo­
mic and Educational Ba?ckwardness: Caste and Individual» , 
(1965) 7 J.I.L.I., 262-272. The author makes the point 
that the case carried the objection against treating caste 
as a factor of backwardness beyond what Balaji (above, 198) 
intended to lay down. He maintains that xn any case the 
framers of the Constitution wanted to favour certain castes 
as backward. For a rejoinder, see Mohammad Imam, 'Reser­
vation of Seats for Backward Classes in Public Services and 
Educational Institutions' , {1966) 8 J.I.L.I., 441-449.
397. (1964) 6 S.C.R. 368, 388.
398. AIR, 1973, S.C.930.
meaningfully narrated here* In spite of repeated warnings 
from the Supreme Court that reservations in favour of back­
ward classes should not be confused with sectarian or reli­
gious factors, the respondent State failed to grasp the point 
or did not, more likely, want to grasp the point made* As a 
result, litigation with respect to the same matter was pro­
longed over several decisions. One cannot help admiring 
the Court for the patience it showed. Underlying the pro­
blems is the fact that favoured treatment has become a means 
of distributing political and sectarian patronage in India.
The litigations show signs of this.
In the matter of promoting school teachers, the State 
had adopted a simplistic formula along sectarian lines.
Since Muslims were in a^Light majority in the province, 50% 
of the posts were reserved for Muslims and the rest were dis­
tributed between Hindus and other minority groups. The 
Supreme Court disapproved of the procedure as being uncon­
stitutional and emphasised the law as laid down in Balaji 
above.
The problems arising in this area of Indian Constitu­
tional law reach out into the administration and its political 
character. The Indian Supreme Court has acted as a restrain­
ing hand where temptations are great for the State to cross 
the constitutional limits. It has stuck to its assessment 
of what is reasonable under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). The 
pressure and influence the Court's judgments exert will con­
tinue to affect this area of constitutional law in India.
SECTION 2(b): THE RELATION OF ARTICLE 14 TO ARTICLE 19
So far we have seen that detecting an unreasonable 
discrimination under Article 14 is a recognised, viable 
method of bringing down a statutory provision* There have 
been a few occasions when the inquiry regarding reasonable­
ness under Article 19 has been compared to that under Article 
14* The possibility of an overlap between the two areas 
covered by the provisions justifies a study of the relation­
ship between them. The points made in two of the decisions, 
in one of which the matter appears to be obiter, could be 
shortly disposed of*
399In Surajmull v* Income Tax Commissioner, the quest­
ion raised amount? to whether there was a common standard of 
reasonableness in the two articles so that there need be only 
one inquiry covering both* This question did not appear to 
he material to the decision in the case which was about the 
constitutional validity of Section 37(2), Income Tax Act, 
1922, which authorised search and seizure of business docu­
ments during a raid by tax officials*
One of the judges of the Calcutta High Court, P.B. 
Mukharji, J. (as he then was), answered the question raised
i
in the negative* He held that a law might pass the testof 
Reasonable classification* under Article 14 and yet might* 
fail under Article 19 as an unreasonable restriction* Prima 
facie, this is sound. The learned judge clearly meant that 
the inquiry under Article 19 was wider in scope than that
399. AIR, 1961, col. 578.
208.
undertaken under Article 14. He stated that the Court1s 
task under Article 14 was to see how the discrimination 
made by the law helped the purposes of the law and how 
reasonable was the equation between the discrimination and 
the objectives. Under Article 19, on the other hand, the 
reasonableness of the restriction imposed by the law in all 
its aspects is examined as against the element of *public 
interest* which the restriction is intended to serve.
The Indian Supreme Court likewise recognised a wider 
inquiry dn the case of Article 19. In Collector of Customs 
v. Sampathu Chetty, the Court was told that the constitu­
tionality of section 178-A, Sea Customs Act, 1878, had al­
ready been determined by the Court with respect to Article 14 
and in view of the similarities in the adjudication of cases 
arising under Articles 14 and 19, the matter would be res 
judicata for an inquiry under Article 19. It was contended 
that the standard of reasonableness was the same under the 
two provisions.
Rejecting the contention, the Court held that while 
there might be cases where a violation of the one article 
was also a violation of the other, there was no question of 
equating the two in order to pre-empt inquiries under the 
two, after all, separate provisions.
An example of a case of agreement between the two 
articles would be where the statute conferred unguided dis­
cretion on administrative or executive officers to deprive 
citizens of their fundamental rights. In that event, it 
would be unreasonable under both Articles 19 and 14. But,
400. AIR, 1962, S.C.316.
where, however, there is (proper) guidance 
and the legislation is challenged on the 
ground that the law with the definite guid­
ance ... it provides has (nevertheless) out­
stepped the limits of the Constitution by im­
posing a restraint which is either uncalled 
for or unreasonable in the circumstances, the 
scope and content of the inquiry is far re­
moved from the test of conformity to rational 
classification adopted for judging whether the 
law has contravened the requirement of equal 
protection under Article 14* 401
There is undoubtedly no general equation between the
two Articles. But it has to be borne in mind that in several 
cases arising under either of the provisions, courts do exam - 
ine the impugned law as a whole to determine its obj*ectivesf 
the extent of the restrictions imposed aid to see how convinc­
ing is the relationship between the obj’ects of the law and 
the restriction it imposes. It is this similarity that 
tempted the arguments in the two cases dealt with. However, 
the difference lies in the emphasis and conclusions drawn, 
this similarity notwithstanding.
Recently, Professor P.K. Tripathi, has asserted that:
So far as the validity of the legislation 
... is concerned the position is that if 
the legislation ... satisfies the demands 
or survives the attack of Article 19, it 
will definitely satisfy and survive Art­
icle 14 also. 402
In so asserting, he refers exclusively to statutes
which confer an unguided discretion on executive or admini­
strative officers. We have seen already the Supreme Court 
acknowledging that this type of case would be an area of
402. P.K. Tripathi, Some Insights into Fundamental Rights, Uni­
versity of Bombay, 1972, 96.
401. Ibid., 325 (para. 16) 3 wovc)s in
overlap between the two articles. But Professor Tripathi 
. 403
illustrates through his discussion that (a) Article 19 
enjoys predominance in such cases, and (b) that Article 14 
could be pressed into service where Article 19 was not avail­
able, such as in the case of a nationalisation measure pro­
tected by Article 19(6)(ii) or in the event of a declaration 
of national emergency which has the effect of suspending 
Article 19 but not 14. Even otherwise, a measure plainly 
supported by national needs and public requirements might be 
directed in a discriminatory manner, as the early*protective 
discrimination* cases showed. Moreover, as for point
(a), there is always the possibility of an individual execu­
tive order being challenged as discriminatory under Article 
14. Professor Tripathi does not appear to dispute it. 
Further, there are cases where a restriction would have to 
be separately examined under Articles 14 and 19*405 This 
also is not, it seems, denied by Professor Tripathi who, in 
fact, confines his point to . select group of cases (see 
f.n. 403 )•
The second point made by him shows how, by varying 
the emphasis, courts could bring the same matter either 
under Article 19 or 14. The decision in Bank Nationali-
403. Relying on the following cases, Dwarka Prasad v. U.P.,
AIR, 1954, S.C .224, Hari Shankar Bagla v. M.P., AIR, 1954,
S.C. 465, and Raj as than v. Nathmal, AIR, 1954, S.C. 307. 
Ibid., 96-99.
404. Madras v. Champakam, AIR, 1951, S.C.226, M.R. Balaji v. 
Mysore, AIR, 1963, S.C. 649.
405. Such as Collector of Customs v; Sampathu, AIR, 1962, S.C.
316, and Moopil Nair v. Kerala, AIR, 1961, S.C. 552.
406
sat ion, is a good illustration of this, this is, per­
haps, the most important point of interest which justifies 
our brief attention to the relationship of Article 14 to 
Article 19.
SECTION 3: REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON INIER-STA1E TRADE
The word * reasonable* occurs in yet another area of 
the Constitution and one might suppose that light might be 
gained from the Courts* interpretation of it. The appli­
cation here of the law developed under Articles 14 and 19 
seems a possibility.
Article 304, Restrictions on trade, commerce 
and Intercourse among States - Notwithstand­
ing anything in article 301 or article 303, 
the Legislature of a State may by law -
(a) impose on goods imported from other 
States or the Union territories any 
tax to which similar goods manufactured 
or produced in that State are subject, 
sop however, as not to discriminate 
between goods so imported and goods so 
manufactured or produced; and
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on 
the freedom of trade, commerce or inter­
course with or within that State as may 
be required in the public interest;
provided that no Bill or amendment for the 
purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced 
or moved in the Legislature of a state with­
out the previous sanction of the President,
Part XIII of the Indian Constitution is probably a 
most coiqplex piece of drafting which has at the end managed
406, See below, 241, 3b9 and 413,
407to stultify its own basic purpose. After several deci­
sions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court one is not 
certain how free this freedom of trade and intercourse is.
The position in other federal constitutions of Australia and 
the U.S.A. is no more clear.
Turning first to the non obstante clause in the begin­
ning of article 304, article 301 referred to states that sub­
ject to the provisions of Part XIII trade, commerce and inter­
course throughout the territory of India shall be free. Art­
icle 303(1) prohibits Parliament and the Legislatures of States 
passing laws giving preference to one State over the rest or 
another. Article 303(2) states that Parliament, however, 
can make laws giving preferential treatment to a State or 
states over others in situations of scarcity of goods in 
any part of the territory of India, The States, however, 
are also prohibited from discriminating between goods manu­
factured locally and outside the State, (304(a)),
Article 304(b), our special concern here, though it 
gives the power to the States to impose reasonable restrict­
ions , has immediately qualified it by requiring Presidential 
sanction before the restrictions can be passed into law.
There is the further question whether Article 304(a) indi­
cates that a tax would not be considered a restriction for 
the purposes of Article 304(b), Seervai would support
407, For a., general study on the subject, see Interstate Trade 
Barriers and Sales Tax Laws in India, Indian Law Institute, 
Tripathi, Bombay, 1962, Seervai, Constitutional Law of 
India, Tripathi, Bombay, 1967, 980-ldd6, sTfo. Jain, ' Free- 
'dom of of Trade and Commerce and Restraints on the State 
Powers ...» (1968) 10 J.I.L.I.. 547-582.
such a view on the basis that the two sub-clauses in Article
304(a) and (b) are distinct and exclusive. Otherwise the
proviso to 304(b) would seem to apply to Article 304(a) as
well, which could not be right. The conclusion is that
'reasonable restrictions* referred to in Article 304(b) refer
408to restrictions other than by way of taxation.
In the earliest case on the point, Atiabari Tea Co.
409Ltd. v, Assam, the Assam Taxation Act, 1954, was impugned* 
U\e Act aimed to tax tea carried through the roads or waterways 
in the State of Assam on its way to Calcutta, Assamese terri­
tory was traversed only for a short distance curing this inter­
state movement of tea.
The supreme Court clearly regarded the tax as a re­
striction on the movement of inter-state trade. Whenever 
a state wished to tax directly any inter-state commercial 
transaction the State would have to satisfy the conditions 
laid down in Article 304(b), The Court did not appear to 
be asking the question, "is the tax a reasonable one?” but 
asked, ”Does the impugned restriction operate directly or 
immediately on trade or its movement?” In the event, the 
tax imposed was found to be such a direct restriction and 
held unconstitutional.
Thus in Atiabari the question of reasonableness did 
not at all figure in the discussions as an issue and the 
impression created by the decision that all tax laws affecting
408. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Bombay, 1967, 
1000.
409, Aik, 1961, S.C. 232,
inter-state trade were unconstitutional was dispelled in 
the next decision. *fhe Supreme Court, in Automobile Trans­
port v. Rajasthan 4 1 0 . mentioneithe element of reasonable­
ness in upholding the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act*
• On examination, the tax inposed by the Act was found 
to be a 'compensatory tax', i*e* compensatory for the facili-
to
ties provided by the State^bus operators* It was held:
Compensatory taxes are no hindrance to 
anybody's freedom so long as they remain 
reasonable; such taxes could, of course, 
be made prohibitive,
in which case they would be unreasonable*
It can be taken as settled law that taxation is not
exempt from the operation of the guarantee in Article 301
but taxation per se would not be unconstitutional* It is
411subject to the reasonableness test*
Ihere are forms of restrictions other than taxation
though tax laws have figured most in litigation on this 
412topic* An example of this is the case in Andhra sugar
413Mills Ltd* v* Andhra Pradesh where the constitutionality 
of Section 21, Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply 
and Purchase) Act* 1961, was attacked as a violation of free 
inter-state trade* The impugned section in addition to 
levying a tax on the purchase of sugarcane by 'occupiers of
410. AIR, 1962, S.C.1406.
411. Firm Mehtab Majid & Co. v. Madras* AIR, 1963, s.C.928* 
Madras v* Nataraja MucEaliar* AIR, 1969, s.C.147.
412. singareni Collieries Co. Ltd* v. Commissioner* Commercial 
Taxes. AIR* 1966* S.C. ^>3; Bengal Timber Trading Co* v* 
Commissioner* Sales Tax* AIR, 196^, £>.0.1348.
413. AIR, 1968, S.C.599*
sugar factories1 provided that such occupier was bound to 
enter into a contract to buy sugarcane if it is offered 
to him from any one of the designated zones at the statutory 
minimum price. The price was determined by the State and 
considered by it reasonable to the buyer and seller. It 
was argued by the petitioner that there could be no 'sale* 
simply because the contract was not entered into voluntarily.
His freedom to buy sugar cane from anywhere he wished at any 
price he wished to pay was, it was argued, curbed in viola­
tion or the guarantee in Article 301*
413aThe supreme court held, relying on an old English
414 415case in Lame v. Cotton and the authors Cheshire and Fifoot
that:
It is now realised that in the public 
interest persons exercising certain call­
ings or having monopoly or near monopoly 
powers should sometimes be charged with 
the duty to serve the public, and, if 
necessary, to enter into contracts.
Ihe restriction imposed was held to be in the public interest 
and therefore, reasonable. Before this conclusion could be 
wholly accepted one must remind oneself that for centuries 
sugarcane growers have been at the mercy of sugar manufactur­
ers who dictated the price the sugaoccame fetched. With that 
background, Indian courts have suitably adjusted the limits 
of reasonableness as far as questions pertaining to deals in
413a. Ibid., 604.
414. (1701) 1 Ld Raym = 91 E.R.17.
415. Law of Contract. 6th Edn., 23.
416. AIR, 1968, 6 .C. 599 , 604, col.2.
sugarcane were concerned.
A secona example of a similar restriction other than
taxation is to be found in the case of Koteswar v. K.R.B. & 
417Co. Without going into the rather complex facts in the
case, the restriction took the form of prohibition of certain 
speculative contracts.
The link between Articles 19 and 304(b) was commented
418upon by the supreme Court in Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. M.P.
It held that the requirements of reasonableness in Articles 
19(5), 19(6) and 304(b) were the same. It is, indeed, to 
be expected but clearly the standards will vary amongst 
these provisions.
In comparison with Articles 14 and 19, Article 304(b) 
is yet to develop. When such development comes, Indian 
Courts will benefit from the decisions under Articles 14 and 
19. The decisions under Article 19 will now be considered 
in the next chapter.
417. AIR, 1969, S.C. 504.
418. AIR, 1970, S.C. 129, see below, 388
CHAPTER 3
THE COURTS AND THE RESTRICTIONS - ILLUSTRATIONS
SECTION 1 : REASONABLENESS OP RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION - ARTICLE 19(1)(a)
Introduction
Prior to the enactment of the Constitution (26th
January, 1950) most of the well-recognized limitations on
this freedom, such as Contempt of Court, Defamation, Obscen^-
419ity and Sedition figured in the Indian Penal Code, I860.
There were other restrictions special to Indian Law, such 
as Section 153-A, i.P.C. (promoting class and communal hatred 
by words spoken or written) and 295-A, I.P.C. (deliberate in­
sult to the religious feelings of any class of citizens by
words spoken or written). In spite of the strict sedition 
420laws free expression was tolerated. After the enactment 
of the Constitution, the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) 
were expected to sustain, between them, the constitutionality
419. Section 228, I.P.C. (Contempt In the face of the Court, 
contempt otherwise was governed by the Contempt of Court 
Act. 1926); Section 499, I.P.C. (Defamation); Section 292, 
I.P.C. (Obscenity) and Section 124 -A, I.P.C. (Sedition).
420. In addition to Section 124-a , I.P.C., there were others 
that made Sedition punishable in different ways - The Drama­
tic Performance Act, 1876; The Prevention of Seditious Meet­
ings Act, i9il, and The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, 
are some of the examples. Two special measures often used 
against the Press were, Section 99-A of the Criminal Pro­
cedure Code, 1898, which empowered the State government to 
prescribe any newspaper or any document that •appeared*-to 
be seditious, and the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act , 
1931.
of many of the old restrictions that were continued. It was
known that some of the severe laws of the past would be held
421 422unconstitutional. Article 19(2), as it stands now, en -
ables the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the free-
dom$ guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), in the interests of the
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency,
or morality, in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.
The reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the
grounds of Obscenity,Contempt of Court and Public Order has
been determined in the same manner as the British-Indian
423courts used to. Thus some basic Common Law notions
have survived in these areas of the law. Indian Courts 
have not shown any doctrinaire anxiety to hold pre-consti-
421* Ihe Indian rress (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, for example, 
was so held in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. Bombay. AIR, 1951, 
S.C.128.
422. it was reconstituted by the Constitution (First iUaendment) 
Act, 1951 (Sec. 3(1)). There was a second amendment which 
introduced the ground of 'the sovereignty and integrity of 
India' , Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. For 
fuller details, see below, 344 and ff.
423. On Obscenity, Ran jit Udeshi v. Maharashtra. AIR, 1965, S.C. 
881, Chandrakant Kalyandas v. Maharasfatra, AIR, 1970, s.C. 
1390. (Both decisions reiterated tke Hicklin test, see 
below, 277 )#
on Contempt of Court, Brahma Prakash v. Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 
1954, s.C.10; Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar, AIK, 1959, s.C. 
102. (Both decisions approved and relied on Ambard v. A.c; 
for Trinidad, AIR, 1936, P.C. 141, (1936) A.C. 32^.)
For decisions on Public order, see below, 310.
tutional laws and restrictions invalid, enacted, as they were,
by the British-Indian Governments. Such restrictions as were
held unreasonable under Article 19(2) were so held on generally
acceptable grounds and for well-understood constitutional
reasons that were seldom revolutionary. The Supreme Court
424has rejected, on the one hand any 'preferred-position*
for the liberty of speech, and on the other, has interpreted
425 426narrowly the scope of 'Public order' and 'Sedition*
in order to favour the liberty of the citizen.
Preventive Detention, Article 19 and (in particular) Freedom 
of Speech
In addition to developing the law relating to free 
speech as guaranteed by Article l9 (l)(a), Indian Courts have 
faced two specially difficult tasks. These are: (a) where a 
citizen is preventively detained for making speeches or pub­
lishing material which are, in the opinion of the Executive, 
prejudicial to the security of the State or public order.
No doubt, mostly such detentions have taken place after the 
Executive has, legitimately, feared communal or sectarian 
violence of one sort or another. Even so it is clear that 
the power to detain people preventively without a proper 
trial could be easily misused, i.e. used for purposes not 
sanctioned by the detention statute. fftich as one would 
sympathise with the Indian Governments having to face street
424. Madhu Limaye v. S.Dt. Magistrate, Monghyr, AIR, 1961, s.C. 
2486.
425. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. Supdt. Central Prison, AIR, 1960, 
S.C. 633 9 also Madhu Limaye, above^ 3 1 7.
426. Kedarnath v. Bihar, AIR, 1962, S.C.955.
violence by demonstrating mobs (the leaders of the mobs are 
generally detained preventively) the danger of Executive over­
reaction has to be taken into account; (b) secondly, the 
regulation of the Press by laws supposedly curbing 'monopol­
istic tendencies'. How far can such, otherwise innocuous
426aregulations apply to the Press?
As for (a) it has generally been assumed that it is
strictly a matter of preventive detention and there is very
little Courts can do. While this was the reasoning of the
427supreme Court of India in A.K. Gopalan v. Madras academic 
writers in India have not raised the question with enough per­
sistence to change the supreme Court's stand on the matter of 
preventive detention and the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19.
The acuteness of the question lies in the fact that the 
Constitution itself provides for preventive detention. Article 
22 of the fundamental rights chapter lays down the 'safeguards' 
subject to which detentions can be made. This subjects the 
fundamental rights to an acute and embarrassing test. The 
Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan certainly faced an embarrass ing 
task. 1 * ^  -• . . * .  ^ j "pie Court's decision
has, of late, been criticised by the Court itself and by many 
writers. Before stating the decision of that case, some more 
details as to the law of preventive detention may be briefly 
referred to.
one of the most valuable rights that a detained citi­
zen (hereafter detenu) has is the right to be supplied with
426a. See below, 2^7*
427. AIK, 1950, S.C.27, (1950) S.C.K.88.
428the grounds of his detention. Following that right is
the right to make representations against the order of de­
tention. Such representations will have to be considered by 
the Government andAdvisory Board. The Courts examine the 
grounds with these matters in mind. Vagueness of any one
or more of the grounds supplied is fatal to the detention 
429order. Unable to question the reasonableness of the
Executive authorities' decision to detain Courts have in­
stead concentrated on the grounds supplied to the detenu.
They have emphasised that the grounds should be relevant 4 3 0  
to the purposes of the detention statute. They have de­
manded strict proof that the authorities applied their 
minds to each case of detention. Especially important is
that the Executive should consider the representations made
431by the detenu against the order. Thus, the existence of
theAdvisory Board does not relieve the Executive itself of 
this duty to consider, independently, such rpresentations
428. Article 22(5). "When any person is detained in pursuance 
of an order made under any law providing for preventive 
detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon 
as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which 
the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order."
429. Bombay v. A't mar am, AIR, 1951, S.C. 157, (1951) S.C.R.167. 
Pwarkadas v. Jammu & Kashmir, AIR, 1957, S.C.164. See 
M.c 7j . Kagzi, 'judicial control of Executive Discretion 
under the Preventive Detention Law: An Indian Experience' • 
(1965) Public Law, 30.
430. In addition to Atmar!am, above, ShyamAI Chakravarty v. 
Commr. of Police, AIR, 1970, S.C. 269.
431. Jayanaryan v. West Bengal, AIR, 1970, S.C.675.
432made by the detenu. Under the Preventive Detention Act,
1950, the Executive is given the power to detain persons pre­
ventively for the attainment of objectives that are substan­
tially similar to those fcund under Article 19(2) which con­
tains the restrictions that could be imposed legally on the 
freedom of speech. Section 3 of the Act of 1950 is as 
follows:
3. Power to make orders detaining certain 
persons:-
(1) The Central Government or the State 
Government may -
(a) if satisfied with respect to any 
person that with a view to preventing 
him from acting in any manner preju­
dicial to -
(i) the defence of India, the rela­
tions of India with foreign 
powers, or the security of India, or
(ii) the security of the State or the 
maintenance of public order, or
(iii) the maintenance of supplies and
services essential to the commun­
ity; or ...
It is necessary so to do, make an order 
directing that such person be detained.
Thus, a person who in the opinion of the State Government has 
made a seditious speech can be detained either under sub­
clause (i) or (ii) above. The courts will in that case be 
unable to review the decision of the Government that the 
speech in question was seditious. Whereas if the author 
of the same speech had been prosecuted under Section 124^A 
of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a preventive deten­
tion measure, the court would have been in a position to
432. Pankaj Kumar v. West Bengal, AIR, 1970, o.C.97.
to examine not merely the reasonableness of the provision
itself but also the speech in question to see that when con-
433strued, fairly it could be said to be seditious* This
very important difference would be inevitable according to
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of India in A.K.Copalan
434v. Union of India where the reconciliation between the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, in particular, and Article 
22 envisaging preventive detention was achieved by holding 
that Article 19 could not be invoked by a person preventively 
detained* The Supreme Court held that for a citizen to be 
able to invoke Article 19, the s>tate action must relate 
* directly* to one of the rights guaranteed by Article 19*
An •incidental* consequence of punitive or preventive de­
tention which restricts the rights cannot be challenged*
Ihe arguments in that case did not pose this specific problem 
of free speech and preventive detention* Unfortunately, it 
was not contended there that there was a possibility of a 
person being held in preventive detention for the views he 
might express on political or other controversial matters* 
it was possible for the supreme Court to have confined their 
reasoning to Article 19(1)(d), (Right to *free movement 
throughout the territory of India*) for it is obvious that 
a person detained preventively or punitively cannot complain 
on the basis of Article 19(1) (d) for the simple reason the
433* Kedarnath Singh v* Bihar, AIR, 1962, S.C*955; Bihar v*
Shailabala Devi, AIR, 1952, S.C. 329, (1952), S.C.R.654.
434* AIR, 1940, S.C.27. In Sarju v. State, AIR, 1956, All 589, 
the petitioner argued ttat detention orders should be re- 
viewable if Article 19(1) (a) was pleaded* Ihe Court re­
jected the argument, relying on A.K. Gopalan v* Madras.
Constitution itself provides for preventive detention* But 
in holding that all Article 19 freedoms were pre­
cluded to a detenu, the Supreme Court, as it were, foreclosed 
itself from exercising any direct control over Executive dis­
cretion in the matter of preventive detention*
There are two more considerations bearing 6n this 
matter. Firstly, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, 
and the powers thereunder are available during relatively 
normal, peaceful conditions (taking into account local dis­
turbances of varying severity which have generally accounted 
for the bulk of the detention cases under the Act of 1950). 
Secondly, there is room for thinking that at times the Exe­
cutive authorities have tended to use their powers under a 
preventive detention law instead of acting under the ordi­
nary criminal law* The justification for resorting to the 
preventive detention measure was then either non-existent or 
very weak* judges have not failed to express their anxiety 
at such misuses of power* Hidayatullah J* for example, in 
Ram Manohar v* Bihar, issued a warning to the District Magi­
strate who had made the order of detention (allegedly after 
the petitioner, a politician, had made a strong speech):
(H)e could not run the law and order 
problems in his district by taking re­
course to the provisions for detention 
under the Defence of India Act* 436
435* From 1971 also the Maintenance of Internal Security Act* 
1971, (2nd July, 1971) provides for preventive detention*
436. Ram Manohar v. Bihar, AIR, 1966, S.C* 740, 759, coli-2. 
The point was made again in P. Mukherjee v. West Bengal* 
AIR, 1970, S.C.852.
The problem as described, arose in the case of Ram 
437Singh v. Delhi * There was disagreement in the Indian
Supreme Court over the balance between free speech and the 
need to prevent communal disturbances, though the disagree­
ment was technically expressed in terms of the adequacy of 
the facts supplied to the detenus* The petitioners were 
leaders of a political party with sectarian inclinations, 
called the Hindu Mahasabha* They were arrested and de­
tained by the order of the Delhi District Magistrate* The 
following ground was supplied to them as the reason for 
their detention:
In pursuance of Sec* 7, Preventive Deten­
tion Act, you are hereby informed that ••• 
your speeches generally in the past and 
particularly on ••* August 1950 at public 
meetings in Delhi has been such as to ex­
cite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims 
and thereby prejudice the maintenance of 
public order in Delhi and that in order to 
prevent you from making such speeches it is 
necessary to make the said order* 438
The petitioners argued that: (1) the provisions of the Pre­
ventive Detention Act * 1950, were not meant to be used to 
prevent a citizen making speeches; (2 ) that (adopting an 
obiter passage of Falshaw J* of the Simla High Court, the 
court of First instance which tried their case) while pre­
censorship of news was not possible, a person could be 
placed under preventive detention (to stop him making more 
speeches) which was an "even greater restriction on personal
437. AIR, 1951, S.C .270.
438. Ibid * * 271, col.2.
liberty than any restriction on a newspaper ever could be1.
(3) the ground supplied to them, they said, did not specify 
the offending passages and as a result, it was impossible for 
them to make effective representation against theorder. Alter­
natively, at least the gist of the alleged inflammatory pass­
ages should have been supplied to them in order that they 
might suitably represent their case before the Advisory Com­
mittee, which must eventually recommend whether or not to 
continue the detention.
For the majority in the supreme Court none of these
contentions created any difficulty. They fell back upon 
439A.K. Gopalan, and held that the matter before them was one 
of preventive detention and therefore, Article 19 could not 
be relevant. in their view, it could not be laid down as 
a general requirement in preventive detention cases that 
actual passages whether from speeches made or documents that 
came into the possession of the authorities should be pro­
vided to the detenus. Moreover, there were difficulties 
in proving information obtained from confidential sources 
(in the case before them, the petitioners were addressing 
public meetings when the speeches in question were made).
It was held by the majority that the Court could not judge, 
in such cases, whether or not the speeches in question con­
stituted a prejudicial act falling within section 3 of the 
Act of 1950. Thus, the majority emphasised the responsi­
bility of the Executive authorities to stop breaches of
439. AIK, 1950, S.C.27.
thepeace by those who make intemperate provocative speeches. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that such provocations 
were offered during that period by members of the Hindu and 
Muslim communities to each other, which resulted in riots 
and running battles between the communities. indeed, the 
possibility that similar offenced will occur unpredictably 
is still with us.
The minority, while accepting the need to preserve 
public order, dissented on the question of the adequacy of 
the information supplied to the detenus. One of the dis­
senting judges, Mahajan J. held:
Without a knowledge of the offending words 
or passages it is not possible to argue ... 
that the words used fall within the ambit 
of legitimate criticism permissible in law 
and cannot be considered to excite disaffect- 
ion amongst Hindus and Muslims ... Again, 
without knowing the substance of the offend­
ing words from which the inference has been 
drawn by the detaining authority, it is not 
even possible to urge that these words were 
merely a quotation from some known author or 
that the words used fall within legitimate 
religious propaganda permitted by Art .25 of 
the Constitution or concern the propagation 
of some political creed to which no object­
ion could be 1aken. 440
The learned judge went on to point out that if the allega­
tion was that the speeches in question were such as to ex­
cite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims, the petitioners 
were guilty of an offence under Section 153-A of the Indian 
Penal code. Thus, a regular prosecution might well have 
been launched. Instead the State chose preventive deten­
tion. The two dissenting judges did their utmost to protect
440. Ram Singh. Ibid., 275. Emphasis added.
interests of Free Speech though what they could do was limited 
by the ratio in A.K. Gopalan. Ram Singh showed how sweeping 
the ratio in A.K. Gopalan was and how there existed a need to 
qualify that ratio severely. Later decisions of the Indian 
Supreme Court and several High Courts did precisely that, as 
we shall see.
There are certainly difficulties in dismantling the 
A.K. Gopalan ratio into its elementary constituents and in 
restucturing it in order that free speech, or indeed all the 
freedoms in Article 19, except the right to free movement, 
could be made compatible with the power of preventive deten­
tion. Seervai, a supporter of A.K. Gopalan. sees Ram Singh
entirely in terms of the requirements of preventive deten- 
441tion. No doubt this is correct in a technical sense
but the basic problem remains unattended. if more safe­
guards are not erected, preventive detention could in theory 
at any rate, erode the content and scope of the Fundamental 
Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Indian Constitution.
Another author, M.P. Jain, has recognized the problem cre-
442ated by Ram Singh.
One way in which the Indian Courts could protect the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 is to increase their control
441. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 312, 457. The 
learned author's observations in supportof A.K. Gopalan 
are to be found in The Position of the Judiciary Under the 
Consitution of India, 62.
442. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 2nd Edn., Tripathi, 
Bombay, 1976, 574. "Ram Singh's case creates an anomalous 
situation ... [a] law of preventive detention which, ... 
does not restrict the freedom of speech as such, is immune 
from judicial scutiny even though action may be taken under 
it to restrain a person from making speeches regarded pre­
judicial by the executive."
over preventive detention matters through the concept of 
'Personal Liberty' incorporated in Article 21. it haa been 
held in A.K. Gopalan itself that a contravention of the re­
quirements of Article 22 would mean that personal liberty 
guaranteed by Article 21 would be violated. Even though 
there are other propositions in A.K. Gopalan that would have 
to be explained, there is clearly scope for action in the 
direction suggested.
Indeed, this is what the Supreme Court did in a later 
case which, in this writer's opinion, has thrown considerable
doubt on the ratio in A.K. Gopalan. In Maharashtra v.
443Prabhakar« the respondent was detained under R.30(l)b of 
the Defence of India Rules which provided for preventive de­
tention. While serving his detention, he wrote an essay on 
the structure of the atom and wished to send the manuscript 
out of the gaol to be published. The gaol authorities re­
fused him permission to do so and when challenged in the High 
Court, they took up the position that they were not obliged by 
law to accede to the detenu's request. They confidently 
pointed out that the detenu could not, under the ratio in 
A.K. Gopalan. invoke his rights under Article 19 since he 
was detained under a law of preventive detention, and there­
fore, could appeal solely to Article 22. More specifically, 
the gaol authorities argued that The Bombay Conditions of De­
tention Order. 1951, which governed the petitioner's deten­
tion, did not provide for such 'privileges' as the petitioner 
was claiming.
443. AIR, 1906, S.C. 424
The High Court had found that the contents of the work 
in question were not, in any way, prejudicial to the defence 
of India, public safety, and/or maintenance of public order - 
the grounds on which the petitioner was detained* The High
Court rejected the gaol authorities#? contention* The Supreme
Court too, in its turn, rejected their contention but made re­
marks that have clearly undermined the authority of A,K.Gopalan:
(T)here are five distinct lines of thought 
in the matter or reconciling Art*21 with 
Art*19, namely, (1) if one loses his free­
dom by detention, he loses all the other 
attributes of freedom enshrined in Art*19,
(2) personal liberty in Art*21 is the resi­
due of personal liberty after excludfcing 
the attributes of that liberty embodied in 
Art*19; (3) the personal liberty included 
in Art *21 is wide enough to include some or 
all of the freedoms mentioned in Art*19, 
but they are two distinct fundamental rights - 
a law to be valid shall not infringe both 
the rights; (4) the expression 'law* in 
Art.21, means a valid law and, therefore, 
even if a person's liberty is deprived by 
a law of detention, the said law shall not 
infringe Art.19; and (5) Art.21 applies to 
procedural law, whereas Art.19 to substan­
tive law relating to personal liberty.
... .«• ... ... ... • • •
We have only mentioned the said views to 
show that the view expressed by Das J., as
he then was, in A.K. Gopalan's case is not
the last word on the subject. 444
Das J.'s view referrred to have, in fact, been regarded as 
the received ratio in A.K. Gopalan. on the second of the 
arguments raised by the gaol authorities, viz. that the rele­
vant law, Bombay Condition of Detention Order, 1951, did not
provide for the ' Privilege* claimed by the respondent, the 
Supreme Court held:
444. Ibid., 427, col.2.
If this argument were to be accepted, it 
would mean that the detenu could be starved 
to death, if there was no condition provid­
ing for giving food to the detenu. In the 
matter of the liberty of the subject such a 
construction shall not be given to the said 
rules ... unless for compelling reasons. 445
There are two very closely similar cases decided by
the Bombay High Court. They may be conveniently dealt with
446here. In George Fernandes v. Maharashtra decided before 
the one just discussed, the gaot authorities raised the same 
argument about 'privileges' not conferred by the Bombay Con­
ditions of Detention Order, 1951. The 'privilege1 claimed 
by the petitioner, a trade-unionist, detained under R.30 of 
the D.I.K., was that he wished to have some fifty-odd books 
with him for study while serving the detention. The gaol 
authorities decided that he could have only twelve at a time.
Such a regulation could have reasonably been applied to the 
borrowing of books from the gaol library. The books in ques­
tion were the petitioner's own. While holding there was no 
power in the gaol Superintendent to refuse a book or books to 
the prisoner unless the book or books preached violence or 
were obscene, the Bombay High Court remarked, "Power of de­
tention cannot be equated to a power of regimentation of per-
447sonal life, thoughts and habits." This could be inter­
preted to mean that there is more to the notion of 'personal
445. Ibid., 428, col.l.
446. (1964) 66 BOM.b.R. 185.
447. Ibid.. 193. The case also establishes a right to information, 
"o/ all the restraints on ... a citizen, that on the opportu­
nity to knowledge is ... is the most irksome and least to be 
justified." Ibid., 193.
liberty* whether it be derived from Article 21 or Article 19 
than what is derived from A.K. Gopalan, There has to be more, 
even if what was involved in this case was a right to informa­
tion and not to expression. But the former could reasonably 
be regarded as included in the latter. The second Bombay 
case reinforces this suggestion,
448<In M.A. Khan v. State, the detenu wished to buy at 
his own cost, several journals and magazines not supplied by 
the gaol library. The gaol administration maintained that 
they had an * approved list* of journals *considered suitable* 
for the prisoners. The petitioner argued that the authori­
ties could not stop him from buying journals that the public 
at large can freely obtain from the open market.
The High Court held that, subject to the requirements 
of maintenance of discipline, the 'reading habits' of the 
prisoners could not be regulated by the authorities. The 
Court helo that the right of the petitioner in that respect 
was no less than that of any 'free* member of the public.
Surely, this is not being faithful to A.K. Gopalan either.
Reverting back to the Supreme Court, in Ashutosh Lahiri 
449v, state of Delhi, the court was presented with a case closely
450similar to gam singh but the reaction this time was differ­
ent, An unanimous court warned the Executive that it may re­
cord a finding of mala fides if the powers of preventive deten-
448. AIR, 1967, Bora. 254.
449. AIR, 1953, S.C. 451.
450. AIR, 1951, S.C.270.
451tion were used without restraint. The petitioner was a
member of theHinau Mahasabha, the same organisation referred 
to in Ram singh, and was detained under section 3 of the Pre­
ventive Detention Act, 1950. The ground supplied to him was:
You came to Delhi on •.. you gave a highly 
exaggerated and communal version of happen­
ings in Bengal and East Bengal, ,,, Your 
activities in the present atmosphere of 
Delhi where a communal riot took place on 
••• as a result of intemperate statements 
made in a public meeting, are likely to 
create hatred between different communities 
which may lead to disturbance of public 
peace and order, 452
No report of the alleged 'highly exaggerated and communal ver­
sion’ was reproduced in the ground supplied. The District 
Magistrate who made the order of detention appears to have 
ruled that no such facts were to be revealed to the peti­
tioner, But clearly the petitioner was detained for some­
thing he had said. The Supreme Court at last recognized 
the implications, and though it upheld the detention order, 
there were strong words of caution addressed to the Execu­
tive authorities.
It was noted that many of the petitioner's colleagues 
were externed out of Delhi, which was less drastic than pre­
ventive detention. Use of extraordinary powers when the 
general law, as for example, section 144, Criminal Penal 
Code, could well have been utilised to deal with the situation,
451,"There could be no better proof of 'mala fides' on the part 
of the executive ••• than a use of the extraordinary provi­
sions contained in the Act for purposes for which ordinary 
law is quite sufficient", Ibid., 453, col,2.
452. AIR, 1953, S.C.452, col. 1.
created a strong suspicion \\ which opened up
possibilities of mala fides.
jnow we must look at some more High Court decisions which 
illustrate how these Courts have tried to balance the reason­
ableness of the detention as against the liberty of speech,
A most extraordinary decision in this connection is the one
decided by the Bombay High Court in Anant Janardhan Karandikhar 
453v. State, The petitioner, a Journalist,was detained under
R,30(l)b (read with R,35(6)(a) to (s)) of the Defence of India 
Rules, In cases of detention under the Defence of India Act, 
1962, there is no statutory obligation on the State to supply 
the grounds of detention. In view of that, it is remarkable 
that the Court not only obtained access to the materials upon 
which the Magistrate maae the detention order, but proceeded 
to examine it, Ihe court Justified its action in the follow­
ing words:
(Ijt is necessary to note that the material 
does not comprise physical tangible acts, 
such as acts of assault, intimidation ,,, 
etc, [it] consists in the articles written 
by the-petitioner, Xhat means that we are 
in the realm of ideas, because the articles 
give expression to certain opinions or ,,, 
ideas, 454
These were three articles written by the petitioner on the 
theme and events leading up to the assassination of Mahatma
453, AIR, 1967, Bom. 11. For an earlier preventive detention 
case with a 'speech element' , Bal Keshav v. Commissioner* 
AIR, 1956, Bom. 490.
454. Ibid., 16, col,2. But see Contra Abdul Hassan v. State,
AIR, 1969, All 548, where forfeiture of books under R,35(6),
Defence of India Rules, 1962, which was done "in the opinion 
of the government*' was held non-Justiciable,
Gandhi, It was alleged by the State that the petitioner was 
a sympathiser of the assassin of Gandhi, The people of India 
considered Gandhi to be the father of their nation and a saint, 
Ihe petitioner's adverse comments on his non-violent attitude 
towards the Muslims would have had the effect of creating 
hatred between Hindus and Muslims,
The petitioner, in his turn, alleged that the State had 
detained him for the views he had expressed and were also vic­
timising him. They had detained a Muslim gentleman and to 
show that they were impartial, detained him, a Hindu,
The Court recognized this was an unique case. In an 
exhaustive Judgment they held that however dear Mahatma Gandhi 
may be to the vast majority of Indians, the petitioner could 
not be made to suffer for expressing his own views on the 
history of a period and the men who participated in it. He 
had not used intemperate language likely to excite the feel­
ings of normal men and women. The three articles responsible 
for his detention were analysed by the Court in detail (to 
this writer's knowledge, the first ever detention case in 
which this was done so thoroughly). The Court concluded 
that on reading the material with the surrounding circum­
stances in mind, such as the time of the writing, etc,, it 
could not be said that it was detrimental to any of the ob­
jects, theprotection of which was contemplated by the Defencd 
of India, Act, 1962,
next the Court examined the question how 'subjective' 
was the 'satisfaction' of the Magistrate while acting under 
the Act of 1962? It gave the wholly acceptable answer that 
'satisfaction' cannot be arbitrary or capricious but must be
'reasonable satisfaction1. For example, it relied on the
following well-known observations of Lord Wright in Liver- 
sidge v . Anderson, to draw the conclusion that 'satisfaction' 
was justiciable:
The actual language is the acid test, 
and 1 see no ground for attaching so 
much weight to so slight a difference 
in words* 'Satisfied* must mean 
' reasonably satisfied'. it cannot im­
port an arbitrary or irrational state 
of being satisfied* I find the dis­
tinction between ' reasonably satisfied' 
and 'has reasonable cause to believe' 
too tenuous* 455
From this, the Court drew the conclusion which Lord Wright 
himself was trying to resist, viz*, that it meant a decision 
arrived at by the application of objective, justiciable cri­
teria* In the same vein, the Bombay High Court quoted Lord
456Denning's observations in P.P.P. v* Head that,
the Secretary of State was satisfied from 
the certificate of the two doctors that 
Miss Henderson was a defective* This 
reference to the medical certificates 
means that they are to be read with the 
order as part of the record* *** And 
'satisfied' in the Act means reasonably 
satisfied* If, on reading the medical 
certificates, no reasonable person would 
have been satisfied that she was a de- 457 
fective, the order is liable to be quashed*
The appositeness of these quotations to a case of preventive 
detention is rather doubtful unless the Court was implying 
that thenceforward it would review the reasonableness of
455. (1941) 3 All E.R. 338, 380.
456. (1958) 1 All E.R. 679.
457. Ibid*, 691.
preventive detention cases. However, it concluded that the
Magistrate was not 'reasonably satisfied' and had recited in
458his order, 'as if by way of chanting a Mantra' that he had 
applied his mind to a report of a Police Officer (which had re­
ferred to the three articles in question) and felt satisfied 
about the need for passing the detention order. The Court 
was, however, on firmer ground when it relied on the obser­
vations of Viswanatha sastri J. in M.R.S. Mani v# District 
459Magistrate:
This Court is entitled to say that the 
detention is bad either because the de­
taining authority had not exercised its 
mina at all on the relevant considera­
tions or that the satisfaction of the 
detaining authority required by Section 
2(1) did not exist. Similarly, if a 
person is detained merely on the ground 
of his religious, political or economic 
beliefs and opinions or because he is 
addicted to some personal vice, without 
anything relating to the maintenance of 
public safety or order appearing from 
the grounds, then also the detention 
would be held to be bad from the same 
reasons•
The Bombay High Court was also correct, it is submitted, 
when it referred to R. v. Vasudeva in support of the
proposition that the impugned activities of the person de­
tained must have a reasonable and proximate connection with 
the likelihood of public disorder or disturbance of the 
public peace.
458. A Hindu sacrificial formula'.
459. A i r , 1950, Madras, 162. Where the petitioner's detention 
on the ground that he campaigned on behalf of the Communist 
Party was held invalid.
460. AIR, 1950, F.C.67.
461In Sitaram Kishore v. Bihar one of the grounds
supplied by the State to the petitioner who was detained
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was that he had
made speeches accusing the then Indian Prime Minister of
responsibility for the partition of Indian and for allowing 
462c ow-s laught er •
The Court held that this was an insufficient ground 
under Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.
The petitioner had given his personal views on these matters, 
it was held, and there was no link between his speech and 
public disorder.
The Allahabad High Court in Md. Ishaq v. Uttar Pradesh4^  
employed the principle that each of the grounds supplied to 
the detenu should be relevant to the object of the detention 
law. The petitioner, printer and publisher of an Urdu news­
paper was told in one of the grounds that he was detained 
under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, because 
he had incited the Muslim community against the ruling party. 
This ground was held by the Court to be irrelevant because
disaffection against a party government without further in-
464citement to violence was no offence in a democracy. The
whole detention order was held void.
461. AIR, 1956, Pat. 1.
462. bee below, 7^4-.
463. AIR, 1957, All 782. But see contra, In the matter of 
Saptaha, AIR, 1950, col.444, ana decisions referred to 
therein.
464. The Allahabad High Court has consistently stuck to this 
view. See Ahmad Ali v. State, AIR, 1951, All 459, and 
Sarju v. State, AIR, 1956, All 589.
Yet another ground for invalidating preventive deten­
tion orders has been 'unreasonable delay&' in either supply­
ing the grounds of detention or in considering the represent­
ations made by the detenu* The following two cases contrast 
well showing how much the Supreme Court's opinion of what is 
'unreasonable delay* can be affected by the 'speech* element 
in the cases before them. In the first of the two cases, a 
plea of free speech was advanced*
465In K.I. Singh v. Manipur * the petitioners were de­
tained under the Orissa Preventive uetention Act* 1970, for 
inciting the students to resort to violence against the 
Government* They were all members of the teaching staff 
in various colleges in Manipur, a ^sensitive border state 
in India* The petitioners pleaded that all they had done 
was to write articles urging the recognition of the 'aspira­
tions' of the pecple of Manipur* Under these circumstances, 
the Supreme Court held the period of seventeen days taken to 
consider their representations unreasonable, and held the 
detention orders invalid* un the other hand, in Nagendra 
Nath Mondal v. West Bengal,4**6 a case decided a few months 
later, a delay of thirty-four days in considering the de­
tenu's representations was held not unreasonable* The pe­
titioner had, the detention order stated, set fire to a 
school and thrown a bomb at another - these attacks being 
ideologically motivated* Naturally enough, the Supreme 
court took a grave view of the matter and were prepared to
465. AIR, 1972, S.C. 438, (1972) II, S.C.J. 459.
466. AIR, 1972, S.C. 66 5, (1972) I S.C.J. 547.
assume that the period of 34 days the Government tookin com­
municating the grounds must have been with good reason*
Thus, working through these apparently technical issues
the Indian Courts have evolved a scale of constitutional values
in which free speech is given priority wherever there is not
467an overwhelming need to preserve public order* It is sub­
mitted that the cases so far considered involve the same bal­
ancing act, the same weighing of interests as when the 'reason­
ableness 1 of restrictions under Article 19 is more directly 
in question*
Finally, there is a clear precedent in In the Matter
of Tribune,46** for saying that detention cases which involve
a 'speech element1 have always been scrutinised closely by
Anglo-Indian Courts* A newspaper reporter was detained
under Rule 129, Defence of India Rules , 1939, for having
misrepresented a statement of the Deputy commissioner while
reporting it in his newspaper. Harries CJ, disapproved of
469his detention in no uncertain terms* If it is remem­
bered that this decision came at the height of the war in 
which the British-lndian government was engaged, then there 
is a greater reason for the present Indian courts to maintain
467. In jagan Nath Sathu v. Union, AIR, i960, S*C*625, the pe­
titioner had sent news -dispatches to Pakistan considered 
objectionable by the Government* His contention that the 
actual passages in question should have been specified in 
the grounds supplied was rejected*
468. I.L.R. (1944) 25 Lahore, 111 (F.B*) Sub nom In re Subrah­
manyan , AIR, 1943, Lahore, 329*
469. AIR, 1943, Lahore, 329, 333.
their scrutiny. This has to be said since it is possible 
for a Court to be deceived by the label of preventive deten­
tion and for it to overlook a hasty or harsh decision by the 
Executive authorities. Obviously Indian Courts are not in 
a position to deny the power of preventive detention to the 
Executive. It has been constitutionally sanctioned. But 
the Courts will hardly be denying that power by recognizing 
that the Constitution has also intended them themselves to 
draw the limits of free speech. That decision is primarily 
theirs and not that of the Executive, unless it is confront­
ed with a serious situation of disorder.
The one serious shortcoming in A.K. Gopalan was that 
it never left room for modifying the relationship between 
Articles 19 and 22. The ratio appears to insist on an 
* either or' formula. We have seen that there are cases 
which do not fall into that pattern. We see that Courts 
have relied on the existing requirements of valid detention 
to protect, where necessary, free speech. Thus, the re­
quired result has been achieved and that so far as it went 
was good.
The Supreme Court found the ratio in A.K. Gopalan too 
wide in R.c. Cooper v. Union, where it came close to over­
ruling the decision. After discussing the ratio in A.K.
Gopalan, and cases that followed it, while interpreting the
470right to property, the Supreme Court observed,
470. Chiranjit Lai v. Union, AIR, 1951, S.C.41, 45 (above, I76 );
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal (1954) S.C.R.587; Bombay v.
Bhanji Munji (1955) 1, &.C.R.777, below, ^ >10.
We have carefully considered the weighty 
pronouncements of the eminent Judges who 
gave shape to the concept that the extent 
of protection of important guarantees, such 
as liberty of person, and right to property, 
depends upon the form and object of the 
State action, and not upon its direct oper­
ation upon the individual's freedom. 471
It is arguable if A.K. Gopalan intended to say that the form 
and object of State action was more important than what hap­
pens to the exercise of fundamental rights. As has already 
been noticed, the case was concerned with preventive deten­
tion and the relationship between Articles 19 ana 22 in cases 
of preventive detention. It is doubtful if the Supreme Court 
in R.C. Cooper was right in attributing such a wide proposition 
as quoted above to A.K. Gopalan. It ia also not accurate, it
471
is submitted, to say that in the other three cases referred to 
by the Court, the decisions rested solely on the object and 
form of the State action. Unfortunately, R.C. Cooper has 
come to be known as the case that overruled A.K. Gopalan.
This again may not be correct since the Court's view of A.K. 
Gopalan. as contended here, was inaccurate.
Following R.c. Cooper, the Grujarat High Court held
472A.K. Gopalan inapplicable in Narottamdas v. State. The
case involved free speech and therefore, ties up with our 
discussion here.
The appellant, editor of a newspaper was prosecuted
471. AIR, 1970, S.C. 5*6 } 5^ 6 , ok<L M 
471a.See f.n.470 above.
472. (1971) Gujarat Law Reporter, 894.
under Section 198B(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
section punished defamatory remarks made against such officers 
of the State as President, Vice-President and Governor in re­
spect of their conduct performed in discharging their public 
functions. Section 198B(5A) (introduced by the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955) provided amongst 
other things:
Every trial under this section shall be 
held in camera if either party thereto 
so desires or if the Court of Session 
so thinks fit to do.
Thus, a distinction was created between the trial procedures 
on this point between ordinary defamation cases and those 
where high officers of the State were involved. The peti­
tioner complained that his fundamental rights under Articles 
19(1)(a) and 14). He complained that the procedure was dis­
criminatory. According to the guarantee in Article 21, he 
should be tried by a procedure established by a valid law, 
i.e. valid in relation to Articles 19(1)(a) and 14. It may 
be recalled that A.K. Gopalan merely denied that in "pro­
cedure established by law" the 'law9 meant 'due process of 
law' as distinguished from statutory law. So A.K. Gopalan 
here too was less guilty than the Gujarat High Court made it 
out to be, as we shall see.
The State raised its standard contention that the 
effect of the impugned section on 19(1)(a) was merely 'in­
cidental' and 'indirect' - the sort of contention taken out 
of its context in A.K. Gopalan that has invited so much 
criticism towards A.K. Gopalan which, it is submitted, the 
case did not deserve.
The Gujarat High Court rejected the State's contention 
and held:
[T]he position that emerges after the 
decision in Cooper's case is that any 
law prescribing procedure as required 
by Article 21 must also satisfy the con­
stitutional guarantees under Articles 19 
and 14. in other words, the validity of 
a law prescribing the procedure for de­
privation of personal liberty • «. under 
Article 21 can also be examined to find 
out whether it in any way infringes the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 or
equality before law guaranteed by Article
14. 473
The impugned provision was held to be unreasonable, because 
the provision compelled a trial in camera at the instance of 
the parties without regard to the interests of administration 
of justice. The State officer could invoke the privilege 
under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, which claim 
was, however, justiciable, thus showing the importance of 
the public interest in keeping trials open. That principle 
should give way only if other vital interests are proved to 
exist. The Court did accept that high officers of State 
required protection in course of trials of the type in ques­
tion, but claimed it could not be compelled to hold the 
trials in camera under all circumstances.
In conclusion, this writer's plea is that Article 19 
rights generally, and in particular, freedom of speech which
is not merely a personal freedom but is also a political and
civil right of considerable importance may be violated if in
473. (1971) Gujarat Law Reporter, 894, 913.
a case of preventive detention the citizen is to be confined 
to his remedies under Article 22. Professor Tripathi has 
suggested that because detention is preventive, it need not 
exclude the applicability of Article 19* According to him, 
it should be made to depend upon the act sought to be prevent­
ed* If the act was murder or such acts of violence about to 
be committed, Article 19 might not figure but if the offensive
act was sedition (or inflammatory speeches), he thinks, Article
47419 should figure in the Court discussions*
of
Finally, sui illustration^now careful courts will be even
if Article 19 is overtly introduced in preventive detention
474acases is the decision in K* Narayanan v* State* Ifce pe­
titioner was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Se­
curity Act, 1971* While in detention, he asked for three 
books by Mao-TseTung* These were denied him as per the 
Kerala Security Prisoners Order; clause 19 of the Order ran 
as follows:
19* Books, Newspapers and Periodicals -
(1) Security Prisoners may receive such 
books, newspapers and periodicals as are 
not (a) proscribed by the Government; or 
(b) considered by the Government as not 
permissible*
475The Kerala High Court following Maharashtra v* Prabhakar 
was willing to assume that the right to free speech and there-
474. P.K. Tripathi, 111 constitutional Law of India* - a Review 
article on Seervai’s book on the Constitution” , (July- 
£>eptember, 1968) 11/3, J.C .P.S.
474a*AlR, 1973, Kerala, 97 (F.B.)
475. AIR, 1966, S.C.434* See above,
fore to information bat held that:
If the books are of such a nature as we 
have already adverted to conducive to 
instigate people to acts of violence to 
overthrow established Governments and 
to disturb public order and peace, they 
can be denied to a detenu. The very pur­
pose of detention will be destroyed by 
allowing security prisoners to train 
themselves to a course of action which 
would overthrow established Governments 
or result in creating instruments that 
will disturb peace and public order of 
the State* 476
REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESS IN INDIA
Since the press in India is one of the most common 
methods by which unduly ’free* expression may give, immedi­
ately, rise to communal disorder, the cherished freedom of 
expression finds in the freedom of the press an Achilles' 
heel*
Liberty of the press appears, nevertheless, to have 
been respected in Inaia in the pre- and post-Constitutional 
periods, i*e* during the British raj as well as in the Indian 
Republic* Pre-censorship as the most well-known restrict­
ion on the pless was disapproved by Anglo-Indian judges* 
Liberty of the press and pre-censorship could not live to­
gether in the view of the Indian judiciary,then as now*
Ihus, in the thirty-^year old case of In re Ardeshir 
477Phirozshaw the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay passed
476. AIR, 1973, Kerala, 97, 99, col.2. 
477* AIR, 1940. Bom* 42.
an order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
1898, directing the appellant, editor of a Gujarati news­
paper, to abstain for a period of two months from publishing 
any news about an agitation, then in progress, against a new 
tax* He could only publish such news as was approved by 
the rublic Relations Officer of the Bombay Government* Sec­
tion 144 of the Code of 1898 ran as follows:
1.44 (1) In cases where, in the opinion of 
a District Magistrate, •*• or of any 
other Magistrate specially empowered 
by the State Government *•• there is 
sufficient ground for proceeding under 
this section and immediate prevention 
or speedy remedy is desirable,
such Magistrate may, by a written 
order stating the material facts of the 
case and served in the manner provided 
**• direct any person to abstain from a 
certain act or to take certain order with 
certain property in his possession or 
under his management, if such Magistrate 
considers that such direction is likely
to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruct­
ion, annoyance or injury, to any person
lawfully employed, or danger to human 
life, health or safety, or a disturbance 
of the public tranquillity or a riot, or 
an affray.
Beaumont C.J. of the Bombay High Court struck down the
order* He held that tPrima facie in a country which enjoys
478liberty the press* the applicant was entitled to pub­
lish any news he chose* The Magistrate could restrict this
liberty of the applicant only if (a) he set out cogently the
material facts of the occasion justifying the necessity of 
such a restriction in the public interest; (b) thereby he
478. Ibid., 43, col.2*
was also able to show the connection between the disorder 
and the applicant’s newspaper; (c) and if he was able to 
show that the restriction imposed was not beyond the require­
ments of the case, and (d) he was able to show the character 
of the news or publication that he wished to see prohibited*
In the Court's view, the impugned order did not fulfil these 
conditions and it was, therefore, held to be invalid*
479Similarly in Editor, Tribune v. Emperor Young C.J. 
dealing with a similar order made under Section 144, Criminal 
Procedure Code, observed:
To justify an order under section 144 there 
] must be a jg&sual connexion between the act 
y *  prohibited and the danger apprehended to
prevent which the order is passed* It is 
not stated in the order, nor is it alleged, 
that the publication of news about the 
hartal [strike] had led in the past to the 
formation of unlawful processions* 480
The grounds that were advanced in these two decisions
by the learned chief Justices have been accepted by the Indian
481Supreme court as applicable to Article 19* But after the
constitution came into force, Section 144 does not appear to 
have been used to censor the press in any manner* The con­
stitutionality of the section, however, came up for consider-
482ation in a different context*
479* AIR, 1942, Lahore, 171 (F.B.) reported sub nom. P.T. Chandra 
v. The crown, I.L.R. tl942] Lah. 510 (F.B.).
480* At.172, col.l, I.L.R. [1942] Lah. 510, 514 (F.B.). The High 
court in revision may examine the propriety as well as 
legality of the order.
481. The Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar, AIR,
19(>0, s.C* 533; Ram Manohar v* Bihar, AIR, 1966, a.c.740*
482. Babulal Parate v. Maharashtra, AIR, 1961, s.C.884; Bihar v* 
K.K. Misra* AIR, 1971, s.C. 1667. see below., } Sis’.
The Indian supreme Court was faced, early on, with
settling the ambit of the freedom of the press in Romesh
483Thapper v. Madras ♦ The Madras Government had probittted
an English weekly called 'cross Roads' from entry into, or 
sale or distribution in the province. The order was made 
under Section 9(1) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order 
Act, 1949, which authorised such an order to be passed if the 
Governor was satisfied that it was necessary to do so "for 
the purpose of securing the public safety and the mainten­
ance of public order" in the province,
"Public safety and maintenance of public order" were 
not amongst the grounds in Article 19(2) as originally enacted 
and before its amendment by the constitution (First Amendment) 
Act, 1951:
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause 
(1) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law insofar as it relates to, 
or prevent the State from making any law 
relating to, libel, slander, defamation, 
contempt of Court or any matter which 
offends against decency or morality or 
which undermines the security of, or 
tends to overthrow, the State,
The state of Madras sought to justify the Act of 1949 as a 
law relating to the security of the state. The contention 
being that "public safety and public order" would be included 
in or subsumed under "security of the State",
This was rejected by the majority in the Supreme Court,
o
who held that the two grounds were not co-terminjis , Acts
aimed at undermining the security of the State were far more
483. AIR, 1950, S.C.124.
grave than acts aimed at disturbing public order or public
safety* Thus Patanjali Sastri J. (for the majority) held:
Where a law purports to authorise the im­
position of restrictions on a fundamental 
right in language wide enough to cover re­
strictions both within and without the 
limits of constitutionally permissible 
legislative action affecting such right 
it is not possible to uphold it even so 
far as it may be applied within the consti­
tutional limits, as it is not severable*
So long as the possibility of its being 
applied for purposes not sanctioned by 
the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it 
must be upheld to be wholly unconstitution­
al ana void* in other words, c((2) of
Article 19 having allowed the imposition
of restrictions on the freedom of speech 
and expression only in cases where danger 
to public security is involved, an enact­
ment which is capable of being applied to 
cases where no such danger could arise, 
cannot be held to be constitutional and 
valid to any extent* 484
While examining the merits of the impugned order, the Supreme 
Court unanimously recognized that ’freedomof speech and ex­
pression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that
485freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation*v so
there was never any doubt and the impugned order ana the law 
on which it rested, imposed restrictions in violation of the 
right guaranteed*
So also there was no doubt at all but that pre-censor­
ship was unconstitutional* This was treated as an a priori 
proposition in the next case which is closely similar to
484. Romesh Thapper, AIR, 1950, S.C*124, 129*
485. Patanjali Sastri J* referred to two United States decisions 
in support of the point, Bx parte Jackson, 96 US 727, and 
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 US 444.
Romesh Thapper (above)* In BriJ Bhushan v* State* the 
Punjab Government acting under the Bast Punjab Public Safety 
Act* 1949, imposed pre-censorship on a weekly called * The 
organiser' • The impugned order directed the publisher and 
the editor "to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before pub­
lication, till further orders all communal matter and news 
and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons 
other than those derived from official sources or supplied 
by news agencies*" As in the Madras Act, the power was 
exercised on the subjective satisfaction of the Governor for 
the purpose of "preventing or combating any activity preju­
dicial to the public safety, or the maintenance of public 
order*" The factual background to the order was the commun­
al hatred that continued from the days of partition of India*
The majority in the supreme Court applied the Romesh Thapper 
reasoning and held the statute unconstitutional*
Ihe dissenting Judge in both cases was Fazl Ali J. who,
487it may be of interest to note, also dissented in A.K. Gopalan*
His reasoning was that the two statutes were not meant to be 
applied to every petty act likely to disturb public order but 
were intended to deal with serious outbursts of a communal 
nature* His Lordship argued that if the basis of the offence 
of sedition 488 was disturbance of public tranquillity which,
486. AIR, 1950, S.C.129.
487. Above, Z23 *
488. Reference was made to Niharendu Putt v. Emperor * AIR,
1942, F.C. 22 (1942) F.C.R. 38*
if unchecked, could result in a threat to the security of the 
State, then the matters dealt with by the two statutes im­
pugned were not different* The purposes of the statutes 
clearly indicated their selective application to those ex­
treme acts of violence which, if unchecked, would become 
threats to the security of the State >
The ratio common to these two decisions was reversed 
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act* 1951, which intro­
duced the ground of public order in Article 19(2) along with
489two new grounds viz*, 'incitement to an offence* and
•friendly relations with foreign States'*
Any criticism that the majority in Romesh Thapper and 
Brij Bhushan were too technical in the construction they put 
on the grounds in the original Article 19(2) must take into 
account the need somehow to limit the general expressions 
used under that sub-clause and indeed, in all the sub-clauses 
of Article 19* Even before the reasonableness of a restrict­
ion arises for consideration the meaning of the terms Justify­
ing such restrictions has to be ascertained* This is some­
thing that no court can avoid* Whether or not the Supreme 
Court could have responded more positively to the urgency of 
the problem dealt with by the Punjab statute, if not the 
Madras statute, may be a debatable point* But about the 
need to ascribe definite contours to the grounds under
489* This was inserted because of two High Court decisions which, 
on a mistaken interpretation of Romesh Thapper (above), held 
that speech urging the cmmmission of murder could not be re­
stricted under Article 19(2) as originally enacted - Re 
Bharati Press* AIR, 1951, Pat.12, I.L.R. (1951) 30 patna 31, 
on appeal to Supreme Court, see Bihar v. Shailahala Devi,AIR, 
1952, S.C.329, (1952) S.C.R.654.
Article 19(2) there can be no doubt*
On the other hand, it is understandable that the Indian
490Parliament showed an impatient concern over the two decisions*
Hie whole of Punjab, now divided into East (Indian) and West 
(Pakistan) Punjab was even around 1949 smouldering with the 
enmity and hatred unleashed at the partitioning of India in 
1947. There was the young Indian Republic trying to see in 
reality the hitherto intellectual dreams of a secular India 
where all communities lived in peace under equal protection 
extended by the State* Provocative reports and comments 
carried by newspapers under not very responsible editors 
could not help the new Government in its efforts* So the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was passed with 
some haste, permitting the State to curb free speech on the 
ground of 'Public order'*
One possible explanation for the Supreme Court's deci­
sions in Romesh Thapper and Brij Bhushan may well be the in­
fluence United States constitutional decisions may have had 
on its mind* The 'Clear and present danger' formula and the 
view taken by United States Supreme Court Judges, like Black 
and Douglas, of a 'total* freedom of expression under the 
United states I Amendment, may have led the Indian Supreme 
Court to believe that It is only in such extreme situations 
as threats to the security of the state that the Indian
490. Mehrchand Mahajan, a former Chief Justice of India, deplored 
the 'hasty* amendment that introduced 'Public order' in Art­
icle 19(2) , The ground in his view, is too wide* M.C. 
Mahajan, Looking Back, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963*
Constituent Assembly too wished to see imposed such severe 
restrictions as pre-censorship. The area of free speech 
has continued to be influenced by United St&tes decisions, 
or so it appears from the frequency of references to those
4 9 1
decisions in Indian) cases on free speech. This is so
notwithstanding general caveats issued against reliance on
492United States decisions.
Finally, on Komesh Thapper and Brij Bhushan (above,
3iS"I) it must be pointed out that the two statutes in 
question were very widely phrased, enabling the Executive 
to impose some of the most severe restrictions on the press.
If the statutes had been drawn more closely, and had indi­
cated the nature of the effect or damage sought to be pro­
hibited, such as communal provocations etc., legislative 
intention would have been made clear to the Court and the 
result of the cases would have been different. 'Public 
order' and 'security of the State' are wide expressions 
and if the discrepancy between these two expressions had 
been overlooked by the Supreme Court, it would have been 
the cause of some confusion subsequently.
These remarks are borne out by the Supreme Court's
491. Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India. AIR, 1958, S.C. 
5^8. "It is trite to observe that the fundamental right 
to the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Art­
icle 19(1) of our Constitution is based on these provisions 
in Amendment I of the Constitution of the United states ..." 
Bhagwati J . at 615. H.M. Seervai is critical of this equa­
tion, Constitutional Law of India, 311-12, parais. 11.33 and
U.34-
492. Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbagwala, AIR, 1957, S.C. 699 , 712.
493decision in Bihar v. ShaiXabala Devi, where the Supreme 
Court held that utterances inciting the listeners to commit 
murder or other violent crimes could be restricted and such 
restrictions would be justified under the ground of 'security 
of the State*• Here the object of the law was very clear 
and the acts to be prohibited identified with reasonable 
clarity. The Patna High court appears to have wrongly con­
strued Romesh Thapper and held that restrictions cannot be
494placed on such incitements* The point made is further
illustrated by the following decision of the Supreme Court*
495The statute impugned in Virendra v. Punjab» as com­
pared to the Madras and Punjab statutes impugned in the earlier 
cases, was more specific and tightly drawn* This was true 
also of the procedural parts of the law* Section 2(1) of 
the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, was as follows:
Section 2(1)* The State government or any 
authority so authorised in this behalf, 
if satisfied that such action is necessary 
for the purpose of preventing or combating 
any activity prejudicial to the mainten­
ance of communal harmony affecting or 
likely to affect public order, may by 
order in writing addressed to a; printer, 
publisher or editor -
(a) prohibit the printing or publication 
in any document or any class of docu­
ments of any matter relating to a 
particular subjecto or class of sub­
jects for a specified period or in a 
particular issue or issues of a news­
paper or periodical ;
493. AIR, 1952, S.C. 329, (1952) S.C.R.654. 
494* Re Bharati Press* AIR, 1951, Pat.12. 
495. AIR, 1957, S.C. >896*
256.
provided that no such order shall remain 
in force for more than two months from the 
making thereof;
provided further that the person against 
whom the order has been made may within 
ten days of the passing of his order make 
a representation to the State Government 
which may on consideration thereof modify, 
confirm or rescind the order;
Two notifications were issued by the State Government under 
this section, one of which prohibited the printing and pub­
lishing of ’’any article, report, news item, letter of any 
other material of any character whatsoever relating to or 
connected with the ’Save Hindi Agitation” 1, and the second 
notification prohibited the bringing into Punjab of the news­
paper which contained a report of the nature mentioned.
The Supreme court stated that it recognized the pri­
mary responsibility of the Government to maintain law and 
order. Das C.J., who gave the judgement of the Court, stated:
uur social interest ordinarily demands 
the free propagation and interchange of 
views but circumstances may arise when 
the social interest in public order may 
require a reasonable subordination of 
the social interest in free speech and 
expression to the needs of our social 
interest in public order. 496
The temporary nature of the orders made under the statute 
certainly helped the Court in supporting its constitution­
ality. Both the substantive and procedural parts of the 
statute were held to be reasonable restrictions.
497In Ramnarayan v. Madhya Pradesh, the impugned order
496. Ibid., 900, col.l. 
497• A i r , 1970, M.P. 102
257.
was made under a statute similar to the Punjab statute. Act­
ing under section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act. 
1959, the State Government prohibited the entry or distribu­
tion of the petitioner’s newspaper into the State on the ground 
that the paper's treatment of news of communal disturbances was 
likely to "promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the 
different classes of the citizens of India ..."
498Reminiscent of Romesh Thapper in its essential 
features, this case received the same kind of disapproval 
from the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Court held that 
the total banning of the newspaper from the State was an 
excessive restriction and that the paper should be free to 
publish news and information about events other than those 
bearing on communal questions.
Press and Economic and Industrial Regulations
whether or not, by contrast, a piece of industrial
legislation imposing financial burdens on the press industry
amount to infringement of Article 19(1)(a) was considered
by the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of 
499India. A number of newspaper companies challenged the
Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act. (45 of 1955), on the ba&is of Articles 19(1)(a), 
(g) and 14. After receiving persistent complaints about the 
inadequate conditions of employment of journalists, Parlia­
ment appointed a Press Commission to go into all relevant
498. AIR, 1950, S.C.124 (1950) s.C.R.594
499. AIR, 1958, S.C.578.
matters affecting the employment and working conditions in 
the Press industry.
The Report of the Commission (submitted on 14th July, 
1954) stated that it was essential to improve the conditions 
of journalists because they played an important role in the 
dissemination of news and on the whole, were important in 
maintaining the quality of newspapers. It suggested legis­
lation covering (i) Notice periods; (ii) Bonus; (iii) Mini­
mum wages; (iv) Sunday rest; (v) Leave; and (vi) Provident 
funds and gratuities. So in essence the Act of 1955 was a 
minimum wage law which left the determination of such statu­
tory minimum wage to a Wage Board whose decisions were to be 
binding on both employers and employees. The Board would 
consist of equal number of employers'and employees' repre­
sentatives with a neutral Chairman. Section 17 of the Act 
provided that the coercive, extraordinary procedure used in 
the recovery of arrears of land revenue can be utilised to 
obtain any money due from an employer. It was admitted on 
all sides that the impugned law did impose additional expendi­
ture on the companies.
The companies argued that the law interfered with the 
necessary means employed in the proper exercise of press 
freedom. By imposing these financial burdens, the Govern­
ment was trying to destroy their independence and freedom by 
forcing them to seek government aid. In support of this 
contention they relied on a number of United States decisions.
The Attorney-General for the Union contended that the
impugned law's purpose did not relate to the activities of 
the press at all but was aimed at regulating the conditions 
of employment of a class of workers. Any indirect or in­
cidental effect the law may have was not to be considered in 
deciding the question of its constitutionality. He relied 
on the following observation of Kania C.J. in A.K. Gopalan:500
If there is a legislation directly attempt­
ing to control a citizen's freedom of speech 
or expression, or his right to assemble 
peaceably and without arms, etc., the quest­
ion whether that legislation is saved by the 
relevant saving clause of article 19 will 
arise. If, however, the legislation is not 
directly in respect of any of these subjects, 
but as a result of the operation of other 
legislation, for instance, for punitive or 
preventive detention, his right under any 
of these sub-clauses is abridged, the quest­
ion of the application of article 19 does 
not arise.
The Supreme Court held that the concept of a minimum 
wage was supported not only by the Directive principle in 
Article 43 of the constitution, but also by its recognition 
and acceptance in many countries of the world. It found 
that the press was not immune from the "ordinary forms of 
taxation for support of the Government nor from the appli­
cation of the general laws relating to industrial relations."50*
500. AIR, 1950, S.C.27, 34-35.
501. At 616. Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1935) 297 US 233, 
Associated Press v. Nat1onal Labour Relations Board (1936), 
301 us, 103 referred to.
The object of the law was industrial relations and hence, in 
its "intention or proximate effect and operation" it could not 
be said to have violated press freedom under Article 19(l)(a). 
Just because the law meant additional financial burdens to be 
borne by the employers, it could not be said there were ulter­
ior motives in passing the law. The dire consequences of 
the law as described by the companies, such as the likelihood 
of the press seeking Government aid, thus losing its independ­
ence or being penalised for its choice of means in exercising 
its right, it was held, were remote. Such consequences would 
depend on a number of factors which might not come into play.
However, the Supreme Court went on to issue a caution 
in the matter of tax and industrial laws as applied to the 
press industry:
Laws which single out the press for laying 
upon it excessive and prohibitive burdens 
which would restrict the circulation, im­
pose a penalty on its right to choose the 
instruments for its exercise or to seek 
an alternative media (sic), prevent news­
papers from being started and ultimately 
drive the press to seek Government aid in 
order to survive, would ... be struck down 
as unconstitutional. 502
Though successful here when the Government of India 
sought to implement the other recommendations of the Press 
Commission by passing the Newspaper (Price and Page Act, 1956, 
it encountered difficulties. This Act and the Daily News-
502. Ibid., p617, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1945) 
3^7 US 186, referred to. Thomas v. Collins (1944) 323 US 
516, and Terminiello v.Chicago (1949) 93 Law Ed. 1131 refer­
red to.
paper (Price and Page) Order, 1960, made under it sought to 
prevent, what, in the Government's view, was unfair competi­
tion in the press industry*
The Press Commission* s recommendation was to the effect 
that there was a need to prevent the growth of monopolistic 
combines in the Press industry which made it difficult for 
smaller newspapers to grow* The effect of the Act and the 
Order was to regulate the number of pages published according 
to a scale of prices provided by the Order* The desired re­
sult being a reduction in the advertisement space and therefore, 
in the revenue that the bigger newspapers collected* Section 
3(1) of the Act was as follows:
3* (1) If the Central Government is of opinion 
that, for the purpose of preventing unfair 
competition among newspapers so that news­
papers generally and in particular, news­
papers with smaller resources and those 
published in Indian languages may have 
fuller opportunities of freedom of express­
ion, it is necessary or expedient so to do, 
the Central Government may, from time to 
time, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, make an order providing for the 
regulation of the prices charged for news­
papers in relation to their maximum or 
minimum number of pages, sizes or areas 
and for the space to be allotted for ad­
vertising matter in relation to other 
matters therein* 503
The Act and the Order of 1960 were challenged in Sakai Papers
504(P) Ltd* v. Union of India.
The petitioners in the case argued that as a result of 
the impugned Act and Order, they would either have to increase
503* The Newspaper (Price and Page Act) (XLV of 1956).
504. AIR, 1962, S.C.305.
the price of their paper or reduce the number of pages, as 
an example, from 34, for six oays of the week, to 24* In 
either case, in their view, their right under Article l9(l)(a) 
was curtailed. If they increased the price their circulation 
would drop, and if the other course were adopted, their right 
to disseminate news and views would be directly curbed.
The Union argued that the aim of the law was to make 
available to the public the maximum matter at fair prices.
The law in no way dictated the contents of the newspapers.
Any drop in circulation as a result of the operation of the 
law was only an 'indirect* consequence. Matters such as 
prices charged and the space devoted to advertisements were 
commercial in nature, and the reasonableness of the restrict­
ion imposed should, therefore, be considered under Article 
19(6) - the sub-clause corresponding to Article 19(1)(g), 
which guarantees free pursuit of one's trade or profession - 
and not under Article 19(2). Thus, according to the Union 
neither the intention nor the effect - the direct and proxi­
mate effect - of the Act was to take away or abridge the 
freedom of speech and expression of the petitioner. More­
over, it was emphasised by the Union that the import of news­
print consumed by the newspapers was a matter that it was com­
petent to regulate. Since the quantity imported was based 
on the total number of pages calculated as at 1957, no news­
paper had an unrestricted right to raise its total of pages. 
Finally, it was said, on behalf of the Union that the price- 
page ratio was adopted from the recommendations of the Press 
Commission which insofar as it took into account all the
263.
relevant factors acted fairly and reasonably.
The Supreme Court made an a priori statement that the 
freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of pages or to 
circulate it to any number of persons was an integral part of 
the freedom of speech and expression. The freedom would be 
directly infringed when some integral aspect of it was sought 
to be curbed. The impugned Act and Order were intended to 
affect the circulation of newspapers and hence, were void as 
being unconstitutional. The alleged need to stop unfair 
competition was not considered by the Court as a sufficiently 
weighty or a sufficiently clear purpose to Justify such inter­
ference with the liberty of the press. These evaluative 
judgments on matters of at least partly political complexion, 
are intriguing, and illustrate the Supreme Court's capacity, 
at any rate, to tread on delicate ground.
On the question whether the impugned Act had a direct
or indirect effect on the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a),
505the Supreme Court appeared to ignore the A.K. Gopalan position 
and offer a different view.
In Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur spin- 
ning Co. » (1954) S.cTr.674, AIR, 19547 S.C.
119, tiiis Court has pointed out that in 
construing the Constitution it is the sub­
stance and the practical result of the act 
of the State that should be considered 
rather than its purely legal aspect. The 
correct approach in such cases should be 
to enquire as to what in substance, is the 
loss or injury caused to the citizen and 
not merely what manner and method has been 
adopted by the State in placing the re­
striction. 506
505. Above, 2^3.
506. AIR, 1962, S.C .305, 311, col.2.
This provides another instance of the Supreme Court ignoring 
A.K. G op a lan (above, 223 )•
The Supreme Court's ratio in Sakai Papers (above, 261)
when read in the light of the decisions in Romesh Thapper and
Brij Bhushan shows that freedom of speech and expression is
guaranteed in order to ensure free propagation of ideas which,
in turn, is ensured only by free circulation. In Romesh 
507Thapper, circulation was denied when the paper was barred 
from a territory of the State, but in Sakai Papers, circula­
tion was to be denied by reducing the pages or volume of mater­
ial that the newspapers could carry. Thus, the meaning of 
freedom of circulation has been specified by the Supreme Court.
One more major opportunity was presented to the Supreme
court further to explore the area of free speech in Bennett
508Coleman ana Co. and others v. Union of India. In substance,
the same type of restrictions that were imposed by the News­
paper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, were written into the Inport 
Policy for Newsprint for the year April, 1972 to March, 1973, 
governing the distribution of imported newsprint. The import 
policy for each season is published by the Government of India 
in the form of handbooks made available to the public. The 
material contained in the handbooks are administrative in 
character, and the power to frame them is derived from the 
Imports and exports Control Act, 1947, ana a number of Oraers 
governing individual commodities. In the present case, news­
print was also 'an essential commodity* under the Essential
507. Above, 3 •
508. (1973) 1 S.C.J.177, AIR, 1973, S.C.106.
Commodities Act, 1955.
The Newsprint Control Order, 1962, made in exercise of 
the powers conferred by the Act of 1955, restricted the acqui­
sition, sale and consumption of newsprint. The impugned News­
print Policy distinguished between “Common-ownership Unit” , 
which it defined as newspaper establishments owning two or 
more 'news interest newspapers' and others. While a quota 
system was devised by the order of 1962, the iNewsprint Policy 
imposed the following restrictions:
(a)No new edition of a newspaper could be started by a 
'common-ownership Unit' , even within the authorised 
quota of newsprint.
(b)A limitation of ten pages was set as the maximum 
publishable by any newspaper.
(c)No adjustment was permitted between the pages and 
circulation so as to increase the number of pages.
(d)Newspapers with less than ten pages were allowed to 
bring them up to ten, i.e. newsprint enough to enable 
them to do it was to be supplied.
According to the Union Government, these policies were 
designed to help Indian-language newspapers which were unable 
to compete with English dailies. The latter attracted the 
most advertisement revenue.
The petitioners attacked the Newsprint Policy as dis-
509criminatory and therefore, violative of Article 14. The
maximum limit of ten pages was described by them as a violation
509.See above, J7|.
of Article 19(1)(a). While they conceded the Government's 
right to devise a quota-system for scarce and essential com­
modities, they argued that the 'post-quota regulations' , as 
in this case, would have to be examined for reasonableness.
In the instant case, the regulations were, they argued, ir­
rational and arbitrary, and therefore, unreasonable. It was 
not a case of newsprint control any longer, but was 'newspaper 
control' . They urged the Supreme Court to reject the Union's 
contention that the impugned matters related 'directly' to 
import control and only incidentally to freedom of the press. 
Petitioners argued that the Bank Nationalisation case, ^  had 
overruled the A.K. Gopalan approach to constitutional inter­
pretation. The petitioners'* contended that it was not direct­
ness in terms of the form of the legislation, as A.K. Gopalan 
would seem to imply, but directness in terms of the effect of 
the legislation that ought to be the deciding factor. The 
impugned Newsprint Policy may be in form, and partly in sub­
stance, an import control but its effect on press freedom was 
direct. What was more, the petitioners went on to say that 
the tests of 'pith and substance* of the subject-matter and 
of*direct and incidental effect' of legislation were relevant 
to the question of legislative competence but were misleading 
and irrelevant to the determination of violation of fundamental 
rights. In any case, they argued, the Supreme court had already 
shown in Sakai Papers that it did not accept the A.K. Gopalan 
approach.
Four out of five Judges of the Constitutional Bench
510. AIR, 1970, S.C.564. See below > ? 1+ 13.
accepted the petitioners' arguments. Mathew J. dissented.
Ray J. (writing the majority j'uagment) held that freedom of
the press was both qualitative and quantitative. In other 
words it comprised of free, unhindered circulation and free 
unspecified volume of news and views. In any event, it was 
not for the Government, boldly asserted the Court, to say 
which newspapers should grow both in page and circulation and 
which were not to grow in a specified direction. If a news­
paper wished to increase its pages at the risk of losing cir­
culation (since every newspaper had a limited quota of news­
print) it should be free to do so. Ihe maj'ority, applying 
its mind freely to the merits of the proj'ect, did not approve 
of the aim of the impugned policy in trying to reduce the 
advertisement revenue of the bigger dailies:
If as a result of reduction in pages,
the newspapers will have to depend on
advertisements as their main source of 
income, they will be denied dissemina­
tion of news and views. That will al­
so deprive them of their freedom of speech 
and expression. On the other hand, if as 
a result of restriction on page limit the 
newspaper will have to sacrifice advertise­
ments and thus weaken the link of finan­
cial strength (sin), the organisation may 
crumble. The /.loss on advertisements may 
not only entail the closing down but also 
affect the circulation and thereby impinge 
on freedom of speech and expression. 511
As far as advertisements were concerned, the question arose
512in Hamdard Pawakhana, in which the Supreme Court had up­
held a law prohibiting advertisements for magical remedies
511. At 199 (S.C.J.)
512. (1960) S.C.J. 611, AIR, 1960, S.C.554.
for diseases and physical ailments on the basis that commer­
cial advertisements, though prima facie expressions, will not 
be protected as free speech. An advertisement to further 
business interests as distinguished from an advertisement to 
convey an idea of a social, political or cultural nature would 
not be regarded as free speech. The Supreme court in this 
instant case, did not see the need adequately to reconcile 
that interesting decision with their present ratio.
The Court was, however, more explicit in reiterating 
what appeared in the Bank Nationalisation decision to be a 
shift in the Supreme Court's interpretation of enactments 
restrictive of fundamental rights. It was held by the Court 
that it was not the legal form - to be specific, the legis­
lative entry relied on by the State - or the object of the 
law, viz., encouragement of newspapers published in Indian 
languages, but the consequences of the law in restricting 
fundamental rights that were to be looked at by the Court •
The action may have a direct effect on 
a fundamental right, although its direct 
subjectQmatter may be different. A law 
dealing directly with the defence of 
India or defamation may yet have a direct 
effect on the freedom of speech. Article
19(2) could not have (sic) such law if the 
restriction is unreasonable even if it is 
related to matters mentioned therein.
The Court refused to be persuaded by an United States deci-
514si on that arose under the Sherman Act. Equally, it was
513. (1973) 1 S.C.J. 177, 193, col.l.
514. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States (1968) 394 U.S. 131,
22 L.Ed. 148.
515not impressed by United states v. O1 Brien, wherein the
United States Supreme Court held that when a substantial 
government interest was involved, the State could regulate 
the 'non-speech* element in conduct that contained both 
speech and non-speech elements. instead, the Court relied 
on what Sir William Blackstone had said in his Commentaries:
Every free man has an undoubted right 
to lay what sentiments he places before 
the public; to forbid this is to destroy 
the freedom of the press; but if he pub­
lishes what is improper, mischievous or 
illegal, he must take the consequence of 
his own temerity. 516
In the view of the majority, the Government's discret­
ion stopped with the determination of the quota that news­
papers were entitled to. How they used the newsprint allot­
ted was not a matter for the Government.
It is necessary to consider the minority view which the 
dissenting justice, Mathew J., expressed. According to the 
learned Judge it was essential to understand what the term 
"abridges" in Article 13(2) meant.
13(2). The State shall not make any law 
which takes away or abridges the 
rights conferred by this Part and 
any law made in contravention of 
this clause shall, to the extent 
of the contravention, be void.
He held that there was a distinction between abridgement of 
speech and abridgement of freedom of speech.
515. (1968) 391 U.S.367.
516. Commentaries, 4 Bl, 151-2
Surely, the reduction in page level or 
circulation is the direct result of the 
diminished supply of newsprint. Yet,
I do not think that anybody will say 
that there is an abridgement of the free­
dom of speech of the petitioners. There 
might be an abridgement of speech, but 
not an abridgement of freedom of speech.
The decisive test would be if the press has been singled out 
for unfavourable treatment.
In fact, regular tax measures, economic 
regulations, social welfare legislation 
... and similar measures may, of course, 
have some effect upon freedom of express­
ion when applied to persons or organisa­
tions engaged in various forms of commu­
nication. But where the burden is the 
same as that borne by others engaged in 
different forms of Activity, the similar 
impact on expression seems clearly in­
sufficient to constitute an abridgement 
of freedom of expression. 518
J. was, perhaps, the first Judge to examine the theory 
freedom of expression in some detail. The values 
by society in protecting this freedom were, in his 
view, (1 ) individual fulfilment; (2 ) the attainment of 
truth; (3) the participation by members of the society in 
the political or social decision-making, and (4) maintain­
ing the balance between stability and change in society.
To this we might well add Lord Denning1 s view that the
5l8aright to dissent is part and parcel of free speech.
The freedom was not primarily for the benefit of the press
/
517. (1973) 1 S.C \ 177, 210.




518a.Lord Denning, "Freedom of Association and the Right to Work" 
in Sir Francis Vallat (ed.), An Introduction to Human Rights, 
London, ly70. r _
but rather for the benefit of the public. It was the public's 
right to be informed that was the basis of the guarantee.
There was also the important aspect of the need of men to 
express their opinions. But in India, he felt there was 
a danger of "Common-ownership Units" dominating the well- 
recognized channels of communication.
A realistic view of our freedom of ex­
pression requires the recognition that 
right of egression is somewhat thin if 
it can be exercised only on the suffer­
ance of the managers of the leading news­
papers . 519
Again the learned Judge stated ^  Indian constitutional law 
was indifferent to the ' reality and implications of non-
520governmental obstructions to the spread of political truth*.
un the question of interpretation of restrictions on 
fundamental rights, Mathew J. did not comment on the A.K. 
Gopalan approach or the 'pith and substance' test of legis­
lation.
Thus, we see that the Supreme Court has stuck to the 
a priori proposition- that freedom of the press includes free­
dom of circulation which is not confined to circulation spati- 
521ally, but includes also the volume of material put in
519. Ibid., 214, col.l. The political evaluation is evident.
520. At 213, col.l (S.C .J.) .Mathew J. also referred to the Report 
of the Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of 
Living, (Mahalanobis Committee Report) "In a study of con­
centration of economic power in India, one must take into 
account this link between industry and newspapers which 
exists in our country to a much larger extent than is found 
in any of the other democratic countries in the World."
Part I, 51-52.




No one suggests that the freedom of the press extends 
beyond the restrictions laid down in the general law of India, 
as summarised above* j. The constitutional guaran­
tee of freedom of expression must be re-examined to observe 
the points of contrast and comparison.
Article 19(2) refers to 'decency and morality' which 
is plainly wider than the ostensibly analogous ground of 
'obscenity*. It seems wide enough to support, e.g. the con­
stitutionality of such a unique provision as section 509 of 
the Indian Penal Code, i860, if the latter were to be challenged.
sec.509. Whoever, intending to insult the 
modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes 
any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, 
intending that such word or sound shall be 
heard, or that such gesture or object shall 
be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the 
privacy of such woman, shall be punished with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may ex­
tend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Yet the antique provisions of the Indian Penal Code in this 
area neither escape the overall provis ions of the Constitu­
tion nor prevent further penal legislation which, is within 
their contemplation. Dr. D. Basu advocates a greater power 
in Indian courts to recognise acts offensive to 'decency and 
morality*, his contention being that while * obsceniiiy* has 
c ome to acquire a technical meaning * decency and morality'
522have not, and are in any case, wider in their connotation.
522. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th ttdn. , 
Vol.l, 035.
It certainly implies that the btate may pass stricter laws.
523The House of Lords* decision in Shaw v. P.P.P. 
indicates the need for a ground other than * obscenity* to 
cover cases that are not covered by that offence but could 
cause as much mischief as an obscene material. In this 
English case the appellant-accused published a "Ladies 
Directory" which was a detailed list of prostitutes and 
particulars of services! available from each of them. The 
act of publishing such a ' directory* was not within the 
Obscene Publications Act, 1959. The House of Lords never­
theless, held, Lord Reid dissenting, that the appellant was
guilty of the Common Law misdemeanour of "conspiracy to cor­
rupt public morals". In the sphere of Criminal Law, held 
Lord simjfbnds:
there remains in the Court of law a resi­
dual power to enforce the supreme and
fundamental purpose of law, to conserve 
not only the safety ana order but also 
the moral welfare of the State, and it 
is their duty to guard against attack 
which may be the more insidious because 
they are novel and unprepared for. 524
525The Offence of Obscenity in India
The main provision that punishes the sale, import, 
advertisement or offer of obscene literature or objects is 
to be found under section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 
section 293 punishes sale or distribution ox obscene material 
to persons under 20 years of age. Section 294 punishes any
523. L.R. [1902] A.C.220.
524. Ibid. , 267.
525. See J.N. Mallik, Law of Obscenity in India, Eastern Law 
House, Calcutta, 1566 (includes' a discussion of ftanjij. 
Udeshi, below, i??-. ).
one who sings or utters obscene songs or ballads in public 
places to the annoyance of others. None of the sections 
defined * obscenity*•
Recently thorough-going amendments were introduced
526by the (Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1969, (Act 36 
of 1969) incorporating in section 292 the main points made
526. Gazette of India, 8/9/1969, I'art XI, S.l, Ext. 667.
2 . Amendment of section 292 of Act 45 of 1860.
In the Indian ^enal Code -
a) section 292 shall be re-numbered as sub-section 
(2 ) thereof and before sub-section (2 ), as so 
re-numbered, the following sub-section shall be 
inserted, namely:-
(1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book, 
pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, 
representation, figure or any other object, 
shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lasci­
vious or appeals to the prurient interest or 
if its effect or (where it comprises two or 
more distinct items) the effect of any one 
of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such 
as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who 
are likely, having regard to all relevant cir­
cumstances, to read, see or hear the matter 
contained or embodied in it.;
b^ in sub-section (2 ) ofsection 2 9 2 , as so re-numbered -
(i) .». •«. «•* ««• ..•
(ii) for the exception, the following exception
shall be substituted, namely: -
11 Except ion - This section does not extend to -
a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, 
painting, representation or figure -
(i) the publication of which is proved to be
justified as being for the public good 
on the ground that such book, pamphlet,«• • 
or figure is in the interest of science, 
literature, art or learning or other ob­
jects of general concern, or
(ii)which is kept or used bona fide for reli­
gious purposes;
b) any representation sculptured, engraved, 
painted or otherwise represented on or in -
(i) any ancient monument within the meaning 
of the Anoient Monuments and Archaeologi­
cal bites ana Remains Act, 1958, or
/Cont* d. on next page:
by judicial decisions* The punishment for the offence under 
Section 292 is increased from up to three months imprisonment 
with or without fine to up to two years imprisonment with or 
without fine in cases of first conviction, up to five years 
imprisonemtn with or without fine (which has also been en­
hanced throughout) for any subsequent conviction.
Section 3 of the Amending Act of 1969 also amends 
Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898, to 
include obscene matter along with seditious literature.
Now it seems obscene matter can be forfeited even vtfki(,& a 
charge under Section 292, Indian Penal Code is pending be­
fore the Court.
The enhanced punishment provided by the Act of 1969 
seem excessive and not every citizen may be aware that there 
is a problem to be coped with. The general impression is
527that there is no special problem justifying such punishments.
528The test of obscenity laid down in Queen v. Hicklin 
is still current law in India. Only recently a new element
Note 526 from 274 - continued;
(ii) any temple, or on any car used forthe
conveyance of idols, or kept or used for 
any religious purposes.**;
n\ **... ... ... . •.
For a detailed analysis of the laws bearing on the topic of 
obscenity, see Vishnu l). Sharma and F. Wooldridge, f The Law 
relating to obscene Publications in India*,22, I,c.L.Q. 
(1973) 632-47.
527# This writer was unable to get at the Objects and Reasons, 
if any, for the Act. The Preamble to the Act says, *An 
Act further to amend the Indian Penal Code ana to provide 
for matters incidental thereto.**
528. (1868) 3 Q.B. 360.
of Redeeming social value1 was introduced as a defence to the
529charge of obscenity, The earliest case which adopted the
530Hicklin test in India was Emperor v. Indarman, a case where
the facts were similar to those in Queen v. Hicklin, The 
accused in both cases had published partisan religious litera­
ture containing obscene passages, Ihe ratio common to the 
cases was if the tendency of the passage was to ‘deprave and 
corrupt’ those whose minds were open to such influences and 
who might come to possess such literature then the offence 
was committed. That the object or intention in writing the 
passages was something else, such as in the above two cases, 
viz, religious discussion, would in itself be no defence to 
the charge.
Thus a book written, it was said, with a view to offer
good advice to newly-weds, when founa to contain detailed and
ornamental description of the sex act with diagrams of coital
531postures supplementing the text, it was held to be obscene.
The Indian Supreme court on Obscenity
Admitted that a publication can be held to be obscene, 
the questions remain. When will such a factor j'ustify a 
restriction on the basic freedom of expression, and subj’ect 
to what conditions? what scope is there for the shift of
529. Ranjit Udeshi v. Maharashtra, AIR, 1965, b.C.881. It was 
referred to in Emperor v, Harnam Das, AIR, 1947, Lahore, 
383, Now the Act of 1969 gives statutory recognition to 
the principle,
530. I.L.R. (1881) 3 All 838.
531. Emperor v. Harnam pas, AIR, 1947, Lahore, 383.
public taste and fashion? is the Court the ultimate 
arbiter of this?
532
In Ran jit Udeshi v. Maharashtra, the Court heard 
an appeal by a book-seller who was charged under Section 292, 
Indian Penal Code, after he sold a copy of Lady Chatterly*s 
Lover, to a plainclothes policemanl Ihe appellant argued
ex.
that the book was a piece of literature and not^ merely a 
common pornographic work. He pleaded his right under 
Article 19(1)(a) and impugned Section 292, Indian Penal 
Code, itself.
The Court held that the important question regarding 
obscenity was, "What is obscenity as distinguished from a 
permissible treating with sex?" A mere mention of sex, the 
court held, could not be punishable - something that may 
well have to be emphasised in the Indian context with its 
strict moral etiquette. Where the obscene, viz., immodest 
or repulsive, passages which offend public morality and de­
cency did not further any public interest or profit, the 
offence under Section 292, Indian Penal Code, would be com­
mitted. Understood in that sens9 , it was held, the Section 
was constitutionally valid.
Next the Court reiterated the Hicklin test, inciden­
tally expressing the view that it was likely to be the stan­
dard test in India for some time to come (I), and proceeded 
to examine the book. Summarising the story of the book and 
the impugned passages, the Court held that, viewed from Indian
532. AIR, 1965, S.C.881.
standards there was no ’preponderant social gain’ through
the passages. The charge under appeal was held made out*
The following passage from the judgment of the Court (written
<K/
by Hidayat#,llah J.) may be profitably looked at:
An overall view of the obscene matter in 
the setting of the whole work ... (wouldj^
... be necessary ... (t)he obscene matter 
must be considered by itself and separately 
to find out whether it is so gross and its 
obscenity so decided that it is likely to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are 
open to influences of this sort and into 
whose hands the book is likely to fall.
In this connection the interests of our 
contemporary society • •• must not be over­
looked.
Today our National and Regional languages 
are strengthening themselves by new literary 
standards after a deadening period under the 
impact of English. Emulation by our writers 
of an obscene book unaer the aegis of this 
court’s determination is likely to pervert 
our entire literature because obscenity pa-ysqqo 
and true art finds little popular support.
Ihe law on this subject was considerably imp roved by 
the introduction tV* Ran jit Udeshi (above, 277) of the idea 
of ’social gain’ as a defence to a charge under Section 2 9 2 , 
Indian Penal code. Whether the social and literary analysis 
and, still more, the prophecies, applied by the Supreme Court 
were adequate and proper may remain a matter of opinion.
A recent decision in chandrakant Kalyandas v. Maharash-
534tra has further diluted the strictness with which the 
courts had viewed obscenity. A Marathi short-story which 
described in some detail the sexual relationship between a 
man and a woman was the occasion for a charge under Section 
292, Indian Penal Code*
533* Ibid. , 8 8 8 . Wonds in bucket's Su.|>J>lied *
534. AIR, 1970, S.C. 1390.
Once again the Court purported to apply the Hicklin 
test. In the application of the well-known conditions, the 
Court appeared to adopte a ’positive tone1 which favoured the 
work. It clearly emphasised that adolescents in India had 
access to a large number of classics, novels and other litera­
ture, all of which were freely available and which had a good 
deal of references to sex, love and romance. bo viewed, the 
short story would not produce any such harm as envisaged by 
Section 292, Indian kenal Code.
These two decisions of the Supreme Court along with
535that in K.A. Abbas v. Union, signify a far less strict 
view of obscenity as a restriction on freedom of expression. 
The cases show that the Supreme Court has preferred to move 
away from the traditional views on the subject, encouraging 
in so doing more * open* trends in India today. From our 
general knowledge, it is clear that their conscious appli­
cation of social and literary ^valuation in what appears 
on the face of it a mere, technical factual decision is an 
example of leadership, in which conflict with the executive 
hardly arises, and in which the court’s subordination to the 
legislature cannot be doubted. Frustration in some other 
fields of their activity may strengthen the justices’ deter­
mination to accept this leadership role without compunction. 
However, the same general knowledge warns us that India has 
no one standard of morals and decency, and that shifts in 
taste and fashion in some areas and social circles may be
535. In K.a, Abbas, AIR, 1971, b.C.48l, the Supreme Court held 
that censorship rules issued under the Cinematograph Act, 
1952, should include ’directions to emphasise the import­
ance of art to a value judgment by the censors’. t3&low 3o^<
irrelevant to others - so that the assertion of a single 
test, at any given time, of reasonableness in this area 
might be premature ana unconsciously tyrannical. The pro­
secution for obscenity, or kindred offences, must be reason­
able and it will be so if the definition of obscenity keeps 
in step with what the country considers reasonable. But 
as the country has, as yet, no one mind on these subjects, 
the role of the Supreme Court, although praiseworthy as an 
incident of leadership, is logically precarious. However, 
an alternative is as yet impracticable, for people of every 
religion and state of civilisation have in theory, and often 
in practice, access to the same bookstall, for example, and 
the most ’advanced* (well represented on the bench itself) 
cannot be held back by the evolving standards of the least 
advanced.
Restrictions on Account of Contempt of Court
English Common Law relating to this subject applied
in India before Independence (August, 1947) and the passing
536of the Constitution, later the Contempt of Court Act ,1952, 
and recently the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, have not meant 
any noticeable divergence from the Common Law position.
Indian decisions continue to refer to old established Englisbp 
authorities.53^
536. Surendranath Banerjea v. Chief Justice and Judges, (1883) 
10 I.A. 171. Re Arnrita Bazar Patrilea (1917) 45 cal. 169.
537. See, for example, Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Co-operative 
Bank, AIR, 1967, S.C. 1494, relying on HaIsbury1s Laws of 
England, 3rd Edn., vol.8 , 7.
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The basic principle in India as in England is that punishing
utterances likely to interfere with the fair administration 
of justice or likely to undermine public confidence in the 
administration of justice is a matter of public policy.
That the Indian Courts can exercise summary jurisdiction 
in a contempt matter, or the mere fact that evidence of the 
parties is not recorded, it has been held, will not render
con
the law of contempt violative of Article 19(1)(a). The
punishment for contempt is not meted out in order to protect
the individual judges. Therefore, a distinction has to be
made between a mere libellous attack on an individual judge
and comments likely to interfere with the administration of
justice. Such defamatory remarks do not constitute contempt,
but it may be open to the individual judge concerned to take
540any action available under the law of defamation.
541In Gobind Ram v. State, the appellant, an advocate 
himself, had in a transfer application, made allegations 
about the trial magistrate's alleged misconduct. He alleged 
that the Magistrate was friendly with the opposite party to 
the case and accepted hospitality from them. The Magistrate 
had, in his view, compromised himself and proper justice
538. B« Ramakrishna v. Madras, AIR, 1952, S.C.149; Brahma 
Prakash sharma v# Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1954, s.C.10.
539. Sukhdeo Singh v. Chief Justice and Judges, AIR, 1954, S.C. 
1861 A.G..Andhra Pradesh v. kamana Kao, AIR, 1967, A.P. 
299.
540. Re Special Reference from the Bahama Islands, jl.R. (1893), 
A.C. 138.
541. AIR, 1972, S.C. 989.
could not be hoped for from him. For the supreme Court, 
Grover J. held that it might or might not amount to defama­
tion of the Magistrate but certainly was not contempt. The 
judge made a point of saying that allegations made in a trans­
fer application stood on a special footing since it would be 
possible to verify them and the High Court could take action 
to rectify matters.
542In B. Ramakrishna v. Madras similar allega­
tions against a Magistrate were published in a^iewspaper and'i^ 
was held to be contempt. Frequent allegations against low-
h
ranking Magistrates, particularly in rural districts, are made 
in Indian with disturbing frequency. There appear to be two 
separate questions relevant in this context. one is the pro­
cedure for making complaints against trial magistrates of the 
kind referred to in the two cases above. The other question 
is, can the defendant seek to substantiate the truth of the 
charges he has made public. The Indian Supreme Court could 
not have meant in Gobind Ram (above, 281) that all sorts of 
complaints and allegations could be made against magistrates 
in transfer applications. The proper complaint machinery, 
or at least a possible one, would be to approach the Advocate- 
General directly or through the Bar council.
As for the second point, the well-established position 
that justification or truth is no defence will apply to com­
plaints made against magistrates. In Brahma Prakash Sharma
543v. Uttar Pradesh. theprovincial Bar Association passed
542. AIR, 1932, S.C. 149, also M.P. v. Revashankar, AIR, 1959, 
S.C.102.
543. AIR, 1954, S.C.10.
resolutions drawing attention to the incompetence of two named 
law officers. The meeting was held in camera and copies of the 
resolutions were sent to the High Court in envelopes marked 
•confidential* • The supreme Court held that the Bar Associ­
ation (through its secretary) was guilty of contempt in a 
technical sense. In view of the care taken to keep the 
matter within the circle of those directly concerned, it was 
found, the remarks contained in the resolutions received 
little publicity. It was held that the 'surrounding cir­
cumstances' of the case and the degree of publicity given 
would be relevant factors in awarding punishment to the con- 
deraners. A token fine was imposed on the Bar Association. 
However, it was made clear by the Court that even a likeli­
hood of interference would be enough to constitute the offence 
of contempt and actual interference with the administration 
justice need not be proved.
As far as general comments on judicial decisions are 
concerned, courts in India have adopted the view of Lord 
Atkin in Ambard v. A.G. for Trinidad and Tobago:
The path of criticism is a public way:
The wrong-headed are permitted to err 
therein; provided that members of the 
public abstain from imputing improper 
motives to those taking part in the 
administration of justice, and are 
genuinely exercising a right of criti­
cism, and not acting in malice or 
attempting to impair the administra- 544 
tion of justice, they are immune.
544. AIR, 1936, P.C.141, 145-6; (1936) A.C. 322, 335. Referred 
to in Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, AIR, 1953, i>.C.75, 
A.G. Andhra v. Ramana Rao, AIR, 1967, A.P.299, and Debi 
Prasad v. Emperor, AIR, 1943, P.C.202.
545In Aswini Kumar an article in the "Times of India", 30th 
October, 1952, deplored the decision of the Supreme Court 
affecting the question of continuing the dual system in the 
legal profession. (It was in vogue in Bombay and Calcutta). 
Quite unnecessarily the article concluded by wishing that 
Courts in India would be detached and not be influenced by 
policies and politics in deciding questions of law. The 
Supreme Court held that contempt was committed but discharged 
the editor of the paper after an unqualified apology from 
him. it was held that it was fair comment to say that Courts 
should be detached but to make remarks that impute 'motives1 
to Courts of law was certainly punishable.
We have an interesting decision in Debi Prasad v.
546Emperor, where the Privy Council made a distinction, for 
purposes of contempt of court, between the judicial and ad­
ministrative acts of Courts and comments on them. The Hindu­
stan Times, a newspaper published from Delhi, carried a report 
about a circular issued to subordinate courts, supposedly by 
the Chief Justice (Sir Iqbal Ahmad) of the Allahabad High 
Court asking all the judicial officers to contribute, and 
get contributions, for the War Fund. It appears that a 
sessions judge asked some accused in a murder case to con­
tribute to the War Fund (according to him after he had sen­
tenced them to lif e-imprisonment'. ) In an editorial, the
newspaper commented:
545. AIR, 1953, S.C. 75.
546. AIR, 1943, P.C. 202.
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If it is true that the new Chief Justice 
of the Allahabad High Court, Sir Iqbal 
Ahmad, in his administrative capacity, 
has issued a circular to the Judicial 
officers under his jurisdiction, enjoin­
ing on them to raise contributions to the 
war funds, then it must be said that he 
has done a thing which would lower the 
prestige of the courts in the eyes of the 
people. Ihe presiding officer of a court, 
while asking for funds, may say that the 
contribution is voluntary, but he cannot 
remove the idea from the mind of a person, 
particularly a litigant, that the request 
is being made by one whom it may not be 
safe to displease. To ebeabsolutely volun­
tary, war contributions ought to be raised 
only by non-official committees or indivi­
duals « •.. «*. ••« *«.
Sir Iqbal Ahmad himself and another judge constituting the 
bench, heard the contempt charge against the editor and 
printer of the paper. The Chief Justice delivered the judg­
ment of the Court. It was held by him that the implication 
of the editorial was that the Chief Justice had done some­
thing which was unworthy of persons holding that high office. 
It was clearly contempt according to the judgment and the 
editor and printer were imprisoned.
un appeal to the Judicial Committee by the accused, 
the charge of contempt was held to be 1 misconceived* and the 
editor and printer were held not to be guilty. Lord Atkin 
for the Committee held that the comments in question were not 
criticisms of any judicial matter. There was no comment on 
* any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on 
him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the 
administration of justice1• If the facts alleged were 
true (it eventually transpired to be mncorrect) they admitted 
of criticism.
No doubt it is galling for any judicial 
personage to be criticized publicly as 
having done something outside his judi­
cial proceedings which was ill-advised 
or indiscreet. But judicial personages
can afford not to be too sensitive. A
simple denial in public of the allged 
request would at once have allayed the 
trouble. If a j'udge is defamed in such 
a way as not to affect the administration 
of justice, he has the ordinary remedies 
for defamation if he should feel impelled 
to use them. 547
Lord Atkin further stated that cases of contempt arising out 
of scandalising the court required to be treated with much 
discretion. Interference with the administration of j’ustice
or that which was calculated to so interfere alone would j*ustify
a charge of contempt.
Ihe Supreme court of India held in a similar case that
indiscreet remarks made by a subordinate j*udicial officer in
his communications with his superior officers would not amount
to contempt. A mere question of propriety would be insuffi-
548cient to constitute contempt.
In his discussion of the law of contempt in England, 
Professor Harry Street appears to be critical of several as­
pects of the law there. In view of the great similarities 
between Indian and English laws on this subj’ect some, at
least, of the points made by him are worth noting. He 
549questions the summary nature of the proceedings in con­
tempt cases and the possibility that a j*udge against whom the
547. L.R. (1942-3) 70 I.A. 216, 224, I.L.R. (1944) All 32, 41.
548. Rizwan-ul-Hasan v. Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1953, S.C.184
549. Harry street, Freedom» the Individual and the Law, 3rd Edn., 
London, Penguin, 1 $*72, 154-5.
alleged contempt may have been committed may himself hear 
the charge of contempt. Pebi Prasad, (above, 2$hr ) illu­
strates the second point. There the Chief Justice whose 
conduct in issuing the circular was the subject of the com­
ments heard the charge himself sitting with another judge.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not refer 
to that aspect of the case at all.
As for the summary nature of the proceedings, it was
550raised m  A.G.. A.P. v. Ramana Kao. it was argued there
that the summary nature of the proceedings where evidence 
of the parties was not recorded offended Article 21 of the 
Indian constitution which provides:
Protection of life and personal 
liberty - No person shall be de- 
prived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to pro­
cedure established by law.
It was said there was no ‘procedure established* in this case.
551The Contempt of court Act. 1952, did not define ‘contempt* 
or ‘court* • Faced with this argument the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court could only rely on the long-established practice of the 
chartered High Courts of India in punishing contempt. G.K. 
Nair C.J. held that the Letters Patent granted to the three 
Presidency Courts in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta referred to 
this power being exercisable by them. There were also clear 
authorities confirming this right from the 1880s to the time
550. AIR, 1967, A.P. 299.
551. It is now repealed and replaced by the Contempt of Court 
Act, 1971.
of the decision. The Chief Justice referred to Peacock C.J.*s
552dictum in Re Abdool as the earliest authority. Reference
was made to the Indian Supreme Court1 s decision in Sukhdeo
553Singh v. Chief Justice. as a modern authority.
It was held that the Court would not exercise its sum­
mary jurisdiction except in a case beyond reasonable doubt. 
Secondly, the power was not to be exercised for the vindica­
tion of a Judge as a person but only to protect the interests 
of the public in a proper administration of Justice. Thirdly, 
if the comment was a fair comment on the conduct of Judge re­
lating to his judicial tasks then the power would not be exer­
cised. Finally, if the contempt was merely slight or techni­
cal a straight apology or regret would satisfy the court and
554no further action would be taken. Professor Street thinks
555that the decision in R. v. Almon (1765), from which the 
power of the courts to punish contempt in summary proceedings 
is derived, was not correct, that the authorities relied on 
in 1765 did not warrant the decision and that the judges* 
power was usurped. He admits, however, that an Act of Parlia­
ment would be needed to take away the power. In India,Parlia­
ment has regularised the power by statute and impliedly en­
dorsed it beyond question. How it is exercised is another
552. (1887) 8 Sutherland W. R. cr. 32, 33. An even earlier autho­
rity was Surendra Nath v. Chief Justice, (1883) 10 I.A.171, 
179 (P.C.JI
553. AIR, 1954, S.C. 186.
554. Op.cit., 154.
555. Reported in Wilmot*s Judgments and Opinions (1802).
matter - ana here the constitutional guarantees are, of course, 
relevant.
In India, unlike England, cases of contempt are gener­
ally those of the *scandalizing-the-courts* uariety ana less 
of the *prejudicing-parties-to-a-case’ type. For the present, 
at any rate, there appears to be ample justification for the 
summary jurisdiction exercised by the Indian Courts in punish­
ing contempt. With a public that takes litigation too 
seriously, perhaps, and which at the best of times remains 
sceptical of those holding public offices and exercising power 
over them, it seems necessary to curb irresponsible comments 
that are too often sharp in innuendos. It is fair and per­
haps necessary to add that many of these comments by liti­
gants and others are not taken seriously by the public and 
hence, it would only make matters worse if the Inaian judi­
ciary remain too sensitive to such comments.
The Indian Supreme Court in particular caime under
strong criticisms ever since the court’s decision in Golak-
556nath and after. The overtly political nature of many of
these comments and their disproportionate zeal in attacking
the court has done much in recent years to damage the prestige
of the Indian judiciary as a whole. Everyone except the
Indian Supreme court appears to be supporting a 1 socialistic
pattern of society1I In one case, at least, the matter was
brought to the court’s attention. In E.M.s. Namboodripad v. 
557T.N. Narobiar, the appellant, a communist leader, made a
556. AIR, 1967, S.C.1643.
557. AIR, 1970» S.C.2015. See also Noordeen v. A.K.Gopalan, 
1968, K.L.T.157.
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speech in which he denounced the law courts as defenders of 
the interests of the dominant classes. The Kerala High 
Court found him, guilty of contempt. He appealed to the 
Supreme Court.
Hidayatullah C.J. held that under certain circumstances 
it was possible that contempt could be committed in respect of 
the whole of the judiciary or the judicial system. In the 
case before them, the appellant had committed just that sort 
of contempt. His Lordship went on to say that courts in 
India were concerned with upholding the Constitution and not
any class interest. They were not sui generis but owed their
existence to the Constitution. They were bound by their oath 
of conscience.
For those who think that the laws are
defective the path of reform is open,
but in a democracy such as ours to 
weaken the judiciary is to weaken demo­
cracy itself.
It was held that while Article I9(l)j^a) guaranteed free ex­
pression of opinion to get political and social changes, such 
expressions would have to remain subject to the law relating 
to contempt of court.
Finally, a decision that shows an interesting and 
subtle form of contempt of courts may be dealt with. It 
may be described as ’contempt by flattery*. The condemner
. eco
in Hi ratal Dixit v. U.P. distributed a pamphlet in the 
premises of the Supreme Court in New Delhi which read as 
follows:
558. AIR, 1954, S.C.743.
The public has full and firm faith in 
the Supreme Court but sources that are 
in the know say that the Government acts 
with partiality in the matter of appoint­
ment of those Honourable Judges as Ambas­
sadors, Governors, High Commissioners, etc., 
who give judgments against the Government.
But this has so far not made any difference 
to the firmness and Justice of the Honour­
able Judges.
At the time he distributed this pamphlet, he was a petitioner 
in a case pending before the Court. He was promptly charged 
with contempt’.
S.R. Das J. held for the unanimous Supreme court that 
far from a flattery of the Court, the pamphlet was an indirect 
warning that if the Court gave a decision against the petition­
er (in the pending cause), and thus in favour of the Government, 
the implication would be the Judges succumbed to thoughts of 
higher office. The timing of the pamphlet the Court held, 
confirmed that view. The condemner and author of the pam­
phlet was sentenced to a fortnight in gaol. Needless to say 
he went away a much sober man’.
In conclusion, it seems the Indian courts have not de-*
parted from the Common Law position in the matter of law of 
contempt by scandalising the Court. It is submitted that 
they have not been particularly anxious to chafge free com­
ments with contempt as long as the comments used restrained 
language and were not abusive of the Courts or Judges.
Sedition
This is an area where Indian courts have tried to 
break new ground though litigation is relatively rare here 
since there are very few prosecutions for sedition* Article 
19(2) does not refer to ’sedition* as one of the grounds justi­
fying imposition of reasonable restrictions* The draft con­
stitution mentioned it but it was subsequently removed after 
K*M* Munshi argued that the meaning of ’sedition* was not
clear and might create difficulties if included in the Con-
559stitution.
360 561In Romesh Thapper and Brij Bhushan this omis­
sion of ’sedition’ from Article 19(2) was explained differ­
ently in the majority and minority judgments* According to 
Patanjali Sastri J. (who delivered the maj’ority j'udgment), 
the framers preferred to use ’security of State* instead of 
’sedition* because it was their intention that criticisms of 
government exciting disaffection towards it were not to be 
restricted unless they were such as to Jundennine the secur­
ity of state or tend to overthrow it* Fazi Ali J., who was
the sole dissenting j’udge, relying on a decision of the 
562Federal Court, held that public order was the basis of
560. AIR, 1950, S.C. 124.
561. AIR, 1950, S.C. 129.
562. Niharendu Putt v. Emperor, AIR, 1942, F.C. 22 (1942), 
F.C .R.38.
the offence of sedition* There was, in his view, no need
to specify sedition as a ground in Article 19(2). Public
disorder, in his view, and a threat to the security of state
could not be easily distinguished. However, in neither of
these decisions did interpretation of ’sedition' arise for
consideration by itself. It was not even a collateral issue.
The majority explanation of ’sedition’ became ineffective the
moment the First (Constitution Amendment) Act. 1951, inserted
'public order’ in Article 19(2). The minority explanation
of Fazl Ali j. has less relevance after the Supreme Court in
563Kedar Nath v. Bihar dealt with the offence cf sedition and 
its constitutionality.
The main provision which makes seditious writings and
speeches an offence is Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code.
5641860. This section was introduced by an Amending Act of
1870, special Act XXVII of 1870. There are other provisions
563. AIR, 1962, S.C.955.
564. 124-A. Sedition. Whoever by words, either spoken or
written or by signs, or by visible representation, 
or other wise, brings or attempts to bring into 
hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to ex­
cite disaffection towards, the Government establish 
ed by law in India, shall be punished with imprison 
ment for life, to which fine may be added, or with 
imprisonment which may extend to three years, to 
which fine may be added, or w'ith fine.
Explanation 1. - The egression ’disaffection’ includes 
disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.
Explanation 2. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the 
measures of the Government with a view to obtain 
their alteration by lawful means, without exciting 
or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaf­
fection, do not constitute an offence under this 
section.
Explanation 3. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the 
administrative or other action of the Government 
without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, 
contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an 
offence under the section.
strewn over different enactments, some of which need to be 
dealt with in this section.
565The history of the offence of sedition in India 
is generally told with Strachey J's decision in Tilak’s case 
as the starting point. In that case, Strachey J. inter-
preted "feelings of disaffection" as ’absence of affection’ 
towards the government’.
y What are ’feelings of disaffection’? I 
agree with Sir Comer Petheram in the 
£&■ ngabasl case that disaffection means 
simply the absence of affection. It 
means hatred, enmity, dislike, hostility, 
contempt, and every form of ill-will to 
the Government. ’Disloyalty* is perhaps 
the best general term, comprehending every 
possible form of bad feeling to the Govern­
ment . 567
Again, the meaning of the words "the Government established 
by law in British India1 was defined by him:
It means, in my opinion, British rule and 
its representatives as such - the existing 
political system as distinguished from any 
particular set of administrators. 568
It was contested by defence counsel that want of affection
569
in any degree towards British rule could not be ’disaffection’.
565. Kor a detailed study of sedition in India, see Law of Sedi­
tion in India, produced by the Indian Law Institute, 19
566. I.L.R. (1897) 22 Bom.112. Leave to appeal refused in I.L.R 
(1897) 22 Bom. 528 P.C.
567. I.L.R. (1897) 22 Bom.112, 134. Sir Comer had, in fact, used 
the expression ’contrary to affection*.
568. IBID., 135.
569. Ibid., 145.
Only active disloyalty could be within the ambit of the of­
fence. Strachey J. appearedto be saying to counsel, after
the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, that that was what
570was meant by him. If he did, one can be sure the jury
did not see that and indeed, could not have done so from his 
summing up. However, when the accused appealed to the Privy 
Council leave was not granted since the Privy Council did not 
see any justification for an appeal* Their Lordships thus 
appeared to confirm the view of Strachey J. In a case re-
571ported in the same year and volume of the Indian Law Reports, 
Farran c.J. held, relying on Murray’s Dictionary, that ’dis­
affection1 meant "political alienation or discontent, a spirit 
of disloyalty to the Government or existing authority". He 
held that it was an offence under English Law to "attempt to 
excite feelings of disaffection to the Government" which was 
equivalent to an attempt to produce hatred of Government esta­
blished by law, to excite political discontent and alienate 
the people from their allegiance."
These holdings were followed in India for a number of
572years. The next milestone was in Niharendu Putt where 
the Federal Court of India, the predecessor of the Supreme 
Court, discussed leading English authorities and demonstrated 
that with regard to Section 124-A the ’literal’ interepretatior
57°. Ibid., 148-9.
571. Queen-Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, I.L.R. (1897) 22 Bom. 
152.
572. AIR, 1942, F.C. 22, [1942] F.C.K.38.
adopted by Indian Courts was incorrect. Maurice Gwyer C.J. 
held that the language of the section was taken from English 
Law. The acts or words complained of must either incite to 
disorder, or must be such as to "satisfy reasonable men" that 
that was the intention or tendency of the wwords. Mere 
strong words or abusive words would not constitute sedition. 
The relevant question according to the Federal Court was 
whether there was an actual incitement to disorder or a 
reasonable likelihood or tendency to disorder.
Public disorder, or the reasonable antici­
pation, or likelihood of public disorder, 
is thus the gist of the offence. 573
This narrowing down of the ambit of ’sedition1 was a
clear break from the loyalty test laid down by Strachey J.
What is really remarkable is that Sir Maurice Gwyer* s view
that correct English Law required proof of a tendency to
public disorder in order to constitute sedition was opposed 
to the earlier understanding of the English legal position 
by Strachey J. and others.
However, the . ' . decision of the Federal Court was
disapproved by the Privy .Council in King-Emperor v. Sadashiv
574Narayan Bhalerao. it was held that whatever the position
in English Law the word ’sedition’ does not occur anywhere in 
Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. It occurs in the 
head-note but that was held not to be an operative part of 
the Section.
573. AIR, 1942, F.C.22, 26.
574. AIR, 1947, P.C.82, L.R. 74 I.A., 89.
Their Lordships are unable to find anything 
in the language of either Section 124-A or 
the Rule which could suggest that ’the acts 
or words complained of must either incite to 
disorder or must be such as to satisfy reason­
able men that that is their intention or ten­
dency.’ The first explanation to Section 
124-A provides, ’The expression "disaffection" 
includes "disloyalty and all feelings of en­
mity", This is quite inconsistent with any 
suggestion that ’excites’or attempts to 'ex­
cite disaffection’ involves not only excit­
ation of feelings of disaffection, but also 
exciting disorder. 575
57 i
When the Indian Supreme Court decided Kedernath v. Bihar 
it had before it two very persuasive views on the interpreta­
tion of Section 124-A. under the changed circumstances repre­
sented by an independent republic Constitution, the Court found 
that unless it adopted the narrow view of the offence under
the section, it would have to declare it unconstitutional.
577Indeed, this had already been done by some High Courts.
So it accepted Maurice Gwyer C.J.'s dictum in preference to 
that of the Privy Council. The Court held that it must choose 
the interpretation, amongst several, which would render the 
section constitutional rather than that which would make it 
unconstitutional and void. Therefore, prosecutions under 
the Section will succeed only if the narrower understanding
575. L.R. 74, I.A. 89, 95.
576. AIR, 1962, S.C.955. Misra, ’Freedom of Speech and the Law 
of Sedition in India’, 8 J.I.L.I. (1966) 117-131.
577. Tara Singh v. Punjab, AIR, 1951, Punj. 27, AIR, 1959 All 
101 (F.B.). Indramani Singh v. Manipur, AIR, 1955, Mani. 
9, holding that if the Privy Council’s view were to be 
adopted, the section would have to be held void in part.
of it is satisfied - a remarkable exercise of judicial ingen­
uity, balancing the then (as ever) exigent demands of the State 
with the civil rights of the individual in confrontation with 
them.
Preservation or public order was the basis of all legis­
lation punishing offences against the State, So, it was held 
that to incite people to violence or to utter words with the 
intention of inciting people to take to violent methods to 
overthrow the Government would most certainly be sedition,
1Absence of affection1 would not invite punishment under the
section, only a ’reasonable anticipation* of public disturb-
, ~  578 ance.
After Kedarnath, the Supreme Court has not so far, it 
appears, heard another case on ’sedition* under Section 124-A* 
But the Court upheld Section 3, Pepsu Police (Incitement to 
Disaffection) Act (1 of 1953): ” ... Whoever intentionally
causes ,,, disaffection towards any Government established by 
law in India amongst the members of a police force or induces 
••• any member of a police force to withhold his services
579or to commit a breach of discipline shall be punishable
The Allahabad High Court has held more than once that 
spreading disaffection against a party government would not
58C
by itself amount to disaffection likely to result in disorder,
578, On similar reasoning, Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code 
was held to be valid constitutionally,
579, AIK, 1962, S.C. 1106,
580, Ahmad Ali v, state, AIK, 1951, All 459; Sarju Pandey v. 
State, AIR, 1956, All 589, 593. Also see Mohd. Ishaq v. 
U.P., AIR, 1957 All 782, ftbbv#, . But see (contra)
TrT"the Matter of SaPtaha, AIK, 1950, Cal. 444. Tne Allaha­
bad view is the right one in the light of the Supreme Court 
decision in Kedarnath.
One wonders if this means that if strong speeches are made 
against the ruling party in the State even if they have a 
tendency to cause disorder they would not constitute sedition* 
The High Court has obviously erred on the side of caution 
but there does appear to be a problem* One knows that in 
India political parties frequently take out huge processions of 
their supporters who unfortunately do cause serious disruption 
to normal life* One can imagine that under certain conditions 
there may well be a threat to the existence of stable govern­
ment* By such large-scale campaigns against ruling parties 
their governments have been brought down in several States of 
the Indian Union. Hao there not been the provision for 
President’s rule (Article 356) to fill the vacuum caused by 
a lack of any government in many of these States, it is easy 
to imagine total anarchy prevailing in them.
But the ’liberal’ attitude of Indian courts - that is
an attitude in favour of the citizen’s freedom - continues and
in the few cases that come before them the charge ofsy sedition
is mostly dismissed. A good example of this trend is the
581decision of the Gujarat High Court in Manubhai v. Gujarat♦
The appellant published the ’Thoughts of Mao-tse-tung* in 
the Gujarati language. The copies were immediately seized 
by the State acting under Section 99-A of the Criminal Pro- 
cedure Code. The question was whether the book was sedi­
tious. The order served on the petitioner is of some 
interest and is, therefore, reproduced here.
581. (1971) 12 Guj.L.K. 968, (1972), Cr.L.J. 373.
300.
Whereas the book captioned ... printed by 
... and published by Manubhai ... contains 
views of Mao-tse-tung which are full of 
hatred and contempt for all persons who 
do not subscribe to the communist ideology 
and also contains Mao’s advice on how to 
overthrow a non-communist Government by 
violent revolution and how to establish 
a communist Government by resort to armed 
revolution:
And whereas the intention of the printer 
ana publisher of the said book, as is clear 
from the preface to the book, is that the 
views and advice of Mao-tse-tung contained 
in the said book should serve as a guide 
to understand the principles and practice 
of communism, and thereby the printer and 
publisher have attempted to bring into 
hatred or contempt and to excite feelings 
of disaffection towards the non-communist 
Government established by law in India •••(’•)
The High Court examined the book and verified that there was 
no specific incitement to violence against the Government of 
India or any other Government. in the absence of such in­
citement it held the book was not seditious. In the Court’s 
view, to regard the book as seditious because it contained 
Mao’s thoughts "would be to close the doors of knowledge, 
to ostracise a philosophy because it challenges values 
cherished and held dear by our present-day society and 
(which) holds up for acceptance a new way of life vastly
582different from what our people are presently accustomed to."
There are other provisions punishing seditious offences. 
Section 99-a  of the Criminal Procedure Code, provides for for­
feiture of any newspaper, book or document where it -
582. Ibid., 979 of the Guj.L.R.
appears to the State Government to oontain 
any seditious matter or any matter which 
promotes or is intended to promote feelings 
of enmity or hate between different classes 
of the citizens of India or which is deliber­
ately and maliciously intended to outrage the 
religious feelings of any such class by in­
sulting the religion or the religious belief 
of that class, that is to say, any matter the 
publication of which is punishable under sec­
tion 124—a  or section 153-A or section 295-a  
of the Indian Penal Code, the State Government 
may, by notification in the Official Gazette 
stating the grounds of its opinion, declare 
... every copy of such book ... to be for­
feited to government.
The Supreme Court laid down in Harnam pas v. State of 
583u .P. that the Government while making an order under the 
Section must state the grounds on which it had formed the 
opinion as to the need to make the order. The duty of the 
courts under Section 99-D would be to set aside the order on 
an examination of the grounds stated in the order, and does 
not extend to an independent scrutiny of the publication to 
see if, in the courts’ opinion, it could be viewed as offend­
ing any of the matters referred to in Section 9 9-A. That 
would amount to the Courts themselves making an order for 
forfeiture whereas the Government would be the appropriate
authority to do so. The supreme Court reversed the deci-
584sion of the Allahabad High Court where the High Court 
appears to have taken the view that it had to examine 
’whether in fact, the document comes within the mischief 
of the offence charged’ .IWeiihe order passed by the Government
583. AIR, 1901, 3 .C.1662.
584. AIR, 1957, All 538 (S.B.).
was upheld though it did not state on what grounds it had 
been passed but merely repeated the words of Section 99-A,
» Supreme'
The majority Its* the^Court in its opinion referred to Arun
383Ranjan Ghose v, State of W,B., and expressed agreement 
with the case.
In that case, decided by the Calcutta High Court, it 
wa^jield that the order made under Section 99-A, Criminal Pro­
cedure Code should have indicated what class of citizens were 
* outraged* by the offending publication and what were the 
classes of citizens between whom feelings of hatred would 
have been produced by that publication. In the absence of 
grounds to account for the Government*s opinion, the court 
had nothing to go on in satisfying itself that the book con­
tained matter of the nature referred to under 99-A, The 
court could not put forth its own grounds for upholding the 
Government’s order. It should see if the grounds stated 
in the order were justified in relation to the material in 
the publication* Moreover, in the absence of such grounds 
it would not be possible for any person aggrieved by the 
Government’s order to exercise his right under 99-B and 
prove that the impugned book did not contain such seditious 
or other objectionable material.
The dicta of the Supreme Court in Harnam Das (above,
38b301) was followed in Md, Khalid v. Chief Commissioner, 
and an order which merely repeated the language of Section
585, (1955) 59 C.W.N. 495 (S.B.).
586, AIR, 1968, Delhi, 13,
99-A without giving the reasons or grounds which were respon­
sible for the government’s action was held invalid* This
587position was confirmed recently in JNarayan Das v* M«P* 
where the order of forfeiture was made under The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act* 1901, which is similar to Section 99-A of the 
Criminal Procedure Code* After holding in this sense, the 
Supreme Court observed:
clearly the grounds must be distinguished 
from the opinion* Grounds of the opinion 
must mean the conclusion of facts on which 
the opinion is based* There can be no con­
clusion of fact which has no reference to 
or is not ex facie based on any fact* 588
There are a number of cognate offences and provisions 
in several statutes which have a bearing on the offence of 
sedition* These are: Section 27-B, The Post Office Act*
1898, Section 3; The Dramatic Performances Act, 1870, sections 
2and 3; The Criminal Law Amendment Act* 1961, Section 3; The 
unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act* 1967, and Sections 4 and 
7; The Press (Objectionable Matter) Act* 1951.
Section 27-B of the Post office Act, 1898, enables the 
Post-Faster General or any officer authorised by him to detain 
any newspaper or book or document which he suspects of contain­
ing any seditious matter the publication of which would be 
punishable under 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, I860.
From the standpoint of constitutional reasonableness, 
the only objection that could be taken would relate to thd
587* (1972) 1 S.C.W.R.984*
588. Ibid., 989-90.
expression ’suspects’ . unless the suspicion can be shown 
to be on reasonable grounds, it may be held unconstitutional. 
According to Section 27-B(3) the State Government should 
arrange for the contents of the article to be examined and 
if the suspicion entertained is confirmed, it shall make 
further orders considered suitable or else release the 
article and its contents. According to the second proviso, 
to Section 27-B(3), an application to the High Court would 
lie only after the Government had rejected an appeal by the 
affected individual. Section 27-D further prohibits seek­
ing a remedy in the High Court before the appeal to the 
Government is rejected. Here there may be one more ground 
of constitutional challenge. Articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution guarantee the right to invoke the Supreme court
or the High Courts respectively. It has been held by the
589Supreme Court in K.K. Kochunni v. Madras that the exist­
ence of an alternative remedy is no ground for barring a 
petition under Article 32. If it is possible for a citizen 
of India to make out a prima facie case that his fundamental 
right is infringed, he could come to the Supreme Court directly 
availing himself of his right under Article 32. The scope 
of Article 226 which is not a fundamental right, is no less 
potent affording a wide writ jurisdiction to the High Courts. 
Therefore, it seems the apparently mandatory provisions in 
section 27-B and 27-D would clash with the two constitutional 
provisions in Articles 32 ana 226.
589. AIK, 1959, S.C. 1X5.
If we consider the following hypothetical case, the 
constitutional implications of Article 27-B may become clear. 
Let us say that copies of election manifestos of a political 
party sent to electors by post were detained while there is 
an election pending, then certainly a swift remedy ought to 
lie. A swift remedy is required whether it is the fundamental 
right of the political party under Article 19(1)(a) or (c) 
that is violated. in granting an injunction against the 
Post Office assuming that there is a prima facie case in 
favour of the petitioners the two stage procedure laid down 
in Section 27-B would, it seems, be brushed aside.
Turning to Section 3 of the Dramatic Performances Act. 
1876, it runs as follows:
Whenever the State Government is of opinion 
that any play, pantomime or other drama per­
formed or about to be performed in a public 
place is -
(a) of a scandalous or defamatory nature, or
(b) likely to excite feelings of disaffection 
to the Government established by law in 
India, or
(c) likely to deprave and corrupt persons pre­
sent at the performance,
the State Government ... may by order prohibit 
the performance.
The constitutionality of this Section was considered in State
590v. Baboo Lai & Ors. There the respondents were charged
as follows:
(a) that they distorted the script of the play 
to suit their political ideology.
590. AIK, 1956, All 571.
306.
(b) that they failed to obtain a proper licence 
to stage the play.
(c) that they failed to supply a copy of the 
play to the Magistrate before the perform­
ance, and
(d) that they disobeyed the prohibitory order 
issued by the Magistrate (which was, in 
fact, served in the middle of the perform­
ance of the play*. )
The first charge was understandably dismissed as unconstitu­
tional. But the Court could have clarified its ratio on 
the point. It seems that the charge itself was wrongly 
framed. The grounds mentioned in Section 3(a) and (b) were 
held reasonable restrictions under article 19(2).
An interesting argument raised by the accused in the 
case was that if pre-censorship of newspapers or any other 
written matter was unconstitutional (Romesh Thapper v. Madras)591 
then by analogy no prior restraint could be imposed on the 
spoken word whether it was in a play, pantomime or drama*
This was rejected by the Court which held that there was a 
distinction between the written word and the spoken word.
The written word takes a long time to reach 
its readers, but the spoken word is conveyed 
to the audience immediately. The written 
wora can be confiscated before it has done 
much damage, but the spoken word achieves 
its object as soon as it is uttered. The 
spoken word is also far more inflammable 
and can engender heat and excite passions 
in a far quicker manner and thus can become 
a much greater danger to the security of the 
community. 592
The comparative degree to which the two modes of expression 
could influence the public is a debatable matter but the last
591. AIK, 1950, 5.C.124, above, Xh- .
592. AIR, 1956, All 571, 573-4.
point maae by the learned Judge, it is submitted, is certainly 
true in India. Unlawful incitement of the public occurs 
more frequently in platform speeches than in newspaper cam­
paigns •
±txamining the procedural provisions of the impugned Act 
of 1876, the Court found that there was no review or revision 
of the Magistrate’s order by a higher authority, which meant 
that he exercised absolute discretion in the matter. This 
was held to be clearly unreasonable.
The Punjab High Court held the Dramatic Performances
5593Act, 1876, unconstitutional in Comrade Chanan Singh v. union.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act. 1961 (Act 23 of 1961) 
was passed with a view to curb political associations who had 
made it part of their policy to encourage demands for inde­
pendent units to be formed by secession from the Union of 
India.
Section 2 : Whoever by words either spoken or 
written, or by signs, or by visible repre­
ss entation or otherwise, questions the terri­
torial integrity or frontiers of India in a 
manner which is, or is likely to be, preju­
dicial to the interests of the safety or se­
curity of India, shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
three years, or with fine or with both.
Section 3: (1) If the Central Government con­
siders that in the interest of the safety 
or security of India or in the public in­
terest, it is necessary or expedient so to 
do, it may, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, declare any area ,adjoining the 
frontiers of India to be amotified area; and 
thereupon, for s&ong as the notification is 
in force, such area shall be a notified area 
for purposes of this section.
593. AIK, 1961, Punj. 272.
(2) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates 
in any notified area any statement, 
rumour or report which is, or is likely 
to be, prejudicial to the maintenance 
of public order or essential supplies or 
services in the said area or to the in­
terests of the safety or security of India, 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to three years, or 
with fine, or with both.
Notifications or orders under this Act have not been challenged 
so far, but from what we have already seen it will be evident 
that small scope is available to the petitioners should the 
impugned documents be skilfully drafted by the Executive.
In conclusion, the only observation that needs to be 
made is that Indian Courts have clearly construed the statutes 
punishing sedition strictly. They have made sure that the 
Executive is fully aware of what it does while charging some­
one with the offence of sedition.
Free Expression and Cinema Films
With the strict social ana moral standards prevalent
in Indian society, cinema films can expect a certain amount 
594of censorship. The Cinematograph Act. 1952, enables the
Government to classify films according to the age of the per­
sons constituting the audience. Section 5-B lays down the 
circumstances under which films can be totally prohibited 
from public exhibition:
594. See Bruce Michael Boyd, ’Film Censorship in India: a
"Reasonable Restriction” on Freedom of Speech and Expression1 
(1972) 14 J.I.L.I., 501-561 for a detailed account of the 
subject in all its ramifications.
(1) A film shall not be certified for public
exhibition if, in the opinion of the autho­
rity competent to grant the certificate, 
the film or any part of it is against the 
interests of the security or the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States, 
public order, decency pr morality, or in­
volves defamation or contempt of Courtor 
is likely to incite the commission of any 
offence.
The Central Government framed rules under the Act.
Kule (l)(e) of the Rules prohibits the showing of films that 
bring into contempt the armed forces or the public authori­
ties entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. Rule 
(l)(f) prohibited public exhibition of films that portrayed 
social unrest or discontent to such an extent as to incite
the public to crime, disorder, violence, disaffection or re­
ft/
sist^nce to Government.
595In K.a. Abbas v. Union of India these two Rules and 
Section 5-B or the Cinematograph Act, 1952, were challenged as 
unconstitutional. The petitioner, a well-known artistic per­
sonality, made a film contrasting the rich and the poor in 
the four major cities of India. There were a few shots of 
’red-light* areas of these cities, ox prostitutes waiting 
for custom. He was refused a certificate for universal ex­
hibition which was what he wanted. Films are extremely 
popular with all classes in India, but especially with the 
poorer classes and young people generally.
He argued that the Rules governing the issue of ’U* ,
’A’, and ’x* certificates to films were vague. The dis­
cretion permitted to the Government was too wide and therefore,
595. AIR, 1971, S.C.481.
the petitioner’s right under Article 19(1)(a) was unreason­
ably restricted.
Hidayatullah C.J., for the ‘Supreme Court, held that 
the cinema film had a special appeal to the Indian public 
and to the public everywhere and the need for control must 
be accepted. Such control, however, must be reasonable and 
in the interests of public morality and decency. When it was 
pointed out to the Court that Section 5-B did not refer to 
’reasonable’ control, the Court replied:
The Constitution has to be read first and 
the Section next. The latter can neither 
take away nor add to what the Constitution 
has said on the subject. The word ’reason­
able* is not to be found in Section 5-B but 
it cannot mean that the restriction can be 
unreasonable. iNOt only the sense of the 
matter but the existence of the constitu­
tional provision in pari materia must have 
due share ... 596
The Court went on to examine the Rules for vagueness and 
held that they were reasonably clear and did not confer un­
controlled discretion on the State. The directions issued 
to the Censor Board were also examined and were found to be 
definite, clear, ana thus, unobjectionable.
Reasonable Restrictions on the Freedom of Assembly - 19(1)(b)
If demonstrations ana meetings in public are any indi­
cation of the freedom enjoyed by a people, Indians do enjoy 
and assert that freedom so frequently that ' the forces 
charged with maintenance of law and order in India are fully
596. Ibid., 494. This admission of the power of growth of
’ reasonableness* - fully consistent with English law - is 
of greater importance than the actual issues in the cases.
stretched and at times unable to cope with the problems pre­
sented. In difficult circumstances, the police can invoke 
Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. That section is the
most prominent restriction on this right. It has already been 
597referred to. Under the Section a Magistrate may, in his
discretion, make an order restricting the formation of assem­
blies or meetings or make an order prohibiting conduct which, 
in his opinion, will cause or likely to cause, obstruction, 
annoyance or injury to the public or to any person or other­
wise endanger life, health or safety*
As already noticed, British-Indian Courts construed 
the executive discretion conferred by the Section strictly, 
that is to say, with the tacit assumption^aiways in the back- ^  
ground;that the citizens haa the liberty of speech and assembly.
One more decision that is in line with this position is
599to be found in Satyanarayana v* Emperor. There during the
civil-disobedience campaign organised by Mahatma Gandhi, a 
Magistrate at Guntur in Andhra prohibited the wearing of 
•Gandhi caps1 as a precaution against possible disturbances 
in his area. There was however, no actual evidence of any 
disturbances or expectation of them. under the circumstances, 
the High Court found that the apprehension of breach of peace 
was too far removed from the act prohibited by the Magistrate
597. See above, Section on Restriction on the Press, 246 ff.
The provision has been reproduced there.
598. In re Ardeshir Phirozshaw, AIR, 1940, Bom. 42; Editor. 
Tribune v. Emperor, a i r , 1942, Lahore 171 (F.B.). See above,
599. AIR, 1931, Madras, 236.
under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code.
It is not enough to say that by stretching 
several possibilities one after the other, 
it is possible to establish a connection 
of cause and effect between the act pro­
hibited and disturb ance of public tran­
quillity* 600
It was held that the likelihood or tendency to disturbances 
must be reasonable and proximate. The Supreme Court has 
independently established this to be law in The Superintendent 
v. Dr. Lohia.^0^
After the constitution came into force, the Section was
f\CY2
challenged m  Babulal Parate v. Maharashtra. In an atmo­
sphere of industrial unrest a Magistrate prohibited meetings 
and processions from certain areas of Bombay in order to stop 
inter-union feuding in the streets. It was argued before the 
Supreme Court that the fundamental rights of free speech and 
assembly were at the mercy of the Magistrate’s total discret­
ion, that he made the order without hearing the parties af­
fected. Secondly, it was argued that any application to get 
his order modified or rescinded was entertained by the same 
Magistrate and thus he became judge of his own decision.
In sum, it was saia, the law conferred unconstitutionally 
wide discretion on the executive. It was strongly urged
600. In defence of the Magistrate one should comment that headgear 
has always been associated in India with caste, religion, 
status, and eventually political association. The wearing 
of headgear can therefore be provocative. Cf. the affair 
of the Sikh turbots and the requirement that motor-cycle 
riders wear crash-helmets in England.
601. AIK, 1960, S.C. 633, See below, 3»?.
602. AIR, 1961, S.C.884; (1961) 3 S.C.R. 423.
that the judiciary must apply the ’clear and present danger’ 
test or something similar in such situations instead of per­
mitting anticipatory restrictions on fundamental rights. It 
was stated that the United States Supreme Court had applied 
the ’clear and present danger’ test in Schenck’s case.6Q2a
For an unanimous Supreme Court Mudholkar J. held that 
the Magistrate had not been given any wide or arbitrary powers 
as had been contended, because he was obliged by Section 144(1) 
to set out the facts and circumstances of each case in his 
order in writing. This was a safeguard judicially insisted 
upon for a number or years. It was held that this indi­
cated that he studied the facts before he made the order.
Though the Magistrate may have himself heard the application 
to get the order modified or rescinded he had a duty to act 
judicially which meant he had to hear the parties ana must 
give reasons for his eventual decision. As for the people 
affected by his order or orders, there was a further opportu­
nity under Section 435,read with Section 439 of the Code, to 
appeal to the High Court.
The Court rejected the contention based on the ’clear 
and present danger’ idea which the United states Supreme Court 
seems to have discussed in a few cases, but never made part 
of its constitutional doctrine.6^33. The scheme of Funda-
602a. (1919) 249 U.S.47.
603. The Editor, Tribune v. Emperor, AIR, 1942, Lahore, 171
(F.B.) refers to the following authorities on the point: 
Chandra Nath v. East Indian Railway, AIR, 1919, €al.584; 
Satyanarayana v. Emperor, a i r , 1931, Madras, 236 and R.E. 
Blong v. Emperor, a i r , 1924, Pat. 767.
603a. See Pierce v. United States, 25a. u . S . 23^ Osa.0).
mental Rights in the Indian Constitution, the Court held, 
afforded no place for such a doctrine. unlike in the 
United States document, the rights in India were qualified 
by ’reasonable restrictions* and Section 144 was one such 
reasonable restriction on the rights of free speech and 
assembly.
It should, however, be noted that free speech is not
subject in its entirety to Section 144, Criminal Procedure
Code. It is only large assemblies of people in certain
e,
areas ana speeches delivered to turbulent assemblies that 
are prohibited for a temporary period. it is quite pos­
sible to express one’s views in other ways such as writing 
to the newspapers. The calmer and more sober atmosphere of 
a discussion in the written medium has always been supported 
by Courts in India.604 Hence, even in the pre-constitutional 
period, British-Indian courts, as has been shown, discouraged 
any attempt at censoring the Press through orders passed under 
Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. It has seldom been 
invoked for such purposes after the Constitution came into 
force.
t
tilery important point about Section 144, Criminal Pro­
cedure Code is that orders made under it are temporary orders 
to meet emergencies. Where it was shown that under Section
Z AC
144(6), Criminal Procedure Code, the State Government could
604. In re Ardeshir Phirozshaw, AIK, 1940, Bom.42. Romesh 
Thapper v . Madras, AIR, 1950, b.C. 124, above,
o05• M144(6)s No order under this section shall remain in force 
for more than two months from the making thereof; unless, 
in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a 
likelihood of a riot or an affray, the State Government, 
by notification in the official gazette, otherwise directs.”
extend an order without specifying any time-limit for its 
eventual expiry that power was held to impose an unreasonable 
restriction on the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(a) and (b). 
Ihe Patna High court in Kami a Kant v. Bihar and the Supreme 
Court in Bihar v. K.K« Misra held that none of the safe­
guards that accompanied a Magistrate’s order applied when 
State Governments extended such order - (a) There was no right 
or opportunity for the parties affected to represent <. against 
the orderj (b) there was no appeal or revision from the order 
passed by the State Government and, (c) there was no upper 
limit fixed by the statute as to the period for which the 
order in question could be extended.
In the Supreme Court there was a lone dissent by Shah J. 
who found that the extension order passed by the State govern­
ment under Section 144(6) had its source in the initial order 
made by the Magistrate. Hence, the Magistrate himself could 
hear the parties objecting to the extension, and there could 
be a further appeal to the High Court. He viewed the Magi­
strate not as a subordinate functionary of the State Govern­
ment but independent of it* In his view, the Government as 
the head of the Executive could exercise no authority over 
the judicial functions of the Magistrate. This, according 
to the learned judge, proceeded from the division of powers 
under the Constitution. It is submitted that the Magistrate 
does combine both executive and judicial functions while act­
ing under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code* When he
606. AIK, 1962, Patna, 292.
607. AIK, 1971, S.C .1669.
makes the prohibitory order he acts as an executive officer 
but when he entertains applications to modify that order, he 
acts as a judicial officer. To many this sophisticated 
notion will seem somewhat unrealistic, however.
The dissent of Shah J. does not give sufficient con­
sideration to the finding of the majority that there was no 
statutory limitation on the period for which the order could 
be extended by the State Government.
Two more challenges to Section 144(1) will have to be 
noticed. In Kam Manohar v. state the petitioner argued 
before the Allahabad High Court that the restrictions imposed 
by the Section were in order to maintain ’public tranquillity1609 
while the nearest ground the Constitution referred to was 
’public order’ in Article 19(2) ana (3). It was said that 
’public tranquillity’ and ’public order’ were- not the same 
but referred to different objects. 'public order’ predi­
cated that certain serious offences or acts committed or 
about to be committed were against the very basis of order 
in the community while ’public tranquillity* covered less 
serious acts that temporarily threatened peace in a local 
area. This qualitative difference, it was argued, must be 
recognized before the question of constitutionality could be 
gone into. In support of his contention, the petitioner,
rightly, relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ram Manohar 
n
v. State, where the Supreme Court distinguished botween
o08. AIR, 1968, All 100.
609. 144(1). See above,
610. AIR, 1966, s>.C .740. The petitioner there and in the case 
under discussion were the same.
public order and public tranquillity and illustrated the 
difference by saying that two drunkards brawling in a public 
street violated public tranquillity, but the preaching of 
communal hatred affected public order* Therefore, the argu­
ment sought to urge the Court to construe the term ’public 
order’ narrowly as to exclude any power in the State to re­
strict acts likely to affect ’public tranquillity’•
The Allahabad High Court, in its turn, rightly relied
on another decision of the Supreme Court, The Superintendent v. 
*1
Dr, Lohia, where the Supreme Court clearly equated public 
order with public tranquillity though it is possible to argue 
that that dictum was obiter* The High Court dismissed the 
petition* The conflict between the two Supreme Court deci­
sions remained*
That was eventually solved by the Supreme Court in the 
recent case of Madhu Limaye v* Sub-Divisional Magistrate 
where most of the contentions just dealt with were reproduced 
in attacking Section 144. in addition, one other new argu­
ment was also put forward* It was said that deprivation 
or the freedom of speech even temporarily, as under Section 
144, should be resisted because this particular freedom en- 
j'oyed a ’preferred position’ amongst all others* The United 
States Supreme Court had accepted, it was said, such a pre­
ferred position for free speech guaranteed by the United States
hirst Amendment. The Indian Supreme Court rej'ecting the con-
o js
tention^that^was shown by Frankf urther* s dicta in Rovacs v.
611. AIK, 1960, S.C.633.
612* AIK, 1971, S.C.1762.
613Cooper the notion of preferred position was never fully 
accepted by the United State Supreme Court* Just as it had 
pointed out so often before, the Indian Supreme Court stated 
that the scheme of Article 19 was different from the United 
States Bill of Rights and there was no room for any such 
»preferred-position' doctrine*
As for the argument based on the distinction between
the two expressions 'public order' and 'public tranquillity'
the Supreme Court held that where the restriction imposed was
severe, like preventive detention (as in the second Ram Mano- 
614har v* State decided by the Supreme Court) the expression 
'public order' in Article 19(2) and (3) would be strictly 
read and distinguished from 'public tranquillity' • But where 
the restriction imposed was a relatively milder and tempor­
ary restriction like the one imposed unoer section 144,
Criminal Procedure Code, then 'public order' in Article 19(2) 
and (3) would be read to include 'public tranquillity' • Ihus, 
if a statute provided for preventive detention of individuals 
likely to disturb public order then that should be understood
615
as a reference to serious acts likely to affect ordre publique* 
In Section 144, criminal Procedure Code, the expression 'public 
order' should be understood to include acts less serious in 
their consequences and which would be likely to disturb public 
tranquillity generally*
613* (1949) 336 U.S.77*
614. AIR, 1906, S.C.740.
615. Hidayatalluh J. who wrote the majority j’udgment, used the 
expression but did not fully explain the meaning the term 
has in French law.
3ly
The Court found that the keynote of Section 144 was 
the urgency or the action taken * to prevent a rapidly develop­
ing danger to public order or peace, or nuisance to public 
health.1
The outcome of this ingenious, and not unrealistic, 
decision is that firstly, the grounds justifying reasonable 
restrictions under Article 19(2) to (6) can bear different 
shades of meaning depending on the context and circumstances 
of the case. This adds a new dimension to the law relating 
to ’reasonable restrictions1 under all the sub-clauses of 
article 19, fully bringing out the ’contextual* nature of 
the test or reasonable restrictions. Secondly, the Supreme 
Court has reiterated its view that executive discretion to 
impose anticipatory restraint on the liberty or free speech 
and assembly would be j’ustified by the need to meet sudden 
disturbances of public order (e.g., pre-election tension be­
tween rival political groups or inter-union rivalries in an 
atmosphere of industrial unrest). This has, in fact, been 
the view taken by all the High Courts.
The Bombay High Court in Bapurao v. State upheld 
Section 37(3) of the Bombay Police act. 1 9 S'! > which em­
powered the Commissioner of Police to prohibit processions 
and assemblies for a period of 15 days if, in his opinion, 
an emergency warranted it. The Commissioner in passing an 
order of prohibition had to mention reasons that made the
616. Section 144(1), see above, 2^9.
617. AIK, 1956, Bom. 300.
order necessary. It was argued for the petitioner that there 
was no opportunity for the citizens to show cause against the 
order being passed. According to this contention, the Com­
missioner should hear those citizens* representations before 
he made the order. It was held by the Court that it was a 
matter for the commissioner to decide whether an emergency 
had arisen to justify this prohibition. When a power was 
conferred to meet an emergency it was futile to argue that 
principles of Natural Justice should apply. The commissioner 
of Police could not be expected to issue such an order after 
what would amount to a public debate between him and the citi­
zens of Bombay*.
While permitting wide discretion to meet public disturb­
ances and other similar emergencies, Indian courts do expect 
the discretion to be exercised by responsible officials. The
C I O
Madras High Court in Re C.N. Annaduraj was willing to
accept that the Commissioner of Police could exercise a dis­
cretion similar to that in the Bombay Act, provided he stuck 
to the self-imposed convention of restricting the duration 
of the Prohibitory orders to 15 days - the Madras statute 
being silent on this point. The court found that the Com­
missioner in addition to being a Police official, had
the status of a remanding Magistrate and a Justice or the 
Peace. Under the circumstances, it held that the impugned 
section was valid. The restrictions imposed by the section
were held to be reasonable restrictions on the rights to free 
speech and assembly.
618. AIR, 1958, Madras, 80S, I.L.R. [1958] Madras 80S.
321.
The next restriction on the freedom under 19(1)(b) to 
be considered will be found under Section 7 of the Indian 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, which made it an offence 
to 1 loiter* at or near any place of work with a view to 
persuade any one in those places not to do or to do any act.
The Section ran as follows:
(i) Whoever -
a) with intent to cause any person to abstain 
from doing or to do any act which such per~- 
son has a right to do or to abstrfain from 
doing, obstructs or uses violence to or 
intimidates such person or any member of 
his family or person on his employ, or 
loiters at or near a place where such per­
son or member or employed person resides 
or works or carries on business or happens 
to be, or persistently follows him rrom 
place to place, or interferes with any 
property owned or used by him or deprives 
him of or hinders him in the use thereof, or
b)loiters or does any similar act at or near 
the place where a person carries on business, 
in such a way and with intent that any per­
son may thereby be deterred from entering 
or approaching or dealing at such place, 
shall be punished ; with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to six months, or 
with fine which may extend to five hundred 
rupees or both. explanation - encourage­
ment of indigenous industries or advocacy 
of temperance, without the commission of 
any of the acts prohibited by this section 
is not an orrence under this section.
The Act was passed to meet the situation of widespread 
ing when Gandhi organized the * civil disobedience* movement.
hi U
In Raj Narain v. State. the Act was challenged
as violating the guarantees of free speech and free assembly. 
The Allahabad High Court recognized that peaceful picketing
019. AIR, 1961 All 531.
was within the guarantees of free egression and assembly* 
But it held that picketing 1 en masse* has been forged into 
a weapon of disruption in India and it has been used in a 
menacing manner too f r e q u e n t l y U n d e r  those circum­
stances, it clearly amounted to * coercion exercised by a 
group upon another group*. The type of * loitering* pro­
hibited by the Act was one which was accompanied by an ele­
ment of menacd. While holding the statute constitutional 
the court observed:
No doubt the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
was passed to meet a certain situation 
which was precipifrted by our national 
struggle to achieve independence, but 
we have still to see the purpose for 
which this law was placed on the statute 
book. 620
The Madras and Bombay High Courts have also held the section
621intra vires the Constitution. In the Madras case, mem­
bers of a parochial party were convicted under Section 7 of 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 1932, for picketing a shop. 
They stood in front of the shop owned by a North Indian and 
dissuaded South Indian customers from patronising the shop. 
In the High Court it was argued for them that they picketed
olya."There is no civil right to organise mass disobedience in 
a free society, ... large scale organised mass disobedience, 
even if passive, is not the civil liberty of freedom of ex­
pression but a negation or it.'* P.B. Mukharji, Civil Liber­
ties , Bombay, 1968, 4-5. The author is a former Chief 
Justice of the Calcutta High Court.
620.AIR, 1961, All 531, 533, col.2, The reason behind the im­
pugned provisions, the Court hela, was prohibit conduct 
likely to interfere with the liberty of another citizen.
621.Re Vengan. AIR, 1952, Madras 95, l.L.R. [1952] Mad. 553. 
Oamoda r Ganesh v. State. AIR, 1951, Bom.549*
in twos at a time and were, therefore, not offensive to any 
one. Mack J. of the High Court helu that an exception coula 
not be made in favour of Such picketing by twos at a time 
especially when their picketing interfered with the liberty 
of another citizen to carry on his trade or business, a 
fundamental right under Article l9(l)(g). The petitioners* 
rights under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) could not be construed 
in such a manner as to deny other citizens their rights. It 
would not be possible for the court to interpret * liberally* 
the petitioners* rights under the constitution if what they 
were trying to propagate were unconstitutional goals such as 
discrimination against North Indians. a  citizen in exercis­
ing his liberties could not be permitted to bring about con-
622ditions that go against the ideals of the Constitution.
Rights of Government Servants to Demonstrate
Of the several restrictions that apply to government 
servants, Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Servant Conduct 
Rules, 1956, was questioned in Karneshwar Prasad v. Bihar,622a 
as in violation of the rights under l9(l)(a) and (b).
622. See Linghanna v. State of Mysore. AIR, 1954, Mys.12, I.L.R. 
[1953] Mys.388 where it was held that the petitioner’s in­
sistence that a meeting be conducted m  a particular langu­
age was not supported by his right to free speech. In a 
country of many languages such as India, this is a right 
decision. It may also be noted that the Constitution recog 
nises 15 languages without implying that the use or any 
others would be unlawful.
622a.AIR, 1962, S.C. 11660
No Government servant shall participate 
in any demonstration or resort to any 
form of strike in connection with any 
matter pertaining to his conditions of 
service.
The State contended that the object of the Rule impugned was 
to maintain discipline amongst Government employees. Any 
breach of discipline amongst them would eventually shake pub­
lic confidence in the administration and might well lead to 
public disorder.
The Indian Supreme Court found that the right to stage 
peaceful demonstrations came within Article 19(1)(a) - demon­
stration being a form of expression of the feelings of an in­
dividual or a group of people. Demonstrations, the Court 
said, took various forms, from merely wearing a badge to 
violent forms such as stone-throwing. It would be un­
reasonable to prohibit all forms of it: there were the
harmful and disorderly as well as the innocuous and peace­
ful. The Court held that prohibiting all forms of demon­
strations could not be entirely justified on the ground of 
discipline amongst the employees. If the impugned rule 
had formed part of a body of rules laying down the proced­
ure for resolution of the grievances of the employees it 
was possible that the rule might have been considered 
reasonable. The Court could not find sufficient relation 
between the rule and the maintenance of discipline.
An initial argument raised by the State was that 
Government employees should be considered as a^pecial class 
of people to whom not all the fiindamental rights were avail­
able. When a citizen voluntarily enters government service, 
he should not complain later about any reasonable restrictions
necessarily implied in his contract of service with the Govern­
ment. The Court refused to create any such exception to the 
operation of guaranteed fundamental rights. It referred to 
Article 33 as the sole provision which created an exception 
in regard to the defence forces of the country to whom funda­
mental rights were not available. There was no question of 
creating any more exceptions.
It was recognized, however, that there could be certain 
special restrictions applied to a government servant because 
of his official position and responsibilities. An example of 
such a restriction was Section 54(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
1922, which provided that a public servant shall not disclose 
particulars of any document he may come across in course of 
his duty. So also Section 128(1) of theRepresentation of 
the People Act, 1951,enjoins upon every officer concerned 
with recording and counting votes to maintain the secrecy 
in regard to voting.
In Ghosh v. Jos eph the Supreme Court held as un­
constitutional another of the service rules which prohibited 
a government servant joining an 'unrecognized* service asso­
ciation.
Rule 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 
1955, laid down that no Government servant should join or 
continue as a member of any 'Service Association' for govern­
ment servants if that association had not obtained 'recogni­
tion* from the government within six months of its formation 
or such ' recognition' though originally granted was subse-
623. AIR, 1963, S.C.812
quently withdrawn by the Government.
The respondent was sought to be penalised for having 
contravened Rule 4B The State raised the contention that 
the rule was intended to secure discipline amongst public ser­
vants. The Court held there was no direct connection between 
the rule providing for granting or withdrawal of recognition 
and discipline amongst the employees. The rule imposed un­
reasonable restrictions on the right of the employees under 
Article 19(l)(c).
These progressive decisions of the Supreme Court have 
624
been criticised by Seervai, who argues that the decisions 
have the effect of undermining the impartiality of the civil 
service which has to give its best service whatever the poli­
tical complexion of the party government in power. While 
this criticism is correct, the rules impugned in the two 
cases so far discussed conferred wide controlling powers on 
the Executive government without adequately defining their 
objectives. Their rationale belonged to an earlier epoch, 
in which the structural function of statutory rules need not 
be disclosed to those subject to them. It is clear from the 
two cases that there existed a need for proper procedures for 
ventilating grievances. In the absence of such procedures, 
the impugned rules when considered in isolation do appear un­
reasonable. Secondly, both these major decisions of the 
Supreme Court were decided mainly in relation to the right 
of the employee to protect himself in his job and to improve 
his conditions of service. The Supreme Court 'ftas not sug­
gested that the government servant had a right to take part
624. See Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Bombay, 1967, 
345-6.
in a political agitation while holding his Job as a government 
employee. High Courts have held that a restriction, requir­
ing him to refrain from taking a public stand in political
matters would be valid. Thus the Madras High Court in P.N.
62 *5
Rangaswamy v. Coimbatore Municipality upheld a regulation 
under which the petitioner was dismissed for taking an active 
part in the Communist Party.
It is clear that the right to assemble has created some 
difficulty to Indian Courts because they have been fully aware 
on the one hand, of the Job that law enforcement authorities 
faced and on the other, the importance of the right to assemble 
which is after all inseparable from the freedom of speech and 
political liberty in its broadest sense.
The Supreme Court has recently applied its scale of 
reasonableness in favour of the right and against the law im-
£\9f\
pugned in Himat Lai v. Police Commissioner. In the case,
Section 33(1)(o) of the ;iBombay Police Act, 1951, and Rule 7 
of the Rules framed under the Section were impugned.
33(1) The Commissioner and the District Magi­
strate, in areas under their respective 
charges or any part thereof, may make, al­
ter or rescind rules or orders not incon­
sistent with this Act for ...
(o) regulating the conduct of and behaviour 
or action of persons constituting assemblies 
and processions on or along the streets and 
prescribing in the case of processions, the 
routes by which, the order in which and the 
times at which the same may pass; ...
625. AIR, 1968, Madras, 387. See also Balakotaiah v. Union, AIR, 
1958, S.C.232, below, 34-2.
626. AIR, 1973, S.C.87.
(7) No public meeting with or without loud­
speaker, shall be held on the public street 
within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner- 
ate of the Police, Ahmedabad City unless 
the necessary permission in writing has been 
obtained from the officer authorised by the 
Commissioner of Police*
The following arguments were raised by the petitioner:
a) The Section and the rule imposed unreasonable restrictions 
on the rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). 
There ought to be no need to obtain prior permission to 
exercise one's fundamental rights*
b) The restrictions imposed were not "narrowly drawn" so as 
to confine them strictly to meeting the supposed mischief 
arising out of any possible misuse of the rights* Legis­
lation dealing with basic freedoms ought to be precise*
The impugned provisions were vague and too general*
c) The Commissioner had no statutory guidance in exercising 
the discretion conferred on him* Therefore, the impugned 
provisions offended Article 14 insofar as the possibility 
existed that the discretion could be unequally administered*
The State argued that the question was not merely one of
right of assembly but assembly on a highway or a public thorough-
627fare* In English Common Law, it was argued, there was no
627. Relying on Halsbury* 3rd Edn., Vol.19, 73, para.107,
the right of the public is a right to pass along a high­
way for the purpose of legitimate travel, not to be on 
it except insofar as their presence is attributed to a 
reasonable and proper use of the highway as such*
and Blackwell, Law of Meetings, 9th Edn*, 5:
There appears to exist a view that the public has a 
right to hold meetings for political and other purposes 
on the Highway* This is an erroneous assumption* A 
public highway exists for the purpose of free passage 
and free passage only, and for purposes reasonably in­
cidental to this right. There can be no claim on the
/Sont'd. on next pages
right to use public places for holding meetings* The Indian 
Law on the point, the State urged, was not different* It was 
denied that Article 14 was violated* The policy of the Act, 
it was said, could be gathered without difficulty and the 
Commissioner had sufficient guidance while exercising his dis­
cretion*
The majority in the Court held that the need for ob­
taining prior permission represented reasonable regulation 
of the right to assemble and to hold processions or meetings* 
It was held that there had come to be established in India a 
presumption that the citizens had a right to take out process- 
ions especially those connected with religious worship*
Note 627 - continued from 328:
part of the persons who desire to assemble for the purpose 
of holding a meeting to do so on the highway. The claim 
is irreconcilable with the purpose for which a highway exists
628. Relying on Parthasaradi v. Chinnakrishna, t.l.R*(1882) 5, 
Madras 304* Sundaram Chetti v* The Queen, I*L*R.(1883) 6, 
Madras 203 (F *B .) and V 1 jlaraghavachar jar v. Emperor, I.L.R. 
(1903) 26 Madras 554 per Benson J, 5871
The practice of using the public highways for religious 
processions has existed in India for thousands of years* 
History, literature and tradition all tell us that reli­
gious processions to the village shrines formed a feature 
of the national life from the very earliest times* That 
alone is sufficient to raise a presumption that it is law­
ful and to throw on those who allege it to be unlawful the 
onus of showing that it is forbidden by law, but this it 
admittedly is not* The law recognizes the use of the 
highway by processions as lawful, and gives the Magistrate 
and superior officers of police power to direct the con­
duct of assemblies and processions through the public 
streets and to regulate the use of music •••
Manzur Hass an v* Muhammad Zaman, AIR, 1925, P.C* 36, which 
was followed by the Supreme Court in Piru Bux v, Kalandi Pati 
AIR, 1970, S.C.1885.
A procession, the Supreme Court held was no more than a 'meet­
ing* in motion* The Police Acts in India dealt with assem-
629blies and processions on the same footing*
The majority repudiated any idea that the only right 
anyone had in regard to a public thoroughfare was confined to 
'passing and re-passing’* They pointed out as examples a 
citizen's right to carry on the business of plying buses on 
the highways for profit - such a right affirmed in Saghir 
Ahmad v* U*P. But the right to all these additional
uses was subject to regulation by the authorities* One 
cannot, for instance, insist on holding a meeting at any 
place one chose to hold it* The regulation, however,
has to be 'reasonable'* The impugned Rule 7, the majority
found was excessively wide and enabled the Commissioner to
refuse permission to hold any meeting at any public place 
whatsoever*
The two concurring judges agreed that Rule 7 was un­
constitutional but had difficulty in accepting the position 
arrived at by the majority that the right to hold meetings 
in public places had come to be established in India through 
long-standing practice* Ciey, however, agreed that the
discretion to regulate meetings as conferred by Rule 7 was
629* AIR, 1973, S.C.87, 94, para.29.
630* AIR, 1954, S.C.738, (1955) 1 S.C.R.707*
631* Railway Board v* Niranjan Singh, AIR, 1960, S.C.966, where 
it was held that there was no fundamental right to hold 
meetings on premises which were Railway property*
632* Para*74, Beg J*
unconstitutionally wide.
Ihe decision is an affirmation of the right to assembly 
through Article 19(1)(b) was not the main ground for holding 
the rule impugned in the case unconstitutional*
Reasonable Restrictions on the Freedom of Association 
Article 19(l)(c) and 19(4)
From the point of view of political freedom in its 
widest sense, perhaps, this freedom as essential as the right 
to speech or assembly*
The right to form associations or unions 
has such wide and varied scope for * its 
exercise, and its curtailment is fraught 
with such potential reactions in the reli­
gious, political and economic fields that 
the vesting of authority in the executive 
government to impose restrictions on such 
right, without allowing the grounds of 
such imposition, both in their factual and 
legal aspects, to be duly tested in a judi­
cial inquiry, is a strong element which, in 
our opinion, must be taken into account in 
judging the reasonableness of the restrict­
ions * * * 633
- so held Patanj'ali Sastri C.J. while declaring Sections 15
634and 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act* 1908, unconst i-
633* Madras v* V.G. Row, AIR, 1952, S.C. 196, 200. Discussed 
above, Chapter 1,
634« Section 15« (1) ••• ••• ••* •*•
(2) 'unlawful association' means an associ­
ation -
(a) which enoourages or aids persons to commit 
acts of violence or intimidation or of which the members 
habitually commit such acts, or
(b) which has been declared to be unlawful 
by the StateGovernment under the powers hereby conferred*
Section 16* If the State Government is of opinion that any 
association interferes or has for its object interference 
with the administration of the law or with the maintenance
/Cont'd. on next pages
tutional as * violating Article 19(1)(c) . An association 
called,* The People's Education Society' (of which the respond­
ent was the secretary) was declared by an executive fiat to be 
an unlawful association* No copy of the order was supplied 
to any of the officers of the society but it was published in 
the official gazette as required by the Act* However,nowhere 
were any reasons provided for declaring the society unlawful.
But the State contended at the hearing that the society was a 
front for the Communist Party declared unlawful in August 1949* 
It was also contended that there was an Advisory Board to help 
the Government with its decision*
The Madras High Court and the Supreme Court in turn 
struck down the Government's order* It was held by the Supreme 
Court that there was no question of subjecting any of the free­
doms guaranteed by Article 19 to executive or administrative 
discretion of the type the Court was considering* In any 
case, full reasons were to be produced so as to enable judi- 
cial review of the order made^/ . The machinery of an Advis­
ory Board could never be a substitute for judicial review*
That arrangement would have to be confined to preventive de­
tention and could not be extended to other provisions of the 
Fundamental Rights part* The Court distinguished the deci- 
sion in Dr* N*B* Khare* by saying that externment of the
Note 634 - Continued from 331:
of law and order, or that it constitutes a danger to the 
public peace, the StateGovernment may by notification in 
the official Gazette, declare such association to be un­
lawful*
635. AIR, 1952, S.C.196, 200.
636. AIR, 1950, S.C.211, (1950) S.C.R.519.
petitioner there was , like preventive detention, a precaution­
ary measure* The basis there was suspicion, but in the case 
before them it was factual and capable of assessment by the 
Court* It was held that it would be necessary for the State 
to establish that the association * encouraged' or ' aided' per­
sons to commit acts of violence within Section 15(2)(a)*
Finally, the Supreme Court disapproved of the mode of 
bringing the order made to the notice of associations in 
question* Publication in the official gazette was held to 
be inadequate and that some other more prominent mode of pub­
lication, such as sticking up a copy of the order at thej>re- 
mises of the society concerned was held to be essential to 
satisfy procedural reasonableness*
This decision in Madras v. V.G. Row is considered in 
India as a strong decision laying down firmly not merely the 
ambit of the right to association but also the Supreme Court's 
approach to all the Fundamental Rights* Recently, the Supreme 
Court followed Madras v* V .G * Row in Damayanti Narang v* Union 
of India* 07In the case, a registered society which
ceased to function as a result of disagreements between its 
members was reconstituted by a union statute* It provided 
for the dissolution of the society and the formation of a 
new one in its place* All the members of the old society 
were to be admitted to the new society but there were to be 
other new members, some of whom were to be 'sponsored* by 
the Government*
637* AIR, 1971, S.C.966.
334*
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional as 
infringing Article 19(l)(c). It was held that while the 
old members had not been deprived of membership, they were 
given no choice in the admission of the new members, some 
of whom were sponsored by the Government* The Government 
had also reserved a discretion for itself to decide on the 
total number of members of the society* This it could not 
lawfully do*
The Court held that the right under Article 19(1)(c) 
was not merely to form an association but was also for a con­
tinued voluntary association between those who formed it* 
Their choice in the matter could not be interfered with.
But this would not mean that ideal conditions are to 
be provided by the State for the 1 effective functioning' of 
o-rv association. In All Indian Bank Employees Association v* 
National Industrial Tribunal, the appellants impugned Sec­
tion 34-A of the Banking Companies Act* 1949, as infringing 
their right to 'function effectively' as a union* The sec­
tion enabled banking companies to keep certain sums of money 
in reserve to provide for bad and doubtful debts* This re­
serve fund need not appear in the balance sheets produced by 
the companies* The appellants were negotiating for higher 
wages, the National Industrial Tribunal acting as the arbi­
trator between them, and their employers, the banking com­
panies* The Union wanted their employers to disclose all 
their assets, including the reserve fund, to the Industrial
638. AIR, 1962, S.C. 171.
Tribunal so that the eventual wage determination would be 
favourable to the employees*
Their contention was that Section 34-A prevented the 
achievement of the object of their association, viz*, get­
ting higher wages for their members* The right to form an 
association, it was argued, would also include the concomi­
tant right of the association 'functioning effectively* with­
out statutory interference. Unions existed, the Court was 
told, to get higher wages*
The Supreme Court held that there could be no such 
additional rights concomitant to the right under Article 
19(1)(c). An opposite construction would "by a series of 
ever-expanding concentric circles in the diape of rights con­
comitant to concomitant rights and so on lead to an almost
639grotesque result*" ' A congregation of citizens, it was 
held, could not claim privileges that as individual citizens 
the members of the congregation could not claim*
As the stream can rise no higher than the 
source, associations of citizens cannot 
lay claim to rights not open to citizens ***
Thus the right of the association to express its views would 
be governed by Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2), its right to hold 
property by Article 19(1)(f) and 19(5) and so forth. There­
fore, it could not be contended that the only restrictions 
that could be imposed on the activities of the association 
were those under Article 19(4),
639* Xbid*, 180, col*2*
640. Ibid* , 180, col.l.
It was held that the arrangement by which the Reserve 
Bank of India issues a certificate as to the secret reserves 
was a compromise in meeting the need to maintain the credit 
structure of the economy on the one hand, and the interests 
of the employees in securing a good wage on the other hand.
Whether or not a right to form and belong to an as so* 
ciation of one's choice would include the right not to belong
641to any association was raised in Xika Ramji v. Uttar Pradesh.
The U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act,
1953, aimed at protecting the interests of cane-g rowers by 
fixing minimum prices'.for sugar-cane purchased by sugar mills 
in the State. Ihe Act divided thecane-growing areas into 
zones and each zone was earmarked for a particular mill. All 
this meant that the mills had to pay the minimum price fixed 
or else they got no cane. Ihe Act favoured growers' Co-opera­
tive Societies and where 75% of the total number of growers in 
any area belonged to the local Co-operative Society, the Act 
ignored the individual grower altogether. The petitioner, 
one such individual, complained that the Act compelled him 
to join' the Co-operative Society and that was in violation 
of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c). His con­
tention was that there was a negative right not to belong to 
an association. Ihe Supreme Court refused to recognize
641. AIR, 1956, S.C.676.
642. (Vide Article 20(2), U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, 10th 
Dec. 1948, "No one may be compelled to belong to an associ- 
ation".) The petitioner relied on the decision of the Mad­
ras High Court, in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corpora­
tion v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR, 1953, Madras, 98, where it 
was held that abusiness corporation could not be compelled 
to carry Ion a business. "A person can no more be compelled 
to carry on a business than a person can be compelled to
/fcont'd. on next pages
any such general preposition that the negative right was to 
be regarded as included in the fundamental rights. It was 
held that in any case there was no compulsion on the peti­
tioner to join the Co-operative Society. He could sell his 
sugar-cane to a buyer other than a sugar-mill.
Commenting on this case, H.M. Seervai thinks that the
negative right not to belong to an association is certainly
643part of the guarantee in Article 19(1)(c). But he agrees
with the outcome of the decision and thinks there was no com­
pulsion on the petitioner. With respect, it seems to this 
writer that there was sufficient pressure on the petitioner 
to amount to compulsion to join the Co-operative society.
It was obvious that for bulk producers of sugar-cane like 
he was, sugar-mills were probably the only bulk-buyers. 
Therefore, to tell him, as the court did, that he could have 
sold his tons of sugar-cane to some buyer other than the mill 
seems unrealistic. However, the real reason for the Supreme 
Court holding the law constitutional may well be the total 
dependency, at that time, of sugar growers all over India 
on the mills. The latter quite often dictated the price 
and the growers were paid very low prices.
Note 642 - Continued from 336:
to acquire or hold property." Also see Suryapal v. U .P., 
AIR, 1951, All 674, 698, where reliance was placed on the 
Declaration of Human Rights conferring the right to belong 
to or not belong to an association as distinct rights.
The Allahabad High Court held that Article 19(1) (c) con­
tained hoth rights (seemingly<wrongly).
643. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Bombay, 1967, 
340.
Ihe Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sitaramachary v.
644Senior Dy. Inspector of Schools held that the negative 
right of not belonging to an association would be part of 
the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c). The circum­
stances of the case appear to justify the Court's decision. 
Ihe following order was issued by the Education Department 
of the State Government:
All teachers (men and women teachers) in 
recognized elementary schools, ... in the 
area shall be members of the Association.
None other than these shall be admitted 
as members.
The Association referred to was sponsored by the Education 
Department and recognized by the Government as the official 
teachers' union. A teacher who did not attend the meetings 
of the association was subject to disciplinary action. The 
State argued that the compulsion was justified because it was 
necessary in order to ensure the 'efficiency' of the teachers.
The order impugned was held to be unconstitutional as
infringing the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article
64519(1)(c). The English case of R. v. Dr. Askew was re­
ferred to in support of the Court's decision. Ihe effect of 
Tika Ramji (above, 336) in these contexts cannot be said to
644. AIR, 1958, A.P.78. Apparently Tika Ramji (above, 336) was 
not brought to the Court's attention.
645. (1768) 4 Burr. 2186, 2200:
If the inhabitants of a town are incorporated,yet 
every one must be admitted before he becomes a cor­
porator. Ihe Crown can't oblige a man to be a cor­
porator, without his consent: he shall not be sub­
jected to the inconveniences of it, without accepting 
it and assenting to it.
be self-evident. It is clear that there is a need to pro­
tect the individual from any pressure to belong to an associ­
ation which he does not support. Ihe guarantee in Article 
19(1)(c) cannot mean that the individual could be pressurised 
into doing an act against his will. In view of this, Tika 
Ramji should be construed as having left the matter open.
The case did not make a definitive pronouncement on the point. 
The Supreme Court's contribution on this subject remains un­
certain.
The right guaranteed by ArtieleH(1) (c) enables work­
ers and employees to form unions. But it is open to a 
statute to prescribe conditions subject to which the mployer 
may ' recognize' a Union as the official negotiating body on 
behalf of the majority of workers employed in the industry. 
Thus, Section 27 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tri­
bunal) Act, 1950, laid down that a Worker's Union could not 
be recognized by an employer unless it represented more than 
15% of the workers in a given industry. This was held to be 
a reasonable restriction by the Indian Supreme Court
Yet the guarantee under Article 19(1)(c) will not help 
an Union in its grievances that a rival Union is taking mem­
bers ’away from it. There is no question of an existing 
Union's interests being shielded by the constitutional guaran­
tee when it is threatened by the emergence of a rival Union.
646. Raja Kulkarni v. Bombay, AIR, 1954, S.C.73.
647In K.R.W. Union v. Registrar, the appellant Union objected 
to the Registrar of Unions registering a rival Union without 
giving the appellants notice and a personal hearing. It was 
said principles of Natural Justice were not observed.
Durga Das Basu J. held that the constitutional guaran­
tee of forming associations belonged to all workmen. No 
Union could claim a monopoly# right to exclude others from 
competing with it for membership of the same workmen. A 
point to be noted is that it was held that the workmen had 
a right not to join a particular Union or any Union at all. 
This again fortifies the conclusion that the right 'to form 
an association cannot mean everyone can be coerced into be­
coming members.
Moreover, it loo^ks as though the Indian Supreme
648Court's dictum in Tika Ramji is rightly not construed by
the High Courts as denying the right not to belong to any 
association.
Where a Union satisfied the statutory conditions and 
recognition is extended to it, that cannot be withdrawn with­
out proper opportunity afforded the Union to explain its case* 
There the principles of Natural Justice would apply. The
act of recognition and the withdrawal of it would be scruti-
649nised by the courts.
647. AIR, 1967, Cal.507.
648. AIR, 1956, S.C.676.
649. B.R. Employees v. General Manager, AIR, 1965, Cal.389.
The conditions for recognition must relate to well- 
understood and predictable objectives such as adequate repre­
sentation , proper functioning of the association, e.g. avert­
ing 1wild-cat1 strikes by members of the association.
In Ghosh v. Joseph the Supreme Court held that the 
need to maintain discipline amongst government employees 
or to ensure efficiency amongst them would be legitimate aims 
and therefore, might form the basis for giving or withdrawing 
recognition. In the case before them, however, the impugned 
provision was held not to be related to these aims. Rule 
4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. 1955, 
penalised any employee who continued his membership of an 
association of employees after the Government had withdrawn 
recognition fizom it.
Prior restraints are not as a general rule regarded
as reasonable restrictions on the right under Article 19(1 )(c).
651In S. Ramakrishnaiah v. The President, Dt. Board. the pe­
titioner, a school teacher, was informed by the respondent 
that he could not become a member of any Union unless he
650. AIR, 1963, S.C.812. Also see A.C. Mukheriee v. Union (1972) 
II, Labour Law Journal, 297, where the Calcutta High Court 
held that non-recognition of, or withdrawl of recognition 
from, a labour union did not violate Article 19(1)(c) when 
such recognition was granted instead to a rival union that 
represented a majority of the workers.
650a.See above, 323 5 for a collection of cases and comments
on the subject, see A.P. Aggarwal, 'Freedom of Association 
in Public Employment1 (1972) 14 J.I.L.I.t 1-20.
651. I.L.R.[1953] Madras 57.
obtained the prior permission of his employers* This order 
was sought to be justified on the ground that it was to pre­
vent school teachers from getting involved in political move­
ments* The Madras High Court held the order unconstitutional:
It is well-established that the exercise of 
any of the fundamental rights like the right 
of free speech, right of freedom of religion, 
or the right of freedom of association cannot 
be made subject to the discretionary control 
of an administrative or executive authority, 
which can grant or withhold the permission to 
exercise such right, at its discretion* 652
It is not incompatible with the freedom of association
653to declare strikes illegal or penalise resort tPo strikes*
654IN P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India the appellants were 
dismissed because, according to them, they were Communists 
and trade unionists likely to organise strikes* This, it was 
contended violated their right under Article 19(1)(c)* The
652. Ibid*9 63* The Court distinguished United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell* (1947) 330 U.S. 75; 91 Law Bd*~>54 and New York 
Ex Rel* Bryant v* Zimmerman * (1928) 278 U.S.63; 73 Law Ed. 
184* It approved of other Uunited States decisions in 
Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444; 82 Law Ed. 949, and 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organisation* (1939) 307 
U.S.496; 83 Law Ed. 1423, both of which dealt with prior 
restrictions on the freedom of the Press and assembly which 
were held unconstitutional*
653. In All India Bank Employees Association v. National Indust­
rial Tribunal* AIR* 1962* S.C. 171* see above, 334, a provi­
sion of the Industrial Disputes Act* 1947, suspending 
strikes during the period of compulsory arbitration was 
held constitutional and reasonable* Also see Radhey Shyam 
v. Postmaster-General* AIR, 1965, S.C. 311, which confirmed 
that there was no fundamental right to strike under Article 
19(1)(c).
654. AIR, 1958, S.C.232, (1968) S.C.J.451.
Supreme Court held that if it was a question of unfair disis- 
sal, they should have pleaded Article 311 of the Constitution* 
The Court held that they had the fundamental right to be Commun­
ists but had no such fundamental right to Government employment!
While resort to strikes can be controlled in the interest
of a negotiated settlement, the Government could not penalise a
655mere resolution advocating a strike* Every association has
the right to pass any resolution it wishes or consider every 
type of resolution*
Though they thus affirmed the independence of associa­
tions wherever economic matters are involved, Indian Courts, 
like Courts in other countries, have exercised restraint in in­
terfering with the Government discretion* In Madhubai Ama- 
656thlal v* India* the Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act* 
1956, empowered the Government to regulate stock dealings*
By virtue of its powers, the Government recognized one of two 
stock-exchanges as the one entitled to carry on transactions 
in stocks and shares* The members of the other exchange were 
permitted to become members of the new stock-exchange* The 
constitutionality of the measure was not challenged in the case 
but it was assumed to be valid* What was challenged was a pro­
vision in the Government's order that those members of the other 
association who wished to be admitted to the new stock-exchange 
should have been members for at least one year previous to the 
making of the order* This was held by the Court to be a rele­
vant condition subject to which recognition was extended to the 
new body and the condition wa9 intended to keep out inactive
655. Benchey Lai v. U.P.* AIR, 1959, All 614*
656. AIR, 1961, S.C .21.
344.
members who would only act as dead weights if admitted.
£% *?7
Likewise in Raghubar Dayal v. Union. it was held 
that speculative and future contracts in an essential comma - 
dity could be reasonably cpnfined to one body or association 
recognized by the Government for the purpose of ensuring cer­
tain economic results.
This deference shown by the Courts to legislative and
executive freedom of action in economic matters could be seen
638applied to most regulations of business and trade.
We have seen that Sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act. 1908, were declared unconstitutional in
659State of Madras v. V.G. Row. Similar powers of dec lairing
an association unlawful were bestowed on the Executive by Sec­
tion 3(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 1967 
(37 of 1967). But unlike the Act of 1908 this is a more 
closely drawn statute giving the Executive the power to so 
declaare an association unlawful only where the association 
attempts to bring about the cession or secession of a part 
of Indian territory. It was the intention of Parliament 
in 1967 to stop political campaigns for securing separate 
home-lands. Thus Section 2(f) says:
(f) 'unlawful activity1, in relation to an 
individual or association, means any ac­
tion taken by such individual or associ­
ation (whether by committing an act or by 
words, either spoken or written, or by 
signs or by visible representation or
657. AIR, 1962, S.C .262.
658. See below, SectCon 3  (cc), 3 5 j  .
659. AIR, 1952, S.C.196.
otherwise),
(i) which is intended, or supports any 
claim, to bring about, on any ground 
whatsoever, the cession of a part of 
the territory of India or the seces­
sion of a part of the territory of India 
from the Union, or which incites any indi­
vidual or group of individuals to bring 
about such cession or secession;
(ii)which disclaims, questions, disrupts or 
is intended to disrupt the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of India;
Also, unlike the Act of 1908, this Act provides that every 
order or notification made under the Act shall specify the 
grounds upon which the order was issued. There is also a 
more realistic and effective manner of serving the order on 
the association in question. The orders under the Act would 
have a life of two years. The Act can be supported, if 
challenged, on the ground of 'sovereignty and integrity of 
India' introduced in 1963 660 into Articles 19(2), 19(3) 
and 19(4) governing the freedoms of speech, assembly and
f\f\ 1
association respectively. It is very likely that the
Act would be held to impose only reasonable restrictions in 
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India.
In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the freedom 
of association and its adjudication by the Courts has, so far, 
not givet\rise to any serious controversies or debates. This 
may well be because there has been no attempt by the State in 
Indian to interfere with any of the existing political or 
religious associations, notwithstanding demands that sectarian
660. See above.
661. Introduced by the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 
1963, (w.e.f. 5.10.63.)•
parties like the Muslim League or Hindu Mahasbha be banned.
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 1967, has not been 
used to ban any of the regional parties.
Reasonable Restrictions on the Freedom of Movement - 19(1)(d) 
and 19(5).
Probably the least developed among the personal free­
doms of the individual in India is the right to movement.
This is primarily because preventive detention is 'recognized*
by the Constitution. It may be recalled, that Article 19(1)(d)
662was invoked in A.K. G opal an by the petitioner who was pre­
ventively detained. The Supreme Court held then that in cases 
of preventive detention or of punitive detention in general, 
the right conferred by Article 19(1)(d) did not come into oper­
ation. In order to arrive at this conclusion the majority 
in the court had to distinguish Article 19(1)(d) frcm "personal 
liberty" in Article 21. In other words, the majority wished 
to say that freedom of movement in Article 19(1)(d) and 'per­
sonal liberty' in Article21 were not identical concepts.
While the foxmer was restricted to movement within the terri­
tory of India, the latter was meant to guarantee freedom from 
physical restraints. Article 19(1)(d), in the view of the 
majority >in the Supreme Court, emphasised 'the factual unity 
of India' • It was included as a fundamental right to fore­
stall any possible parochial barriers.
But the lone dissenter, Fazl Ali J., pointed out, with 
some justification it seems, that Article 19(1)(d) and Article 
21 overlapped and both meant 'Liberty' in its general sense
662.See above, 3 ? <3 5 9 <363.
of freedom from restraints. In his view, this overlapping 
need not be explained or rationalised by cutting down the 
scope of Article 19(l)(d). There was no need to differen­
tiate between the two provisions at all.
One must, however, note that Article 19 is an unique 
provision amongst all the Fundamental Rights, with its own 
scheme of 'reasonable restrictions' while Article 21 is a 
general - perhaps, a too general - provision and is probably 
the weakest right in Part III of the Indian Constitution.
One of the majority Judges, Mukherjea J. realised this and 
held that Article 19 provided for a proper balancing of free­
doms and the necessary social control, whereas Article 21, 
along with Articles 20 (guarantee against ex post facto 
criminal laws) and 22 (safeguards to be observed by the State 
in cases of preventive detention) contemplated penal statutes 
exclusively.
Yet another view is possible on this matter. As 
against the majority view that Article 19(1)(d) was in sub­
stance a right to travel up and down India, it may be pointed 
out that Article 19(1)(e) fully provided for free access to 
citizens to any part of India. This right assumes the right 
of movement because it says citizens can 'reside and settle 
in any part of the territory of India'. This, more than 
Article 19(1)(d), would enable one to say that 'the factual 
unity of India* was being emphasised. No doubt, Article 
19(1)(d) also uses the expression 'throughout the territory 
of India' . Quite obviously, the Indian Government could 
not have extra-territorial powers to guarantee free movement
outside the territory of India. Thus there is an internal 
and external aspect to free movement and internal free move­
ment was sought to be guaranteed in 19(1)(d). It would 
have been wholly compatible with this meaning to read into 
Article 19(1)(d) liberty of movement to its wider sense as 
the minority judge, Fazl. Ali J. did. The actual decision 
in A.K. Gopalan denied this. It was unfortunate because the 
outcome of the decision meant that of the two provisions which 
had to do with liberty of movement only the weaker provision 
(Article 21) that yielded little judicial review could be in­
voked if physical liberty ('personal liberty') is violated 
either by confinement in a cell or through any other means.
It will be plain to see why Article 21 is the weaker provi­
sion:
21. Protection of li^e and personal liberty - 
No personal shall be deprived of his Ixife 
or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.
This was construed in A.K. Gopalan to mean that as long as 
there was a relevant law, which meant lex and not jus, Article 
21 would be satisfied. Where a law enacted by the Legisla­
ture could be shown in support of the executive action no 
further judicial review would be possible under Article 21.
In the light of the 'poor start* by Article 19(1)(d) 
it is not surprising that the number of cases covered by it 
are limited and are of one kind - cases of externment of 
individuals from specified areas of the country.
The first of these cases is Or. N.B. Khare v. Delhi
6 6 3 . A lso  see above, I <2 9*
already once dealt with. It may be recalled that the East 
Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, under which the petitioner 
was externed out of Delhi was upheld by a majority of three 
to two in the Supreme Court. The Act impugned, empowered a 
District Magistrate to pass orders of externment on his sub­
jective satisfaction. A plain reading of the relevant pro­
visions of the Act showed that there was no compulsion on the 
authority to supply the reasons or grounds of the order to 
the externee. There was no time-limit fixed by the Act for 
the operation of the orders made under it. However, the Act 
was itself a temporary one and was to expire within a year's 
time. The majority emphasised the temporary nature of the 
statute, construed the provision that grounds 'may' be sup­
plied as grounds 'must' be supplied and upheld the Act and 
the order impugned as constitutional. It has already been 
shown how the test of reasonableness applied by the majority 
was narrower than that accepted by the Supreme Court in 
V.G. Row.664
The absence of provisions to ensure that power under 
the Act would be exercised only to secure the objects of the 
Act was held by the majority to be of no consequence in de­
termining its reasonableness.
The two minority Judges pointed out that the atatute 
(admittedly a temporary one) had been extended by a further 
period once before and there was nothing to prevent a simi­
lar, further extension. Moreover in their view, the circum­
stances surrounding a case should be looked at as a whole
664. Above, 131 y 132-
while determining the reasonableness of the law as well as 
the order made under it.
An earlier decision of the Bombay High Court had in 
fact taken this minority view in the Supreme Court. It
was held that the Bombay Public Security Measures Act. 1947, 
which did not provide for a time-limit for the operation of 
the order nor for the supply of the grounds of the order, im­
posed unreasonable restrictions on the rights conferred by 
Article 19(1)(d) and (e). The High Court also took a broader 
view of the test of reasonableness.
The freedom of movement comes out severely circum­
scribed after the interpretation given it in the two deci- 
sions of A.K. Gopalan and Dr. N.B. Khare.
Following Dr. N.B. Khare*s case, the Assam High Court 
668held that only two considerations entered into the deter­
mination of the reasonableness of an externment law. They 
were (a) the extent of the territory from which the indivi­
dual is externed, and (b) the duration of the externment.
The Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act. 1947, provided 
provided that a District Magistrate could pass an order of 
externment for up to a year's duration on grounds of public
665. Jeshingbhai v. Emperor, AIR, 1950, Bom. 363 (F.B.).Above,
666. See above,
667. AIR, 1950, S.C.211, (1950) S.C.R.519.
668. Amrit Bhattacharya v. State, AIR, 1953, Assam, 77. P. Arum- 
ugham v. Madras, I.L.R. (1953) Madras, 937, is a similar 
case where the Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 
(VI of 1948) that prescribed no time-limit for confining a 
'habitual offender* to a specified area was upheld follow­
ing Dr. N.B. Khare*s decision.
351.
order and public safety. The petitioner was ordered not to 
leave his home-town. His argument was that the Act did not 
provide for such safeguards as an independent Advisory Board, 
which even laws of preventive detention included. His con­
tentions were rejected and the Act was held constitutional.
669
The Supreme Court had laid down in Hari Khemu Gawali v. Bombay 
that there was no universal rule that an Advisory Board should 
be provided in such statutes for them to be constitutional.
Cases of externment of violent characters, known in
India as 'Goondas' , come up before Indian courts from time
669& 670to time. . In Gurbachan Singh v. Bombay, Section
27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act. 1902, which author­
ised externment of persons whose presence might 'cause alarm, 
danger or harm to person or property' was held to be reason­
able and constitutional. It was held that two aspects of 
the impugned provisions were in favour of their constitution­
ality: (a) only a high-ranking official - the Commissioner
of Police - could pass the order of externment, and (b) a 
maximum duration of two years for the operation of the 'order 
was fixed by the statute but at any time in the meanwhile, the 
Commissioner could, in his discretion, revoke the order.
An attack on the section that the externee could not 
cross-examine those who complained and/or bore witness against
669. AIR, 1956, S.C.559, £1956] 1 S.C.R.506.
669a.See Deb, Puri and others, 'Operation of Special Laws relat­
ing to externment of Bad Characters* (1969) 11 J.I.L.I.,1- 
28. The authors urge that there is a need to strengthen 
police powers to extern criminal characters.
670. AIR, 1952, S.C.221.
him was rejected. It was held that externment was resorted 
to because of the difficulty in getting those terrorised by 
him to come forward and depose in a regular trial. That 
being the case, the right to cross-examination would be 
counter-productive. The externee, however, could make repre­
sentations to the Commissioner in other ways. It is submitted 
that this is a correct decision bearing in mind the operations 
of such gangsters in India.
But where such a law aimed against a ’Goonda* had not 
indicated, however generally, who was a goonda for the pur­
poses of the law, it would be unconstitutional under Article
671
19(5) and perhaps also under Article 14.
In the first of the cases concerned, Madhya Pradesh v. 
Baldeo Prasad, the Supreme Court did something towards restor-
671 a
ing the right under Article 19(l)(d) to the level of the
rights to free speech and association.
Where a statute empowers the specified autho­
rities to take preventive action against the 
citizens it is essential that it should ex­
pressly make it a part of the duty of the said 
authorities to satisfy themselves about the 
existence of what the statute regards as condi­
tions precedent to the exercise of the said 
authority. If the statute is silent in re­
spect of one of such conditions precedent it 
undoubtedly constitutes a serious infirmity 
which would inevitably take it out of the pro­
visions of Art.19(5). The result of this in­
firmity is that it has left to the nnguided 
and unfettered discretion of the authority 
concerned to treat any citizen as a goonda.
671. Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR, 1961, S.C.293.
Jagannath Prasad v. Madhya Pradesh, AIR, 1968, M.P.155.
671a.M3. Setalvad, The Indian Constitution, 1960-65, Bombay, 
1967j 7<f.
672. AIR, 1961, S.C.293, 298.
Thus the Supreme Court applied here standards similar 
to those in V,G. Row and Romesh Thapper to the right of free 
movement•
Another welcome decision of the Supreme Court is to be
673found in Madhya Pradesh v. Bharat Singh. There it was
held that if the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959, is 
to be regarded as constitutional, it must enable the externee 
to make representations against the order. The decision 
covered other constitutional points which are not relevant 
here.
In the line of welcome decisions must be included also
674the decision of the Bombay High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe 
where it was held that a valid order of externment should 
satisfy two conditions, (a) the alarm, danger or harm caused 
by the presence of the person inclined to violence should be 
with reference to more than two or three individuals. There 
must be a general apprehension of fear on the part of the
public in the area concerned, (b) the area from which he is
to be externed must be strictly relevant to the purpose of 
externment. The Magistrate passing the order could not 
include additional areas (in good measure) merely on grounds 
of contiguityl
The Bombay High Court has also held that ordering 
prostitutes to remove themselves from a given area would be
675a reasonable restriction on the guarantee in Article 19(1)(d).
673. AIR, 1967, S.C.1170.
674. AIR, 1969, Bombay, 351.
675. Smt♦ Begum v. State, AIR, 1963, Bom.17.
The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act,
6761956, enables a Magistrate to order a woman or a girl 
prostitute to move out of any place to any other within or 
outside his area of jurisdiction* The woman or girl prosti­
tute concerned could appear before the magistrate and deny 
that she is a prostitute. While upholding the Act and the 
powers conferred therein the Court (Patel J.) observed:
While dealing with the argument about reason­
ableness or otherwise ***,one must remember 
that women do not choose this vocation because 
they like it* It has been recognized *** they 
are forced into this *** by social conditions*
**• one may not therefore judge these cases 
with any harshness* 677
It was held that the power of the Magistrate to ask 
a prostitute to move out of the area of his jurisdiction 
was, however, excessive and unreasonable* Though the Court 
did not say it, one presumes that an unlucky prostitute 
might be continuously asked to be on the move by several 
magisterial orders! The psychological, sociological and 
economic factors referred to by the learned judge in passing 
were not the subject matter of testimony and argument before 
him, and expertise in this area of value judgments has evi­
dently still to be developed*
In Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushaliya the Supreme Court 
approved of the constitutionality of the same Act of 1956 but
676* See R.K. Raizada, 1 The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in 
Women and Girls Act, 1956: Some Socio-legal Problems' 8, 
J«I«L,It (1966^)96.
677. Ibid*, 18, col.2 (para.5)*
678. AIR, 1964, S.C .416, overruling Shama Bai v. U.P., AIR, 1959, 
All 57.
disagreed with the Bombay High Court, holding that the Magi­
strate’s power to order the prostitute to go out of his area 
of jurisdiction was not unreasonable* The clear possibility 
of her being moved from district to district by such orders 
was dismissed by the Supreme Court as a »fantasy1I No
testimony or arguments on this subject were available to the 
Court* Surely it is not ’fantasy1 and, with respect, the 
Court may have underestimated the harassment of such 'common 
women’ by the Police and the authorities alike in India* Ihe 
high moral tone adopted by everyone concerned reserves little 
sympathy for the prostitute who (if she is selected for harass­
ment) is generally a poor and wretched character commonly liv­
ing in a slum*
Extraditing an Indian citizen to Ceylon according to 
the terms of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, would amount 
to a reasonable restriction in the interests of the public 
under Article 19(5)
But deporting an Indian citizen because he had violated 
passport rules would be plainly unreasonable however serious 
the violation might have been.^80 It would be an excessive 
punishment for any of the offences that one may commit under 
the Passport Rules.
A decision of the Supreme Court that was not given
under Article 19(1)(d) but which is of significance to free
movement is to be found in Sat want Singh Sawhney v* Assistant
681Passport Officer, New Delhi* The passports of the several
679* ReSockalingam, AIR, 1960, Madras, 548.
680. Ebrahim Vazier v. Bombay, AIR, 1954, S.C.229*
681. AIR, 1967, S.C.1836.
petitioners jointly represented in the case, were withdrawn 
by the Government on grounds which varied from petitioner to 
petitioner• They included such complaints against some of 
them as contravening the immigration laws of a friendly 
foreign power and contravening the Exchange Control Rules, 
etc*
The petitioners prayed for a writ directed at the 
Government to issue them their passports. They argued that 
"personal liberty" under Article 21 included the right to go 
abroad. They did not invoke Article 19(1)(d) since that 
was confined to movement "throughout the territory of India".
The Supreme Court which had already shown an anxiety^8*’3’
to restore the content of * personal liberty* in Article 21
accepted the petitioners*arguments and held that there was
682a fundamental right to travel abroad (under Article 21)
and this meant there was a right to a passport.
By way of conclusion it remains to be said that Article 
19(1)(d) has suffered more because of the existence of Article 
21 which has shown signs of a potential which Article 19(1)(d) 
does not seem to possess. But its importance in cases of 
externment cannot be ignored. We have seen that it has also 
played its part in questions concerning the deportation of 
citizens and their right to re-enter India after a sojourn 
or stay abroad.
681a.KhardcSingh v. V.P. (1964) 1 S.C.R.332.
682. United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948,
Article 13'(l) Everyone has the right to freedom of move­
ment and residence within the borders of 
each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his 
country.
CHAPTER 3
SECTION 2(a) :REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF FREE 
PURSUIT OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR PROFESSION
The naturally complex factors that characterise matters 
of trade and business have made it difficult to arrive at any 
clearly spelt-out limits of reasonableness, whether one is con­
sidering an individual case or a particular class of restrict­
ions. An ideological element is strongly present in commer­
cial practices and legislative restrictions on those practices. 
Therefore, unlike the case of restrictions on the freedom of 
speech or assembly, the element of ’public interest* in re­
stricting a trade or business becomes a matter of debate and 
its applicability a matter of opinion. Ideally these differ­
ences should not or, perhaps, need not be reflected to the 
same extent in a decision of the court as to the reasonable­
ness of a legislative restriction. But a consideration of 
the decisions not only in India but also in other federations
i i Q O j ,  A Q O T - %
such as the U.S.A. and Australia leaves one with
the impression that the diverging points of view do (and are 
thus perhaps bound to) affect the question of reasonableness. 
Thus, while the majority and minority judgments in a case may 
express their rationes in terms of well-recognised formulae, 
the distinction between them may be solely in the appreciation 
of such broad but essential features as ’public interest*.
682a. Alpheus T. Mason, The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom, 
University of Michigan Press, 1962, Chapter 5.
682b. W. Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers 
in Australia, 3rd Edn., The Law Book Company of Austral­
asia, 1962.
Indian courts have pronounced upon the reasonableness
of import-export restrictions, licensing measures, controls
on the trading of commodities essential to the community
(like food, fuel and textile articles), nationalisation
and State enterprise in trades that could ordinarily be
carried on by citizens - all of which prima facie violate
the freedom guaranteed to the individual under Article 
68319(1)(g). Restrictions imposed by industrial legis­
lation such as the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the
684Minimum wages Act, 1948, have been challenged. Anti­
smuggling measures and other steps taken to counter tax- 
evasion have presented questions of the constitutionality
683of search and seizure of documents, such as account-books.
683. Daya v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, AIR, 
1962, S.C. 1798, (1963) 2 s.C .R.673; M/S Dwarka Prasad v. 
Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1954, S.C .224; Kishanchand Arora v. 
Commissioner of Police, AIR, 1961, S.C.705; For the admini­
strative law of licensing, see the excellent judgment in 
Sukhlal v. Collector, AIR, 1969, M.P.176; S.M. Mohd.Anzar 
Husnain v. Bihar, I.L.R. (1952) 31 Patna 203 (F.B.); Manja- 
shetty v. Mysore, AIR, 1972, Mys. 138; Saghir Ahmad v.
Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1954, S.C.728; Akadasi Pradhan v. 
Orissa, AIR, 1963, S.C. 1047. For a general conspectus , see 
Government Regulation of Private Enterprise, Indian Law In­
stitute (ed.) Dinesh C. Paude, Tnpathi, Bombay, 1971. In 
particular, see the same, R.B. Tewari at 45, and T.S. Rama 
Rao at 51.
684. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. v. Union, AIR, 1960, S.C.923; 
B.C. Mills v. Ajmer, (l955T~ 1 S.C.R.752.
685. Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty, AIR, 1962, S.C.316; 
Madras v. R.S . Jhaver, AIR, 1968, S.C.59; Balwant Singh v. 
Director of Inspection, AIR, 1969, Delhi, 9i.
In the determination of the reasonableness of restrict­
ions on this right, a principle that clearly emerges is that 
in economic matters the State has been left with almost total
discretion to do what it liked. This factor together with the
866constitutional approval of nationalisation has meant that 
the right to trade is a relatively weak right. The enactment 
of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment Act, 1971, leaves 
it even weaker. None of this, however, means that judicial 
review has become so minimal that it cculd be ignored. The 
material in this section would support this.
In Glass Chatons Importers & Users Association v. Union, 
the Central Government acting under clause (h), para 6, Imports 
Control Order, 1955 (made under Section 3 of the Imports and 
Exports Control Act, 1947) prohibited the petitioners from 
directly importing glass chatons that they had freely imported 
in the past. The said para. (6), clause (h) ran as follows:
Refusal of Licence - The Central Government 
or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports 
may refuse to grant a licence or direct any 
other licensing authority not to grant a 
licence:-
• •• * • • • • • • • • t t •
(h) if the licensing authority decides to 
canalize imports through special or 
specialized agencies or channels;
• • • •  • • •  • • •  • • •
The Government had exclusively authorised the State Trading 
Corporation, a publicly-owned commercial enterprise, to im­
port the material. With these facts before it, the Supreme
066. See below, 3S2-*
867. AIR, 1961, S.C.1514, (1962) 1 S.C.R.862.
Court observed:
It may be difficult for any Court to have ade­
quate materials to come to a proper decision 
as to whether a particular policy as regards 
imports is, on a consideration of all the 
various factors involved, in the general in­
terests of the public. Even if the necessary 
materials were available it is possible that 
in many cases more than one view can be taken 
as to whether a particular policy as regards 
imports - whether one of heavy customs barrier 
or of total prohibition or of entrustment of 
imports to selected agencies or channels - is 
in the general interests of the public.
••• ••• .•.. ... ....
Consequently, we are unable to accept the 
argument that a decision that imports shall 
be cancelled is per se not a reasonable re­
striction in the interests of the general 
public. We wish to make it clear that while 
the decision that import of a commodity will 
be canalised may be difficult to challenge, 
the selection of the particular channel or 
agency decided upon in implementing the de­
cision of canalisation may well be challenged 
on the ground that it infringes Article 14 of 
the Constitution or some other fundamental 
rights• 868
The Court held that if the creation of special agencies to 
carry on the import trade is found by the legislature to be 
in the public interest, then that was conclusive and the 
restrictions would be regarded as constitutionally valid.
But this ratio and the passage quoted above were con-
O f T Q
firmed in Daya v. Joint Chief Controller where the quest­
ion was similar except that it was export rather than import 
that was prohibited. Acting under para.6, clause (h) of the 
Export Control Order, 1958, (which is in the same terms as 
para. 6, clause (h) quoted above) the Central Government
868. AIR, 1961, S.C.1514, 1516, col.2 (para.6).
869. AIR, 1962, S.C.1796, (1963) 2 S.C.R.73.
restricted the export of manganese ore to the following three 
categories of exporters: (a) established shippers of the ore,
(b) mine-owners who were already in the trade, and (c) the 
State Trading Corporation, a public company established and 
controlled by the Government. The petitioner, a ‘ new-comer1 
with no previous experience of the trade, found that there 
was no provision made for people in his situation who, in view 
of the Government’s order, were forced to sell their ore at 
reduced prices to one or the other of the three who had quotas 
for export.
The Supreme Court was asked to hold that the withhold­
ing of the right to engage in export trade from the class of 
’new-comers* was an unreasonable restriction under Article 
19(6). Section 3 of the Act of 1947 was the source of the 
impugned order of 1958. That section enabled the Government, 
(a) to specify the goods in respect of which the control or 
restriction was to be exercised, (b) to specify the quantities 
that may be exported, (c) to specify the quality of the goods 
that may pass out of the country, and (d) to specify the desti­
nation to which they may be exported.
It was argued that the section did not enable the Govern­
ment to restrict the number or class of persons wishing to ex­
port. The Court rejected the argument and held that if the 
quantity to be( exported could be controlled, that must neces­
sarily mean control of the persons who would be able to export 
the specified quantity. This appears to be an incompletely 
evolved or dubious reasoning.
The following reasons were presented before the Court 
by the State as the basis for controlling the trade -
a) The previous trading mechanisms were found to be inade­
quate for properly catering to the export market, 
bj Frequently Indian exporters had failed to honour their 
commitments arising out of contracts they had entered 
into with foreign buyers. That was detrimental to the 
trade as a whole, 
c) And therefore, the Government had to canalise the export 
by fixing target quantities to be exported. The quanti­
ties were to be progressively increased in such a manner 
as to accommodate every mining interest in the country.
The majority in the Court considered that these were 
reasonable j'ustifications for the restrictions. However, 
the maj'ority j’udgment ended with the following remarks:
Though we consider that the appellant has no 
legal right to the relief that he sought, his 
grievance is genuine and it would be for the 
Government to consider how best the interest 
of this class should be protected and it is 
made worth their while to win the ore so as 
to expand, foster and augment the export trade 
in this valuable commodity. 870.
In a separate concurring j’udgment Subba Rao J. found 
that the Government had tried to confer an exclusive right 
in the trade on the State Trading Corporation by progress­
ively eliminating the other two categories of people who had 
originally been given quotas. In those circumstances, he 
found that the exclusion of the petitioner and others in a 
similar situation was an unreasonable restriction. Ihe 
learned judge stated, rightly:
870. Ibid., 1804, col.2, ( para.20)
The scheme of channelling of exports through 
an agency or agencies could certainly be dove­
tailed with that of equitable apportionment of 
quotas amongst persons producing or doing 
business in manganese ore without any detri­
ment to the object of promoting export trade*
Any scheme of channelisation of exports through 
specialised agencies must be governed by defi­
nite rules whereunder provision is made giving 
stability and guarantee of fair treatment in 
ordinary times as well as in times of emer­
gency. 871
On other grounds, he concurred with the order made by the 
majority of the Court.
872In re Venkatakrishnan. the Central Government spe­
cially authorised certain co-operative societies to export 
chillies to Ceylon at a time when there was a general ban on 
export of chillies. This was held to be a reasonable and 
valid action since those co-operative societies were consider­
ed non-profit making organisations. This may be viewed as 
another example of tacit recognition by the Court of India’s 
• raixed-economy* philosophy.
The discretion vested in the Government would cover 
other matters incidental to imports and exports. It is 
reasonable for the authorities to demand an income-tax veri-
873
fication certificate before granting any one an import licence. 
The following reasons advanced by the State for insisting on 
the certificate were held good and sufficient: the financial
871. Ibid. , 1809 (para.30).
872. AIR, 1958, Madras, 218.
873. Dasai Gounder & Co. v. Deputy Chief Controller, AIR, 1955, 
Madras 699. inadequately distinguishing Raman & Co. v. 
Madras, [1952] 2 M.L.J. 544, where it was held that product- 
ion of income-tax certificate had nothing to do with the 
grant of a yarn licence.
status and reliability of an applicant could be seen from the 
certificate, it was essential that the quota likely to be 
granted is put to full use by the allottee* The production 
of an income-tax certificate is now a standard pre-condition 
to most transactions between individuals and Governments in 
India.
However, matters incidental to imports and exports in 
relation to which the Government has freedom of operation can­
not extend beyond statutory rules and executive regulations 
made under the rule. This sounds simple enough but does not
appear so in the course of the administration’s work. Ram
874Krishna v. Union, is a good example of a casual action 
taken by a government department but which was shown to be 
an unauthorised infringement of the petitioner’s right under 
Article 19(1)(g). The petitioner was granted an import 
licence on certain conditions. After importing the material 
he wanted, he broke somecf the conditions which he had earlier 
agreed to. The Government immediately put him on a ’banned 
list’. A circular was sent round to all government depart­
ments as well as to public sector commercial cbrporations, 
which were legally independent entities, warning them not to 
have any dealings with the petitioner. He went to the High 
Court complaining that the circular materially affected his 
right to trade.
The High Court held that the administration was en­
titled to take such action as was authorised by the regula­
tions under which the import licence was originally issued
874. AIR, 1969, Calcutta, 18.
to the petitioner. There, however, was no authority given 
by any of the import regulations examined to let the cadmini- 
stration ’induce* other independent entities not to do business 
with the petitioner. So it was held that the circular sent 
to those outside government departments was a violation of the 
petitioner’s right under Article 19(1)(g).
Nor would all the freedom the Government has to control 
imports andexports mean that it can be released from promises 
made in the course of administration of its import/export 
policies. The guaranteed right in Article 19(1)(g) would 
(remarkable as this seems) give the citizen an ’equity* to 
enforce a promise, even if that promise was made by the govern­
ment as part of an administrative act and not in any statutory 
regulation or specific contract with any particular citizen.
875In Union v. Anglo-Afghan Agencies, the Government 
of India in one of their bi-annual statements of import-export 
policies (contained in a red book) announced an export promo­
tion scheme covering certain specified commodities. Under 
the scheme they stated that import licences would be issued 
to the full export value of certain goods exported, provided 
the export value was not over-invoiced and no other fraudu­
lent practices were adopted.
The petitioners were given import licences which were 
of a value less than the value of goods they had exported.
But in all respects, they qualified for licences of full 
value within the meaning of the scheme. When the Government’s
875. AIR, 1968, S.C.718. See S.N. Jain, ’Administrative Dis­
cretion in the Issue of Import Licences’ 10 J.I.L.I. (1968) 
121.
refusal to comply with their scheme was challenged, the govern­
ment took the position that the policy statements in the ’Red 
book’ were administrative matters and could not bind them in 
the same way as statutory provisions.
This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court on the 
ground that it was not the form of State action that mattered, 
whether it be legislative, executive, or administrative, but 
the damage suffered by the citizen in the proper exercise of 
his fundamental rights. The representations held out in the 
handbook, on the basis of which the petitioner company acted, 
were binding on the government.
It was also held that there was no question of ’execu­
tive necessity’ being invoked under such circumstances to en­
able the Government to vacate their obligations.
But where the representations made in the ’Red book’
clearly stated that import licences up to a maximum of 50%
value of goods exported would be considered by the Government,
it was held that the Government had a discretion in the matter.
No commitment was entered into or promises held out by the
Government that under all circumstances the maximim would,
in fact, be given. In exercising their discretion they
were entitled to take into account such factors as the foreign
876exchange reserves, balance of payments, etc.
Whatever the representations made by the Government in 
the 'Red book’ if a citizen has fraudulently over-invoiced the 
export bills (in collusion with the buyer abroad) in order to
876. Prabhu Das v. Union, AIR, 1966, S.C.1044.
inflate the value of import licences to be obtained, he would
have no ’equity1 in his favour and under those circumstances,
a court would not interfere with a decision not to grant him
877any import licence.
A further consideration that may show the right under
Article 19(1)(g) to be weaker than, particularly, the right
of free speech, free assembly and free association emerges from
two decisions of the Madras High Court. In the first of these
878decisions, Anantakrishnan v. Madras, the petioner, a law 
graduate, objected to the Advocate’s enrolment fee of Rs.625/- 
(approximately £34) as excessive. Without enrolling as an 
advocate he would not be allowed to practice before the courts 
in Madras. The sum of Rs.625/- was fixed under the Indian 
Stamp Act, 1899.
One of the arguments raised by him was that such an un­
reasonably excessive sum demanded of him as enrolment fee 
amounted to a prior restraint on his fundamental right to 
practice his profession. By the standards obtaining in 
1951-52, many would have agreed with him that the figure was
substantial as a fee. The petitioner relied on a number of
879
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in support
877. See also Fedco (P) Ltd. v. S.N. Bilgrami, AIR, 1960, S.C. 
415, where section 9(a) of the Imports Control Order, 1955, 
which provided for cancellation or the licence obtained 
through fraud or misrepresentation was held to be a reason­
able restriction under 19(6).
878. I.L.R. [1952] Madras 933.
879. Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S.6961; Lovel1 v. Griffin 
(1938) 303 U.S. 444 ; Schneidar v. Invington (1939 ) 308 
U.S.147, and Cantwell v. Connecticut (1946) 310 U.S.296.
of his contention that no prior restraints could be imposed
on the exercise of fundamental rights•
All the American cases relied upon were, as pointed out 
by the Court, on pre-censorship of the press or speech in the 
form of religious propaganda* It was held by the Court:
But these freedoms differ by their very 
nature considerably from freedoms relating 
to property or trade. While a censorship 
in the case of the /owner is tantamount to 
a prohibition, it is otherwise when it re­
lates to property or trade. To apply the 
theory of previous restraint to the freedom 
of trade or profession is to ignore the reason 
behind the rule, c ess ante rat ione leg is, cessaa^ 
ipsa lex. 880
The Madras High Court, therefore, rejected the peti­
tioner’s argument. One of the judges, Verikatarama Ayyar J. 
held:
A... Article 19 does not enunciate a general 
rule that previous restraint is unconstitu­
tional; that rule was evolved in the Courts 
with reference only to freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, [8811 having regard to 
the nature of those rights, and it cannot beF 
applied as an absolute rule of law with re­
spect to freedom of trade or right to hold 
property or indeed, to any of the freedoms 
mentioned in Article 19. 882
The petitioners1 case was dismissed and the sum of Rs.625/-
held a proper non-recurring tax. This ratio was reiterated
883in another case that came before the same High Court,
880. Ibid. 9 954.
881. Reference is to Romesh Thapper and Brij Bhushan, above,^ Ut<?32si.
882. I.L.R. [1952] Madras 933, 955.
883. C.S.S. Motor Service v. Madras, I.L.R. [1953] Madras, 304.
in« which it was held that the grant or refusal of peirmits 
by transport authorities to selected applicants must be accord­
ing to rules laying down principles of selection, rules reason­
able to interests of the public as required by Article 19(6), 
to be followed by all transport authorities including the 
Government itself. The same learned judge, Venkatarama Ayyar J, 
stated:
As observed in the decision in Anantakrishnan 
v, Madras the theory of previous restraint 
which was evolved with reference to the free­
dom of person and freedom of speech cannot 
operate with the same force with reference 
to the freedom of trade or profession and 
reasonable conditions forming part of licen­
sing regulations cannot be held to be repug­
nant to Art,19(1)(g). 884
Again, it was in a case concerning the right to pro­
fession that the Supreme Court held that under certain cir­
cumstances a total prohibition of the exercise of the right 
could well amount to a 'reasonable restriction',
OQ C
In Narendra Kumar v. Union the Supreme Court was 
examining the validity of the Non-Ferrous Metal Control Order, 
1958, issued by the Central Government under section 3 of the 
Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
Claus e 4 of the Order impugned was as follows:
,,, no person shall acquire or agree to 
acquire any non-ferrous metal [886] except 
under and in accordance with a permit 
issued in this behalf by the controller
884. Ibid,, 334,
885. AIR, 1960, S.C.430.
886. The non-ferrous metal being copper, zinc or lead.
in accordance with such principles as the 
Central Government may from time to time 
specify.
It was further laid down that no one could buy or sell the 
metals except at prices fixed by the Order, The controller 
referred to was informed by the Government that permits 
should be issued only to direct importers and actual customers. 
This meant that several middlemen dealers were deprived of 
their businesses. The petitioner, one such dealer, argued 
that such elimination of a class of traders amounted to a 
total prohibition of their fundamental right to pursue their 
trade. The Constitution in Article 19(6) authorised the im­
position of reasonable restrictions which meant that the 
rights could be reasonably regulated but not prohibited. 
Restriction, it was said, could never amount to prohibition.
The Supreme Court decided against the petitioner on 
this point:
It is reasonable to think that the makers of 
the Constitution considered the word 'restrict­
ion' to be sufficiently wide to save laws 'in­
consistent' with Art.19(1), or 'taking away the 
rights' conferred by the Article, provided this 
inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in 
the interests of the different matters mentioned 
in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore 
that they intended the word 'restriction' to in­
clude cases of 'prohibition' also. The conten­
tion that a law prohibiting the exercise of a 
fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot 
therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly cor­
rect, however, that when, as in the present 
case, the restriction reaches the stage of 
prohibition special care has to be taken by 
the Court to see that the test of reasonable­
ness is satisfied. The greater the restrict­
ion, the more the need for strict scrutiny by 
the Court. 887
887. AIR, 1960, S.C.430, 436, col.l. In thus holding,the Supreme 
Court distinguished Kania C.J.'s dictum in A.K. Gopalan, 
which regarded 'deprivation' and 'restriction' as separate. 
AIR, 1950, S.C.27, 37. The diet urn was confined to Article 
19(1)(d) in its relation to Article 21.
The following reasons supplied by the State for enact­
ing the impugned order was found to be justifiable and there­
fore, reasonable:
a) That the market prices of these metals were high as a 
result of the large profit margins fixed by middlemen 
dealers•
b) In order to bring down the prices of a number of articles 
made out of copper, zinc and lead it was essential that 
control be exercised in the trade of these metals*
There was one point where the Supreme Court held that the law 
was not properly complied with. The Act of 1955 under which 
the Order was made required the publication of the principles 
meant to guide the controller in the administration of the 
Order. Such publication was to be in the Official Gazette 
or as part of the Order made. Neither was done in the case 
before them. So the administrative communication with the 
Controller was held invalid.
The High Court of Orissa had earlier discussed the
question w r e s t r i c t i o n 1 could amount to prohibition
888in Loknath Misra v. Orissa. The petitioner attacked
the constitutionality of the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regu­
lation of Stage Carriage & Public Carrier*s Services) Act, 
1947, which provided for nationalisation of the passenger 
bus services by conferring a monopoly on a joint stock com­
pany owned by the State and union governments.
The petitioner argued that thus putting him out of 
his business was more than restricting his fundamental right
888. AIR, 1952, Orissa, 42
to trade and was unconstitutional. Relying on Municipal
880Corporation, City of Toronto v. Virgo, he argued that 
’restriction’ in Article 19(6) implied mere ’regulation’ 
and not total prohibition of the fundamental right.
The High Court distinguished the Canadian appeal by 
stating that ’regulation’ might well carry that sense but 
’restriction*, which was not synonymous with ’regulation’, 
could be complete or partial. Where it was complete it 
would amount to absolute prohibition. The dictionary mean­
ing of the term ’restriction’, the Court pointed out, inclu­
ded ’prohibition* too. Though the Court did not say it, 
then the extent of the restriction would after all, be one 
of the main factors in the determination of its reasonable­
ness. A total prohibition would be serious and the Court 
would normally seek good justification for holding it 
reasonable.
On the facts, the Court held that passenger bus ser­
vice was a ’public utility service’ and as such, admitted 
State monopoly.8^0 The role of the State too, the Court, 
observed had changed from a ’police state* (what the Court 
meant was a State that ’’contented itself with mere mainten­
ance of law and order” ) to a ’welfare State’ that actively 
participated in matters of vital concern to the community.
889. L.R. (1896) A.C.88, 93 ”a power to regulate and govern s^ gns 
to imply the continued existence of that which is to be 
regulated or governed.”
890. ’’From the earliest days of English Common Law it was always 
recognised that common carriers and other public utility 
undertakings require drastic State control and that they 
cannot be left to free competition” . AIR, 1952, Orissa,
42, 46, col•1•
Thus while holding the impugned Act constitutional the Court, 
however, held that existing permit holders were to be suitably 
compensated by the State for having cancelled them prematurely.
Such 'prohibitions'as in the two cases discussed above, 
and in the cases to follow have occurred more often in rela­
tion to the right under Article 19(1)(g). This is attribut­
able to the notion of 'mixed economy' pursued by the Indian
801Government at the centre and the governments of the States. 
There are nother areas of economic and business regulation 
where the right of some to pursue their particular trade has 
been prohibited.
892In M.B. Cotton Association v. Union, Cotton Control 
Order, 1950 (made under Section 2(a) of Essential Supplies 
Temporary Powers Act, 1947) was challenged as violating Article 
19(l)(g). The Textile Commissionejjlsxercising the powers con­
ferred on him by the Order named the petitioner's rival in 
trade as the sole authorised association to enter into 'hedge 
contracts* - a form of speculative contracts in forward deal­
ing.
This form of speculative, future transactions if not 
regulated carefully, held the Supreme Court, could ruin a 
number of cotton dealers not involved in'hedging1. 'Hedging' 
like insurance and banking required experience and stability.
It was found by the Court that the Association named by the 
Textile Commissioner did have more experience behind it than 
the petitioners.
891. See betaw, Conclusion»
892. AIR, 1954, S.C.634.
893In Arunachala v. Madras, The Madras Commercial Crops 
Markets Act, 1933, sought to eliminate commission agents in 
order that the actual grower of the crops and the purchaser 
could get in direct contact and arrive at a realistic price 
which would be for the grower*s benefit* The Act established 
wholesale markets in specified areas of the State and prohibit­
ed any other privately organised wholesale markets in such 
areas *
The Supreme Court went into the historical background
of the law and discussed the Report of the Royal Commission on
Agriculture, 1928. This report appears to have concluded that
the Commission Agents in the trade made excessive profits at
the expense of the grower* Their role was on balance more
damaging than beneficial* Having regard to the scheme of 
894the Act the restrictions were held reasonable*
Res extra commercium in India
895In Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, the constitu­
tional validity of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions 
Control and Tax Act, 1948, was tested. The Act passed by the 
State under entry 34 of List I I , t h e  State list, imposed,
893. AIR, 1959, S.C.300.
894. A similar Act in Gujarat which applied to wholesale as well 
as retail markets was upheld in Jan Mohammad v. Gujarat, 
[1966] 1 S.C.R.505. The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets 
Act, 1939, upheld in Ramakrishna Hegde v. Market Committee, 
AIR, 1971, S.C.1017.
895.* AIR, 1957, S.C.699.
896. "Betting and gambling**.
according to the respondents, such a heavy tax on prize-compe- 
t it ions conducted by them that they could not carry on the 
activity without incurring a loss. They invoked their funda­
mental right under Article 19(l)(g).
The question of the State*s competence to impose the 
tax settled, the only other question was .whether the heavy 
taxation amounted to an unreasonable restriction under Article 
19(1)(g)? The State argued that no such question arose since 
Article 19(1)(g) did not intend to protect trades or occupa­
tions opposed to public policy. Gambling was always, it was 
said, considered an evil in India and therefore, the Court 
could not regard that as a trade included under Article 19(1)(g). 
Here was evaluation with a vengeance*.
The Supreme Court in its attempt to discover the consti­
tutional norm appropriate to the case examined ancient Hindu 
literature and traditional moral teaching and arrived at the 
conclusion canvassed by the State that gambling was opposed 
to public policy and there could not be any trade in it.
Gambling activities from their very nature 
and in essence arev extra commercium although 
the external forms, formalities and instru­
ments of trade may be employed and they are 
not protected either by Art.19(1) (g) or Art.
301 of our Constitution. 897
The respondents contention that ’trade* or * business* or 
* Commerce* should be construed to mean any activity undertaken 
to earn profit was rejected.
897. AIR, 1957, S.C.699, 720,col.2
In another case, the Supreme Court held that there was 
no * general right’ in citizens to carry on trade in liquor.
The Excise Regulation 1 of 1950 was challenged in Cooverjee v.
898Excise Commissioner as creating a monopoly by conferring
the right to sell liquor to the highest bidder in an auction
specially arranged by the State. The argument was that, by
creating a monopoly in favour of one, the rest of the traders
were precluded from exercising their right to trade. It
might have succeeded had not the Court come to the conclusion
that the protection of Article 19(1)(g) was not available to 
899such a trade. It was held that the State could prohibit,
and not merely regulate, trades such as dealing in liquor or 
in other dangerous, noxious goods.
It was not disputed that in order to deter­
mine the reasonableness of the restriction 
regard must be had to the nature of the 
business and the conditions prevailing in 
that trade. It is obvious that these 
factors must differ from trade to trade and 
no hard and fast rules concerning all trades 
can be laid down. It cannot also be denied 
that the State has the power to prohibit 
trades which are illegal or immoral or in­
jurious to the health and welfare of the 
public. 900
One \other aspect of the case that the Court, perhaps, should 
have investigated, but did not was the petitioner’s complaint 
that there wftre some irregularities in the actual conduct of
898. AIR, 1954, S.C. 220.
899. Hie Supreme Court relied on the United States decision of 
Crowley v. Christensen (1890) 34 Law Ed. 620, in support of 
its binding, AIR, 1954, S.C.220, 223, col.l.
900. Ibid., 223, col.l (para.7).
the auction.
Serious doubts were thrown on the theory of res extra
commercium when the Supreme CAurt held in Khrishna Kumar v.
901Jammu & Kashmir that dealing in liquor would be trade with­
in Article 19(1)(g). Subba Rao J. held (most understandably) 
for the unanimous court that,
The morality or otherwise of a deal does not 
affect the quality of the activity though it 
may be a ground for imposing a restrict!onion 
the said activity. 902 1
The petitioner in the case, the proprietor of a restaurant, 
was refused renewal of his liquor licence by the excise autho­
rities acting under the Excise Act, 1958. When the refusal
was challenged, the State took up the position, relying on
903the decision in Cooverjee that there was no trade in 
liquor and the petitioner had no case. But the Supreme 
Court did not accept that the judgment in Cooverjee laid down 
that liquor deals were outside the purview of Article 19(1)(g). 
In answer to the State’s contention that there could not be 
trade in commodities like liquor which were subversive of 
community morals, it was held,
The acceptance of this broad argument in­
volves the position that the meaning of the 
expression ’trade or business’ depends upon
and varies with the general acceptance of
standards of morality obtaining at a parti­
cular point of time in our country. Such
901. AIR, 1967, S.C.1368.
902. Ibid., 1371, col.l. (My emphasis).
903. AIR, 1954, S.C .220.
an approach leads to incoherence in thought 
and expression. Standards of morality can 
afford a guidance to impose restrictions, 
but cannot limit the scope of the right •
So too, a Legislature cam impose restrictions 
on, or even prohibit the carrying on of a 
particular trade or business and the Court, 
having regard to the circumstances obtaining 
at a particular time or place may hold theQ04 
restrictions or prohibition reasonable.
The reasonableness and appropriateness of this view will
905appeal to most academic lawyers. However, the Court
accepted the finding of fact by the lower court that the 
ground on which the refusal was made was taken bona fide 
and was arrived at after a proper inquiryl
It seems incorrect for the Cooverj*ee and RMDC
cases to treat morality as a ground in addition to the only 
ground of restriction in Article 19(6)(i) - viz. * in the 
interests of the general public*. Considerations based on 
morality could come within the ground of 1 in the interests of 
the general public* but could not be treated as forming a 
separate ground for justifying legislative restrictions.
This is what is indicated by the judgment in Khrishna Kumar.
There is one other important obj'ection against the
reasoning in the Cooverjee and RMDC cases. By declaring
904. AIR, 1967, S.C.1368, 1371, col.l.
905. Liquor trade held protected by Article 19(1)(g) in Damodaran 
v. Kerala (1969) K.L.T. 587.
906. Also a similar case in U.P. v. Kart or Singh, AIR, 1964, S.C. 
1134 - where the Supreme Court equated trade in adulterated 
commodities with trade in prohibited articles like liquor, 
and held that there was no protection for such trades under 
Article 19(1) (g). But see A.P.G. & S.H. v. Union, AIR,
1971, S.C .2346, which negatives that stand by implication.
that there was no trade in liquor or that a business in gamb­
ling was res extra commercium, the Supreme Court precluded it­
self from enquiring into the substantive as well as the proced­
ural reasonableness of the impugned laws. For instance, in 
Cooverjee, the petitioner had complained of what ^ appears to be 
a clear irregularity in applying the auction procedure laid 
down by the Excise Regulation, 1950. This aspect of his con­
tention deserved a proper answer, but one was not given because 
the Supreme Court had precluded itself by maintaining that trade 
in liquor did not fall within Article 19(1)(g). On the other 
hand, by recognizing that there was a trade in liquor but that 
could rationally be subject to greater restrictions, the 
Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar was able to examine whether the 
petitioner was denied his licence on proper grounds. Lastly, 
the Krishna Kumar view of the matter enables the Court to 
maintain its review of restrictions on a ’sliding scale’ in­
stead of tying itself to one end of the scale.
907In Amarchandra Chakraborty v. Excise Collector 
a unanimous Court recognized that there was trade in liquor.
But the Court held the Strict regulation contained in Section 
45 of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, reasonable because trade 
in a commodity like liquor had to be strictly controlled.
The petitioner’s licence to trade in liquor was revoked be­
fore it had run its course for reasons not supported by the 
Act of 1909. It was held that there was a ’reasonable nexus’ 
between the actual ground for terminating the licence and the 
object of the Act. Under the circumstances the revocation
907. AIR, 1972, S.C.1863.
380.
was held valid. This appears to be an interesting exception 
to the general rule that revocation of a licence could not be 
otherwise than on the basis of grounds laid down by the sta­
tute. But that rule is so well established that the deci­
sion heremust be regarded as erroneous.
Monopoly Rights
Probition of a trading activity as we have seen, 
could very often be the result of a State monopoly in the 
activity. Article 19(6)(ii) which enables the creation of 
a State monopoly refers to the exclusion, complete or partial,
906
of citizens from such trades over which a State monopoly exists.
It is clear that no monopoly of any kind could be cre­
ated through mere executive or administrative acts. The lead-
909ing case on this point is Mannalal v. Assam where the 
Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961 (made 
under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955) pro­
vided a licensing system for regulating the trade in food­
grains. One of the considerations in granting licences 
under the Order was to be whether or not the applicant was 
a co-operative society.
The petitioner, a private dealer, challenged the re­
fusal of a licence to him and the reason supplied to him for 
the refusal, viz. that the Government wished to encourage
908. For a short account of the rise of public corporations in 
India and some "of the basic problems in nationalisation, see 
R.S. Arora, * Ri&e of the Public Corporation in India: Some 
Constitutional Aspects’ (1961) Public Law, 362.
909. AIR, 1962, S.C.386.
381.
co-operatives, and therefore, licences would be issued only to 
them and no one else.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that neither the 
Order of 1961 nor the parent Act of 1955 under which it was made 
authorised the creation of such a monopoly in favour of co­
operative societies. Creation of one through a biased admini­
stration of a licensing system offended Article 14 and also 
Article 19(1)(g) since it amounted to an unreasonable restrict­
ion on the right of the petitioner and those like him.
The two minority judges, Sarkar and Mudholkar JJ., held 
that there being a directive principle of state policy provid­
ing for encouragement of c o - o p e r a t i v e s t h e  preference shown 
to them would be a reasonable restriction even if private deal­
ers were totally excluded from the trade.
There is a passing reference to co-operatives in Article 
43s ” ••• the State shall endeavour to promote cottage indus­
tries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas.11 
This does not seem to be a sufficiently strong or clear refer­
ence in favour of giving monopolies to co-operatives.
911In District Collector v. M/s Ibrahim & Co. the facts 
were similar to Mannalal. A monopoly was sought to be confer­
red on co-operative societies in the sugar trade. The Andhra 
High Court while holding the monopoly unconstitutional, pointed 
out that ordinarily the creation of a monopoly was to be in 
favour of the State and not in favour of any individual or
910. Article 43.
911. AIR, 1966, A.P.310.
group of citizens like co-operative societies. This clearly 
emerges from Article 19(6)(ii).^2
913The Punjab High Court disapproved of the action 
of a municipal authority which used a licensing power intended 
to further the interests of health and safety in markets to 
confer a monopoly in the wholesale vegetable trade on an ex­
clusive group of traders*
State Monopoly
On the basis of the law before the introduction of 
914Article 19(6)(ii) the Supreme Court held in Saghir Ahmad v*
915Uttar Pradesh that a monopoly in favour of the State in a 
trade that could normally be carried on by the citizens would 
amount to an unreasonable restriction.
The effect of Article 19(6)(ii) came up to be examined
916by the Supreme Court in Akadasi Pradhan v* Orissa* The
Orissa Kendu Leaves created a State monopoly in the trade of 
Kendu leaves used in the manufacture of cigars*
The first question to be decided by the Supreme Court 
was whether the test of reasonableness applied to such a law,
912. See A)*J>e^ dix U, .
913. Municipal Committee v. Haji Ismai 1, AIR, 1967, Punj*32.
914. By the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
915. AIR, 1954, S.C.728.
916. AIR, 1964, S.C.1047.
917While deciding Saghir Ahmad v. Uttar Pradesh referred to 
above, Mukherjea J. stated obiter that after the First Amend­
ment Act, 1951, the State need not justify a monopoly in its 
favour as a reasonable restriction on the rights of citizens 
under Article 19(6^;
Here in Akadasi, the Supreme Court held unanimously 
that the concept of State monopoly itself was not justiciable 
because it was based on a doctrinaire view of the matter. Ihe 
addition of sub-clause (ii) to Article 19(6) showed that nation­
alisation schemes introduced by legislation should be regarded 
as reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general pub­
lic.
But it was laid down that this did not mean that the 
entire law creating a State monopoly would be exempt from the 
test of reasonableness. Firstly, only provisions "relating 
touthe creation of the monopoly were thus exempt. The other 
provisions of the law not directly concerned with, or inti­
mately connected with, the monopoly would be examined by the 
Court. Secondly, if any of the provisions of the impugned 
law directly and not merely incidentally violate any of the 
other rights guaranteed by Article 19(1) then also it would 
be examined from the standpoint of the sub-clause correspond­
ing to the right or rights affected.
Which provisions were to be regarded as incidental and 
which essential for the monopoly would be a question of fact.
917. AIR, 1954, S.C.728, (1955) 1 S.C.R.707.
Ihe essential attributes of the law creating 
a monopoly will vary with the nature of the 
trade or business in which the monopoly is 
created; they will depend upon the nature 
of the commodity, the nature of commerce in 
which it is involved and several other cir­
cumstances. 918
In the case before them, the Court held that fixing the pur­
chase price of the leaves was not an integral part of the cre­
ation of the monopoly and, therefore, could be examined. In 
the event they held that the price fixed was not shown to be 
low or unreasonable. The object of the law itself in fixing 
the price was to benefit the growers of the leaves.
On the second point, the Supreme Court employed the 
ratio in A.K. Gopalan to say that if any of the other rights 
guaranteed by Article 19(1) were directly infringed, then 
each such infringement would be separately examined.
The construction put on Article 19(6)(ii) was regarded
by the Supreme Court as strict, since it was in its view an
919exception to the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g).
This is also illustrated by the Court’s finding that appoint­
ment of private individuals as Commission Agents for the State 
to run the trade was inconsistent with the idea that in a mono­
poly the only beneficiary was the public exchequer. What is 
remarkable is that the Court insisted that all the benefit to 
flow out of the monopoly should be derived by the State. It
918. Ibid., 1056 (para.23).
919. See J. Narain, ’Nationalisation and the Right to hold Pro­
perty under the Indian Constitution: Lessons from Comparable 
Australian and U.S. Experiences1, (1965), Public Law, 256.
was held that the monopoly trade should be generally run by 
officers of the State and not by private individuals. But 
where the nature of the trade meant that outsiders would 
have to be appointed they were to work as agents - agency 
being narrowly defined. Those appointed must be essenti­
ally concerned with working for the State and not for them­
selves. This might mean that if they worked for a salesman’s 
commission, it might be unconstitutional but if the same agents 
worked for a salary it might be within the Court’s view of a 
proper monopoly in favour of the State.
If the agent acquires a personal interest in 
the working of the monopoly, he ceases to be 
accountable to the principal at every stage, 
he is not able to bind the principal by his 
acts, or if there are any other terms of the 
agency which indicate that the trade or busi­
ness is not carried on solely on behalf of 
the State but at least partially on behalf 
of the individual concerned, that would fall 
outside Art.l9(6)(ii).
• f t  t • • • • • • • •  • • • • • •
In other words, the limitations imposed by 
the requirement that the trade must be car­
ried on by the State or by a Corporation 
owned or controlled by the State cannot be 
widened and must be strictly construed and 
agency can be permitted only in respect of 
trades or businesses where it appears to be 
inevitable and where it works within the 
well-recognised limits of agency. 920
The Supreme Court did not consider the possibility that there 
might be circumstances where those agents working for them­
selves might also increase the profits for the State. The
decision appears to force reliance on the State bureaucracy
t
under all circumstances and implies the Court’s committing
920. Ibid., 1058, col.l.
itself to a doctrinaire position of an economic-political 
character. Bureaucracy, not only in India but in several 
countries of the world, whatever their ideology, has proved 
cumbersome and inefficient in managing enterprises of a 
commercial nature. The ideals of mixed-economy followed by 
India would, in principle, permit State enterprises exploit­
ing private talents for ultimate State benefit. The basis 
of a monopoly could be viewed as an exclusive right in the 
State to trade or business. This right would be intact 
even if private enterpreneurs are to be brought in at ,the 
1 ground level* in accordance with a clearly-understood pat­
tern of management of the trade concerned.
It is therefore unfortunate that on this point the 
Supreme Court*s view has proved inflexible. But on the 
other hand, the Court might have felt that such flexibility 
might prove to be the thin end of the wedge which might even­
tually destroy or complicate the notion of a State monopoly.
A possible answer to this would be, in every instance of 
State monopoly brought to the attention of the Court, the 
crucial question would be: * Is there a substantial profit
to the public exchequer out of the monopoly, in view of the 
attending circumstances of the case?* That these conjectures 
are still open, reveals the methodologically immature state 
of this power of review.
Any excessive use of private enterprise or private 
individuals would be held unconstitutional. State monopoly 
is but a way of benefitting the community as a whole. Any 
and every legal means, including exploitation of private 
talents could well be employed in that process. A further
reason for the Court’s view of monopoly in Akadasi Pradhan 
(above, 382) might have been the fear that a system of patron­
age might develop in the matter of connections between nation­
alised and private commercial sectors. Here the answer 
would be, the Court could rely upon Article 14, the equality
guarantee, to see that no unfair patronage is given to any
921one class or community of traders. One hopes that at
some time in the future, the Supreme Court would modify this 
inflexible condition laid down in Akadasi Pradhan. The case 
itself represents an area of judicial policy-making, which is 
more overt than any other we have come across.
On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found 
that such agents as there were could keep any sum of money 
beyond what was specified in the contract between them and 
the State. This arrangement was held to be beyond the scope 
of ’monopoly1 as understood by the Court.
This part of the ratio was confirmed said followed in
922Rashbihari Panda v. Orissa where under the Orissa Kendu 
(Control of Trade) Act, 1961, the State had picked as agents 
the contractors under the old system before State monopoly 
was introduced, to work the monopoly. The Court held that 
confining the selection of such agents to the class of con­
tractors under the old system was an unreasonable restriction,
921. For an example, see Rashbihari Panda v. Orissa, AIR, 1969, 
S.C.1081, below.
922. AIR, 1969, S.C.1081.
both in terms of Article 14 and 19(6). A State monopoly had 
to bring the entire benefit to the State and could not be used 
as a cloak to reward a limited class of people with profit.
The process of selection of such agents should be so admini­
stered that any one interested in the trade may have a chance 
to offer his services. With this decision few could dis­
agree.
923In Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. M.P., the Supreme Court 
found that the M.P. Kendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam 
(Act 29 of 1964) created a State monopoly in the trade of 
leaves used in the manufacture of bidis (small cigars). The 
Act had established that no one except the Government could 
buy and sell the leaves. All trading would be chanalised 
through the government. The Act further imposed restrictions 
on the movement of the leaves to and from the territorial units 
created by the Act. A permit was required to move the leaves 
from place to place. The purpose was to stop anyone else 
from buying and selling the leaves. The petitioners, bidi- 
manufacturers, complained that once they had bought the leaves 
from the government they should not be put to the inconvenience 
of obtaining permits every time they moved the leaves from 
their warehouses to their sub-contractors who, in turn, moved 
them to the dwellings of rollers of bidi.
The Supreme Court held that the elaborate provisions 
restricting the movement of the leaves by obliging traders 
to obtain permits were not basically and essentially part of
923. AIR, 1970, S\.C.129.
the monopoly. They were incidental provisions and hence were 
liable to be tested for their reasonableness. Since these 
provisions also affected the petitioners1 property right under 
Article 19(1)(f) and the constitutional mandate of free inter­
state commerce (Article 304(b)), they were to be examined in 
the light of each of these provisions. But the Court held 
that the requirements of reasonableness under these three pro­
visions were the same and therefore, could be examined together.
The petitioner was compelled to obtain permits even 
after he had bought the leaves from the State, even after he 
had acquired ownership over them. The Court held that the 
object of the Act and the nature of the trade in the State 
justified the need for permits till the leaves were taken to 
the sub-contractors to be distributed to rollers of bidis. 
Insistence on permits after that stage was held to be un­
reasonable. The impugned law was clearly an example of
a badly thought-out nationalisation measure.
The Supreme Court was faced with yet another challenge
924to a nationalisation measure in R.C. Cooper v. Union.
The Banking Companies(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) 
Ordinance (8 of 1969, dated July 19th, 1969), and the Act (22 
of 1969) which replaced it, nationalised fourteen named Indian 
banks, all of which had deposits exceeding Rs.50 crores. The 
Act replaced these named banks with new statutory banks which 
succeeded to the rights and liabilities of the named banks. 
Provision was made for the payment of compensation. Section 4
924. AIR, 1970, S.C.564.
of the Act vested in the Union government the entire under­
taking in the named banks and further prohibited them from 
engaging in the business of banking as defined in Section 5(b) 
of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. They were, however, 
expressly enabled by Section 15(2)(e) to carry on any business 
other than banking.
The question that the Supreme Court posed was, were 
there any means by which the named banks could engage in any 
other business? The Court was thinking of the compensation 
that might be paid them and which they might use to set them­
selves up in any new venture.
The provisions of the Act dealing with compensation 
envisaged that a major part of the payment would be in the 
form of Government securities which matured after a period 
of ten years but which were marketable at any time.
The majority in the Supreme Court came to the conclu­
sion that the petitioners and their banks were rendered in­
capable of engaging in any business whatsoever because no 
immediate compensation money was made available to them.
If compensation paid is in such a form that 
it is not immediately available for re-start- 
ing any business, declaration of the right 
to carry on business other than banking be­
comes an empty formality, when the entire 
undertaking of the named banks is transferred 
to and rests in the new banks together with 
the premises and the names of the banks, and 
the named banks are deprived of the services 
of its administrative and other staff. 925
This finding added a new dimension to the law relating
925. AIR, 1970, S.C.564, 602, col.l (para.76).
to nationalisation vis-a-vis the right guaranteed by Article 
19(10(g). The majority view appears to be that the State 
not only deprived the petitioners of their regular business 
but also deferred payment of compensation, as a result of 
which the petitioners were left with nothing to do, finan­
cially unable as they were to start any other venture - an
926arguable conclusion under the circumstances.
This could also be described as the Court’s view of 
how compensation is to be paid when an industry or trade is 
nationalised. ihe adequacy of compensation is the other 
question.
The sole dissenting judge, A.N. Ray J. (as he then was) 
took the view that lack of immediate resources to fund the 
petitioners* new trade was no ground of attack on the consti­
tutionality of the Act. Once the payment of compensation 
was clearly provided for there was nothing more the Consti­
tution required. The question whether there were enough 
funds available to the petitioner to carry on some other 
trade was (in his view) not relevant in the case.
Besides Article 19(1)(g), 19(1)(f) was also invoked 
by the petitioners. This would be dealt with in the next 
section on property rights.
927The decision in R.C. Cooper is considered the
926. But now The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, 
provides in Article 31(2) that the payment of compensation 
by the State could not be challenged on the ground that "the 
whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise 
than in cash**.
927. Above, ,
direct cause for the enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Fifth
928Amendment) Act» 1971, Section 3 of the Act is by far
the most novel provision affecting the rights in Articles 14, 
19, and 31. in practice, it would be Article l9(l)(g) and 
(f) that are likely to be seriously curbed.
3. Insertion of new article 31C.
After article 31B of the Constitution, 
the following article shall be inserted, 
namely:-
Saving of laws giving effect to certain 
directive principles.
31C. Notwithstanding anything contained in 
article 13, no law giving effect to 
the policy of the State towards secur­
ing the principles specified in clause
(b) or clause (c) of article 39 shall 
be deemed to be void on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with, or takes away 
or abridges any of the rights conferred 
by article 14, article 19 or article 31;
The rest of Section 3 held invalid by the Supreme Court re-
929recently in Kesavananda Bharathi v. Kerala was as follows:
•••; and no law containing a declaration 
that it is for giving effect to such policy 
shall be called in question in any court on 
the ground that it does not give effect to 
such policy.
Provided that where such law is made by 
the Legislature of a State the provisions 
of this article shall not apply thereto 
unless such law, having been reserved for 
the consideration of the President, has 
received his assent.
One final point on the subject of State commercial ventures
is that Article 29b of the Constitution provides:
928. keceived Presidential assent and published in the Gazette
of India on 20/4/72, pt.II-S. 1, Bxt. p.79. For the state­
ment of Objects ana Keasons, oazette of India, Pt.II-S, 2, 
Jbxt. p.492.
929. AIK, 1973, S.C. 1461.
Power to carry on trade, etc, - The execu­
tive power of the Union and of each state 
shall extend to the carrying on of any trade 
or business and to the acquisition, holding 
and disposal of property and the making of 
contracts for any purpose;
• • •  • • *  • • • • • • • « •  •
The article was given this form by the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act > 1956, by way of confirmation of the decision
930of the Supreme Court in Ram jawaya v, Punjab, There it
was held that the executive power of the union extended to 
carrying on the business of publishing school text-bobks, 
in doing so, the state executive need not show a legislative 
enactment in support provided the action of the executive 
did not infringe upon any of the fundamental rights guaran­
teed.
To sum up, it is clear that India*s policy of 'mixed 
economy* is fully reflected m  the provisions of the Consti­
tution considered in this section. But nationalisation - the 
primary means by which the 'public sector' is created - enjoys 
no immunity from the requirements of ' Rule of Law' or judicial 
review. The provision enabling the state to create monopolies 
in its own favour has been construed strictly (Akadasi, above, 
382), in spite of the Twenty-Kifth Amendment, the scope of 
review in this area is still substantial. There is more 
potential here than the Indian Supreme Court has admitted 
hitherto. The policy of non-interference pursued by the 
Courts is commendable insofar as the State must have consider­
able discretion m  economic matters. But non-interference 
should be informed restraint rather than total judicial
930, AIR, 1955, S.C. ; (1955) 2 S.C.R.225,
abstinence.
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to 
briefly examine an aspect of reasonableness that has present­
ed the Indian Supreme Court with some problems, in a batch 
of three or so cases, the Court was asked to review laws 
passed by the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh banning the 
slaughter of cows and calves. The laws were enacted to 
respect deep Hindu sentiments on the question. The cow - 
•provider of milk equal to one's own mother's milk* , as many 
Hindus gratefully describe it - is venerated as much m  Indian 
folk lore (which is largely secular) as in religious litera­
ture. The fact that cattle is the basis of livelihood in 
rural India ana the undeniable need for the progeny of the 
cow in agriculture still do not provide an entirely ' rational' 
explanation for the powerful sentiments Hindus entertain in 
protecting the Cow. The generally meek, and at times stoic, 
Hindu becomes violent when he sees, or is told that a cow is 
being slaughtered. Those Hindues who say that they are pre­
pared to agree to some 'humane* method of slaughtering decre­
pit cows are a modern minority who see the issue differently. 
Whatever the Hindu sentiments, the Muslim butchers who chal­
lenged these cow-protection laws did not share them. In
o30aMohd. Hanif (Xxareshi v. Bihar they claimed that their
fundamental right to trade as butchers was unreasonably re­
stricted by the U.P. Prevention of Cow-Slaughter Act, 1955, 
and C.P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, These two 
impugned laws prohibited not only slaughter of cows and calves
930a. AIR, 1958, S.C.731, (1959) S.C.R.629,
(of all ages) but also bulls, bullocks ana heifer. So at 
first glance, it would appear that the laws went beyona what 
was strictly required in terms of Hindu sentiments. The 
Supreme Court, rightly, did not regard such sentiments as the 
basis of discussion in the case. It affirmed that the Muslim 
petitioners' fundamental right was violated by the ban imposed 
and on that finding, proceeded to examine the reasonableness of 
the provisions of the impugned laws. But as we^hall see, the 
Court's view of reasonableness in the case did take into ac­
count the sentiments of the Hindu majority.
After a detailed examination of the position of cattle 
in India, the milk production and other related matter, the 
Court agreed with Lora Lithgow who had earlier commented, "The 
cow and the working bullock have on their patient back the 
whole structure of Indian a g r i c u l t u r e . F r o m  this, the 
Court concluded that there was some justification for the pro­
tection extended to milking cows, she-buffaloes and working 
bullocks. In the next stage of its reasoning, the Court 
seemed to urge the futility of preserving useless cows. The 
work done by charitable trusts which ram homes and sanctua­
ries for useless and old cows, the Court pointed out, was 
economically impossible to justify. Having said this much 
the court went on to hold constitutional the total ban on the 
slaughter of cows and calves,thus clearly showing a concession 
to Hindu sentiments. Admittedly, Article 48, a directive of 
of the Constitution, was framed with the intention of protect-
930b. Quoted in the Report on the Marketing of cattle in India. 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 20.
m g  the cow fully.930c This was taken into account by the
The Court aid hold unreasonable the ban on
buffaloes and bulls that had become useless.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court made no more
concessions to Hindu sentiments which tried to extend protect­
ion to such useless buffaloes and bulls. In Abdul Hakim v.
were above the age of twenty years. The Supreme Court accept­
ed expert opinion to the effect that on an average such cattle 
in India did not survive to that age. So the rule based on 
twenty years was practically a total ban on the slaughter of 
the animals. The Court struck down the statute as imposing 
unreasonable restrictions.
On the whole, these decisions dealing with such deli­
cate issues as the cases did, are satisfactory. They have 
firmly drawn a line which represents a reasonable compromise 
between the requirements of the two communities, Hindus and 
Muslims.
930c. A plain reading of Article 48 does show this:
48. organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry.- 
The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture 
and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines 
and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving 
and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaugh­
ter, of cows and calves and other mibh and draught 
cattle.
930d. For a comment on this and other aspects of the case, see 
J.D.M. Derrett at (1958) 8 I.C.L.Q., 221-4, and also at 
(1961) 10 I.C .L.Q., 914-6, where he comments generally, 
"The India which expresses herself in terms of concepts 
that were originally Western has won these rounds of a 
contest which is waged relentlessly by ' Indian* India."
Bihar,930e the impugned law banned their slaughter until they
930e. AIR, 1961, S.C.448.
SECTION 2(b): LICENSING MEASURES AS RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT 
UNDER ARTICLE 19(1 )(g)
Licensing measures have been scrutinized; by Indian 
Courts not merely with reference to Article 19(1)(g) but 
also in respect of the right guaranteed in Article 14, Con­
ferring wide or excessive direction on executive officers 
has been construed as offending against either Article 14 or
any one of the rights in Article 19(1), depending on the 
931case. Excessive delegation (Delegatus non potest dele­
gare) is a separate principle which may also be a ground for
932declaring statutes invalid.
A discretion would be held wide if no recognizable
L
standards governing its exercise are laid down either by
933the law itself or the rules made under it, the objection 
being that fairness in the administration could not be en­
sured if no standards or criteria are previously determined 
and known. Licensing statutes are particularly vulnerable 
to a charge of lack of definite standards. A full review 
of the law relating to licensing is beyond the scope of this 
work. Since the main concern here is Article 19(l)(g), the 
following summary of the law is produced.
(1) Flowing from the fundamental right in Article 
19(1)(g) there is a right to compete for a licence* The
931* Dwarka Prasad v. Uttar Pradesha AIR (1954), S*C;R.982.
R.M. Seshadri~v. District Magistrate. AIR, 1954, S.C.747.
932* In re Delhi Laws Act* 1912, (1951) S.C.R.747.
933. Asit Ranjan v. Calcutta Dock Board, AIR, 1961, Cal. 365.
Indian Supreme Court has disagreed with the view expressed in
934Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne that a licence amounted to a
935privilege and that there was no general right to it* More­
over, in view of Article 14, not only is there a right to com­
pete for a licence but there is also a right to expect that 
all the applicants to the licence will be treated equally 
(provided they qualify for the licence in terms of the con­
ditions laid down in the statute)* Any real, and not imag­
ined, discriminatory practice, could fruitfully be brought to
936the Court’s notice* Ihese rights are subject to such
factors as municipal planning and other decisions of local
authorities relating to factual details or decisions of any
’domestic tribunal*. Thus in T.B. Ibrahim v* The Regional
937Transport Authority, the Supreme Court held that it was 
for the transport authorities to decide where the central 
bus station of a town should be located* Therefore, the 
petitioner who had owned the site where the Bus Station was 
until it was shifted to a municipally-owned site, could not 
complain* The loss of income he suffered as a result of the
934* L.R. (1951) A.C.66*
935* Shri Bhagwan v* Ramchand; AIR,'1965 ^ S.C.1767* Rameshwar v* 
District Magistrate* AIR, 1954, All, 144*
936. C.S.S. Motor Service v* Madras, I.L.R. (1953) Madras, 304*
But what ever principles be adopted as criteria for 
making the selection among the applicants, it is 
necessary that they should be applied uniformly and 
without differentiation, as if they had been enact­
ed as part of the statute.
Per Justice T.L.V.WrtkoctoLY'c^a-Ayyar, Ibid., 344.
937. AIR, 1953, S.C.79.
move was held not relevant to the case. He did not have 
a fundamental right to be licensed to carry on his business 
in any place he might choose# The right was subject to 
the 1 interests <f the general public’ which in the case, took 
the form of public convenience and comfort.
(2) Courts could be persuaded to declare a restriction
reasonable if the discretion to impose the restriction vests
in an officer of senior rank whose accountability is greater
938in comparison with minor officials. However, that is not
necessarily conclusive.
(3) If the discretion is vested in a minor official, 
the Courts would wish to see that his decisions to grant or 
refuse licenses are properly supervised to ensure fairness.
(4) A good and convincing indication of such super-
939vision is the availability of appeal to a higher authority.
But the absence of appeal need not be always fatal to the
940question of constitutionality# In any event, barring
resort to a court would be unreasonable in matters of licen- 
941sing.
(5) The administration of licensing statutes should 
be in accordance with their objects, i.e. to achieve the 
objects set out therein. Extraneous or irrelevant consider-
938. Chinta Lingam v. Government of India, AIR, 1971, S.C.474.
939. Harichand Sarda v. Mizo District Council, AIR, 1967, S.C. 
829. Dwarka Prasad v. Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1954, S.C.224.
940. Chinta Lingam v. Government of India, AIR, 1971, S.C.474.
941. Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co., AIR, 1964, 
S.C. 1279.
at ions should not figure in granting or refusing licenses.
Where a Muslim butcher’s licence was cancelled because 
the Hindu residents of the locality objected to his selling 
beef, it would amount to an unreasonable restriction on his 
right* Only the breach of conditions imposed by the licen­
sing statute would justify cancellation of his licence. What
the residents of the locality felt would be irrelevant to the 
942case.
(6) A licensing statute should be clear and workable.
If vagueness and inconsistencies prevail the statute may be 
declared unconstitutional under Article 19(1) (g).^3
Thus the actual administration of licensing statutes 
comes under greater scrutiny than the substantive area con­
sisting of limitations imposed on the right to trade. There 
is no doubt at all that Indian courts have kept a * low pro­
file* in regard to Article 19(1)(g) * A pronounced judicial 
presence which appears to interfere with economic and busi­
ness regulations is likely to be strongly criticised by 
economists, policy-makers, administrators, but perhaps also 
by lawyers themselves. Though it appears that the Indian 
Supreme Court did lay down rather sweeping rati ones in re­
gard to matters like trade in liquor or business of conduct­
ing cross-word competitions, the Court’s reticence or restraint, 
it is submitted, is to be approved.
942. Abdul Hameed Md. Hayat v. Town Municipality, AIR, 1965, Mys. 
281.
943. Kandaswamy v. Textile Commissioner, I.L.R. [1953] Madras 51. 
As it Ranjan v. Calcutta Dock Labour Board, AIR, 1961, Cal. 
365 . Harakchand v. Union, AlR, 1970, S .C .1453.
Therefore, if Article 19(1 )(g), in practice, happens to 
be one of the weaker rights guaranteed by Article 19 the reason 
for it lies not with the judiciary but with Parliament, which 
interferes with the exercise of the right on account of what 
it sees to be public interest and the Constitution itself 
which permits nationalisation and state enterprise in other 
forms. In spite of the central role of the State as an entre­
preneur, it is not true to say that judicial review does not 
cover this field. As we have seen, many aspects of a national­
isation law can be examined for their reasonableness.
SECTION 2(c): REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO ACQUIRE,
HOLD AND DISPOSE OF PROPERTY
The nature and extent of the restrictions that could be 
imposed on this right and the scope %of judicial review of the 
measures imposing the restrictions are questions that have 
infested Indian Constitutional Law from early days. While 
framing the provisions relating to property rights, the Indian 
Constituent Assembly was aware that different views were held 
on the subject by the members. There was some anxiety not to 
succumb to the well-known propensity of issues relating to pro­
perty to take an ideological, dogmatic, course leading to irre­
concilable disputes.
This anxiety to get a general agreement seems, in retro­
spect, not to have been such a wise move, and one would have 
liked to see a fuller and franker discussion which would have 
reduced the extent of the controversies produced in subsequent
years. The views prevailing in the Assembly could be roughly
9 4 4
divided into three categories: (a) The views held by the
’progressives* who wanted equal distribution of wealth achiev­
ed through such measures as nationalisation, land reforms, free
945universal education and employment opportunities, etc. This
944. See also H.C.L. Merillat, *A Historical Footnote to Bela 
Banerjee’s Case1, 1 J.I.L.I. (iqrSr), 375-401. The three 
groups mentioned here are substantial* the same as those 
mentioned by H.C.L. Merillat, but has a rather more general 
reference.
945. Professor K.T. Shah provided the intellectual power in sup­
port of these views. There were others who independently, 
in their own way, expressed such views. See, CAD. 9, 1271.
view opposed the very idea of guaranteeing the right to pro­
perty. It recognized no right to private property. How­
ever, in comparison with the other two schools of thought 
this did not exert much of an influence in the Assembly.
(b) The second set of views, though inclined to sympathise 
with •progressive* ideals, yet wished to see some form of 
guarantee which might be suitably phrased to allow the legis­
lature to enact extensive measures of nationalisation and land 
reform. In later years, this group would prevail over the
others. They admitted the principle that compensation should
be paid for private property compulsorily acquired by the 
State for public purposes, but made exceptions in such cases
as the abolition of the Zamindari estates. This school of 
946thought which now prevails in India has gradually enlarged
such exceptions, from Zamindari abolition, to land ceiling -
947and now to nationalisation. A great deal of controversy
centres upon this development.
(c) Thirdly, there was the traditional view in favour of proper
948guarantees. The * traditionalists* could have been persuad­
ed to agree to limited nationalisation measures but they would
946. Jawaharlal Nehru belonged to this group. He made a dis­
tinction between acquisition for regular public purposes 
and acquisition with social and economic reform in view, 
in the former type of casest he was willing to see full 
compensation but in the latter type of case^ he doubted the 
principle of full compensation. See C .A.D., 9, 1192.
947. See the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971,
See Appendix I.
948. Certainly K.M. Munshi and Sardar Patel would have to be 
put under this category.
have insisted on full compensation being paid for whatever 
loss is caused to the individual citizen* All three groups, 
however, made an exception in favour of Zamindari abolition*
But one gets the impression that unfortunately these 
three groups never adequately articulated their views in the 
Assembly itself* One certainly misses a desirable and essen­
tial discussion of the kind of measures the future Governments 
of India (Union and State Governments) were to undertake* 
Details of that nature were lacking* Ihe excuse may well 
be that the Assembly was anxious to finish its work in a 
reasonably short time in order that the independent Govern­
ment of India might attend to its tasks or that information 
of that nature were not available then*
However, the following extract from the speech of a
member of the Assembly, Sri T.T. Krishnamachari, shows the
949somewhat unsatisfactory view of property rights arrived 
at by the Assembly at the end of the day;
We in this House, ' though the bulk of us be­
long to one party, have different ideas on 
economic matters* We were all together in 
one particular fact that the British should 
go; we are all united in the desire that we 
should have a stable Constitution which will 
ensure to the common man what he needs most, 
what he did not obtain in the former regime.
But in the achievement of that goal, our ideas 
vary considerably, and vary from one end to the 
other. I am happy to see that the Drafting 
Committee has chosen to avoid importing into
949. To further confound matters, the constitutional lawyers
in the Assembly gave conflicting (though it was not noticed 
at that time) views on the extent of judicial review /on 
account of * compensation* payable for acquired property.
See C .A.D;, 9, 1271-72, for Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar and 
C «A.D«. 9, 1299, for K.M. Munshi.
this particular article the economic implica­
tions in the enumeration of fundamental rights 
that obtadn in other constitutions.
••• ... ••• ...
I know a friend of mine in this House has ob­
jected to one particular sub-clause (f) of 
Article 13, namely, to acquire, hold and dis­
pose of property. I would like to assure him 
and those who hold the opinion that he holds 
that this does not really mean ... more than 
what any person even in an absolutely social­
istic regime will desire, that what he possess­
es, what are absolutely necessary for his life, 
the house in which he lives, the movables that 
he has to possess, the things which he has to 
buy, should be secured'to him, what I think 
any socialistic regime, unless it be commun­
istic, will concede, is a right that is due to 
an individual. 950
This is the closest to any summing up that was attempted dur-
✓
ing the debates of the Assembly and perhaps, the only attempted 
explanation of the ’philosophy* behind the property guarantee. 
The explanation has been largely j'ustified by the policies pur­
sued in the last twenty-four years. These have meant national­
isation of many sectors of Indian economy and strict control of 
private enterprise through an extensive bureaucracy which pur­
veys the licences and permits referred to above.
The explanation given by the member, however, was not
compatible with the text of the article, Article 13(1)(f) in
the draft, and Article 19(1)(f) now. There seems no reason
951for a court to give the interpretation canvassed by Sir 
T.T. Krishnamachari. But his explanation is retrospectively
950. C .A .D., Vol.7, 771-2, December 2, 1948.
951. As for the actual interpretation given by the Courts it
Mwould seem to indicate that the framers of the Constitution 
failed to realise that these large rights to property and — 
trade were incompatible with the obj'ectives of the Constitu­
tion and the directives of State policy which they were ' 
enunciating in Part IV of the Constitution.n MC. SetalvadL, 
The Indian Constitution. 1950-65» Bombay, 1967, 123.
951a
justified by the long course of amendments to Article 31. To
simplify and sum up a lengthy account, this view of property 
952rights has resulted in the Indian Parliament amending the 
original text of these provisions on several occasions.
Through those means decisions of the Supreme Court reviewing 
the reasonableness of measures affecting private property have 
been progressively nullified. The attitude of the Supreme 
Court has been to show the kind of regard for private property 
that is likely to be shown in a property-conscious but middle- 
of-the-road democracy. The Court has upheld any number of 
restrictions on property as being in the interests of the 
public.953
The real and perhaps only difficulty has been that
954the Court has always insisted on full compensation being 
paid for private property acquired by the State while the
951a.Notably the First, Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Amendment Acts.
For a discussion of these amendments, see R.S. Gae, ’Land'
Law in India; With Special Reference to the Constitution*,
22 *»C.L«Q. (1973) 312-328.
952. For a detailed account, see H.C.L. Merillat, Land and the 
Constitution of India. Columbia University Press, 1970, and 
H.M. Jain, Right to Property under the Indian Constitution, 
Property right in the context of nationalisation is dealt 
with in R;S. Gaea The Bank Nationalisation JCase and the Con­
stitution. Bombay, N.H. Tripathi, 197i. A compilation of 
essays looking at property right from different angles is 
found in Property Relations tn ’ Independent India, The Indian 
Law Institute, New belhi, 1967.
953. Below,
954. See T.S. Rama Rao, ’The Problem of Compensation and its 
Justiciability in Indian Law’, 4 J.I.L.I. (1962) 481-509.
V.S. Rekhi, ’Courts and Compensation* 4 Aligarh Law Journal, 
(1969) 1-55.
Court has maintained ( understandably) that they could not 
possibly afford to fulfil that condition and at the same 
time hope to benefit the public at large# The contest has 
been between full compensation as a basic ingredient of con- 
stitutional reasonableness and a ’socialistic* view that, in 
a largely poor and under-privileged country, if full compen­
sation were to be paid the rich would get richer and the poor 
poorer* Neither of these views has met the other in a com­
promise*
If that is the case what would abe a third view - the 
view of a neutral but sympathetic observer? First, he is 
likely to notice that the basis on tdiich the Legislature 
claims to avoid paying full compensation is too general 
(”to aid social progress” or ’’for sweeping land reforms” )*
In the absence of adequately understood stages in socio­
economic reforms - understood by the Government and by the 
majority of (at least the educated) people - a neutral obser­
ver is likely to say that it need not only be a love of pro­
perty which prompts one to insist that as a general rule 
reasonable compensation should be paid for a private property 
acquired by the State. There is always a danger than an un­
fair administration may possibly victimise a class or commun­
ity or even an individual by holding out the threat of compul­
sory acquisition of their or his or her properties. Much as 
one would like to sympathise with the point of view of the 
Government of India, these dangers could not be ignored.
' This matter, it should be recognized, involves questions of 
equal treatment.
It is gratifying to note that so far as is known, no 
such threates of victimisation have been held out against 
any community or individual in India. But if conditions 
permit unreasonable acts may be committed. That is so 
anywhere in the world.
One other point a neutral observer may make is that
955it is not advisable to insist on barring judicial review 
without first clarifying the extent to which and the precise 
circumstances under which the less-than-full compensation is 
to be paid. Clearly, this has not been done in India and as 
a result, a neutral observer is likely to be left with too 
many unanswered doubts and questions. These considerations 
do tell upon the question of reasonableness. Hence, a brief 
mention has been made of them.
The issue of compensation was undoubtedly the main 
issue. But clouding every issue in regard to property 
rights was, and still is, the chaos created by the multipli­
cation of provisions all put together in a misleading manner.
The inter-relationship between Article 19(1)(f) on the one
956hand, and Article 31(1) and (2) each considered separately,
955. By creating a ninth schedule to the Constitution and includ­
ing in it a number of statutes connected with land tenure, 
the Indian Parliament has made the entire schedule non-justi­
ciable on account of fundamental rights to equality (Article 
14), property (Article 31) and the rights in Article 19.
956. 3L• Compulsory acquisition of property -
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by 
authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requi­
sitioned save for a public purpose and save by autho­
rity of a law which provides for compensation for the 
property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes 
the amount of the compensation or specifies the prin­
ciples on which, and the manner in which, the compen­
sation is to be determined and given; and no such
/Cont* d. on next page:
on the other, forms one of the two main questions in the law 
relating to property rights. Thus complimentary to the 
career of the law of compensation (which is the other quest­
ion) is the extension of the Courts* power to pronounce upon 
the reasonableness of a restriction under Article 19(1)(f) to
Note 956 - contined from 407:
law shall be called in question in any court on the 
ground that the compensation provided by that law is 
not adequate.
(2a)where a law does not provide for the transfer of the 
ownership or right to possession of any property to 
the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by 
the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the' 
compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, 
notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his 
property.
(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by 
the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless 
such law, having been reserved for the consideration 
of the President, has received his assent.
(4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Con­
stitution in the Legislature of a state has, after it 
has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for 
the consideration of the President and has received 
his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this 
Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be 
called in question in any court on the ground that it 
contravenes the provisions of clause (2).
(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect -
(a) the provisions of any existing law other than a' 
law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply,or
(b) the provisions of any law which the State may 
hereafter make -
(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any 
tax or penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion of public health, or the 
prevention of danger to life or property, or
(iii)in pursuance of any agreement entered into 
between the Government of the Dominion of 
India or the Government of India and the 
Government of any other country, or otherwise 
with respect to property declared by law to 
be evacuee property.
957compulsory acquisition under Article 31(1) and (2)* One
may begin to discuss this development by asking the question:
Is the requirement of constitutional reasonableness in Article 
19(1)(f) and 19(5) extendable to Article 31(1) and (2) (which 
deal particularly with what conditions are to be fulfilled be­
fore private property could be compulsorily acquired)?
It may be noticed that a similar question was asked in 
A.K. Gopalan in relation to Article 19(1)(d). The precise 
question there was: Could the requirement of reasonableness
in Article 19(1 )(d) and 19(4) be extended to Articles 21 and 
22, which deal particularly with what conditions are to be 
fulfilled before a person could be preventively detained?
The answer given was that given the nature of preventive 
detention there was no question of meaningfully examining 
its reasonableness. The Constitution itself has provided 
for it and there was nothing the Court could do. While ex­
pressing this point it was also held Article 19 could not be 
extended to other provisions of the chapter on fundamental 
rights.
Coming to the question of property rights two deci­
sions of the Supreme Court gave answers similar to what was 
done in A.K. Gopalan. It was held in West Bengal v. Subodh
957. The two outstanding decisions in the entire law of property 
rights are perhaps, K.K. Kochuni v. Kerala, AIR, 1960, S.C. 
1080, and R.C. Cooper v. Union,’""AIR, 1^70, S.C.584. Though 
they may seem hard on the Government they have laid down the 
law more clearly than any of the other decisions.
Gopal 958 and Dwarkadas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving CoM 959 
that Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 dealt with different 
areas of the subject of property and were mutually exclusive* 
Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed the right to citizens only while 
Article 31(1) and (2) applied to every person in the Union of 
India* The latter came into operation whenever there was a 
* substantial1 deprivation of the rights of ownership over pro­
perty*
Patanjali Sastri, the then Chief Justice of India, 
described Article 19(1 )(f) as dealing with the general right 
of the citizen to own property while Article 31(2) dealt with 
the incidents of ownership over specific items of property*
He equated the former with Article 17(1) of the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights:
Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with 
others *
So according to the Chief Justice every citizen irrespective 
of his community or sect or race was entitled to own property*960
Non-discrimination between classes of citizens is 
guaranteed separately in Articles 14, 15 and 16* Artcicles 
25, 29 and 30 enable minority institutions to own property and 
administer them themselves* In view of that the Chief
958. A ir I s.c. 9 3 ,.
959. Air W 5 t+ s.c- H 4*,, (135-i O  s-c-r. &Tif.
960. Vide Sections 111 and 298 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, referred to by the Chief Justice.
* • • 061 Justice*s opinion loses much of its force. It was speci­
fically overruled by the Supreme Court in S.M. Transports Ltd.
962v. Sankaraswamigal,
QZL o
In Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, the analogy between pro­
perty rights in Article 31(1) and (2) and the ratio in A.K.
Gopalan with respect to preventive detention was admitted by 
Supreme Court itself.
Wherever there was a compulsory acquis ition, the owner 
had lost his title to the property and therefore, could not 
invoke Articlel9(l)(f) or 19(5) since both of them presupposed 
a title to hold and dispose of property. This was exactly a 
parallel to the ratio that since a person has lost his freedom 
by being preventively detained he could not invoke Article 
19(1) (d) since that presupposed a free individual*.
Thus the reasonableness test was strictly confined to 
Article 19 which was distinguished from the rest through the 
notion that the different articles in the fundamental rights 
part formed 1 self-contained codes* concerned with particular 
matters•
A break came in this line of thinking when in K,K,
964Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala the majority in
961. However, see Jagat Narain, ‘Equal Protection Guarantee and 
the Right of Property under the Indian Constitution*, (1966), 
Vol«15/jI.C»L.Q., 199-230, who argues that in property mat­
ters the Legislature should have greater discretion to clas­
sify and distinguish in view of the greater disparities of 
wealth between sections cf the Indian society.
962. R\& S.C.
963. AIR, 1955, S.C.41.
964. AIR, 1960, S.C.1080.
the Supreme Court held that any law depriving an individual 
of his property should be justified as a reasonable restrict­
ion under Article 19(5). When the property is ‘acquired or 
requisitioned1 by the State, Article 31(2) would apply and 
not Article 19(5). But in all the other cases, Article 19(5) 
would govern. The Supreme Court j'ustified this departure on 
two grounds:
(a) After the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, intro-
965duced Clause 2A to Article 31(2) that provision and 
Article 31(1) became distinct - the former should be con­
fined to direct State acquisition or requisition of pri­
vate property and the latter read with Article 19(5) to 
govern all other forms of deprivation. What the Court 
did was to afford the protection of j'udicial review to 
such cases of ‘non-acquisition* which nevertheless re­
sulted in a loss to the o w n e r . I t  seems right that 
the reasonableness of such measures should be tested by 
the Court.
(b) The Court distinguished the ratio in A.K. Gopalan on the 
basis that while Article 19(1)(d) guaranteed freedom of 
movement Article 21 dealt with the wider concept of
965. (2A) Where a law does not provide for the ownership or
right to possession of any property to the State or to
a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall 
not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition 
or requisition J.of property, notwithstanding that it de­
prives any person of his property.
966. Chiranjit Lai v. Union, AIR, 1951, S.C.41, and Dwarkadas 
Sreemvas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co., AIR, 1954, 
S.C. 119, (1954), S.C.R.674.
1 personal liberty* and hence the two provisions could not
be read together. But in the case of Article 19(1 )(f)
and Article 31(1), it was held, that both were about the
967same matter of deprivation of property otherwise than 
through compulsory acquisition.
A second decisive step was taken by the Supreme Court 
in this development in R.C. Cooper v. Union, where the Court 
extended the reasonableness test to cases of ’acquisition and 
requisition* under Article 31(2) as well.968 There the Court 
rejected the A.K. Gopalan ratio in these words:
To argue that state action which deprives 
a person permanently or temporarily of his 
right to property or personal freedom, oper­
ates to extinguish the right or the remedy 
is to reduce the guarantee to an empty 
platitude. 969
It was held that Articles 19(5) and Clauses (1) and (2) of 31 
were parts of a single scheme and therefore, had to be con­
sidered together. This meant that the test of reasonable
restrictions under Article 19(1)(f) had been fully extended
970to all possible cases affecting property. The Court,
967. In ean earlier decision, Narendra Kumar v# Union, AIR, 1960,
X U A  S.C. 430, (1960) 2 S .C. R . 375 ,^the C ourt had held that re-
J striction under Article 19 could, under certain circumstances 
amount to total prohibition of the exercise of the right 
guaranteed. The Supreme Court in Kochuni relied on that 
decision in extending Article 19(1)(f) to areas which it 
should legitimately cover.
968. AIR, 1970, S.C .564$ The case is also known as the Bank 
Nationalisation case.
969. AIR, 1970, S.C.564, 593, col.l (para.46-A). See above,38*?*
970. Except the limited number arising under Article 31(5)(b):
31(5) Nothing in clause 2 shall affect -
(b) The provisions of any law which the State may 
hereafter make -
(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax 
or penalty, or
/Cont*d. on next page:
however, laid down that where a law of compulsory acquisition 
was clearly in the public interest, i.e. for a public purpose, 
it might be assumed to be reasonable in the substantive sense.
The law could still be scrutinized to see if it satisfied the 
requirements of procedural reasonableness. An example given 
by the Court was where the law sets up a tribunal to deter­
mine the amount of compensation but does not afford the owner 
a hearing before the tribunal, then it would be unreasonable 
on procedural grounds.
In a case decided two years earlier, Madhya Pradesh v.
971Ranojirao Shinde the Supreme Court had laid down yet an­
other new proposition which was that where a deprivation of 
property wasnot for any ostensible public purpose but merely 
to benefit the State exchequer then the law would come under 
Article 19(5) and can be declared an unreasonable restriction.
The M.P. Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963, laid down that 
certain cash grants executed by the erstwhile Rajas of the 
princely states included in the State of Madhya Pradesh need 
not be continued. These grants, in favour of certain indi­
viduals, were more in the style of feudal pensions for ser­
vices rendered or in some cases simply gratuitous.
The result was that the State was saved the expenses
Note 970 - continued from 413:
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the pre­
vention of danger to life or property, or
(iii)in pursuance of any agreement entered into be­
tween the Government of the Dominion of India 
or the Government of India and the Government 
of any other country, or otherwise, with re­
spect to property declared by law to be evacuei 
property.
971. AIR, 1968, S.C.1053.
it had incurred in meeting the payments. Its obligation 
arising out of its succession to the princely states was 
thus at an end.
It is true that the abolition of the cash 
grants would augment the resoucres of the 
State but that cannot be considered as a 
public purpose under Art*31 (2). If it is 
otherwise it would be permissible for the 
legislatures to enact laws acquiring the 
public debts due from the State, the annuity 
deposits returnable by it and provident fund 
payable by it by providing for the payment 
of some nominal compensation to the persons 
whose rights are acquired ... 972
Thus it seems the Court*s apprehension was in regard to set­
ting up an undesirable precedent. Such caution is under­
standable in a constitutional bench.
973The ratio in R.C. Cooper has now been nullified 
by yet another amendment. The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment) Act, 1971ij provides in Section 2(b) that Article 
19(1)(f) will not apply to cases arising under Article 31(2). 
This directly nullifies R.C. Cooper v. Union. The decision 
in K.K. Kochuni establishes that there are cases of depriva­
tion of an individual* s property otherwise than by acquisition 
under Article 31(2). The applicability of Article 19(1)(f) 
to such cases, it seems, is still the current law and The 
Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act. 1971, has not 
overruled that position. If that is the case there may 
yet be some protection left to cases covered by the ratio 
in K.K. Kochuni. But all this is subject to the overriding 
effect of the new Article 31-C introduced by the Twenty-
972. Ibid., 1057.
973. AIR, 1970, S.C.564.
Fifth Amendment Act*
There are a number of decisions in Indian courts given 
squarely on Article 19(1)(f) itself, thus rendering that pro­
vision meaningful enough for us to take it seriously. But 
before those cases are dealt with, a useful preliminary point 
may be mentioned. What is the * property* protected by Art­
icle 19(1)(f)? Reading the text it may appear that it is 
only property that one may * acquire, hold and dispose of* 
that is protected by the article. * Property* is not de­
fined in the Constitution itself. There are other enact­
ments which define ‘immovable* and ‘movable* properties. 
Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act. 1897, defines im­
movable property as "land, benefits to arise out of land and 
things attached to the earth or permanently featured to any­
thing attached to the earth". It is, however, an inclusive 
definition.
Other enactments like the Indian Companies Act, 1956,
classify shares and stocks as movable property. There are,
of course, judicial decisions arising under the Transfer of
Property Act, 1872, which have defined the extent of pro-
974perties of different kinds.
As we have already seen in an early Supreme Court
975decision, Chiranjitlal v. Union, the question arose whether 
the right of a share-holder in a joint-stock company to vote 
in the election of directors and to vote to pass resolutions
974. D.F. Mulla, Transfer of Property,
975. AIR, 1951, S.C.41, (1950) SCR. 869.
in the meeting of share-holders would amount to ’property1 
one could ’acquire, hold and dispose of’ •
It may be recalled that the management of a company 
was taken over by Government-nominated directors after a 
shut-down of the company’s mills, it was alleged, through 
mismanagement•
Mukherj'ea J. (with whom Kania C.J. agreed) giving 
the main majority judgment held thats
The petitioner undoubtedly has been precluded 
from exercising his right of voting at the 
election of directors so long as the statu­
tory directors continue to manage the affairs 
of the company*
• •• ••• , • • • ••• •••
In my opinion, these are rights or privi­
leges which are appurtenant to or flow from 
the ownership of property, but by themselves 
and taken independently, they cannot be reckon­
ed as property capable of being acquired, held 
or disposed of as is contemplated by Article 
19(l)(f) of the Constitution* 976
It was held that the petitioner’s share was not taken away 
and he continued to receive his dividends. He had not lost 
the main incidents of his property over the share. The de­
finition of property adopted by Mukherj'ea J,, which has not 
been questioned, is that it consists of a bundle of rights
of ownership exercisable in relation to the obj*ect of pro-
„ 976aperty.
976. Ibid., 909, S.C.R.
976a,See Jagat Narain, n. 961 above, 4-/J • He is critical of
this view of property. He would prefer a more sociological 
view that takes into account the widespread poverty in India 
Many Indian writers are looking for a notion of property 
That will fit Indian needs as reflected in the policies pur- 
sured at present. For example, see A.R. Biswas, ’Property 
in a Changing Society’ (1973) 15 J.I«L,I,» 1-73. So far no 
definite propositions have emerged.
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This notion was also convenient when it came to the 
distinction made by the Supreme Court between 1 restrictions1 
under Article 19(1)(f) and Substantial deprivation* under 
Article 31(1) and (2). Restrictions that affected only a 
limited number of incidents of property were to be adjudged 
under Article 19(1)(f) while any substantial curb on most of 
the incidents of ownership attracted compensation under 
Article 31(2).977
Generally, the Indian Courts have regarded as property 
any beneficial, pecuniary interest* Thus the office of trus­
teeship of a religious institution with power of disposal over
978its properties has been declared to be property in itself.
But a mere power of management where no such beneficial inter­
est is derivable in favour of the office would not be property
979even if it is a hereditary position*
The type of office to which a beneficial interest as
U
attached and which, therefore, is property ara£e generally found 
in Hindu religious institutions where the head of the institu­
tion, e.g., Mahant has a personal interest in the properties 
endowed.^80 Special to Indian law are two particular matters.
977. West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, AIR, 1954, S.C .92. Dwarkadas v. 
Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co., AIR, 1954, S.C .119•
978. Commissioner, Hindu R.E. v. Lakshmindra, AIR, 1954, S.C.282, 
(1954) S.C.R.iOOS.
979. Bira Kishore Deb v. Orissa, AIR, 1964, S.C .1501.
980. For details, see J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State 
in India, Faber, London, 1968, 482 ff.
One is * evacuee property1 and the other is a right of pre- 
981emption.
With the partition of India (1947) into India and Paki­
stan, religious minorities in the two countries migrated across 
the borders leaving behind their properties which became 1 evac­
uee properties1 . A pool of such properties were created and 
distributed amongst such evacuees after they reached their new 
country on the basis of what they had left behind in the other 
country. In the administration of the allotment of such pro­
perties, the law recognized a quasi-permanent stage which meant 
that there was a provisional allotment in favour of a * dis­
placed person* while the title still inhered in the * evacuee* 
to whom it belonged before the partition of India. If such a 
quasi-permanent allotment were to be held, property and pro­
tection extended to it under Article 19(l)(f) the administra­
tion of the evacuee property laws would have become difficult#
goo
So rightly, it was held not to be property. But ease of
administration is no basis for dispensing with uniform stan­
dards in the computation of values of properties exchanged or 
983allotted. Nor is there any room for * expediency* with no
984other excuse or reason to support it.
The second matter of special, interest to Indian law,
981. The role of pre-emption in Islamic laws is ignored here.
982. Amar Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR, 1957, S.C. 
599, (195?) S.C.R.861.
983. Lachman Das v. Municipal Committee, Jalalabad, AIR, 1969, 
S.C. 1126.
984. Ibid.
1 pre-emption1, is a customary right especially strong in the 
provinces of Punjab and Haryana. in its simplest form it 
means that !A* has the right of first refusal to the pro­
perty situated next to his in case it is put on sale. In 
village communities it is unlikely that the owner of that 
neighbouring property would be any stranger. The two owners 
concerned would in all probability be relations, however dis­
tant. The strength of the claim to exercise this customary 
right made it necessary to pass legislation in some States of 
Northern India. The validity of these have been attacked on 
the ground that the right of pre-emption was an unreasonable 
restriction on the right of the owner to dispose of his pro­
perty to his liking.
4
After considerable disagreement between the High Courts,
the Indian Supreme Court held by a majority that the right of
pre-emption was unconstitutional in the light of the fundamental
985right guaranteed in Article 19(l)(f). However, where such
a right rested in a co-sharer or in any agnatic relation of 
theo owner, it would not be regarded as unconstitutional since
in these cases the existence of the right promoted family in-
• 4. 936tegrity.
A trade or a business would be property in most of its 
manifestations. A trading licence is property and hence, if 
it is cancelled arbitrarily both Article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g)
985. Bhau Ram v. Brij Nath, AIR, 1962, S.C .1476.
986. Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR, 1963, S.C.553, [1963] 3 S.C.R.858*
987would be violated.
Thus, one aspect of judicial review in the area of 
property is the declaration that a certain right is also a 
constitutionally protected right to property. Two illustra­
tions of this kind of declaration may be given here. In the
988first decision, Madhay Rao Scindia v. Union, the main issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether the action of the Indian 
Government in discontinuing the payment of * privy purses* to 
those ex-Rajas and ex-princes of Indian States was constitu­
tionally valid. Their right to receive the sums arose out of 
agreements entered into with the independent Government of 
India just before the Princely States were merged with the
rest of India. The Constitution provided that the agreements
989were not to be adjudicated upon by ordinary Courts of law#
But it also made provisions for the payment of the privy purses 
fromr out of the Consolidated Fund of India and laid down that 
Parliament and the State Legislatures were to pay »due regard* 
to the privileges given the ex-rulers
In the face of protests by the Union and the States 
that the whole question was a * political* matter, the Supreme 
Court declared that the ex-rulers* right to receive the privy 
purses was a fundamental right to property which could not be
987. Mineral Development Ltd. v. Bihar, AIR, 1960, S.C.468.
988. AIR, 1971, S.C.530.
989. Article 363.
990. Articles 291 and 362, since repealed by the Constitution 
(Twenty-vSixth) Amendment Act, 1971.
taken away without adequate compensation.
The decision of the Court, which has been criticised
991by many both on purely legal and wider general grounds, 
is perhaps the least defensible of all the decisions on pro­
perty matters.
The second illustration of a right being declared for
the first time as a right to property is to be found in
992Deokinandan Prasad v. Bihar. The appellant was denied
his pension after he was discharged from Government service 
for misconduct. That was in accordance with an executive 
order.
The Supreme Court held that a right to receive what­
ever pension was due was a right to property. It was not a 
bounty payable at the *sweet will* of the government.
While these decisions considered on their own may 
give the impression that the Indian Supreme Court has been 
too meticulous about the right to property,a look at other 
cases may make one qualify that impression.
The following examples from cases that frequently 
arise before the Courts may be given.
Tenancy legislation reducing the amount of rent
993chargeable by a landlord whether it be agricultural land,
991. See H.H. Seervai, * The Privy Purse Case: A Criticism* , LXXIV, 
Bombay Law Reporter (Journal), 37-49.
992. AIR, 1971, S.C .1409.
993. Madras v. Kannepalli, AIR, 1962, S.C .1687.
994or urban accommodation has been held to be reasonable.
In Vajrapani Naidu v. N.T.C. Talkies the Madras City 995 
Tenants Protection Act, 1922, was challenged with reference 
to Article 19(l)(f). The Act was enacted with the object 
of preventing eviction cf tenants who leased lands and built 
buildings on them with the expectation that as long as they 
paid their rents regularly they would not be evicted. in 
most cases, the lease agreements permitted the raising of 
such structures on the lands. But evictions became frequent 
after the inflationary trend following the European War, 1914- 
18, sent land values soaring. Section 9 of the Act provided 
that notwithstanding any contract to the contrary (with some 
specified exceptions mentioned in the Act) where a landowner 
sought to evict such a leashold tenant, the latter could apply 
to the Court to get an order that the landlord should sell the 
land at a price to be fixed under the Court’s supervisions.
The majority in the Supreme Court held:
The protection becomes effective only when 
the landlord seeks to obtain, in breach of 
the mutual understanding, benefit of the 
unearned increment in the land values, by 
instituting a suit in ejectment. It was 
manifestly in the interest of the general 
public to effectuate the mutual understand­
ing between landlords and tenants as to the 
duration of tenancies, and to conserve 
buildings for purposes for which the leases 
were granted. 995A
994. Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR, 1955, S.C.41.
995. AIR, 1964, S.C.1440. On questions of land use and. urbanisa­
tion^ see Law and Urbanisation in India, Indian Law Insti­
tute, Tripathi, Bombay, 19^97
995a.Ibid., 1444, col.2.
An interesting argument was produced in a case decided by the
Madras High Court that a ’restriction* under Article 19(5) could
not be a bestowing of rights on some at the expense of others.
The argument was raised in a tenancy case which affected the
rights of landlords adversely but increased the security of
996farm labourers attached to lands by custom.
The Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952, 
was passed under circumstances of violence and unrest amongst 
the cultivating tenants and farm labourers of Tanjore. The 
root-cause of the unrest appeared to be frequent dismissal of 
tenants and labourers by landowners who were unwilling to pay 
increased wages demanded by the former. The Act sought to 
remedy the situation by providing for the reinstatement of 
those dismissed within a certain date and provided for their 
undisturbed tenure for a period of five years.
The landowners pleaded Article 19(1) (f) and argued 
that none of them would be able to resume personal cultiva­
tion for the five-year period and all of them had to accept 
tenants thrust upon them by the Act.
The High Court upheld the Act as imposing only reason­
able restrictions. Firstly, it was held that the Act was to 
meet an emergeicy; and secondly, that it was a matter of general 
public interest to see that friction between agricultural 
labourers and landowners are resolved through State interven­
tion where necessary.
996. Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam, I.L.R. [1953] Mad.1114.
425.
The High Court rejected the contention that a restrict­
ion could only be negative in character and could not confer 
benefits on some at the expense of others. It was held that 
such a ’scholastic1 view of the meaning of ’restriction’ could 
not be read into Article 19.
Tax laws are subject to fundamental rights though it
has been held that the legislature should be regarded as having
a wide discretion in matters of taxation. It can choose the
subject matter of taxation and the means of realising tax 
997levied. An unauthorised tax levy would offend Article
19(l)(f). In other words, a tax levied by an unconstitutional 
law could also be hit by Article 19(l)(f).^98
099In Kantilal Babulal & Bros, v. H.C. Patel Section
12(a)(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, provided for for­
feiture of any sum collected by a dealer by way of sales tax 
in contravention of the provisions of the Act. The section 
was meant to be a penalty provision.
But the Act was silent as to how the provision' was to 
work. By reading the Act one obtained no idea as to how the 
fact of unauthorised collection was to be established and
997. Khadinge Bhat v . Agricultural I.T. Officer, AIR, 1963, S.C. 
591-594; Purushottam v. B.M. Desai,^IR, 1956, S.C .20; 
Twyford Tea Co. v. Kerala, AlR, 1^70, S.C.1133.
998. The decision in K.T. Moopil Nair v. Kerala, AIR, 1961, S.C; 
552, [1961] 3 S.C .R.^7, has ai r eady been referred to above,
(92-* There a law which violated Article 14 was also held 
to violate Article 19(1)(f).
999. AIR, 1968, S.C.445.
whether the dealer would be given an opportunity to present 
his case. From this the Court concluded that total discret­
ion existed in the tax authorities to impose the penalty 
under the impugned section in any way they wished. In the 
absence of any guiding principles whatosever, it was held 
that it operated as an unreasonable restriction on Article 
19(1)(f). A second ground for holding the section unreason­
able was that it provided no opportunity for a dealer accused 
of collecting unauthorised tax to rebut the charge.
In the Central India Spinning & Weaving Co. v. Muni­
cipal Committee the Supreme Court held that in constru­
ing a taxing statute, of two possible interpretations the one 
favourable to the citizen should be preferred and the one 
that imposed a greater burden on him should be rejected*
This seems to be another consequence of the right under 
Article 19(l)(f).
As has been briefly mentioned above, one cf the two 
1001important decisions that enhanced the importance of
Article 19(1)(f) was K.K. Kochuni v. States of Madras and 
1002Kerala. The petitioner was the holder of a feudal im-
1003partible estate, given to his ancestors for military
1000. AIR; 1958; S.C.341. Also see J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union, 
AIR, 1970, S.C .117.
1001. The other being R.C. Cooper v. Union, AIR, 1970, S.C .564, 
above•
1002. AIR, 1960, S.C.1080.
10 03. See J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, 
Bombay, O.U.P., 1963, 528.
services rendered to the Rajas of Cochin* The estate was 
described in Malabar Joint Family Law as ’sthanam’ and the 
holder the ’Sthanee**^004 Ordinarily, the estate was in­
herited by the senior male member of the joint family, the 
other members having no more than a right of maintenance* 
These junior members of the family (tarwad) claimed parti­
tion of the estate and unsuccessfully litigated the matter 
up to the Privy Council* The impartibility of the estate 
having thus been confirmed, the legislature at Madras step­
ped in to pass the impugned measure which was declaratory 
of the rights of the members of the tarwad to partition the 
es tate.
In other words, the enactment sought to convert, at 
a stroke, an impartible estate into a partible one* Thus 
the customary law, however unfair it might have been, was 
sought to be altered to the detriment of the petitioner who 
held the entire estate. He raised the following conten­
tions :
(a) The Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act* 
1955, the impugned measure, infringed the equality 
guarantee in Article 14.
(b) The Act amounted to an infringement of the peti­
tioner’s right under Article 19(1)(f) to ’hold 
and dispose of property*•
The States of Madras and Kerala argued:
1004. J.D.M. Derrett, op.cit*, 354.
(a) The petitioner*s ’Sthanam* was an ’estate’ within 
the meaning of Article 31-A which authorised 
the State to extinguish or modify rights in such an
’ estate* without having to face the challenges under 
Articles 14, 19, and 31*
(b) In any case, the petitioner could not rely on Article 
19(1 )(f) since he had been legally deprived of his 
title to the properties in the estate. This meant 
that the requirement of Article 31(1) had been satis­
fied. There was nothing more to answer. [Cf. A;K; 
Gopaiarr ]
Taking the first argument of the States, the majority in the 
Supreme Court examined the nature of the ’ estate* referred to 
in Article 31-a . The Article w as inserted by the Cons ti tut inn 
(First Amendment) Act, 1951, and subsequently amended by the 
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, to provide for a 
wider definition of the term ’ estate’ •
Looking at the Objects and Reasons of the Fourth 
Amendment, the majority concluded that the sole concern of 
the Amendment was 1 agrarian reform* . The purpose was to 
regulate the rights inter se of landlords and tenants of
1005. Article 3l-A(2) defined an ’estate’ entirely in terms of 
land tenure. It had no reference to any matters of Hindu 
Joint Family Law. bo clearly the first argument of the 
States was inapplicable.
1006. AIR, 1950, S.C. 27 (1950) S.C.R.88.
agricultural lands. The impugned Act was not one which had 
that as its aim. Therefore, the protection of Article 31-A 
was not available to the impugned Act - a protection which in 
view of its effect on fundamental rights could not be widened 
to include subjects other than ’agrarian reform’.
The second argument of the States was that in Article 
31(1) (”No person shall be deprived of his property save by 
authority of law”), the term ’law* should be given a meaning 
analogous to what was given in a .k . Gopalan, viz., any pro­
perly enacted law.
The majority in the Supreme Court found that there
was no parallel between the provisions that formed the basis
1007of the discussion in A.K. Gopalan and the provisions
the Court was concerned with in the case. deprivation of 
property for other than public purposes affected not merely 
Article 31(1) but also Article 19(1)(f). A law which did 
not acquire or requisition property for a public purpose must 
satisfy the test or reasonable restrictions under Article 
19(5) and ought to be in the interests of the general public. 
When the test under Article 19(5) was applied to the impugned 
enactment, it was found by the majority to be unreasonable 
and not in the interests of the general public.
We cannot say on the materials placed be­
fore us that any public interest will be 
served by depriving a sthanee of his pro­
perties and conferring title in his pro­
perties ... on cftiers. Nor is there any
1007. AIR, 1950, S.C. 27, (1950) S.C.R.88.
evidence that there was a real and genuine 
grievance in this particular section of the 
public belonging to tarwads justifying the 
interference by the State. We cannot on 
the materials placed before us hold that i008 
this reform is in the public interest.
In the view of the majority:
The Act is only a legislative device to 
take the property of one and vest it in~ 
another without compensation, and there­
fore, on its fane stamped with unreason­
ableness. 1009
It may be pointed out that the questions whether the measure 
was necessary, whether the need to reform the customary posi­
tion was desirable, whether there was discontent amongst the 
junior members of the tarwad, were not matters on which the 
judiciary could express an opinion - they were political 
matters. The answer to such a criticism may be that the 
Court, though it expressed an opinion, was willing to hear 
evidence or look at any other material placed before it.
Admittedly, it is extremely difficult to delimit the
extent of the Court’s power to say that a measure is or is
not in the interests of the general public. The safest
course would be for a Court to assume that an enactment is
1010in the interest of the public and concentrate on the
nature of the restriction imposed. But then that may be 
viewed as going against the express words of Article 19(5)
1008. K.K. Kochuni, AIR, i960, S.C.1080, 1104-5.
1009. Ibid., 1104.
1010. See above, Chapter 2, Section 1(b).
which speaks of the restrictions being in the interests of the 
general public. In any case, there is no harm, it seems, in 
asking the Legislature to disclose the precise need for, or 
simply the background to, the restriction imposed. This 
question may not be asked if the restriction did not amount 
to much and could be considered restsonable whatever the degree 
to which it served a public interest.
However, it seems quite possible for the Kochuni Court 
to have left out of consideration the question whether the im­
pugned Act served any public interest. The Court had already 
held the Act an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(5). 
Presumably that will hold whether or not the Act served any 
public interest.
The effect of the decision was to give some life back 
to Article 19(1)(f); no other decision before had done such 
service to that article. Nor did any other decision subse­
quently do so except R.C. Cooper v. Union which now stands 
reversed by the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act,1971. 
The central problem with regard to property rights is the 
question of compensation. This is the sole basis on which 
much of the present criticisms against the Indian Supreme 
Court are directed. it seems inappropriate to let this 
question influence an overall assessment of the notion of 
reasonableness in relation to Article I9(l)(f).
CONCLUSION
P.B. Mukharji, the former Chief Justice of the Calcutta
High Court observed while delivering his Ramanad Lectures that
the Indian Fundamental Rights "were conceived in a ’liberal
1011spirit* but phrased in a ’suspicious spirit’” . He was
contrasting the freedoms in Article 19(1) with the wide ex­
ceptions in the rest of the sub-clauses of that Article that 
appear to overwhelm the freedoms guaranteed. Undoubtedly, 
the one redeeming feature in Article 19 is the requirement of 
reasonablenes s .
It is thus evident that the only thing funda­
mental about Article 19 is the word ’reason­
able’ which empowers the courts to review to 
a limited extent legislation restricting the 
freedoms. It is rather sad to reflect that 
in the original draft, this word did not find 
a place - 1012
so observed recently one of the few surviving members of the
Indian Constituent Assembly, which finished its work nearly
twenty-five years ago. Thus, the credit goes to the member
from Punjab, Thakurdas Bhargava who insisted on the inclusion
of the term * reasonable’ in the sub-clauses of Article 19.
The leaders xn the Constituent Assembly, most of whom became
members of the first independent government of India, were,
perhaps, apprehensive of judicial review preoccupied as they
were with nervous expectations of their new responsibilities.
Though they had some experience with judicial review for a
«
1011. Civil Liberties, Bombay, 1968, 31.
1012. K. Santhanam, Fundamental Rights, Bharatiya vidya Bhavan, 
Bombay, 1970, 24.
short period under the Government of India Act» 1935, they 
only contemplated the 1 inconvenient• aspects of judicial re­
view.
From the account of the proceedings in the Assembly, 
the following points emerge! (a) The framers started with 
an inadequate notion of the role of judicial review in written 
constitutions; (b) Their prejudices *013 against judicial re­
view were based on a static view of the*due process* clause 
and how the united states supreme Court interpreted *due pro­
cess* at a particular point of time in the long United States 
Constitutional history. It is rather sad to see Indian 
Courts and lawyers still talking about *due process* in 
terms that would not be recognized by an American lawyer to­
day. Given the slightest opportunity, Indian lawyers dart 
back to the * New Deal* controversy and Roosevelt*s ’court- 
packing plans* as if that is the only lesson to be learnt 
from United States Constitutional experience. No doubt it 
is to be borne in mind, but judicial review cannot be viewed 
from the standpoint of how it might be ’abused*. No power 
of whatever kind could be viewed solely from the angle of its 
possible abuse; (c) Entertaining such views as the experts 
and the leaders in the Assembly -did, they failed to adequately 
provide for the protection of ’social welfare* legislation 
they were so anxious to see enacted.
1013. Pandit Nehru’s remarks on the role of the Courts sound as 
though he regarded judicial review as an interfering old 
aunt. See above, 33, note, (,(,, for more details of Nehru’s 
views. See M. Markandan, ’Are amendments to Part III of 
the Constitution necessary to achieve Socialism?* (1969) 
ix/3f The Indian Advocate, 22-45.
These attitudes c£ the experts and leaders of the Con­
stituent assembly produced, predictably, a nervous response 
from the judiciary in the early days of the Constitution.
Thus whatever the merits of A.K; Gopalan may not have been, 
the fact remains that the Indian Supreme Court assigned it­
self very limited judicial review in relation to Article 19.
In Madras v. V.G. Row» Patanjali Sastri C.J. almost ’apolo­
gised* for the exercise of judicial review in relation to 
Article 19.1014
By a comparison with American ’due process* and by 
reference to the legislative history of Articles 19 and 21, 
courts and lawyers m  India convinced themselves that there 
was not ’full* judicial review in inaia but only a ’limited* 
one. The Courts came under immediate criticism if ever they 
attempted anything novel, i.e. if they departed from the 
English legal tradition of aloofness and apparent unconcern 
with the basic issues in a case. Thus Subba Rao C.J.’s 
enunciation of the principle of ’prospective overruling* was 
criticised as a dangerous American idea. But the recent 
trend has been to criticise the Courts for still adhering 
to the English style of review with the premium put on
1014. ”If, then, the Courts in this country face up to such im­
portant and none too easy task, it is not out of any de­
sire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader’s 
spirit but in discharge of a duty plainly laid upon them 
by the Constitution.
... ... ..• ••. . •. .•• ••»
We have ventured on these obvious remarks because it 
appears to have been suggested in some quarters that 
the Courts in the new set-up are out to seek clashes 
with the legislatures in the country.”
Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR, S.C.19b, 199, col.2.
textual analytical • legalism1 #^ °^4a
This shift in the emphasis by the critics or the 
Courts in India does not mean they would tolerate judicial 
innovation in the future* It is clear that none of these 
notions that have infested the birth of judicial review in 
India has helped its natural growth* The whole idea of 
less-than-full judicial review is meaningless* Either there 
is or there is not judicial review* There could not be any 
in-between positions* The following comment^by a perceptive 
Indian scholar and judge is very appropriate:
The springs of interpretative law themselves 
lie deep, and as the development of Consti­
tution Law has shown, the rigorous exclusion 
of ’ultimate referents* by Courts, circum­
scribed in their task of interpretation by 
the Constitution and the specific import of 
words, is not permanently successful*
Either the interpretation broadens, or 
changes in the law invest the Courts again 
with the flexible power of declaring and 
protecting substantive rights. 1015
The entire area of preventive detention illustrates 
the inhibitions felt by the Indian Courts in relation to judi­
cial review* Indeed, the section of this thesis on preven­
tive detention and free speech shows that the Courts did
1014a.A.R. Biackshield, *11 Fundamental Rights11 and the Institu­
tional Viability of the Indian Supreme Court* , (19e>6) 8 
J.I.L.I., 139-217. *»The Indian Supreme Court, like Courts 
in other common law countries at other periods, went 
through a phrase early in its career when it might have 
been accused of the self-deception of legalism*11 Ibid** 
163.
1015* M. Anantanarayanan, * some Reflections on the *i>ue Process* 
Clause ana our Constitution* , (1956) 1/2 Lawyer, 24, 27,
render justice in most cases where the element of free speech
showed itself but they did so without altering the doctrinal
basis of exclusion of Article 19 in cases of preventive detn- 
101btion. Another illustration of Indian Courts1 inadequate
A*
use and development of the notion of reasonableness is the 
area of freedom of profession and trade. It has been too 
easily assumed, and that assumption too frequently employed, 
that economic issues were not for the Courts to consider.
It is indeed a salutary principle (fortified by the United 
States experience) that Courts should be slow to interfere 
in economic matters which are often indistinguishable from 
policy. But one should also bear in mind that judicial re­
view on the basis of a fundamental freedom is entitled to 
take a stand in the middle and expect other factors to adjust 
themselves to the constitutional requirements. Clearly too 
dogmatic a stand without a comprehension of the responsibi­
lities of the Legislature and Executive will be unwise.
This takes us to the point about judicial deference 
to legislative wishes and policies. The need for such judi­
cial deference is clear and it is often expressed through 
such ideas as the doctrine of ’margin of appreciation1 and 
’presumption of constitutionality’ of enactments. The best
means of ensuring judicial deference, or better still, judi-
to
cial understanding in relation/an impugned statute is to give
the Court as much information as possible about the nature and
scope of that statute. We noticed that this was lacking in
1017many cases, especially those arriving under Article 14.
1016. See above,
1017. Above, 171 -f-f*
In order that a discriminatory classification may be reason­
able, a good justification in terms of public interest must 
be shown* Indian courts have too often accepted slender
1018proof of the existence of public interest* Many judgments 
of the Supreme Court seem rather barren because the reader 
is unable to gather the element of public interest j’ustifying 
the law* It is clear that Courts must be prepared to ask 
for details and the State must be willing to offer such de­
tails in support of a statute’s reasonableness* Many 
reasons for impostmg restrictions on freedoms may sound 
adequate in paper, but the whole point is the State should 
be able to substantiate these with facts and information*
More on this a little further below* But relevant here to
the need to get the Courts to appreciate legislative wishes
1018ais the actual drafting of the statutes* The importance
of drafting for the issue of reasonableness cannot be exagger­
ated. The process of interpretation and the determination of 
reasonableness can be largely determined by realistic framing 
of laws* Judicial review, after all, is only one stage in a 
chain of events. It may be a decisive one but is not totally 
unpredictable.
It often strikes an observer that the Executive in 
India is inept in framing subordinate rules and regulations, 
even though they have many detailed and sympathetic j*udgments 
to guide them.
1018. Such as in Board of Trustees v* Delhi, AIK, 1962, S*C. 458,
(1962) Supp• 1, S.C.R .156•
1018a.”I strongly believe that if laws and statutory rules and 
orders are carefully drafted, litigation will lessen.”
Chief Justice S*M. Sikri (Supreme Court) (1971), 3/4 Lawyer
66, 67.
a recent instance will show how the problem looks 
from the angle of the High Court* in Jolly v. State of 
K e r a l a , ^01y Subramonian Poti J*, comments on a rule framed 
by Government which restricted admission to part-time LL*B* 
classes in all Government Law Colleges of the State to * em­
ployed persons on a regular full-time basis in the central 
and state government departments, quasi-governmental bodies 
including public corporations and government-owned companies.’ 
The learned judge found this violated the fundamental right 
of otherwise qualified applicants at large to equality guaran­
teed under Article 14 and quashed it. In so doing he observed:
It is very difficult to conceive of a rational 
policy behind the impugned Government order.
It is highly doubtful whether the Government 
seriously took note of the consequences of 
exclusion resulting from the implementation 
of its order. It suggests to me from a 
perusal of the file that in an attempt to 
lay down some rule or criteria, suggestions 
made by the then Principal of the Law 
College the second respondent, to the
Government were accepted as such without 
seriously considering the consequences that 
would result from the course adopted. There 
has not been a serious attempt to justify the 
classification ... 1020
Now in framing statutes and statutory rules and orders 
the State must have guidance from expert counsel. These, in 
turn, must have available to them doctrinal material based 
upon the Supreme Court’s judgments. It is in the light of 
these observations that the following criticism must be 
looked at. since the primary responsibility of implement­
ing the Directive Principles lies with the Legislature and
1019. 1974, IC.L.T.95.
j
1020. Ibid.. 101, para.15.
Executive it is for them to frame appropriate laws giving 
effect to those principles.
The criticism that the notion of reasonableness has
not adequately taken into consideration the Directive Prin-
1021ciples of State Policy in such decisions as the Privy
Purses case ^022 or Bank Nationalisation case may be
supported by rather general arguments. One may point out 
that the Directives have not been used in a creative manner 
by Indian Courts. That the Supreme court assigned a second- 
ary position to the Directives and gave primacy to the funda­
mental rights is in accordance with the Constitution. Too 
often the very general nature of the Directives is the impedi­
ment which prevents their inclusion in the list of factors 
relevant to the determination of reasonableness.
It is not the intention of the writer to deny that 
directive principles are part of the rules of the Constitu­
tion. Their non-enforceability does indeed pose a problem 
and only recently has a simple workable suggestion emerged 
to overcome the difficulty. The suggestion in the words of 
the author is:
The plain, ordinary meaning of the words 
’shall not be enforceable by any court’, 
does not preclude recourse to a court for 
a declaratory judgment. All that a court 
of law is restrained from doing is the en­
forcement of Directive Principles. In a 
declaratory judgment there is no enforce­
ment contemplated. 1023a
1021 Above, I 3^ -ff .
1022.AIK, 1971, S.C #530 above, Moiflkxv Rtxc S<Liodi<x.
1023.AIK, 1970, S.C.534 above, 3 % ^
1023a. Joseph Minattur, "The Unenforceable Directives", K.L.T., 
1973, Journal Section. 104-109, 106.
He suggests that the executive authorities in India will 
respect declaratory judgments and he points out that such 
judgments are not unknown to law. The merit of the suggest­
ion lies in the fact that,
a) The Constitution speaks of non-enforceability and not 
non-justiciability;
b) It is always open to a Court to resort to declaratory 
judgments #^ 23b
The one possible objection to the Suggestion may well 
be that it still does not solve the question of judiciary tak­
ing the Directive Principles into consideration while inter­
preting the fundamental rights and in determining reasonable­
ness of restrictions. We may look at some more propositions 
put forward by other writers.
One of the arguments put forward by protagonists of 
Directive Principles in judicial interpretation is that the 
determination of reasonableness is not ideologically ’neutral’ 
but should follow the values determined by the Directives.
The fundamental assumption of the Constitu­
tion undoubtedly is that the organisation of 
society as it obtained in India at the time 
of Constitution-making was productive of in­
justice of many kinds to many people and 
accordingly the State is required to strive 
to promote a new social order in which 
justice, social-economic and political shall *q2 4 
inform all the institutions of national life.
Many writers have emphasised the increased State interference
1023b. The author refers to Lord Atkin£ in Simmonds v. Newport 
Abercorn Black Vein Co., "The Court Has power to make a 
declaration whenever it is just and convenient.” (1921) 
1 K.B. 616, 630.
1024. Narayana Netta*; ’Fundamental Kights and Directive Prin­
ciples’ , (1969) 9/4, The Indian Advocate. 24-31, 24.
in almost all areas of national life* Determination of 
reasonableness in their view should acknowledge this fact*
From this it is argued that ’reasonable restriction’ of 
trade, for example, is more than ’ reasonable regulation’ 
of it* The State can do more than that in the interests 
of the general public* Public interest, and that alone, is 
conclusive of the question of reasonableness.*025 Another 
writer has stated that ’reasonable’ restriction is not neces­
sarily what * conmon-sense’ dictates* Reasonableness and 
’common-sense’ are not identical according to this view* 
"Common-sense’ in such cases often becomes another name for 
unconscious prejudices.”
This takes us to the question what meaning or mean­
ings the term * reasonable* appears to bear in the Indian 
C ozas ti tut ion, especially under Article 19.
1027In the early case of Chintamanrao v. Madhya Pradesh 
reasonable was identified with the ’course reason dictates* • 
Restrictions that are excessive or arbitrary in relation to 
what was aimed at by the law, it was held, would be unreason­
able. In a number of decisions the arbitrary nature of the 
restriction imposed was characterised as the element of un- 
reasonableness #^028
1025. V.B. Awasthi, ”»Restriction’ on right to freedom of trade 
in ’public interest’” (1971) 3/1, Lawyer, 17-21.
1026. V.R. Bhat, *a  plea for an Integrated study of Social 
Sciences and Law, a Scheme’ (1963) VIII/3 & 4, Lawyer, 
139-144, 141, col.l.
1027. AIR, 1951, S.C.118, above, .
1028. The classic case being Madras v. V.G. Row. AIR, 1952, S.C. 
196. Many subsequent decisions have followed it. a  re­
cent example is Himat Lai v. Commissioner, a i r , 1973, S.C.
87.
442.
1029Both in saghir Ahmed v. Uttar Pradesh and Mohd.
103b 'Hanif Quaraishi v. Bihar inconvenience caused to a large
number of citizens was referred to as the element of unreason­
ableness. It seems by and large,Indian judges have follow­
ed the English Law notion of a * reasonable man’ in respect of 
1031Article 19. They have looked for a balance between ’free­
dom’ and ’social oontrol’• They have thus accepted that there 
is no absoluteness about any of the guarantees but that they 
are subject to restrictions in the interests of the public.
They see ’reasonableness’ as representing a balancing actjof 
which they are in charge. It is a yardstick with which they 
measure both the extent of the individual’s freedom of action 
ana the public interest or public policy served by legislative 
restriction.
A most interesting point here is, of course, the 
’conviction’ with which the judges perceive these two factors. 
Judicial value judgment can vary according to the degree to 
which they either lack conviction (in the light of material 
presented to them) or have conviction in regard to the type 
of legislative restrictions challenged before them. What 
is reasonable and what is not is greatly influenced by judi­
cial credibility and imagination. The judiciary cannot be 
hurried along this path. They have to be presented with
1029. AIK, 1954, S.C.728, above,
1030. AIK, 1958, S.C.731, above,
1031. Surendra Kumar Agarwala, ’Standard of "Reasonableness” in 
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution’ , (1955) XVII, The 
Supreme Court Journal (Jj, 151-162.
persuasive arguments and relevant material in support before
they can be convinced. Here one is entitled to assume that
the judges themselves are reasonable and responsible men.
In India, it is submitted, there are more reasonable judges
than reasonable administrators or even politicians - such is
1032the view of this writer.
Admittedly, the whole question of how successfully 
the judiciary can act as supplementary to, or co-adjutive of, 
the legislature in political decision-making and decision- 
enforcement cannot possibly be solved until the judicial role 
is better worked out.
This thesis has shown that many judgments of the 
Supreme Court and of High Courts in India appear to be ad hoc 
decisions on matters of importance to India’s policy. The 
question of what amounts to a reasonable restriction need 
not be that subjective.
The present view that Courts while deciding the quest­
ion of reasonableness, seek to strike a balance between the 
freedoms guaranteed and social control is adequate and funda-
1032. The following observations, albeit indirectly, support 
this view:
[Youth] also sees the unedifying manner in which 
these very persons - legislators and political execu­
tives, politicians in brief, periodically attempt to 
ride roughshod over the restraints imposed on them by 
the Constitution and the judgments of the Supreme Court. 
It has instilled in fouth a growing belief that nothing 
is sacrosanct m  this country; no pledge, undertaking 
or promise - written or unwritten - is binding, if it 
comes in the way of one’s own desires, or stands in the 
way of one’s exercise of power in the way one wants it 
at a particular time for obtaining something for oneself. 
Badr-ud-dm Xyabji, The Self in Secularism, New Delhi,
1971, 179-180.
mentally sound. There does not appear to be a compelling 
need to urge the Courts to alter this view of their inter­
pretative role.
This writer has two other serious matters in mind.
A more thorough approach to the determination of reasonable­
ness will entail a deeper inquiry by the Courts into the social 
and economic background to the statutes challenged before them 
and an equally sustained inquiry into the consequences the 
statutes operate. This clearly means more time spent on 
cases and a greater need for assistance from the bar. On 
both these counts, Indian Courts at present are so badly off 
that one cannot help admiring them for producing such judg­
ments as they do manage.
The last Chief justice of India, Sri S.M. Sikri, prac­
tically carried on a crusade in publicising the extent of pres­
sure of work in the Supreme Court. If there is proof needed 
that in India there has been an increase in State activity, 
one only has to look at the number of suits in which the 
Governments are involved. Both the High Courts and Supreme 
Court are extremely busy with litigation pertaining to funda­
mental rights. Appeals lie to the Supreme Court in civil, 
criminal and constitutional matters. The Supreme Court 
also adjudicates election disputes, taxation suits and suits 
by Government employees alleging discriminatory treatment or 
some other irregularity. There are other problems the Courts 
have to cope with. In the words of Chief Justice Sikri:
The legislatures in India,apart from enact­
ing fresh legislation, are for ever amending 
existing legislation, especially tax legis­
lation. une reason for the necessity to 
amend laws is that a Minister responsible 
for a legislative measure sometimes accepts 
amendments on the floor of the legislature 
without^all its implications. 1033
The consequence of all this in the words of the Chief Justice 
himself:
I have not been a Judge of a High Court but 
I can say that Judges of the Supreme Court 
work extremely hard. We do not dictate 
Judgments in Court. Almost every Judgment 
is reserved and dictated at home. Most 
Judgments are dictated on Saturdays and 
Sundays•
• • • ... ... ... ...
on an average, X should say, a Supreme 
Court Judge works 60 to 70 hours a week, 
some work even harder than that. 1034
The other handicap the Supreme Court, and indeed, 
the High Courts suffer is lack of adequate assistance of the 
kind that will enable them to undertake a more thorough in­
quiry into such questions as the reasonableness of restrict­
ions.
In the same context, the Chief Justice of India re­
ferred to this second factor also, deferring to senior 
lawyers who undertake too many briefs at a given time, the 
Chief Justice says:
Again, with respect, I say this is not 
fair to the client. He has a right to 
expect, not only the benefit of pure 
advocacy based on a solid foundation 
of research. I remember when 1 used
1033. Sri S.M. Sikri, ’Inaugural Address:'Punjab & Haryana Bar 
Conference, 1971* (1971) 3/4, Lawyer, 66, 67.
1034. Ibid., 67.
to work in the chambers of the late Mrv 
jagan Nath Aggarwal, ... we used to re­
ceive from solicitors in London detailed - 
inquiries about points arising in the ap­
peals pending before the Privy Council.
These showed that preparation was going 
on well in advance of the hearing. Un­
fortunately, in most cases nothing like 
this happens in the Supreme Court. The 
result is sometimes even relevant Supreme 
Court Judgments are not brought to our 
attention. This tends to waste time both 
of the Counsel and the Court. 1035
It will be extremely sad to let the Supreme Court 
smother under weight of work in this fashion. It is even 
more sad when one realises that Judicial review in any mean­
ingful form exists only in India amongst the countries of
Asia, the others either deliberately not choosing Judicial
1036review or experiencing military governments.
It is hoped that this thesis has highlighted at 
least some of the problems arising under the provisions 
of the Indian Constitution without aiming to achieve more 
than the wholly transitional state of the subject permits.
1035o Ibid., 68.
1036. T.K.K. Iyer, 1 A Comparative N6te on the Scope of Judi­
cial Review'in India, Pakistan, Malaysia and CeylonT, 
(1973), 5/2, Lawyer, 21-28. Also,
’Constitutional Law in Pakistan; Kelsen in the 
Courts', (1973)» 21/4, The_American Journal 
of Comparative Law , 759-771.
APPENDIX I
THE CCNSTITUTIQN (TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT) ACT. 1971
An Act farther to amend the Constitution of India.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-second Year 
of the Republic of India as follows:-
1. Short title.
This Act may be called THE CONSTITUTION (TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT ACT), 1971.
2. Amendment of article 31.
In article 31 of the Constitution -
(a) for clause (2), the following clause shall be 
substituted, namely:-
n (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or 
requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority 
of a law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of 
the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or 
which may be determined in accordance with such principles 
and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; 
and no such law shall be called in question in any court on 
the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not ade­
quate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be 
given otherwise than in cash:
Provided that in making any law providing for the 
compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational 
institution established and administered by a minority, 
referred to in clause (1) of article 30, the State shall 
ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such
law for the acquisition of such property is such as would 
not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that 
clause” ;
(b) after clause (2A), the following clausd shall 
be inserted, namely:-
**(2B) Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of 
article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in 
clause (2)n»
3. Insertion of new article 31C.
After article 31B of the Constitution, the following 
article shall be inserted, namely:-
saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles
”310• Notwithstanding anything contained in article 
13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards 
securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) 
of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of 
the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31; 
and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving 
effect to such policy shall be called in question in any 
court on the ground that it does not give effect to such 
policy:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legis­
lature of a state the provisions of this article shall not 
apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the 







12* Definition. - In this Part, unless the context other­
wise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parlia­
ment of India and the Government and the Legislature of each 
of the States and all local or other authorities within the 
territory of India or under the control of the Government of 
India.
13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the funda­
mental rights. - (1) All laws in force in the territory of 
India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, 
in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away 
or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made 
in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the 
contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise 
requires, -
(a) "law**includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law,
rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage 
having in the territory of India the force of 
law;
(b) "laws in force14 includes laws passed or made 
by a Legislature or other competent authority 
in the territory of India before the commence­
ment of this Constitution and not previously 
repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or 
any part thereof may not be then in operation 
either at all or in particular areas:
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amend­
ment of this Constitution made under article 368.
Right to Equality
14. Equality before law. - The State shall not deny 
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection 
of the laws within the territory of India.
15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of reli­
gion. race, caste, sex or place of birth. - (1) The State 
shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject 
to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with 
regard to -
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and 
places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads 
and places of public resort maintained wholly 
or partly out of State funds or dedicated to 
the use of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State 
from making any special provision for women and children*
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of 
article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and education­
ally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled castes 
and the scheduled Tribes*
16. Equality of Opportunity in matters of public 
employment. - (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for 
all citizens in matters relating to employment or appoint­
ment to any officer under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any 
of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in re­
spect of, any employment or office under the State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament 
from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or 
classes of employment or appointment to an office under the 
Government of, or any local or other authority within, a 
State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence 
within that State or Union territory prior to such employ­
ment or appointment.
(4) Nothing in t^ iis article shall prevent the State 
from making any provision for the reservation of appointments 
or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, 
in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented 
in the services under the State.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the opera­
tion of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office 
in connection with the affairs of any religious or denomina­
tional institution or any member of the governing body there­
of shall be a person professing a particular religion or be­
longing to a particular denomination.
17. Abolition of Untouchability ♦ - "Untouchability" 
is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden, zhe 
enforcement of any disability arising out of "Untouchability" 
shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
18. Abolition of titles. - (1) No title, not being a 
military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the 
State.
(2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from 
any foreign State.
(3) No person who is not a citizen of India shall, 
while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State, 
accept without the consent of the President any title from 
any foreign State.
(4) No person holding any office of profit or trust 
under the State shall, without the consent of the President, 
accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from or 
under any foreign State.
Right to Freedom
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of 
speech, etc. - 11) All citizens shall have the right -
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory 
of India;
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall 
affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the 
State from making any law, inso far as such law isposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right confer­
red by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty 
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly 
relations with foreign States, public order, decency or moral­
ity, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incite­
ment to an offence.
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall 
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it im­
poses, or prevent the State from making any law imposing in 
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or 
public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the 
right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause 
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as
it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, 
in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or 
public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exer­
cise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the 
said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law 
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making 
any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise 
of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses 
either in the interests of the general public or for the 
protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause 
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far 
as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of the general public, reason­
able restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred 
by the said sub-clause, ana, in particular, nothing in the 
said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing 
law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from 
making any law relating to, -
(i) the professional or technical qualifications 
necessary for practising any profession or 
carrying on any occupation, trade or business, 
or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corpor­
ation owned or controlled by the State, of any 
trade, business, industry or service, whether 
to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citi­
zens or otherwise.
21. Protection of life and personal liberty. - No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.
22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain 
cases. - (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in 
custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the 
grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to 
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his 
choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in 
custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate with­
in a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to 
the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be de­
tained in custody beyond the said period without the autho­
rity of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply -
(a) to any person who for the time being is an 
enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under 
any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall 
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than 
three months unless -
(a) An Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, 
or have been or are qualified to be appointed as 
Judges of a High Court has reported before the 
expiration of the said period of three months
that there is in its opinion sufficient cause 
for such detention;
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause 
shall authorise the detention of any person 
beyond the maximum period prescribed by any 
law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) 
of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the 
provisions of any law made by Parliament under 
;sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an 
order made under any law providing for preventive detention, 
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, 
communicate to such person the grounds on which the order 
has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity
of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority 
making any such order as is referred to in that clause to 
disclose facts which such authority considers to be against 
the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe -
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or 
classes of cases in which, a person may be de­
tained for a period longer than three months
under any law providing for preventive detention 
without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board 
in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause
(a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in 
any class or classes of cases be detained under 
any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board 
in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).
PART XIII
TRADE. COMMERCE AN0 INTERCOURSE WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF
INDIA
301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. - 
Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce 
and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be 
free.
302. Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on 
trade, commerce and intercourse. - Parliament may by law im­
poses such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or 
intercourse between one State and another or within any part 
of the territory of India as may be required in the public 
interest.
303. Restrictions on the legislative powers of the 
Union and of the States with regard to trade and commerce. -
(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 302, neither Parlia­
ment nor the Legislature of a State shall have power to make 
any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference 
to one State over another, or making, or authorising the mak­
ing of, any discrimination between one State and another, by 
virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of
the Lists in the Seventh Schedule.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent Parliament 
from making any law giving, or authorising the giving of, 
any preference or making, or authorising the making of, any 
discrimination if it is declared by such law that it is 
necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situa­
tion arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the terri­
tory of India.
304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse 
among States. - Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or 
article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law -
(a) impose on goods imported from other States or 
the Union territories any tax to which similar 
goods manufactured or produced in that State are 
subject, so, however, as not to discriminat be­
tween goods so imported and goods so manufactured 
or produced; and
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the free­
dom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or 
within that State as may be required in the public 
interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of clause
(b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State 
without the previous sanction of the President.
305. Saving of existing laws and laws providing for 
State monopolies. - Nothing in articles 301 and 303 shall 
affect the provisions of any existing law except in so far 
as the President may by order otherwise direct; and nothing
in article 301 shall affect the operation of any law made 
before the commencement of the Constitution (Fourth Amend­
ment) Act, 1955, in so far as it relates to, or prevent 
Parliament or the Legislature of a State from making any 
law relating to, any such matter as is referred to in sub- 
alause (ii) of clause (6) of article 19.
306. [Power of certain States in Part B of the First 
schedule to impose restrictions on trade and commerce.] Rep. 
by the Constitution (seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s.29 and 
Sch.
307. Appointment of authority for carrying out the 
purposes of articles 301 to 304. - Parliament may by law 
appoint such authority as it considers appropriate for 
carrying out the purposes of articles 301, 302, 303 ana 
304, and confer on the authority so appointed such powers 
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